

"NOT TO ANNUL THE LAW RATHER TO FULLFILL
THE LAW AND THE PROPHETS:"

An Exegetical Study of Jesus and the Law
in Matthew with Emphasis on 5:17-48

Dissertation

zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde
der Evangelisch-Theologischen Fakultät
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vorgelegt von

Robert A. Guelich
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To my parents on
their 30th Anniversary

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I. INTRODUCTION

§1. Introduction to the Problem

From the latter half of the nineteenth century and into the earlier segment of this century the topic of Jesus and the Law was probably the most discussed aspect of Jesus' ministry.¹ Here scholars sought the similarity and the differentiation between Jesus and his environment. By stripping away both the supernatural and the apocalyptical elements Liberalism, in search for the "historical Jesus," succeeded in discovering the supreme moral teacher and the ideal moral example.

With the eclipse of Liberalism and her use of the historical critical methodology by the more recent kerygmatic theology combined with the study of comparative religions and form criticism, the pendulum swung to the opposite direction. Abandoning the attempt to discover the "historical Jesus," the recent literature has been concerned with the eschatological implications of the Kingdom of God and the radical demand of the will of God which confronts man in the Church's proclamation of the Word.² The supernatural and apocalyptical characteristics, which were formerly discarded, have now become most important in one's attempt to peel away the husk to reach the kernel of the proclamation. In contrast, the formerly "historical" elements are approached with either such disdain or futility that the very topic "Jesus and the Law" smacks so of imprecise language that one must either qualify it³ or consider it in terms of the theology of an evangelist or an apostle.

¹Cf. H.J. Holtzmann, Lehrbuch der Neutestamentlichen Theologie (21911), I, 182, "Der hier maßgebende Anschauungspunkt hat aber sein Zentrum weder im Begriffe Gottes, noch in dem Begriffe seines Reiches, sondern ganz und gar in demjenigen des Gesetzes. Das gesetzliche Judentum bietet den positiven wie negativen Anknüpfungspunkt der Predigt Jesu."

²Cf. R. Bultmann, Theologie des Neuen Testaments (41961), I, 3-21.

³Cf. W. D. Davies, "Law in the New Testament," I.D.B. (1962), III, 96.

As in the case of most extremes, however, it is not merely a question of either/or but rather of both/and. As Goppelt has put it: "Jesu Wirken ist durchweg auf zwei Pole bezogen, auf den bisherigen Gottesbund Israels unter dem Gesetz und auf das kommende Reich."¹ Neither emphasis can correctly be understood apart from the other. That this is true is substantiated by the presence of both in every stratum of the Synoptic tradition. Therefore, to concentrate on the one at the expense of the other is not only impossible to justify from the sources but also can only serve to jeopardize one's understanding of Jesus' ministry. For this reason the purpose of this exegetical study of the problem in Matthew is not merely to ascertain just what meaning the term "Law" had for Matthew and to explicate his understanding of Jesus' relationship to it but also to demonstrate how this relationship displayed itself in Jesus' total ministry.

Why then, it may be asked, is this thesis limited to the topic of Jesus and the Law in Matthew? First of all, practically speaking, to examine the nature and range of the issue throughout the Synoptic tradition would demand far more than the scope of this thesis could allow. As Bultmann has noted one must work backward through three layers: the evangelists' redaction, the influence of the early congregation, and then the older tradition.² Consequently, the first of these has been singled out. Secondly, there can be little doubt but that Matthew is the one evangelist who has struggled the most with the problem. This is evident not only within Matthew itself (esp. chapters 5-7) but also in the extended role which Matthew has played in the various discussions of the problem.

¹L. Goppelt, Christentum und Judentum im ersten und zweiten Jahrhundert (1954), p. 33.

²Bultmann, op. cit., p. 2.

§2. Some Solutions to the Problem

A detailed history of criticism would involve a vast body of literature reflecting the various nuances in interpretation and methodology. Since, however, there have been numerous studies on Matthew of late and since our major concern in the work ahead is to reconsider the specific problem of Jesus and the Law in Matthew with particular view to these more recent works, the following analysis has been limited to a few examples of the classic works with primary emphasis on the later treatments. The approaches to Matthew's understanding of Jesus' relationship to the Law have been quite varied. Nevertheless, generally speaking three basic interpretations have emerged: Jesus as the "exponent" of the Law; Jesus as the "giver" of a nova lex (or "Messianic Torah"); and Jesus as the "interpreter" of the Law. As will be seen below, these divisions are not absolute; rather they merely reflect the relative emphases of the various writers.

A. Jesus as the Exponent of the Law

The first approach to the question of Jesus and the Law in Matthew reflects to a certain extent the continuity between the Law and Jesus' ministry and teaching. The controversy over issues in the Law which did arise during his ministry was more the product of differing emphases in relation to the Law than in a new concept of the Law itself. Resulting from both his ministry among the Am-ha'-ares and from his desire to "fulfill" the Law, Jesus proclaimed a deeper understanding of the Law which was to be centered in the "heart" of the individual rather than in legalistic observances determined by traditional and ceremonial regulations. In other words, he had come to fulfill the Law by affirming it and by clarifying the principles which lay behind it.

This was the position often taken by Liberalism at the turn of this century. A prime example is the work of H. J. Holtzmann, Lehrbuch der Neuentestamentlichen Theologie¹ which follows the historical critical methodology stemming from F. C. Baur and the "Tübingen School." Holtzmann described the ministry of Jesus as the "religion of the littleman," a "Gospel to the poor and to the sinner," in contrast to the religion of the Pharisees in their separation from the Am-ha'-ares.² It was in the very nature of this ministry itself that the seeds of conflict took root and sprouted, since the character of this mission forced Jesus to deny the formal principle of Pharisaism (tradition) and to proclaim a prophetic rather than legalistic understanding of the Law.

This ministry, however, tended to have a paradoxical aspect. Although the Mosaic Law remained the "purest expression of morality," its outer form was disregarded and even transcended from time to time.³ This is not only reflected in the tradition of Jesus' ministry⁴ but also is apparent in the twofold division within the early Church (Paul and Jerusalem).⁵ According to Holtzmann, Matthew himself has incorporated both segments in 5:17-20, either in his lack of awareness of the contradiction or in a conscious effort to serve the two divisions within Jewish Christianity (Diaspora and Palestinian).⁶

W. C. Allen, in one of the standard English commentaries on Matthew, begins his discussion of Jesus' relation to the Law with an attempt to explain the apparent

¹Holtzmann, op. cit.

²Ibid., I, 189.

³Ibid., I, 207.

⁴Ibid., I, 204f.

⁵Ibid., I, 208f.

⁶Ibid., I, 504ff.

disparity between 5:17-20 and 5:21-48.¹ According to Allen, the former section was so constructed to represent Christ "...as speaking in the spirit of Alexandrine and rabbinical Judaism," whereas vss. 21-48 were "...clearly intended to explain and illustrate the way in which Christ fulfilled the Law."²

To resolve this problem Allen places 5:17 and 20 together as being inherent to the context and as representing, more or less, the intent of Jesus within the Sermon.³ He then explains 5:18, 19 to be an addition to the context by which the "editor" deliberately changed the meaning of $\pi\lambda\eta\rho\omega\varsigma$ to reflect a sense foreign to the Sermon (viz. "to reaffirm and to carry out in detail" in contrast to the actual meaning "to bring into clear light the true scope and meaning").⁴

From this exposition of 5:17-20 it is possible to understand both how Allen perceived the actual relationship between Jesus and the Law (as seen in the Sermon, as such) and how he considered the "editor" to have reinterpreted this. The "editor" placed Jesus in the role of simply reaffirming the authority of the Law of Moses, whereas Jesus was really the fulfiller of the Law by bringing to light the principles which underlie it.⁵

¹W. C. Allen, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to St. Matthew (1912).

²Ibid., p. 45.

³Ibid., p. 46.

⁴Ibid., pp. 45f.

⁵Ibid., p. 46. Cf. A. H. McNeile, The Gospel According to St. Matthew (1915). He represents practically the same approach as Allen. Although 5:18, 19 are considered to be out of context, McNeile does not go to the lengths of Allen in explaining them. Consequently, whereas Allen gives both the attitude of the "editor" and of Jesus to the Law, McNeile handles only the latter. Jesus is represented as the "fulfiller" of the Law in that "...He came to fill the Law, to reveal the full depth of meaning that it was intended to hold" (p. 58). Jesus demanded a "legal righteousness" which consisted

Although both of the above are older works, one of the most recent American commentators on Matthew, F. Filson,¹ appears to be quite similar at times to this position. According to Filson, Jesus came with a deep appreciation for the Law, both as a divine revelation and as an authority. His desire was not to "...fight that revelation but to affirm it, clarify it, and give it fuller expression."² Matthew 5:18, therefore, could perhaps be best understood as a more figurative "...emphatic expression of Jesus' deep loyalty to his heritage."³

To be sure, Matthew does record a critical attitude which Jesus was forced to take in reference to some of the Law's demands, but this, according to Filson, was a result of putting first things first in his own ministry. Such an ambivalent attitude originated from his deep respect for the Law, his penetrating insight into its "spiritual objective," and his desire to express this objective more completely in life.⁴ The Antitheses are the result of this desire to "...give the fullest expression to the divine intent in the ancient utterances."⁵ They are "...examples to show how Jesus both preserved and fulfilled the Law."⁶

of good works which "...without annulling it (the Law) they are to transcend it by giving expression to the deepest principles involved in love to God and to man" (p. 57).

¹F. Filson, The Gospel According to St. Matthew (1960).

²Ibid., p. 30.

³Ibid., p. 83.

⁴Ibid., p. 31.

⁵Ibid., p. 83.

⁶Ibid., p. 84. At the same time, Filson notes that the Law was not the center of Jesus' teaching and that his own teaching carried a "pre-eminence" to the Law as well as an independent authority. It was his own person

Moving from an entirely different context than those above, the Catholic New Testament scholar, W. Trilling has taken the thesis in his recent work, Das Wahre Israel, that the Church is for Matthew the true Israel and the rule of God is now seen as the rule of Christ.¹ Consequently, the calling and task of "true Israel" is considered to be the fulfilling of the will of God.² The latter is particularly evident in that the content of Jesus' teaching is his commandments, not merely as moral law but, as originally in the Old Testament, in reference to the total conduct of one's life.³

What then was Jesus' relation to the Law and to the Old Testament? This is brought out by Trilling in his extensive examination of 5:17. Since the verb καταλῦσαι obviously refers to the normative character of Scripture, one must understand Jesus' coming as the culmination of God's former revelation and instruction and not as its annulment nor as its replacement through a new revelation or instruction. This is accomplished through Jesus' own message and teaching. Therefore, Trilling concludes that the Old Testament writings (the "material object" of 5:17) are brought to fulfillment in their normative character (the "formal object") through the

to which the disciples were directed and in following him they followed the one who not only exercised his authority at that time, but who also would speak the decisive word at the end (p. 31). Unfortunately, Filson has only removed the paradox one step further. Although he has explained the problem passages of 5:18 and 19 as being figurative, he still has not resolved how Jesus' own "pre-eminent, authoritative teaching" relates to the Law. In other words, how could Jesus demand the total allegiance of his disciples to his own person and teaching and yet be loyal to the Law?

¹W. Trilling, Das Wahre Israel (31964), pp. 49f.

²Ibid., p. 50.

³Ibid., pp. 37f. Cf. Matthew 28:16-20, from which point Trilling begins his investigation.

authoritative teaching of Jesus.¹

The practical implications of this interpretation of 5:17 for the Church are brought out in 5:20. Here one finds "...die wesentlichen Elemente dieser Lebenslehre..." for the people of God: a) the goal, the Kingdom of Heaven; b) the entrance requirement, righteousness; c) the method, through a righteousness which is greater than that of the Scribes and Pharisees.² This latter is accomplished through the fulfilling completely (without curtailment) of the Law in the manner in which Jesus brought the true and final understanding of the Law and the Prophets.³ This is the force behind the concluding imperative of 5:48 (cf. 19:21) and the meaning of discipleship.⁴

Trilling is careful to point out that this represents neither a nova lex nor a new interpretation of the Law in the rabbinic sense.⁵ The old and new must be understood as "heilsgeschichtlichen Nacheinander von Verheißung und Erfüllung."⁶ The old is not simply set aside or cut off nor is the new merely a continuation of the old; rather the continuity of the old is conditioned in its relationship to Jesus Christ.⁷ In this way the normative character of the Old Testament is preserved by

¹Ibid., pp. 178f.

²Ibid., p. 184.

³Ibid., p. 179.

⁴Ibid., p. 193. Trilling summarizes Matthew's viewpoint with a quotation from a recent work by V. E. Hasler, Gesetz und Evangelium in der alten Kirche bis Origenes (1953), p. 22: "Für Matthäus ist das Neue, das Jesus bringt, das recht verstandene Alte. Und recht verstanden heißt hier: Das Gesetz in seinem radikalen und konkreten Sinne tun, die praktische verwirklichung."

⁵Cf. ibid., pp. 186 and 209.

⁶Ibid., p. 204.

⁷Ibid., p. 204.

Matthew for the "true Israel;" but, at the same time, it undergoes a definite change even in its "fulfillment" in the teaching of Jesus.¹

B. Jesus as the Bringer of a New Law

The second approach to Jesus and the Law is almost at the opposite pole to the first. Whereas the former emphasized the measure of continuity in Jesus' teaching with the Mosaic Law--although allowing room for an element of discontinuity and criticism, the second approach stresses the discontinuity by considering Jesus to be the bringer of a new Law. This group, however, is certainly not homogeneous. While some see in Matthew simply an arbitrary construction of Jesus as the giver of a new law in contrast to the old, others see this to be a correct representation of the messianic fulfillment in the person and work of Jesus. In spite of the various motives and expressions each member of this group does consider Matthew to have understood Jesus as the bringer of a Law different to that of Moses.

Without a doubt one of the most influential men among Anglo-American scholars has been B. Bacon. In an article for JBL² Bacon first posited that one of the major aims of Matthew was "...to counteract what he designates 'lawlessness' by presenting the whole message of Jesus as a new and higher Torah and apocalyptic sanctions."³ This theory was then substantiated by three examinations: a) the fivefold structure of Matthew itself (resembling the Pentateuch) and the "peculiarly

¹Ibid., pp. 204f.

²B. Bacon, "Jesus and the Law: A Study of the First Book of Matthew (Mt. 3-7)," JBL, 47-48 (1928, 29), 203-31.

³Ibid., p. 204. According to Matthew "...the Christian message is a promulgation of the nova lex, i.e. the Torah of Moses amplified and spiritualized by Jesus" (p. 223).

Matthean expressions" (e.g. 28:20);¹ b) a comparison of Matthean handling of Marcan materials;² c) and a comparison of Matthew's use of the "Second Source" common to him and Luke.³ This position gained much headway⁴ through the appearance of his book, Studies in Matthew,⁵ in which Bacon developed further the pentateuchal structure of Matthew.⁶

Hans Windisch in his Der Sinn der Bergpredigt⁷ arrived at the same conclusion about Matthew's understanding of the Sermon but for a different reason.

¹Ibid., pp. 223f.

²Ibid., pp. 224-27.

³Ibid., pp. 227-29.

⁴Cf. G. D. Kilpatrick, The Origins of the Gospel According to St. Matthew (1946), pp. 107ff. "Bacon has convincingly developed the view that the Gospel is the new law and that the fivefold division of chapters III-XXV is a deliberate imitation of the Pentateuch."

⁵B. Bacon, Studies in Matthew (1930). E. P. Blair in his work on Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew (1960) has also developed the "new Moses" motif (pp. 124-137), although he rejects Bacon's basis, namely, the pentateuchal structure of the Gospel (pp. 132f.). One example of the typological relationship is the role of the "mountain" in Mt. 5 as well as the accompanying new Torah (p. 134). However, by using this terminology, Blair does not put himself in the same category as Bacon. Instead, his discussion of Jesus and the Law (pp. 114-124) is much closer to those in the first group (cf. p. 118).

⁶B. H. Branscomb, Jesus and the Law of Moses (1930). Branscomb whose work still represents the standard work in America on the general topic of "Jesus and the Law," also falls under this grouping. Matthew contains both a strand of tradition which affirms the validity of the Law and a strand which represents Jesus' teaching as "...a new law supplanting and superseding the older legislation" (p. 223). Branscomb concludes that the latter is the actual viewpoint of Matthew since the former has lost some of its "conservative meaning" by his interpretative comments throughout the Gospel and through his interweaving of these sayings within his own text (pp. 225f.).

⁷H. Windisch, Der Sinn der Bergpredigt (2¹⁹³⁷).

Matthew, according to Windisch, brought together a collection of commandments signifying the will of God in order to establish Jesus as the new lawgiver who is both the fulfillment of the Mosaic Law and its revisor.¹ This is seen in Matthew's construction of the introductory verses (5:17-20), in the Antitheses (5:21-48), and in his christology.

First of all, Windisch interprets the "fulfillment" in 5:17 in terms of two points of reference: as pointing backward to 3:15, meaning "...die Gerechtigkeit zur Geltung bringen durch die Tat;"² and also as pointing forward to 5:21-48, meaning "...zur Vollendung bringen durch Lehre und durch Erfüllung."³ The emphasis, therefore, of 5:17-20 is on the bringing into force of the authority of the Law rather than any rejection of a legalism or a freeing from the Law. Secondly, the fact that the Antitheses in 5:21-48 are in most cases constructed in relation to the Old Testament Law is sufficient evidence for Windisch to demonstrate that these were intended to be unconditionally valid as new commandments.⁴

This interpretation of the Antitheses is then borne out in Matthew's christology. Jesus is "...der Herr, weil er neue Gebote verkündet hat, denen die seinen gehorchen sollen, weil er Gesetzgeber, Lehrer, Prophet und Herr für sie ist, weil er das richtige Verhältnis zu Gott, die Gotteskindschaft und den unbedingten Gottesgehorsam gelehrt und gebracht hat."⁵ Judaism is brought to its downfall, not through the appearance in itself of the Messiah, but through his

¹ Ibid., p. 45.

² Ibid., p. 46.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 56.

⁵ Ibid., p. 99.

work as the revealer of a new and better law.¹

In a more recent work² Eduard Schweizer interprets Matthew's construction of 5:17-20 to be a reflection of his concept of the New Torah. Schweizer arrives at this position having made the difficult verse 18 his point of departure. By establishing that ἕως ἂν πάντα γένηται meant the same as πληρώω for Matthew³--i.e. the fulfilling of something prophesied before,⁴ Schweizer then concludes that Matthew reinterpreted 5:18 (an earlier piece of tradition which had been used as a defense for the keeping of the entirety of the Law)⁵ to mean "...ob und wie das Gesetz als ganzes eine Erfüllung gefunden habe."⁶ This is done through the coming of Jesus as the

¹Ibid., p. 103. Another older work which also sees Matthew as the depicter of Jesus as a new lawgiver is G. W. Kümmel, "Jesus and der jüdische Traditionsge-
danke," ZNW 33 (1934) 105-30. Although Kümmel did not occupy himself primarily with Matthew, his work has been of lasting importance in this direction. Jesus and the Law can best be understood in terms of his consciousness of being sent by God to proclaim in a new way, yet with finality, the will of God in view of the coming judgment (p. 125f.). Mt. 5:17 can only mean that He is come not to set aside the Law but rather to bring it to its completion through his teaching and his proclamation of the will of God (p. 39). In other words, "...so konnte er wohl im Gesetz der Väter nach Gottes Willen suchen, aber als allbeherrschende Tradition, als unbeugsames Recht war das Gesetz damit am Ende" (p. 129). Therefore, Matthew 5:18, 19 can only be "...jüdaistischer Zuwachs zur Tradition, den Matthew der Einleitung zu seiner neuen 'Gesetzesgebung' eingefügt hat" (p. 128).

²E. Schweizer, "Matthäus 5:17-20--Anmerkungen zum Gesetzesverständnis des Matthäus," Neotestamentica (1963).

³Ibid., pp. 402ff.

⁴In contrast to the twofold usage of πληρώω by Windisch above (a--"zur Geltung bringen durch die Tat" and b--"zur Vollendung bringen durch Lehre und Erfüllung"), Schweizer takes πληρώω to mean in 5:17 what it generally does for Matthew, namely to fulfill what has been prophesied before (pp. 400ff.).

⁵Ibid., p. 401.

⁶Ibid., p. 404.

bringer of a new commandment, the New Torah which brings the fulfillment to the aim of the Law and Prophets.¹

The content of this New Torah is "die Nächstenliebe" and it is seen in the "better righteousness" which is proclaimed in the following verses of the Sermon.²

One of the most recent contributions from this approach has been the work of W. D. Davies. In an article on Mt. 5:17, 18³ Davies wrestles with the source for the apparent contradiction between verses 17 and 18.

Rather than attribute the source of this problem to either Matthew's misunderstanding of Jesus or to various strata of Gemeindetheologie, Davies sees its roots to lie within the earthly ministry of Jesus.⁴

This reasoning hinges on a twofold argument. First, Davies argues that Jesus envisaged himself to be the "Servant of the Lord" who was both to suffer and to bring his own Torah.⁵ Both elements were so interrelated that only through his death could Jesus "...justify himself as the Servant and thus bring into being a New Torah to transcend the old."⁶ Secondly, Davies interprets ὡς διὰ πάντα γεννα to refer to the "...consummation wrought through his death."⁷ Therefore, 5:18

¹Ibid., p. 403.

²Ibid., p. 405.

³W. D. Davies, "Matthew 5:17, 18," Christian Origins and Judaism (1962), pp. 30-66.

⁴Ibid., pp. 36, 52.

⁵Ibid., pp. 56f.

⁶Ibid., p. 56. Davies also adds that the shedding of his blood was necessary to establish the New Covenant, apart from which the New Torah would have no authority.

⁷Ibid., p. 65.

represents in nuce Jesus' attitude toward the Law both during his ministry and at its consummation. Matthew, therefore, correctly wraps the cloak of the lawgiver around Jesus with 5:17, but only when seen from the total ministry of his life and his death.¹

This is not to say, according to Davies, that Matthew represented Jesus as the giver of a nova lex as such, but rather as the bringer of the Messianic Torah which is depicted in the Sermon on the Mount.² Strictly speaking this is a new interpretation of the Law and is only "Torah" in the sense that Hillel and Schammai's interpretation were considered "Torah."³ Nevertheless, this is more than just another interpretation, since it was authoritative "...in a new way."⁴ Thus Jesus is understood as the initiator of the Messianic Torah, and not simply as another interpreter of the Law.

C. Jesus as the Interpreter of the Law

This approach to Jesus and the Law in Matthew is a product of the more recent studies in Gemeindetheologie and Redaktionstheologie. On the one hand, in contrast to the second approach this group is concerned that Jesus be understood as the correct interpreter of the Law and not as the bringer of a new Law. On the other hand, in contrast to the first approach the stress lies on the role of interpretation resulting from Matthew's

¹Cf. to the above: "We may with some confidence assert that the Gospel of Matthew regards the words of Jesus as a New Torah and tended to find in them the ground for a new halakah," W. D. Davies, Torah in the Messianic Age and/or the Age to Come (1952), p. 92.

²Davies has discussed extensively the background and meaning of the Sermon in this his latest work. The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount (1964), p. 107. This same position was also developed with particular reference to the Rabbinic material by Billerbeck in one of his excurses, cf. "Zur Bergpredigt Jesu," S.-B., IV, 1-22.

³Ibid. (Setting)

⁴Ibid. (Setting)

christological bias and/or the need in the early community for rules of conduct instead of emphasizing Jesus' role as interpreting the Law in view of his clear perception of the will of God and his attempt to get at the essence of the Law. It will be noted, however, that in spite of the difference in emphasis the substance represents a position quite similar to the first approach.

For G. Bornkamm the problem of Jesus and the Law plays an all important part in Matthew as the connecting link between his conception of both the Church and the "End-expectation."¹ The Church in Matthew is still involved sub specie Judicii and the only distinguishing factor is and will be her "better righteousness," a righteousness which is both the conduct corresponding to the will of God (as seen in Jesus' interpretation of the Law) and will be the pronouncement by the coming judge on the day of judgment.² Here one has the twofold element of Matthew's christology: the earthly lowliness of Jesus as Messiah and his future appearance in glory at the judgment.

The function of Jesus as the lowly Messiah is seen above all in his authoritative interpretation of the Law.³ In this way Jesus fulfills the Law (5:17).⁴ Through his use of the Law itself⁵ and the norm of the original will of God in creation⁶ Jesus set forth the radical demand of God. This authoritative interpretation of the Law, however, is not set over against the

¹G. Bornkamm, "End-expectation and Church in Matthew," Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew, Bornkamm, Barth, and H. J. Held (1963), pp. 15-51, p.24.

²Ibid., p. 31.

³Cf. p. 35--The miracles, although important, are second to his teaching.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 37.

⁶Ibid., p. 26.

Law itself;¹ rather it is in opposition to the protective legalism into which the Law and its interpretation had developed.²

In his term "better righteousness" Matthew combines the concept of faith in the authority and person of Jesus as the Messiah³ with the concept of faith as faithfulness in the sense of conduct congruous with the will of God. "Better righteousness," therefore, reflects both an allegiance to the Law, which Jesus fulfills (i.e. authoritatively interprets) and also an allegiance to the person and way of the Messiah.⁴ This "better righteousness," then became the distinguishing factor between the Church and Judaism and it will be the standard by which all (the Church included) will be judged. In this way Matthew links both Church and "end-expectation" through his understanding of Jesus and the Law.

The work of G. Barth⁵ follows the same methodology of his teacher, G. Bornkamm. This work represents a more expanded investigation of the problem, but the conclusions are much the same as Bornkamm's. For Barth, Jesus is the one who fulfills the Law both through his interpretation of it in the love-commandment and as the lowly one who coming in humility obediently fulfills the

¹On the contrary, it remains in conformity to the validity of the Law (cf. 5:18). Bornkamm takes Matthew to be oblivious to the inconsistency between the Antitheses and Mt. 5:18. "His allegiance to Jesus' own words and to the understanding of the Law in Judaistic Jewish-Christian tradition stand here in unmistakable tension with each other" (p. 25).

²Ibid., p. 25.

³This concept was familiar to him from the Christian tradition. Cf. 8:10; 9:2 a.o. p. 27.

⁴Ibid., p. 29.

⁵G. Barth, "Matthew's Understanding of the Law, Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew (1963), pp. 58-164.

will of God--even to the point of suffering and death. Jesus, therefore, demanded a radical obedience to his interpretation of the Law and also the imitation of his example as the lowly one who must suffer. This, however, is not actually a dual requirement, according to Barth, since "...imitation is expressed in the obedience to the Law as interpreted by Jesus."¹

It might be noted at this point that both Bornkamm and Barth move into their investigation of Matthew in terms of his christology. Barth explicitly states that such an understanding of the Law on Matthew's part could only be a product of his christology itself. His christology was so dominant that it modified his understanding of the Law which he had brought over from Judaism.²

In contrast to Bornkamm and Barth, R. Hummel³ chooses an ecclesiological point of departure by examining the traces of the Church's disputes with Judaism and with the Antinomians, rather than in Matthew's christological understanding of the Law as such. After investigating seven Streitgespräche representing the dispute between the Church and Judaism, Hummel notes a major difference between Matthew and Mark's purpose for recording them. Whereas the Streitgespräche in Mark point toward a christological motif, Matthew's intend to legitimize conduct within the congregation.⁴ Therefore, he concludes: "Es handelt sich im ersten

¹Ibid., p. 103.

²Ibid., pp. 104f.

³R. Hummel, Die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Kirche und Judentum im Matthäusevangelium (1963).

⁴Ibid., p. 56. This is not to say, however, that christology had no role in Matthew; quite the contrary, since christology and the Torah were inseparable for him. By Jesus' authoritative interpretation of the Law he validated his messianic claim and conversely through his messianic authority he brought the Law to eschatological fulfillment.

Evangelium um ätiologische Streitgespräche, die vorwiegend die in der Gemeinde befolgten Gesetzesentscheidungen gegenüber dem pharisäischen Einspruch legitimieren."¹

On the other hand, the antinomian tendency within the Church also abetted the development of Christian halacoth² and primitive "Traditionsgedanken."³ The structuring of Matthew 5:17-20 was primarily to bring to bear the continuing necessity for the Torah. Given the fact that the Torah itself was not sufficient to develop the "better righteousness" of 5:20, it was equally certain that the "better righteousness" was impossible apart from the Law; i.e. the Law as Jesus authoritatively interpreted it.⁴

At just this latter point Matthew demonstrated his consciousness of the great difference between the Church and Judaism. The Antitheses reflect both an inward glance and an outward differentiation: inwardly, the words, "But I say unto you," form the foundation of a Christian "Gesetzestradi-tion;" outwardly, these same words indicate the difference between the new interpretation of the Law and its transcended form in Pharasaic Judaism. As Hummel states it: "Jesus ist gekommen, um zu 'erfüllen.' Die Auslegung des Gesetzes durch ihn und die damit verbundene Begründung einer neuen Gesetzestradi-tion ist die eschatologische Erfüllung des in der Sinai-offenbarung bekundeten Gotteswillens.... Die neue Gesetzestradi-tion ist nicht etwas zweites neben der Tora in der von den Rabbinen gelehrten Gestalt, sondern deren Überbietung. Als solche ist sie die Anleitung zur 'besseren Gerechtigkeit.'"⁵

¹Ibid., pp. 54f.

²Ibid., p. 57.

³Ibid., pp. 59ff.

⁴Ibid., pp. 69ff.

⁵Ibid., p. 75.

One of the latest and most demanding works on Matthew defies classification under any one of these categories, namely, G. Strecker's Der Weg der Gerechtigkeit.¹ On the one hand, methodologically this work is related to the approach taken by the third group, although a much clearer distinction--as in the work of Trilling--has been drawn between redaction and tradition. On the other hand, Strecker's underlying thesis that Jesus' demand can be described in terms of the bifercation "external"/"internal," "ceremonial"/"moral law"² is reminiscent of the earlier representatives in the first grouping. Nevertheless, this correspondence in terminology is misleading because for Strecker Jesus is much more than a prophetic voice of his time. Reflecting the tenor of his contemporary milieu, Strecker's work can be placed quite readily in the stream of kerygmatic theology. This is the key to Jesus' relationship to the Law--the dialectic between the indicative and imperative in Jesus' teaching-proclamation.³ In relationship to the Old Testament Law as such, Matthew has two apparently contradictory elements: a) Jesus' proclamation-teaching is characterized by the positive acceptance of the entire Old Testament Law and b) Jesus strongly criticized and even set aside the Old Testament Law.⁴ For Strecker this tension is bridged in terms of Jesus' "interpretation" which in its indicative/imperative character brought the correct interpretation of the Old Testament to realization (παραίω --5:17).⁵

¹G. Strecker, Der Weg der Gerechtigkeit (1966).

²Ibid., pp. 130-147 (esp. pp. 141ff.).

³Ibid., pp. 126-128; 130-176 (content of the proclamation is Jesus' ethical teaching).

⁴Ibid., pp. 145-147.

⁵Ibid., p. 147, "Da sie ('Realisierung') hier durch 'Lehre' geschieht, ist sie nichts anderes als die rechte Auslegung, die mit der grundsätzlichen Bejahung der

The chief contribution of this work is its basic approach to the Gospel of Matthew which sees Matthew as a heilsgeschichtliches understanding of history. Within such a context Jesus' teaching is: historically speaking, ethical instruction which developed its form and correct interpretation of the Old Testament in the disputes with the Pharisees; eschatologically speaking, it is an ethical teaching differing from the profane instruction in that the motivation of the demand is conditioned by the Eschaton.¹ The actual basis for Jesus' ethical proclamation is the future Kingdom and the coming judgment according to one's works (cf. esp. 5:20 where a "better righteousness" is the "entrance requirement" to the Kingdom).² At the same time, Matthew places beside this "not yet" of the future Kingdom the "but already" of the present rule of Christ (cf. Mt. 28:20 the rule brought to all nations through proclaiming Jesus' commandments).³ Therefore, Strecker concludes that the eschatological rule of God is already here in the present tense in Jesus' demand:⁴ "In seiner Forderung und in seiner vorbildhaften Erfüllung des von ihm Gebotenen ist das eschatologische Heil in der Zeit gegenwärtig."⁵

Since the more general topic of Jesus and the Law comprises several specific, but interrelated elements, certain basic questions repeatedly came to the surface in the various approaches described above. One of the

alttestamentlichen Grundlage und der Bindung an ihre wesentliche Aussage die Freiheit gegenüber den Anforderungen des Alten Testaments vereint.

¹Ibid., p. 185.

²Ibid., p. 158.

³Ibid., pp. 166-71.

⁴Ibid., p. 170.

⁵Ibid., p. 185.

most basic, of course, is the meaning of "Law" for Matthew. For some it was the essential purport or intent of the Mosaic Law which Jesus clarified; for others it was the rabbinic understanding of "Torah" which included both the Mosaic Law and its legalistic interpretation.

This question cannot be divorced from the context of a second: What was Jesus' relationship to the Law for Matthew? On the one hand, there was the viewpoint that Jesus came as the one who both affirmed the Law as the will of God and gave to it a fuller, more radical expression by either his clarifying of its underlying principles or in his authoritative interpretation of it. On the other hand, according to another view such a concept is impossible since Matthew's portrayal of Jesus' teaching was deliberately in terms of a new Law or, at least, a Law for a new age (Messianic Torah). No longer could it be a matter of rejuvenation or revision of the old, but rather the replacement of the old with something new.

Jesus' relationship to the Law, however, must also be considered in view of Matthew's "christology:" Who was Jesus for Matthew? Was he merely a man with a prophetic consciousness whose mission forced him to re-evaluate the Law? Was he the greatest of all rabbis in that he laid the groundwork for a final and authoritative halacha on behalf of the Church? Or was he more--the equivalent of a second Moses? Some recognized in his handling of the Law a certain urgency resulting from his eschatological expectation of a coming judgment. This impelled him to prepare his followers by giving to them rules of conduct which not only would prevail in the Kingdom of God but which would also be the conditions by which the followers could enter. Still others understood Jesus' own person and teaching to be the fulfillment of the Law and the actual breaking in of the Eschaton; the old was "fulfilled"--not broken

off, nor merely continued but brought to "fulfillment." What had been promised was now carried out. Therefore, the normative element still remained, but in terms of the eschatological element in Jesus' person and teaching.

One question remains: What has happened to the Law? Is it simply revitalized and made more relevant through the peeling away of the legalistic and ceremonial husks and the clarifying of its underlying principles? Then 5:18 must be declared to be the misunderstanding of the ministry of Jesus by either Matthew or the early Church. Is it discarded or replaced through a new Law? Then 5:18 must be interpreted to fit the context, a passage which must have had a different intent originally for either Jesus (Windisch, Davies) or the Church (Branscomb, Schweizer) than it had for Matthew. Is the Law reinterpreted or radicalized through Jesus' authoritative demand which pared away all legalistic pretensions? or does the Law remain as the representative of the normative character of the old order which was fulfilled by its heilsgeschichtlich interpretation and proclamation in Jesus' person and message? In any case 5:18 presents the kernel of this question and thus receives a variety of treatments.

We shall return to these and other questions in the discussion below. But first let us look at the background of one aspect of the problem, namely, the Law in the Old Testament and incipient Judaism.

§3. The "Law" in the Old Testament and Pharisaic Judaism

Behind all the above questions pertaining to the Law stands even a more elementary problem, namely the meaning, scope and role of the Law not only for Matthew but in his immediate and distant background. Beginning with the latter one finds himself quite easily speaking

of the Law and the Old Testament, as though the Law were a clearly defined entity within--if not synonymous with--the Old Testament. The meaning of the Law, however, is not so self-evident. The most frequently used Hebrew word for Law in the Old Testament is Torah. Although the etymology is still debated,¹ its usage in the Old Testament indicates that the basic meaning is "instruction."² Most probably Torah referred originally to the individual instructions over cultic, legal and moral matters which were given by God and delivered by the priests (cf. Deut. 17:11; Hab. 2:11ff.). In contrast to individual instructions Hosea uses "Torah" to signify the Law in general ("I wrote for him the ten thousand things of my Law...." i, 12). This usage is also seen in Deuteronomy where it is often difficult to distinguish between the meaning of individual instructions, the Law in general (Deut. 17:11; 33:10 cf. 17:19; 32:46), or Deuteronomy itself in particular (cf. 32:46). It is but a step further in the same direction when one refers to the Pentateuch, which embodies the Law, as the Law itself (cf. Prologue to Sirach).

On the one hand, in using the inclusive term "Law" one risks an oversimplification by implying that the Law is a unified element within the Old Testament. The Law has many aspects and the interplay within the various aspects makes it difficult to distinguish them. On the basis of form-critical principles a major distinction has been made between the casuistic and the apodictic elements.³ From both of these one lifts out

¹G. Oestborn, Tora in the Old Testament: a Semantic Study (1945), H.-J. Kraus, "Freude an Gottes Gesetz," Ev. Theol., 10(1950/51), 338. Cf. E. Würthwein, "Der Sinn des Gesetzes im Alten Testament," ZThK, 55(1958), 259.

²W. Gutbrod, "nomos," TWNT, IV, 1038, E. Würthwein, "Gesetz im Alten Testament," RGZ, II, 1513, Kraus, op. cit., p. 338.

³A. Alt, "Die Ursprung des israelitischen Rechts,"

the cultic regulations on the basis of content rather than form. This, however, is a dangerous task because the life and culture of the Old Testament do not really separate the profane and the cultic.¹ On the other hand, in spite of this diversity within the Law, one is justified in speaking of the Law inclusively. Noth has put it, "Innerhalb des ganzen Alten Testaments ist 'das Gesetz' jedenfalls eine besondere Erscheinung, die trotz aller inneren Gliederung als eine Größe eigener Art hervortritt und als solche angesehen werden kann und muß."²

The various aspects of the Law, be they apodictic, casuistic or cultic, were brought together in Israel in view of the Source of the Law. Every aspect of the Law came from a common Source; it was God's Law which He had given to Israel whom He had chosen to be his people. Here lies one of the most burning questions of Old Testament studies today: What was the relationship between the covenant and the Law in Israel and how did Israel understand this relationship?

There seems to be little question since the work of von Rad and Noth that the Law and the covenant were closely bound together in ancient Israel.³ It is equally certain that the Law was not the condition upon which the covenant was given. On the contrary, obedience to the Law was never considered as the covenant-

Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte des Volkes Israel (1953), pp. 278-332. Cf. further E. Gerstenberger, Wesen und Herkunft des "Apodiktischen Rechts" (1965).

¹Noth, op. cit., p. 68.

²Ibid., p. 20.

³G. von Rad, "Das formgeschichtliche Problem des Hexateuchs," Gesammelte Studien (1958), pp. 9-86, sees the giving of the Law bound up with the Sinaitic covenant. M. Noth, "Die Gesetze im Pentateuch (Ihre Voraussetzungen und ihr Sinn)," Gesammelte Studien (1960), p. 71, refers to the "sakralen Stämmebund" as the basis and meaning of the Israelite Law.

creating factor, rather as a result of the covenant itself. The challenge to obedience in Deuteronomy is always couched in terms of the covenant, not the covenant in terms of the obedience (Deut. 5:2-21; 26:16-19; 27:9-10): "Der Imperativ folgt aus dem Indikativ."¹ Within this context the Law was never considered to be an oppressive burden, an unobtainable standard, or an instrument of death (Deut. 30:11-14). Von Rad in summarizing the Law in Deuteronomy wrote, "Die Gebote erscheinen dem deuteronomischen Prediger als durchaus erfüllbar, ja eigentlich als leicht erfüllbar. Von dem Gesetz her ist Israels Heilszustand nicht bedroht. Nicht das ist die Sorge dieser Paränese, daß Israel möglicherweise nicht können wird, sondern vielmehr, ob es überhaupt wollen wird."²

If the Law was not the basis of the covenant, how is its relationship to the covenant to be understood? Würthwein has noted on the basis of Glueck's study of chesed³ that with every covenant (berith) comes the obligation, explicit or implicit, for the covenant partners to prove themselves loyal (chesed). He consequently concludes, "Ein Bund ist ohne ḥn nicht denkbar."⁴ In this way Würthwein considers the apodictic law to be an expression of how Israel is to demonstrate its loyalty to the covenant ("Bundestreue gegen Jahwe"), "nämlich durch Meidung von allem, was als Akt der

¹ Würthwein, ZThK, 10(1950/51), 267.

² G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments (1960), II, 407.

³ N. Glueck, Das Wort hedes im alttestamentlichen Sprachgebrauche als menschliche und göttliche gemeinschaftsgemäße Verhaltungsweise (1927).

⁴ Würthwein, ZThK, 10(1950/51), 266. This appears to be borne out in the Qumran writings. Cf. 1QM 14:4,8-9 where the "God of Israel" is the one "who keeps favor (chesed) unto His Covenant."

Untreue verstanden werden kann."¹ Seen from another perspective the Law is considered to be the direction for the life under the covenant.² Just as the covenant was given by Jahweh to Israel, so also the instructions for life under the covenant (Deut. 27:9,10).

This relationship of the Law to the covenant appears to be substantiated by its parallel in the Hittite suzerainty treaties.³ Here it is the king and his vassals (not two equal partners) at the bargaining table. The king states who he is ("The Great King" cf. Ex. 20:2a; Deut. 5:6a), what he has accomplished for the people (cf. Ex. 20:2b; Deut. 5:6b) and the stipulations and obligations for the people to follow (cf. Ex. 20:3-17; Deut. 5:7-12). For Israel it was not a God who had conquered them or had won them in any way against their will, rather it was Jahweh who had chosen them (Deut. 7:6-11; 10:15). It was the same Jahweh that had acted on Israel's behalf that gave to Israel his will and instruction which they were to follow. If it were a privilege to be Jahweh's chosen people, it was also a privilege to follow his will, the Law. But

¹Ibid., cf. von Rad, Theologie, II, 405f., "Im übrigen sind diese Gebote ja weit entfernt, so etwas wie ein Ethos zu umreißen; vielmehr bezeichnen sie in ihrer negativen Formulierung doch nur Möglichkeiten, die an der äußeren Peripherie des menschlichen Lebenskreises liegen, nämlich Praktiken, die Jahwe absolute mißfällig sind...." In his further discussion on 406f. von Rad indicates that these were mainly for the purpose of purity within the cult. In this way the Law and the covenant are functionally related, not materially.

²Kraus, op. cit., pp. 338f. and Bückmann, "Gesetz im Alten Testament und Judentum," EKL (1956), I, 1552.

³J. J. Stamm, "Dreißig Jahre Dekalogsforschung," Theol. Rund., 27(1961), p. 214, "Was die Forschung über Alt hinaus bisher unzweifelhaft erbracht hat, ist der Nachweis eines Zusammenhangs zwischen dem Aufbau der hethitischer Vasallenverträge und der Amt, wie in Israels Frühzeit am Fest die Proklamation des Gottesrechts erfolgte." See also W. Zimmerli, "Das Gesetz im Alten Testament," TLZ, 85(1960), p. 494, G. Mendenhall,

at the same time one must grant that here a moral dimension enters into the covenant relationship.

Is this moral dimension, however, a conditional element for the preservation of the covenant? If one of the two involved in the covenant proves to be disloyal, what is to become of the covenant? Although the covenant was not a product of Israel's obedience or righteousness (Deut. 9:4-6), can it be maintained that the covenant remains for Israel regardless of her obedience to the Law? This question strikes at the center of the dialectic between Jahweh's gracious acts toward Israel and Israel's responsibility to Jahweh within the covenant relationship. This tension and its consequences can be traced through the Old Testament.

In Deuteronomy, dating from the seventh century but containing some of Israel's oldest traditions, it was noted above (p. 24) that the Law is given in terms of the covenant and the exhortations for Israel's obedience are always spoken in view of the covenant of Jahweh's redemptive acts. There is no evidence of a legalistic religion or an oppressive Law; rather the Law is explicitly described as being "not too hard for you.., the word is very near you; it is in your mouth and in your heart...." Deut. 30:11,14.

Although obedience to the Law comes as a challenge within the framework of Jahweh's redemptive acts, it should not be overlooked that a blessing or a cursing corresponding to Israel's response frequently follows. Promises of blessing, prosperity, and length of life in the land are in the majority.¹ Yet the threat of

Law and Covenant and the Ancient Near East (1955).

¹Deut. 5:29,33; 6:2,3; 11:9; 12:28; 26:16-19; 29:9; 30:9,20.

cursing and destruction for disobedience also appears.¹ This tension of blessing or cursing within Israel's covenant relationship is seen most clearly in 9:6-29 (cf. Ex. 32:11f. and Num. 14:11ff.) where Jahweh's threat of destroying a murmuring and disobedient Israel (6:8; 14:25) is counterbalanced by Moses' plea that Jahweh show mercy in view of his covenant and promises (9:26, 29). On the one hand, this narrative is a demonstration of the enduring covenant in view of Jahweh's preventive favor in spite of Israel's "stubbornness" (9:6), which indicates that the validity of the covenant lies in Jahweh's hands. On the other hand, it is not a demonstration of the enduring covenant regardless of Israel's disobedience (10:12ff.), which indicates that Israel also had a responsibility (cf. 10:12-13--"for your good"). Deuteronomy certainly does not present a legalistic system of rewards and punishments,² but it does set forth Israel's responsibility along with Jahweh's redemptive acts.

In the prophets, modern criticism has shown that they do not represent a new, creative effort within Israel, but rather stand within the framework of ancient Israel.³ The prophetic message also takes place in the dialectic between God's graciousness and Israel's responsibility, the accent falling on the latter.⁴ In

¹ Deut. 6:15; 8:19; 11:16. Cf. Deut. 11:26-28 and the extended passage in 28:1-14, 15-68 where blessing and cursing are considered side by side. Hillers, Treaty-curses and the Old Testament Prophets, 1964.

² Noth, op. cit., p. 133.

³ von Rad, Theologie, II, 409, Kraus, op. cit., p. 29, Würthwein, ZThK, 10(1950/51), 267, Gutbrod, op. cit., p. 1032.

⁴ von Rad, Theologie, II, 409, sees the impetus for the proclamation of the impending wrath of God and Israel's failure before the law to be the coming of a "ganz neue Stunde für Israel." In view of the prophets themselves, as follows above, this appears to be the

other words, whereas the message of Deuteronomy exhorted Israel to obedience in light of Jahweh's redemptive acts, the message of the prophets emphasized Israel's disobedience in spite of Jahweh's redemptive acts.

In the eighth century one finds prophets, such as Hosea, prophesying the coming destruction of Israel who has "forgotten the Law of your God" (4:6 cf. 8:1), who has "played the harlot" (9:1) going after other gods. Again and again one meets the contrast between what God had done for Israel, yet how Israel had forsaken her God. The coming doom is pictured in terms of destruction ("Lo-am-mi" Hos. 1:9 and "The end is come upon my people Israel," Amos 8:2). The people have been proven unfaithful and irresponsible to their God who has acted over and over again on her behalf.¹ The picture, however, is not one of total darkness; God may act again, although this is not expanded (Hos. 1:10f.; 2:21f.; Amos 3:12; 5:3,5,6f.; Isa. 1:26; cf. Micah 4:1-4 and Isa. 2:2-4).

In Jeremiah and Ezekiel the question of the role of the Law as a condition for the preservation of the covenant reaches its apex. Not only do they cite Israel's unfaithfulness to God and her disobedience to his Law (Jer. 11:9-13; Ezek. 20), but they accuse her of breaking the covenant (Jer 11:10; 31:32; Ezek. 16:59; 17:19). It would appear that the emphasis of

reverse of the situation. The future is seen in view of the past and present; not the past and present in view of the future.

¹Ibid., pp. 410 and 412 finds a difference in emphasis between the prophets of the eighth century and the prophets of the seventh and sixth centuries. The former emphasize Israel's rejection of Jahweh's redemptive rule (Heilswaltung) whereas the latter bring more to bear upon the "Law." Is this such a "considerable" ("erheblicher") difference (p. 410) or is it not more a matter of terminology?--particularly in view of the close relationship of "Law" and the God who has acted

Deuteronomy on the covenant-acting Jahweh has been totally eclipsed by the emphasis on Israel's responsibility. This is doubly illustrated in Jeremiah. First there is futile intercession to dissuade God from bringing the destruction to pass in view of his covenant ("...do not disgrace the throne of thy glory: remember, break not thy covenant with us" Jer. 14:21; cf. Moses' successful intercession in Deut. 9:25-29). Secondly, the subordinate element of responsibility in Deuteronomy is now explicitly cited as the reason for the coming judgment (Jer. 11:6-9).

Is the covenant-making Jahweh who chose Israel in spite of her weakness, stubbornness and unrighteousness (Deut. 9:5-6) in actuality replaced in the prophets by a justice-demanding God, who can act only in terms of the obedience or disobedience to his Law? The question is illegitimate. It is not an either/or (neither for ancient Israel, Deuteronomy, nor the prophets). The covenant-making Jahweh is just, he will punish the disobedient; but the just God is the covenant-maker, from him alone can salvation come.

This is seen most explicitly in Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Deutero-Isaiah. The hope for the people does not stem from a legalistic righteousness. Although the coming doom is a result of her disobedience, nowhere is obedience proclaimed as a basis for salvation. The prophets who proclaim Judah's destruction in view of her responsibility proclaim her salvation solely in view of her covenant-making God. In Jeremiah it is a "new Spirit" and they shall walk in his statutes and observe his ordinances (Ezek. 11:19; 36:26-31); and for Deutero-Isaiah it is a time of "new things" (48:6, 7), Israel has been forgiven and her "iniquity is

for Israel in Deuteronomy, whose composition itself could be the cause for the change in terminology.

pardoned" (40:1ff.), they are a people in whose heart the Law is (51:7), and God will make an "everlasting covenant" with them (55:3).

From the standpoint of the people's responsibility under the covenant the picture is hopeless, so hopeless that the covenant appears to be broken both in her unfaithfulness and in Jahweh's coming judgment: From the standpoint of Jahweh's prevenient favor there is hope, hope that Jahweh will again act redemptively for his people.

This future act by God is described in the familiar terminology of the Old Testament--a "new covenant" (Jer. 31:31; Isa. 55:3). The bridge between God's act toward his people and their responsibility is to be a "new heart and new Spirit" (Ezek. 36:26-31) in which the Law will be written (Jer. 31:33f.; Isa. 51:7). In this future hope as in the past of ancient Israel, the Law comes with the covenant relationship. Therefore the dialectic remains in the prophets, even if presented from the opposite perspective to Deuteronomy.

The Exile came for Judah and with it the destruction of the city of Jerusalem and the Temple. When the people were permitted to return to their land the question as to the fulfillment of Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Isaiah's prophecy must have been much in consideration.¹ Unfortunately, things did not happen as they expected, and this is reflected in the late-Exilic and post-Exilic writings.

Trito-Isaiah commences with "...keep justice, and do righteousness, for soon my salvation will come..." (Isa. 56:1). The cause for the delay must be unrighteousness on the part of the people. The promises of a "new covenant" (cf. Jer. 31), the presence of God's

¹Noth, op. cit., p. 107, considers this hope to have given impetus to a study of the Law, even though the sakralen Stämmebund was lost.

Spirit (cf. Ezek. 36), and the perpetual "words are to be in their mouths and in the mouths of their posterity" (59:21) are promised to them "who turn from transgression" (59:20). Zechariah complains that the people refuse to hearken; "Indeed, they made their hearts like adamant (cf. Ezek. 36, "heart of stone") lest they should hear the Law and the words which the Lord of hosts had sent by his Spirit through the former prophets..." (Zech. 7:11-12). Finally, Malachi writes a vicious attack on the priesthood which has profaned the ceremonial worship (1:6-14), distorted the Law in their instruction as well as in their favoritism to certain ones in the Law (2:1-9). The final condemnation is laid at the heart of the matter--they have asked concerning the "profit" in serving the Lord (Mal. 3:13f.). The pendulum has swung from service under the Law in view of the Lord's redemptive acts to service for what it is worth--mere perfunctory rites without meaning. The people in seeking to fill their responsibility have lost the source and goal of that responsibility--a covenant-making Lord.

This divorce of the Law from its initial context is seen by some in the priestly writings. The concept of the Law as given in terms of the Sinaitic covenant is totally absent in P.¹ Instead the setting follows in which Moses received the rules for cultic and daily living. Noth, on the one hand, interprets this to be an indication that the covenant concept on which the laws were based was already destroyed.² Zimmerli, on the other hand, considers this to show that the sacrificial system replaces in P the giving of the Law and

¹Ibid., p. 121, Gutbrod, op. cit., p. 1035, Zimmerli, op. cit., col. 496.

²Noth, loc. cit.

its demands for the people within the covenant context.¹ Between these two, von Rad cautiously notes, "Die Steigerung und Detaillierung des Opferkultes in der Priesterschrift mit ihrer Betonung der sühnenden Funktion kann auch aus der allgemein religiösen Unsicherheit einer Zeit erklärt werden, die an den Fundamenten des Bundes und seiner Gültigkeit zu zweifeln begann."²

In all events P seeks to set up a cultic life for the worship of the Lord. Instead of the expectancy in the prophecies of Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Deutero-Isaiah, a cultic aura settles in.³ The major emphasis is holiness. This is seen in the regulations for clean and unclean and in the sacrificial atonement for sins of the individual as well as of the nation. The commandment under which the people are to live is a commandment to holiness (Lev. 22:31-33), and the two signs of Israel's separateness are circumcision and the Sabbath. Nevertheless even this, as seen above in the Prophet Malachi, was no guarantee for holiness.

Ezra then enters the scene of post-Exilic Israel. He not only was a member of a priestly family but also came with Persian authority to rejuvenate the cultic activities and to teach the "Law of Jehovah" (Ezra 7). In view of the complexity of the sources it is almost impossible to evaluate properly the work of Ezra; one thing appears certain, namely, that he made the reading and teaching of the Law central in the period of the

¹ Zimmerli, loc. cit.

² von Rad, Theologie, II, 417.

³ K. Koch, Die Priesterschrift von Exodus 25 bis Leviticus 16 (1959), p. 98, "Weil nach ihrer Meinung das Heil Israels in einem wohlgeordneten Kult begründet liegt, sammelt sie die alten kultischen Regeln, geprägte und ungeprägte, um sie zu einem eindrucksvollen Ganzen zusammenzubauen."

restoration. That, however, he was the "scribe" who set in motion the development of normative Judaism and the scribal schools appears to have its roots only in the work of the Chronicler and Jewish tradition.¹

When one considers the way in which the Deuteronomist evaluates each king² and especially when one reads the accounts of the Chronicler (e.g. I Chron. 22:12; 28:7f.; II Chron. 12:1; 15:3-6), the impression of a legalistic system is hardly avoidable.³ This tendency in the post-Exilic writings to place the emphasis on the responsibility of righteous living has already been noted. Yet the point at which this emphasis became the basis for a system of rewards and punishments is unfortunately beyond one's reach.⁴

In summary, it has been noted that the Law was given and proclaimed within the context of the covenant relationship between Israel and Jahweh who had chosen her to be his people. Here lies the tension between a covenant-making Jahweh and the responsibility of his "chosen people" within the covenant; the former being emphasized in Deuteronomy, followed by the ensuing demands for obedience; the latter being emphasized in

¹ von Rad, Theologie, I, 102f.

² G. von Rad, "Die deuteronomistische Geschichtstheologie in den Königsbüchern," Gesammelte Studien (1958), p. 192, "Offenbar will Dtr. damit sagen, daß der betreffende König und seine Zeit, dem Ganzen der göttlichen Gehorsamsforderung nicht genügt habe. Es ist also die Frage nach dem vollkommen Gehorsam, die von Dtr. an die Könige gerichtet wird."

³ G. von Rad, Das Geschichtsbild des chronistischen Werkes (1930), p. 38, notes, "Wir hatten...das ganze chronistische Werk zu der Gattung israelitischer Geschichtsbetrachtung gerechnet, die dem Ablauf der Geschichte zwischen Gott und Volk keinerlei kontingenz zusprach, sondern ihn als Ergebnis der menschlichen Haltung verstehen wollte." Cf. his Theologie, II, 419.

the prophets, followed by the hope that God will act again. During the latter stages of the Exile and thereafter a different emphasis appears. Whereas the prophets had proclaimed the coming judgment to be a result of Israel's disobedience and the coming deliverance to be an act of God and not a reward for obedience, the accent now falls on obedience and righteousness according to the Law--almost as if to imply: If judgment comes through disobedience, then salvation comes through obedience. Had the dialectic of God's action and Israel's ensuing responsibility been reversed to Israel's action and God's ensuing responsibility?

In the new emphasis of the late and post-Exilic period traces come to light of lines which led eventually to normative Judaism. To be sure, the role of the Law in Judaism becomes most evident after the codification of the Mishnah. However, no one questions the fact that this was a product of oral tradition stemming from deep in the inter-testamental period.¹ The rabbinic sources themselves claim to be a product of a line stemming from Ezra.² One of the most influential groups in the rise of rabbinic Judaism was the Pharisees whose historical function was that of mediating the Law to the people by emphasis on its authority and by "example of punctilious observances of its minutiae."³ After the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 they finally gained the upper hand and set the pattern which ultimately led to normative Judaism. Consequently, Pharisaism is often taken as synonymous with normative Judaism.⁴

¹ Moore, op. cit., I, 71; Schürer, op. cit., I, 112.

² b. Succoth 20a.

³ Moore, op. cit., I, 67.

⁴ Ibid., p. 59. Cf. L. Goppelt, Christentum und Judentum (1954), p. 25.

In Judaism along side the appeal to the Patriarchs the Torah became the primary concern. It was here that God had revealed himself and his will, and in observance of the Law man found fellowship with God and a proper ordering for his life. Naturally this emphasis led to a greater study of the Law in order to understand it and to explain it in terms of everyday living. The generalities of the Old Testament Torah were explicated by an equally authoritative Law in the form of oral tradition¹ and by the authoritative interpretation of the men whose profession it was to study the Law. Yet, in spite of what appears to have become a legalistic approach to the Law, the concept of the Law in Judaism still remained a complexity of ethical demands and legal ordinances.²

One of the major results of such an emphasis on the Law was the divisive tendency which arose. Salvation was the hope of the righteous alone; the wicked, although prospering for a time, would perish. This concept of righteousness was based on a system of merit and demerit defined in terms of one's adherence to the Law.³ "True" Israel was no longer considered to be merely a direct result of God's choosing for himself a people; but

¹An emphasis which was a distinctive of the Pharisees according to Josephus. Cf. Antiq. xiii, 10, 5-6.

²This has been pointedly demonstrated by such Jewish scholars as C. G. Montefiore, The Synoptic Gospels, I, II (1927) and his Rabbinic Literature and Gospel Teachings (1930); J. Klausner, Jesus of Nazareth (1925), and I. Abrahams, Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels (second series, 1924), et al. This has also been noted by Christian scholars, esp. G. Kittel, Die Probleme des palästinischen Spätjudentums und das Urchristentum (1926); G. F. Moore, Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era (1927), I, 18f., 117.

³Evidence of this can be seen in II Baruch 14:7; 84:6, 10 and IV Ezra 7:77; 8:32f. Cf. H. Braun, Spätjüdisch-häretischer und frühchristlicher Radikalismus (1957), I, 6f. for Pirke Aboth.

rather it was determined by the individual's obedience to the Law. This was a principle which not only separated Jew from the non-Jew, but it also led to the separation of groups within Judaism itself.

Against such a background in which the Law was so important for the religious leaders of the Jews, it is not surprising that Jesus' own ministry should be faced with the vital question concerning his relationship to the Law. The problem certainly remained acute for the primitive Church and particularly for the Jewish-Christian element. Such a complex background, of course, gives rise to the basic question of the Sitz im Leben of the various pericopes as well as their intent for the particular evangelists. Of the three Synoptists, Matthew gives by far the most prominence to the problem. In his Gospel the issue appears in a twofold manner. On the one hand, the didactic method of question and answer serves as a backdrop to set forth Jesus' response to questions raised by others, generally by his opponents, concerning the Law. The occasion for such questions is often situations in which either his conduct or that of his disciples runs contrary to the "Law." On the other hand, these incidents are framed by two discourses in which Jesus sets forth both his positive demand in contrast to that of the Law (Mt. 5:21-48) as well as his negative condemnation of those whose life's goal is study (Scribes) and practice (Pharisees) of the Law (Mt. 23). Both aspects evidence the hand of the first evangelist in composing, reworking, inserting and rearranging the material.

The subject of Jesus' relationship to the Law is treated most extensively in 5:17-48. As we saw in the suggested solutions to the problem, this section also offers the key to understanding the evangelist's interpretation of this relationship, yet, in spite of the

number of recent works on Matthew, few if any have really examined the theological implications from the standpoint of tradition and redaction.¹ Therefore, the primary task of this thesis will be to examine 5:17-48 and compare the use of tradition and redaction to see if there are any clear-cut lines which can be drawn for Matthew's understanding of Jesus' relationship to the Law. Prior to this, however, the other passages dealing with the subject in the First Gospel should be briefly examined in order to see if there are any dominant traits which emerge from the evangelist's treatment of the material.

¹H.-T. Wrege, "Untersuchung zur Überlieferungsgeschichte des Spruchgutes der Bergpredigt," (Diss., Göttingen, 1963), is primarily a history of the tradition and transmission of the material with very little emphasis on the theological implication for Matthew. Similarly, J. Dupont, Les Béatitudes: Le problème littéraire--Les deux versions du sur la montagne et des Béatitudes (1958).

II. JESUS AND QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LAW

We turn first of all to the passages in which Jesus' relationship to the Law is seen in his response to questions raised by others with reference to the Law. The first three (9:11-13; 12:1-14; 15:1-20) are set in the framework of a Streitgespräch. Three others (17:24-27; 19:3-9;¹ 22:34-40), while not set in a Streitgespräch as such, do reflect a polemical note. In only one case is Jesus' response concerning the Law set in a non-polemical context and that is the reply to the "Rich Young Ruler" (19:16-22). We conclude this section by dealing briefly with the second of two discourses in Matthew which touch in part on the Law, namely on the discourse of "Woe" directed against those very ones who had raised the polemical questions concerning the Law.

§1. "Publicans and Sinners:"

9:11-13 // Mk. 2:16f. // Lk. 2:30f.

Throughout the Gospel tradition Jesus is portrayed as the friend and helper of the "sinners," the social outcasts--lepers, and in general the religious rejects of his day--the amhaares. For the religious leaders of the Jews, such contact was highly questionable, particularly at meals.² Thus it is quite understandable that

¹This question on divorce will not be handled alone in the following discussion. See the discussion under 5:32, pp. 172ff.

²Early rabbinic tradition informs us that such association with the amhaares was disdained lest one himself be tempted into lawless conduct or lest one be misunderstood as condoning lawless behavior, cf. S.-B., I, 499. Such avoidance is also praised by the Old Testament, cf. Psa. 1. A third aspect also entered in particularly at meals, namely, ceremonial considerations which were reflected in the Pharisaic attitude towards the amhaares (cf. Abrahams, Studies, I, 55f.) and the Essenes towards the sons of evil. This same consideration also was acute in the primitive Church (cf. Acts 11:3 and Gal. 2:12).

such a conflict between Jesus and the religious representatives should arise over this issue and that this conflict be reflected in the Gospel tradition.¹

Matthew takes over both the Marcan and the "Q" tradition on this question. The latter is merely repeated, but the former involves some modifications. In the Marcan tradition, subsequent to the call of Levi (Mk. 2:14 parr.) Jesus is invited to his house where he is served a festive dinner (συνάγεσθαι)² in the presence of "publicans and sinners" (2:15 parr.). The "Scribes of the Pharisees" seeing this take issue with his disciples (2:16 parr.). Jesus responds to the question with the twofold reply consisting of a figure of speech (2:17a, concerning the role of a physician) and an ἰλαθὼν-saying (2:17b parr.). The history of the tradition behind the apothegm or pronouncement-story itself has been variously evaluated,³ but Matthew and Luke follow the Marcan account quite closely.

Matthew, however, does demonstrate three modifications of the tradition. First of all, in place of the historically accurate "Scribes of the Pharisees" in Mk. 2:16 (par. Lk.) Matthew has simply the generic term "the Pharisees." This is quite typical for Matthew since Pharisaism, as such, has come to represent particularly Jesus' opponents.⁴ Secondly, Matthew has

¹Lk. 7:36-50 (L); Mk. 2:13-17 parr. (Mk); Mt. 11:19 // Lk. 7:34 (Q).

²J. Jeremias, *Die Abendmahlsworte Jesu* (4th 1966), pp. 42f., who notes that such a practice only accompanied festive meals.

³Cf. Bultmann, *Tradition*, p. 16, who considers vs. 15f. to be the created scene for the isolated saying of vs. 17. Taylor, *Mark*, p. 203, on the contrary, suggests that the very broken nature of the narrative and the faithfulness of Mark to his tradition rule in favor of the authenticity of the tradition.

⁴Cf. 9:14 *contra* Mk. 2:18--rather than "disciples of the Pharisees" it is simply the Pharisees themselves;

inserted the proper Jewish title of δίδασκαλος in keeping with the familiar rabbinic terminology¹ in order to help smooth over the rather broken style in Mk. 2:16 (cf. Lk. 5:30 who aims the question specifically at the disciples' conduct). The third difference and most important for us is the insertion of Hos. 6:6 between the two elements in Jesus' response (Mk. 2:17 cf. Mt. 9:12, 13a, 13b).²

By responding to the opponents' question with a twofold saying pertaining to both the objects and character of Jesus' ministry (Mk. 2:17a) as well as the purpose of his coming (Mk. 2:17b), Mark answers the question of "why"³ Jesus was eating in such company. Matthew, however, having already modified the questioners as being Jesus' arch adversaries with reference to the Law (9:11), inserts Hos. 6:6 with a deliberate introductory formula addressed at the Pharisees (9:13a). In so doing, the evangelist attributes an ulterior motive to the "Pharisees'" question, namely, their concern for the Law. Stylistically, by addressing the response to the Pharisees Matthew turns what was basically a pronouncement-story in Mark focusing on Jesus' coming and ministry to the "publicans and sinners" into a Streitgespräch focusing more on the element of conflict inherent to such a ministry.

12:14 cf. Mk. 3:6 rather than "Pharisees" and "Herodians" it is the Pharisees alone; 12:24 cf. Mk. 3:22 Pharisees replaces Scribes; 22:15 heightened over Mk. 12:13; plus insertions pertaining to the "Pharisees" in 15:12; 22:34; 22:41; 23:26. Cf. Goppelt, Christentum und Judentum, p. 183, n. 1; and Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 120ff.

¹For further discussion of Matthew's use of δίδασκαλος, see p. 82.

²That this was Matthean is demonstrated by a similar insertion of Hos. 6:6 in 12:7 (cf. below).

³Mk. 2:16 has ὅτι used interrogatively (cf. Taylor, Mark, p. 206) as reflected by Matthew and Luke's ὡς γάρ.

Just how does Hos. 6:6 inserted into this context respond to the question about Jesus' conduct and that demanded by the Law? Some have suggested that the anti-thesis revolves around the ceremonial (cultic) Law--emphasized by the Pharisees--and the moral (ethical) Law--emphasized by Jesus.¹ In more recent works on Matthew, this insertion has been considered from the standpoint of the love-commandment as the overriding principle of the Law's interpretation for Matthew.² Both explanations, however, are inadequate. Apart from the fact that no such distinction between ceremonial and moral Law existed for the Jews, the usage of 12:7 lacks a counterpart to the "moral Law."³ The converse is true^{here} when one relegates Hos. 6:6 to the equivalent of the love-commandment. To be sure, the "love" might be seen in 9:13 with reference to Jesus' relationship with sinners, but there is hardly any object of this love in 12:7. Jesus certainly is not asking the Pharisees to view the disciples' behavior "in love" nor does he imply that the "love-commandment" sets aside the Sabbath regulations (cf. under 12:1-7 below). Therefore, we need to see if there is not a common denominator for the usage by Matthew in both 9:13 and 12:7.

The verse in its Old Testament context is a rebuke against the ritual usage of the cult at the expense of the basic covenant relationship with God (יְהוָה) which in turn determined one's conduct ("ethos").⁴ In rabbinic Judaism, the passage came to have particular

¹Allen, Matthew, p. 90; B. Weiß, Matthäus, ad loc., and more recently, Strecker, op. cit., p. 32.

²G. Bornkamm, "Das Doppelgebot der Liebe," (Festschrift für Bultmann, 1954), p. 93; G. Barth, "Matthew's Understanding of the Law," esp. p. 83; Hummel, Auseinandersetzung, p. 43; Strecker, Der Weg der Gerechtigkeit (1966), p. 135; Kretschmar, ZthK, 61 (1964), p. 57.

³Cf. further discussion in Barth, op. cit., p. 82.

⁴Cf. H. W. Wolf, Hosea (1961), pp. 153f.

significance after the fall of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Temple.¹ It also had its casuistic interpretations, but it never was taken as being a denial of the efficacy of sacrifices or the validity of the cult. This was the case, however, in Qumran. In 1QS 9:3ff. Hos. 6:6 quite plainly stands behind the sect's attitude toward the cult in Jerusalem. As Gärtner has summarized it, "...a life lived in accordance with the Law...is felt to be more important than blood sacrifices offered in the Temple at Jerusalem."² Yet, in spite of their strong animosity towards the cult as performed in Jerusalem and their own emphasis on keeping the Law as revealed to them, it is a little surprising that Hos. 6:6 should be limited to only one passage in this literature, and this being a rather oblique reference.³ Matthew hardly reflects a similar tendency to that in Qumran. This not only is clear from the standpoint of the cult and sacrifices which were involved (even if remotely) in Qumran's usage of Hos. 6:6. Neither can one very well contend that Matthew intended to replace these or the questions of ceremonial cleanliness (9:13 cf. 15:11-20) and Sabbath regulations (12:7) through a more radical understanding of the Law as found in Qumran. How then is Hos. 6:6 used by Matthew?

By contrast to the other usages, the Matthean occurrences place the Old Testament verse in a context where

¹Cf. S.-B., I, 500.

²B. Gärtner, The Temple and the Community in Qumran and the New Testament (1965), p. 116, n. 4.

³The emphasis in 1QS 9:3-5 in view of the Sect's attitude towards sacrifices is not on the negative aspect of Hos. 6:6, i.e. against sacrifices as such, but rather on the positive relationship to the Law which expiates for sin far better than the sacrifices in the defiled sanctuary of Jerusalem, cf. F. M. Cross, Library of Qumran (21961), p. 101. That they planned to resume sacrifices after the purification of the Temple is clear in 1QM 2:1-6; 1QS ii-v, 19, et al.

its meaning cannot refer literally to the cultic practice of sacrifices. Thus his usage is to be a derivative one. His introduction ("Go, learn what it means....") corresponds to the rabbinic preface (אף 7אף)¹ and has led some to conclude immediately from the form that it is a Christian halacha.² This need not be the case, since even if it were a technical introduction it could also have been intended as an additional rebuke for the "Pharisees" by addressing them--the very ones who concerned themselves with knowing and doing the Law--with such a command. As seen by the different introduction in 12:7 to the saying, the importance lies with its content not merely its form.

Without doubt the heart of the parallel between Hos. 6:6 and the Matthean usages is the correspondence between the ritual performances of the cult, on the one hand, and the meticulous concern for the Law on the other, both at the expense of ἐλεος / ἰσθν. The noun ἐλεος only appears three times in Matthew (9:13; 12:7; 23: 3), two of which being the quotation of Hos. 6:6. Although Matthew's special source uses ἐλεημοσύνη in the sense of alms-giving common to later Judaism (6:2-4)³ and though Matthew may have himself used ἐλεήμονες in 5:7 meaning "to show mercy, to help someone," there is no reason to interpret ἐλεος in its three Matthean occurrences any differently than its Old Testament/LXX counterpart--acts of loving-kindness, conduct befitting the covenant relationship with others and corresponding to the will of God.⁴

¹Cf. S.-B., I, 499, and D. Daube, The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism (1956), p. 433.

²Most recently, Hummel, op. cit., pp. 39, 45.

³Acts of loving-kindness resulting from τὸ ἐλεος .

⁴Cf. Wolf, op. cit. and R. Bultmann, TWNT, II, 476. This is seen in particular in 23:23 where the three basic characteristics of the covenant relationship are enumerated: κρίσις (ὁσώμ); ἐλεος (ἰσθν); πίστες (ἰσθν).

There is, however, one notable difference between Matthew's usage and that in Hosea. Whereas Matthew concurs with Hosea's negative judgment by using the passage against the "Pharisees'" concern for the Law at the cost of $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$, Matthew has a positive aspect which first makes the negative accusation intelligible. For him $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ was exemplified by the person and work of Jesus. One must not overlook the fact that Hos. 6:6 has been inserted in both 9:13 and 12:7 into contexts referring explicitly to the coming and ministry of Jesus.¹ God, in his loving-kindness ($\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ / $\gamma\omicron\theta\eta$) was extending his offer for fellowship to the "publicans and sinners" through the fellowship offered them by Jesus' person and work which summoned one to repentance (9:13 // Mk. 2:17b cf. Lk. 5:32 which has correctly finished the thought) and which brought about discipleship (9:9f. // 2:13f.). Thus 9:13b // Mk. 2:17b could serve as the basis, $\gamma\alpha\rho$, for the quotation in 9:13a.

At this point, the negative aspect becomes clear. Whereas the stress upon the ritual Law had led to an ignoring of the vital $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ / $\gamma\omicron\theta\eta$ in relationship to the covenant and God's will in Hos. 6:6, so the meticulous concern for the detailed observance of the Law had blinded the "Pharisees" to the presence of $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ in Jesus' ministry and thus caused them to react in judgment rather than in $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$, i.e. conduct and attitude befitting those of the covenant. Rather than seeing God at work in Jesus and rejoicing on behalf of the salvation of the "sinners" as would befit those who could recognize the will of God at work, they could only condemn such conduct on the basis of the Law. Thus Matthew repudiates their incriminating ignorance by introducing the quotation with "go and learn!"

¹9:13a between 9:12b // Mk. 2:17a and 9:13b // Mk. 2:17b; 12:7 follows directly vss. 5f., which are but a further "Matthean" illustration of vss. 3f. // Mk. 2:25f.

Therefore, by inserting Hos. 6:6 into this context addressed to the "Pharisees" Matthew rounds off the pronouncement-story in terms of the conflict between Jesus' ministry and the concerns of his opponents about the Law. In so doing the evangelist does not attempt to justify Jesus' conduct either by distinguishing between the moral/ceremonial Law or by setting forth a pregnant usage of the love-commandment as a hermeneutical principle for the Law. Neither does Matthew intend to programmatically remove the tension between the demands of the Law and Jesus' ministry, since the negative thrust of Hos. 6:6 in Matthew is no more a condemnation of the Law's observance than Hos. 6:6 was an absolute condemnation of the cultic sacrifices. Rather, instead of justifying in any way Jesus' conduct, 19:13a is both a positive declaration about Jesus' own coming and ministry as well as a negative condemnation of the Pharisees because they in their concern for the Law had failed to recognize God's $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ present in Jesus' coming. Consequently, the Pharisees themselves had failed to exhibit $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ --conduct and attitude in keeping with a vital relationship to God.

§2. "Sabbath Controversies:"

12:1-14 // Mk. 2:23-3:6

A. Plucking Grain on the Sabbath: 12:1-7 parr.

The recent discussion of Matthew's treatment of the Sabbath controversies has been quite varied,¹ but

¹E.g. Barth, op. cit., p. 83--"...God is no longer primarily understood as the demanding one, but as the gracious one, the merciful one. Matthew regards the Sabbath commandment as subordinated to the kindness and mercy of God." Hummel, op. cit., pp. 40, 43 sees Matthew as an apologetic attempt to show that the disciples had kept the Law in spite of the Jew's accusations. Strecker, op. cit., pp. 32f., views this in terms of the distinction between the ethical and ceremonial requirements of the Law. Ethically, the disciples were not guilty of breaking the Law. Cf. Kilpatrick, op. cit.,

all are at one in seeing the Streitgespräch solely in terms of the congregation and the Sabbath Law. This is due in part to the foregone conclusion present in recent literature that Mk. 2:23-28 merely reflects the Church's conflict with the Jews over the Sabbath question. Thus any discussion of the problem of necessity involves the Marcan tradition and its Sitz im Leben. However, instead of beginning with Mk. 2:23-28 and using this as our a priori for understanding Matthew, by beginning with Matthew's use of his traditional material perhaps we can draw valuable conclusions for the intent and Sitz im Leben of both accounts.

First of all it should be noted that Matthew follows his Marcan tradition quite closely with the exception of 2:27 which he omits. In 12:1 he inserts a temporal element (ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ καιρῷ) and a comment about the disciples (ἐπεισάγαγον ... ἐτρεῖς), and in vss. 5ff. the first evangelist introduces two further "arguments" based on the Old Testament: the conduct of the priests on the Sabbath (vss. 5f.; Num. 28:9ff.) and Hos. 6:6 (vs. 7). How do these modifications reflect his understanding and usage of Mark?

The temporal specification is obviously stylistic in character,¹ but what about ἐπεισάγαγον ... ἐτρεῖς? If one should take this as an indication of dire need² on the part of the disciples, there would be no further point to the controversy and thus no reason to have added vss. 5ff. since the Scribal teaching also

p. 116, who sees Matthew's concern to lie not in whether but to what extent the Sabbath should be kept. Cf. E. Lohse, "Jesu Worte über den Sabbat," Judentum, Urchristentum, Kirche (Festschrift für J. Jeremias, BZNW, 26, 1964), p. 89.

¹Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 105.

²McNeile, Matthew, p. 169, cf. Bultmann, Tradition, p. 14 on Mk. 2:23ff.; Allen, Matthew, p. 127.

recognized such exceptions to the Law.¹ Nevertheless, it could have been inserted to give a concrete basis for vs. 7. The disciples would then be the objects of ^{3/}ἐλεος, God's loving-kindness rather than his demand.² This suggestion accounts for the addition of ἐπελάτουν and vs. 7, but it leaves vss. 5ff.³ without any point of reference and ignores the "innocence" in vs. 7b. On the other hand, to attribute the modification to simply stylistic considerations in order to align vs. 1 more with the Davidic example in vss. 3f.⁴ would be to take the modifications too lightly. More was at stake than formal principles. By adding this, Matthew was giving expression to the essential parallel between the conduct of David and his companions and that of the disciples. This comparison was inherent to Mark,⁵ namely, both hungered and both assuaged their hunger with what was forbidden.

In Mk. 2:25f. Jesus responds to the Pharisees' accusation against the conduct of his disciples with a counter question based on the Old Testament account of David's behavior in eating and giving to eat of that which was forbidden (I Sam. 21:1ff.). Matthew takes

¹S.-B., I, 624-28. Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 392.; Abrahams, Studies, I, 134. This was, indeed, the way in which the Scribal interpretation explained David's conduct, cf. S.-B., I, 619.

²Barth, op. cit., p. 83; Bornkamm, "End-expectation," p. 31, n.2; Kilpatrick, Origins, p. 116, does not go as far as Barth with reference to vs. 7 as the motivating factor, but sees the addition as a softening of the transgression so that it would not seem so "wanton."

³Barth, op. cit., p. 83, consequently, considers vss. 5f. to have simply been a pre-Matthean part of the tradition which was of no particular significance for his argument.

⁴Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 105; cf. McNeile, Matthew, p. 82, and most recently, Hummel, op. cit., p. 41.

⁵Mk. 2:25, David and his men "had need" and hungered: ἤρεσαν ἐσθῆν ... ἐπελάτουν .

over the same response even though the Marcan material does not correspond in detail with the Old Testament counterpart.¹ Does this reference to David's unlawful conduct actually offer a basis for the conduct of Jesus' disciples? In other words is Mk. 2:23-28 simply aimed at defending the transgression of the Sabbath because of hunger by using an example found in the Old Testament?² From a Scribal viewpoint this would only be justifiable if the lives of the disciples were in danger.³ But, as we just saw, such could hardly have been the intent behind Matthew's insertion of ἐπεὶ ἔλεγον, and it would be even less the case for Mark who does not even make note of the disciples' hunger. If we then take David's unlawful conduct to be a precedent or example of further unlawful conduct then all would be allowed, not simply plucking corn on the Sabbath! This riddle would not be solved by positing the Scribal discussion which placed David's "transgression" also on the Sabbath,⁴ since whether David ate the showbread on the Sabbath or any other day of the week was irrelevant. The disciples were doing what was not allowed specifically for the Sabbath; David had done what was not allowed at any time. Therefore, David's conduct as such could not

¹In I Sam. 21:1ff. the main figures are David and the priest Ahimelech (the error "Ablathar" in 2:26 could have arisen in the traditional development and was omitted by Matthew as a result of the error) with David's men not even entering the scene. Instead of receiving the showbread from the priest (I Sam. 21:2f.), Mk. 2:26 states that David himself entered and took them personally.

²So Bultmann, Tradition, p. 14; and Kümmel, "Traditions-gedanke," ZNW, 33(1934), p. 121.

³Cf. p. 48 n. 1

⁴E. Lohse, "Jesu Worte über den Sabbat," Judentum, Urchristentum, Kirche, p. 82, n. 11. Cf. also S.-B., I, 618f.; and Abrahams, Studies, I, 134. The justification was the fact that David, who was fleeing for his life, was in mortal danger.

have been the tertia comparationis.¹ How then was this reply to defend the disciples' conduct on the Sabbath, or was it?

Matthew, while taking over the Marcan reference to David, has added two further arguments. In 12:5 reference is made to the fact that the priests in the service of the Temple "profane" the Sabbath but are "innocent." Some have taken this along with vss. 3f. as simply another example of the exception to the rule (or Sabbath Law)² without trying to relate it directly to its immediate context. Others have sought the heart of Matthew's "defense" in vss. 5-6, since the Davidic argument did not suffice for him.³ Nevertheless, vss. 5f. alone could hardly suffice any more than vss. 3f. as either a fitting example or a precedent for the disciples' conduct since the work of the priests and the conduct of the disciples were hardly parallel. Barth has considered the element of "urgency" in the service of both the priests and the disciples but admits that even this does not really cover the latter's actions.⁴ Hummel sees here a casuistic principle typical of Scribal rulings, namely the setting of one Law (duties of the priests) over another (the Sabbath regulations).⁵ He combines then vss. 5f. with vs. 7 to have Jesus using the "love-commandment" (vs. 7) over the Sabbath

¹This is even more the case should one attribute this pericope to the creative work of the primitive Church (cf. Bultmann, Tradition, p. 14; Lohse, op. cit., p. 82, et al.). If the Church were seriously involved in a struggle with her Jewish counterparts, such illogical arguments would never have sufficed!

²Kilpatrick, Origins, p. 116; Bornkamm, "End-expectation," p. 37, n. 2; cf. Barth, op. cit., p. 82; Strecker, op. cit., p. 146, n. 2.

³Hummel, op. cit., p. 42.

⁴Barth, op. cit., p. 82.

⁵Cf. S.-B., I, 620ff.

commandment.¹ However, this mistakes the heart of the comparison in vss. 5f. as well as the meaning of vs. 7.

The analogy is not between two different applications of the Law but rather between the conduct on the part of those in the service of the Temple and those in the service of one greater than the Temple. Using the rabbinic argument a miniori, Matthew reaches a high-point with the typological reference to Jesus as the one greater than the Temple. The Temple in which God was present for his People was now superseded--indeed replaced--by God's gracious presence in the person and work of Jesus.² The age of salvation and fulfillment had dawned. Jesus was not setting one law against the other but rather two redemptive orders in a typological relationship to each other. Therefore, whereas the priests could "profane" the Sabbath in the service of the Temple and be innocent, Jesus' disciples in the service of one who was greater than the Temple and for whom they had left all in order to follow him (cf. 19:27 // Mk. 10:28) could also "profane" the Sabbath and remain "innocent" (vs. 7b). Thus rather than an ethical question we have a christological issue at stake. It was not simply a question of whether the disciples were or were not guilty of transgressing the Sabbath,³ rather their "innocence" (vs. 7b) could only be acknowledged from the standpoint of their relationship to one greater than the Temple.

Does not a typological understanding throw light on the previous argument as taken over from the tradition? The heart of the analogy in the example from

¹Hummel, op. cit., pp. 42f. Also E. Lohse, TWNT, VI, 23.

²L. Goppelt, Typos (reprint, 1966), p. 102; Schniewind, Matthäus, p. 156.

³There can be little question about this. They were "guilty" of transgressing the Law, just as David did that which was "forbidden" (vs. 4) and the priests "profane" (vs. 5) the Sabbath!

I Sam. 21:1-5 and the situation of the Streitgespräch would neither be between David's conduct as such and the conduct of Jesus' disciples nor between the needs of the two. The point of contact, rather, would be between David and Jesus, just as the force of the argument in vss. 5f. was between Jesus and the Temple. This is true in spite of the fact that it was the disciples and not Jesus who had transgressed the Law, and is borne out by the pericope by the action of the Pharisees. Although the disciples were the guilty party, the Pharisees accosted Jesus personally (vs. 24 //Mt. 12:2 cf. Lk. 6:2). Such a practice was perfectly logical in terms of the rabbi-pupil relationship which held the rabbi responsible for the conduct of his pupils (cf. 15:1 //Mk. 7:5). Furthermore, the Marcan tradition referring to David has also brought "those with him" into the foreground,¹ although they had been quite secondary to I Sam. 21:1-5. Therefore, the parallel is now between David and what he did with Jesus and what he has done, as well as between the companions of both. In other words, just as David, God's elect had the authority and the freedom to do that which was not allowed and give those with him to eat of that which was not allowed, so Jesus as God's anointed, the counterpart to the Davidic type, had the authority to permit those who had left all to follow him to do that which was not allowed.²

With such a christological motif as found in both vss. 3f. and 5f., this could hardly reflect the situation of a congregation's apologetic struggles with Jewish religious leaders. As Scribal casuistry they would have held no weight in arguments under such circumstances.

¹Vs. 25b //Mt. 12:3-- ὁ μετ' αὐτοῦ ; Mk. 2:26 // Mt. 12:4b-- τοῖς μετ' αὐτοῦ . Whereas Mk. 2:26b has ἔδωκεν καὶ τοῖς σὺν αὐτῷ σῦνεν , Matthew has ἐφ' ὧν rather than the singular ἐφ' ἑνός (vs. 26 //Mt. 12:4).

²Goppelt, TWNT, VI, 19. Cf. Schniewind, Matthäus, p. 156.

However, this still does not explain the usage by Matthew of such a pericope. Is this indication not to be found in the second verse which was inserted by the evangelist?

The heart of 12:7 is the quotation of Hos. 6:6, but it is surrounded by an accusation addressed to the Pharisees: "If you had known (ἐγνώκετε) what this means ...you would not have condemned (κατεδικάσατε) the innocent (τοὺς ἀναιτίους)." As we noted above,¹ the reference to Hos. 6:6 has generally been taken as the normative principle reflecting Jesus' attitude (or Matthew's understanding of it) towards the Law. However, the fact that it has been inserted both times into a context involving primarily christological elements (cf. Mt. 9:12b, 13b) indicates that this too was intended to have christological implications. For Matthew, God in his loving-kindness was at work in Jesus' person and ministry. On the one hand, this was evidenced in the offer of forgiving fellowship to the sinner (9:11ff.); on the other hand in the provision for the needs of those who had left all in answer to the call of discipleship (6:33). This positive thrust is in keeping with the christological motif of vss. 3f., and vss. 5f.

Yet, at the same time, this christological element becomes a condemnation of the "Pharisees," as seen in the introductory and concluding statements (cf. above, 9:13a). These had become so preoccupied by the details of the Law that they have not recognized the will of God at work in Jesus' person. Consequently, they accuse Jesus of associating with sinners and condemn the "innocent" who follow him in discipleship. For the Pharisees, this service on the part of one who was greater than the Temple did not supersede the Law of the Sabbath as was the case with the priests in the service of the Temple. They had failed to recognize the presence of

¹See p. 42, n. 2.

one greater than the Temple, indeed, the Son of Man (vs. 8).

At this point, Matthew's intention behind vss. 5-8 becomes clear. As we have seen, the Sabbath controversy focused--both in the Marcan as well as the Matthean material--on the christological element, the import of Jesus' person. Since the Pharisees had failed to acknowledge him to be who he was, their zeal for the Law led to their final rejection of him (cf. 12:14 // Mk. 3:6). It also, however, led to the rejection of his disciples (vss. 5-7). This was no longer the reflection of a discussion intra muros between the Church and its Jewish counterpart. Instead of apologetic or casuistic traces in the arguments, we have the tone of judgment (vs. 7). It reflects the Jewish blindness to Jesus' person and thus to the conduct of his disciples.

Matthew, therefore, has taken a traditional Streitgespräch with its veiled christological emphasis (vs. 3f.) and rather than modifying its thrust to give it a more casuistic or apologetic color he has clarified the christological element (vss. 5-7). At the same time, by focusing on the Pharisees' condemnation of the disciples (vss. 5-7), the first evangelist also brings out the rejection of the disciples' Lord. Thus for him Jesus in his earthly ministry and the conduct of the disciples both have placed the Jews before the same decisive issue--the claim of Jesus' person. Their reaction to this is seen in the following Sabbath conflict.

B. Healing on the Sabbath: 12:8-14 par.

Matthew again follows his Marcan material and brings a second Streitgespräch pertaining to the Sabbath question (12:8-14 // Mk. 3:1-6). From a purely form critical viewpoint the Marcan account is only an incipient Streitgespräch or, as Taylor has put it, is "...on

its way to becoming a pronouncement-story."¹ The issue at hand remains implicit to the narrative and the actions involved. The only words exchanged between the two sides is Jesus' "counter"-question (vs. 4) to which his opponents remain silent. Instead of leaving the conclusion with the "counter"-question, the narrative concludes with a "biographical" element foreign to the form of a Streitgespräch.² Therefore, even from the standpoint of form one must be cautious in assigning its Sitz im Leben to the debates of the Palestinian Church.³ The content raises even further questions.

In the Marcan pericope after placing the man with a withered hand in the midst of those critically observing in order to gain an opportunity to accuse him, Jesus then raised a twofold question with two alternatives: Is it allowed to do good or evil, to save life or to take it on the Sabbath (Mk. 3:4)? The question was obviously irrelevant. Not only does a withered hand whose healing could have waited another day fail to represent an endangered life, but also if the life of the man were actually in danger, there would have been no cause for the opponents' attitude. The Law made explicit allowance for such cases.⁴ Thus their only response could have been that the question was out of order. Such an apparently irrelevant reply could hardly have sufficed to justify this healing on the Sabbath (cf. vs. 6!), and it could hardly have been used by the

¹Taylor, Mark, p. 220, who views this as originally a narrative which was developing for literary reasons into a Streitgespräch because of its concentration on the Sabbath question.

²Bultmann, Tradition, p. 9, who thus concludes that it is secondary. However, Taylor, Mark, p. 220 and ad loc. argues for its authenticity noting that the pericope itself did not have all the expected elements of a Streitgespräch. Cf. E. Lohse, "Jesu Worte über den Sabbat," Judentum, Urchristentum, Kirche, p. 84.

³Cf. Bultmann, Tradition, p. 9.

⁴Cf. S.-B., I, 623-629; Abrahams, Studies, I, 134f.

Church for setting aside the Sabbath Law. Neither the primitive Church, as supposed source, nor their Jewish opponents with whom they were to have been in conflict could have considered such an argument as valid.¹

Nevertheless, the question was not without reason as seen in the reaction to it. Mark records that the opponents remained silent and that Jesus viewed them in anger because of the "hardness of their hearts" (vs. 5). What could have caused such a response? Quite obviously the question involved more than a self-incriminating reply.² The answer lies in the parallel construction. To save a life which is to do good is the work of God; to take life which is to do evil is the work of Satan.³ The question, therefore, was essentially a veiled reference to the fact that God was at work in Jesus bringing salvation to those who sought his help. As such, the question about Jesus' healing a withered hand was actually one of "life" or "death" and necessitated a decision concerning his person and work. Their response came in the form of silence which reflected their "hardness of heart," their inability to recognize God at work in Jesus because of their concern for the Law. It was just this concern which eventually led them to answer by taking council to put him to death (cf. vs. 6). Therefore, instead of being intended as a casuistic

¹Cf. the "Jewish" coloring of the argument in the Gospel According to the Hebrews in New Testament Apocrypha, ed. by Hennecke and Schneemelcher (Eng. trans., 1963), p. 148. There the man was a mason by trade and healing his hand (right hand) was necessary for his livelihood.

²Such as the question: Do you still beat your wife? In other words, the silence by the opponents was not because the question presupposed the very point they were contesting, namely, breaking the Sabbath (cf. most recently, Hummel, op. cit., p. 45). They could easily have responded to the question's validity.

³Cf. Goppelt, Christentum und Judentum, p. 46; Schniewind, Markus, p. 66; Lohmeyer, Markus, p. 69; C. E. B. Cranfield, The Gospel According to St. Mark,

justification for healing on the Sabbath or a programmatic setting aside of the Sabbath Law, the question of vs. 4 was another veiled messianic claim which demonstrated the conflict between the Pharisees' zeal for the Law and the meaning of Jesus' person and work. It was this conflict illustrated throughout the Streitgespräche of Mk. 2:1-3:6 which led to Jesus' death (vs. 6).

Matthew has taken over the Marcan material but has modified it considerably. Whereas the Marcan pericope focuses on the man with a withered hand, Matthew uses this merely as a framework (vss. 10, 12f!) for a dialogue which he has constructed between Jesus and his opponents. Here the formal elements of the Streitgespräch missing in Mark are added and the narrative takes on the complete form of a Streitgespräch. By putting the question implicit to his tradition into the mouths of Jesus' opponents, Matthew draws the issue quite clearly--is it allowed to heal on the Sabbath? (vs. 10). Jesus' response is also altered. Rather than leaving the matter in the form of a "counter"-question (Mk. 3:4), the first evangelist develops an argument a minori quite similar to that found in the "Q" saying of 6:26 and 10:31.¹ For this argument he inserts an isolated saying from "Q" (vs. 11 cf. Lk. 14:5) and adds the redactional comparison with man (vs. 12a): If one can help a sheep which has fallen into a pit on the Sabbath (vs. 11), then one can certainly help a man who is of greater value than a sheep (vs. 12a). This then becomes the basis for Jesus' direct reply to the question by the opponents in vs. 10 about healing on the Sabbath: Therefore, it is allowed to do good on the Sabbath (vs. 12b).

Taken in isolation, vss. 11-12b give every indication

1959, p. 120; et al.

¹Similar in form and content, since the comparison is between God's concern for the birds and his own: 6:26 // Lk. 12:24 and 10:31 // Lk. 12:7.

of being a "Christian halacha" in character. Beginning with a clear-cut example (vs. 11) the argument moves a minori (vs. 12a) to its culmination in a legal pronouncement (vs. 12b). Consequently, several have concluded that the modification of the Marcan tradition by Matthew was merely an attempt to place a principle by which his congregation could regulate their Sabbath practices in Jesus' mouth.¹ If there were a need for such a principle in Matthew's congregation, this would presuppose either a) a congregation which was so "liberal" towards the Sabbath that its conduct needed curbing in terms of vs. 12b, b) a congregation consisting of strict Jewish-Christians who still carefully observed the Sabbath regulations which Matthew was attempting to "liberalize" with vs. 12b or c) a congregation still a part of the Synagogue but whose Sabbath conduct had brought criticism by the Jews or the stricter members of her number.

The first option corresponds to neither the tenor of Matthew's Gospel nor to the argument constructed in vss. 11f. which presuppose a "strict" rather than a "lax" attitude towards the Law. The third option is ruled out first of all by the insertion of ἁγία following τὴν συναγωγὴν (vs. 9).² This is a solid indication that a split had already set in between the two. Furthermore, if the Church were still within the confines of Judaism and hence following the Jewish

¹Barth, op. cit., p. 79, the "love-commandment" stood as a "positive rule" over the Sabbath Laws as an interpretive principle; Hummel, op. cit., p. 45, "Es legitimiert die Freigabe des Sabbats für die Liebestat gegenüber dem Pharisäismus;" Kilpatrick, Origins, p. 116, views it as Scribal casuistry; Braun, op. cit., I, 70, n. 1, takes it as the elevation of man over the cult and Strecker, op. cit., sees the distinction between ceremonial and moral observance of the Law, pp. 16, 32f.

²Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 110f., on the usage of ἡ συναγωγὴ ἁγία by Matthew as indicative of the split between the Synagogue and the Church. Cf. Goppelt, Christentum und Judentum, p. 183, n. 3; Strecker, op.

interpretation of the Sabbath Law, any discussion among her members or with their Jewish counterparts would of necessity involve the proper use of the tradition. Yet a closer examination of Mt. 12:11 indicates that the so-called Scribal tradition does not even correspond to the "lax" usage of the Jewish interpretation referring to animals which have fallen into a pit on the Sabbath.¹ Whereas the "lax" interpretation permitted aiding the animal in a way so that it might emerge of its own accord, κρατῆσαι αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγερῆν goes considerably beyond the limits of the Scribal tradition. Therefore, an argument with such a basis as vs. 11 would never have been valid in a strict Jewish-Christian community.

The argument against the third option also applies in part to the second. If Matthew had to do with a strict Jewish-Christian congregation whose strict Sabbath observance he was trying to casuistically modify, the "argument" of vss. 11f. would have had no value. In addition this is actually contradicted by his handling of vss. 1-8. As we saw above, Matthew clarified the christological issue latent in the Marcan tradition and also focused attention on the resultant attitude on the part of Jesus' opponents towards his disciples (vss. 5-7). The "disciples" had already "profaned" the Sabbath and did so in view of their relationship to the one greater than the Temple, the Lord of the Sabbath (vss. 6-8). Their conduct on the Sabbath was not ameliorated by Matthew but rather was used as the very

cit., p. 30. Contra, Hummel, op. cit., pp. 28-30.

¹S.-B., I, 629, indicates the appearance of a "strict" and a "lax" attitude in the rabbinic tradition. In the strict view, only feeding and watering of the animal was allowed (cf. Lk. 13:15) but not its removal (cf. CD 11:13); in the more lax interpretation, one could provide articles so that the animal could come out of its own accord with the latter prerequisite being stressed. Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 185; Barth, op. cit., p. 79, n. 3; and Hummel, op. cit., p. 45 follow

ground for condemning the Pharisees (vs. 7ac). Thus it seems rather unusual that Matthew should turn right around and construct a "halachic" argument calling for the conduct which he had just presupposed in vss. 1-8!

To see the issue drawn in vss. 11-12 in terms of either the love-commandment over the Sabbath regulations, man over the cult or even as the moral over the ceremonial Law not only lacks a fitting "Sitz im Leben" in Matthew's congregation, but it also overlooks the fact that Mt. 12:12b is nothing but the positive answer to the unanswered question of Mk. 3:4. This concluding sentence is not to be interpreted out of context as a neutral principle for conduct which one can arbitrarily fill with content.¹ It stands in a definite question-answer relationship to the parallel constructed question which Matthew has inserted deliberately in vs. 10. That such was the case is supported by the argument itself (vss. 11-12) since the conclusion of vs. 12b does not logically follow when taken solely with vss. 11, 12a.² The only way for the argument to reach its culmination is for vs. 12b to have a definite point of reference, and this point of reference is to be found in the Marcan tradition.

Since vs. 11 would hardly be applicable as an argument for a strict Jewish-Christian audience, since the conclusion of vs. 12b does not necessarily follow from vss. 11, 12a, and since vs. 12b is a direct

Billerbeck's suggestion that the less severe interpretation was intended in Mt. 12:11.

¹Cf. Lohse, TWNT, VI, 25.

²Logically, even helping an animal is to "do good," and this would have sufficed for the argument. To help a man who is of greater value than a sheep is logically to do merely a "greater" good. Matthew, however, added vs. 12a to tie the isolated saying of vs. 11 pertaining to an animal into the context of helping (healing) the man with a withered hand.

response to the editorial question of vs. 10 and corresponds essentially with Jesus' reply in Mk. 2:4, is it not more probable that we have here a literary basis for the Matthean modifications rather than a theological one? Matthew's primary concern would have been in bringing together two traditional elements into one context. On the one hand, he had the given Marcan framework of a healing on the Sabbath. On the other hand, he had a "Q" saying which also pertained to the Sabbath and in all probability to healing on the Sabbath¹ (cf. Lk. 14:1-6, and the content of the saying presupposes a similar analogy). In combining these, Matthew has bridged the gap between his insertion of vs. 11 and his tradition in vs. 12b by constructing an argument similar to the two "Q" sayings (6:26 // Lk. 12:24 and 10:31 // Lk. 12:7) which dealt with the comparison between God's concern for man and the birds.

In so doing Matthew not only answers the question

¹It is, unfortunately, no longer possible to trace the history of this and related sayings. Luke has two similar sayings in 14:5 and 13:15. It is possible that these two sayings betray the necessary link between them and Mt. 12:11 which is more related to 14:5. In 13:15 we have a saying pertaining to watering of a young calf or ass which is in need. This corresponds to Scribal tradition, cf. S.-B., I, 629f., II, 199f. In 14:5, however, we have a combination of "son or ox" which falls into a cistern. In this case, the one in need is to be "drawn" out. If, as we saw above, the ox is the one in question, this goes beyond even the "lax" teaching of the Scribal tradition. If, however, "son" is the object, then we have specific references in rabbinic materials applicable to the situation, cf. S.-B., I, 625. Could it not be possible that we have here the confusing of two sayings, both of which were originally applicable to Scribal practice and used against the "hypocrisy" (cf. Lk. 13:15!) in the polemic of the primitive Church (a motif found in Mk. 7:6 and in Matthew's Palestinian tradition, 6:2, 5, 16)? Cf. Lohse, "Jesu Worte über den Sabbat," Judentum, Urchristentum, Kirche, p. 87 and M. Black, An Aramaic Approach to the Gospels, 21954, p. 126 on the possible Aramaic background to the saying in Lk. 14:5.

of vs. 10 (implicit to Mk. 3:2) with the positive reply to the "counter"-question of Mk. 3:4 (vs. 12b), but he rather artificially bases this on the a fortiori argument which he has constructed with the help of a traditional logion (vs. 11:12a). Therefore the thrust of the Matthean account would be basically the same as that of Mark. However, the modifications did soften the direct confrontation of the christological question in Mk. 3:4 and accented more the note of conflict between Jesus and his opponents. It was this very conflict which led to Jesus' death. Following the Marcan tradition, the evangelist completes the pericope with the Pharisees taking council to put Jesus to death (vs. 14) after he had healed the man's withered hand (vs. 13).

C. "Flight on the Sabbath:" 24:20

In light of the above, we can see that 24:20, which was most probably an addition by Matthew (cf. Mk. 13:8),¹ does not reflect the strict observance of the Sabbath Law by Matthew's congregations.² Neither 12:1-8 nor 12:9-14 is any more indicative of a church within the walls of Judaism than are the Marcan parallels. In fact, the Matthean additions (vss. 5-7, cf. ~~23~~24 in vs. 9, and the content of vs. 11) would appear to substantiate the separation between his congregation and the synagogue. Furthermore, to take this as a strict "Jewish"--

¹Strecker, op. cit., p. 18, n. 3, following Loisy and Weiß (cf. Allen, Matthew, p. 256 and McNeile, Matthew, ad loc.) attributes the verse to the more original form of the Jewish-apocalyptic source, which would mean that Mark dropped it. However, the almost verbatim agreement of Mt. 24:15-22 with Mk. 13:14-20 would seem to mitigate against this view. Furthermore, such a strict view of the Sabbath was not characteristic of the Jews either, cf. p. 63, n. 1.

²Contra, Kilpatrick, Origins, p. 116; Bornkamm, "End-expectation," p. 31; Lohse, "Jesu Worte über den Sabbat," Judentum, Urchristentum, Kirche, p. 89 and TWNT, VI, 30.

Christian principle would imply that they had an even more radical view of the Sabbath than did the Jews themselves.¹

On the other hand, it is no longer possible to determine with certainty the intent behind the insertion in 24:20. Without doubt it follows the context and means that the flight on the Sabbath, as in the winter, would bring undue hardship. Schlatter has suggested that a Christian fleeing on the Sabbath would be readily recognized by his Jewish adversaries,² but such would also be the case if they did not observe the Law where they were living and would thus imply a strict observance of the Law otherwise. Perhaps the answer is much more mundane and reflects the Jewish milieu of the evangelist's surroundings, namely, the problem of procuring necessary provisions. The verse immediately preceding vs. 20 speaks of the sudden nature of the calamity, so sudden that one will not even have an opportunity to return long enough to pick up his cloak. Under such circumstances one would have no chance to make provisions for his flight, and a flight on the Sabbath would remove any possibility of getting provisions along the way. The weakness of this suggestion, naturally lies in the remote possibility that the Gospel arose in an area which was so entirely dominated by Jewish surroundings. Thus while possible, the question must remain open. None of the solutions are without question, but the verse certainly does not necessarily reflect religious compunctions of a strict Jewish-Christian congregation.

In summary, therefore, we have seen that Matthew

¹Cf. S.-B., I, 952f., cf. Barth, op. cit., pp. 91f. for discussion.

²Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 706, cf. Barth, op. cit., p. 92.

has taken over two accounts from his Marcan tradition concerning the Sabbath question. In both of these he has expanded his material by use of other tradition and his own composition in order to bring out two particular motifs, namely, a christological aspect of Jesus' relationship to the Law (12:5f. 7b) and the particular aspect of conflict which is heightened by stylistic modifications. This leads us next to the evangelist's handling of the question concerning ceremonial cleanliness and Scribal tradition.

§3. "Things Clean and Unclean:"

15:1-20 // Mk. 7:1-23

Mt. 15:1-20, with the exception of 5:12-14 which involves a "Q" saying, is taken almost entirely from the Marcan tradition. Nevertheless, there are numerous differences--some of greater consequence than others--and all are to be attributed to Matthew's handling of his source. Thus we have an excellent opportunity to compare his view of the issues at stake with that of his tradition. To begin with, whereas Mark has combined three separate traditional units into three loosely related sections,¹ Matthew has compressed, rearranged, and integrated these under the problem raised by Jesus' opponents.² This stylistic modification also affected to an extent the content. Is it, however, possible to determine whether the motivation was theological or stylistic in nature? This necessitates a closer examination of the accounts.

Two of the most significant changes at the outset

¹vss. 1-8, concerning the disciples' conduct and tradition; vss. 9-13, concerning Qorban; vss. 14-23, sayings to the crowd and disciples concerning defilement (for discussion cf. Taylor, Mark, pp. 334, 339, 342).

²In 15:1 they are designated as "Pharisees and Scribes" (anarthrous) apparently in agreement with "the Pharisees and the Scribes" in Mk. 7:5 cf. 7:1--the only place where Mark uses the formula.

are the dropping of the explanatory section in Mk. 1:3f.¹ and the placing of the Qorban question as a direct counter to the Pharisees and Scribes' question (vss. 4-6). Without doubt the first change was for stylistic purposes rather than theological. As has often been suggested, such a detailed explanation and illustration would not have been necessary for Matthew's audience. Since the second modification involved a rearrangement incorporating directly into the reply to the opponents' question an element which was rather loosely attached to it in Mark (cf. 7:8f.), this is also quite definitely a stylistic improvement.

On closer comparison, however, one also notes that the actual question was modified in Matthew. Mark has the more general question which taken literally involves two distinct questions: a) why do the disciples not walk (περιπατοῦντες) according to the tradition of the fathers (vs. 5a) rather b) they eat with ceremonially unclean hands (κοινὰς χεῖρας ἐνθροῦντες)? The problem of eating with defiled hands was integral to the question. The heart of Jesus' reply was a direct attack against the opponents' stress on the Scribal tradition in vs. 5a (cf. the point of the Isaiah quotation and the summary in vs. 8), and the Qorban question (vss. 9-13) is an illustration of how the "traditions of men" (= παραδόσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων) were used contradictory to God's commandment (vss. 9, 13). This reply was aimed directly at the Pharisees and Scribes. In Mark's composition² Jesus then summons the crowd (vs. 14) and responds in a veiled manner (vs. 15) to the subject of defilement

¹A section secondary to the Streitgespräch in Mark, having been added by either Mark or a later redactor. Cf. Taylor (Mark, pp. 334, 339, 342) for a detailed history of the tradition for Mk. 7:1-23 and its handling by others.

²Cf. Taylor, Mark, p. 343 who demonstrates that 7:14 is redactional.

raised initially in vs. 5b. This saying is then explicated later for the disciples (vss. 17-23).

Here we meet a stylistic difficulty. Are vss. 14-23 intended to be an answer to vs. 5b? If not, then the question remains unanswered. If so, why then did Mark construct vs. 14 which changed the audience since the "answer" would actually now be aimed at the multitude. As Taylor (Mark, p. 342) has demonstrated, such a practice of attaching related sayings to "pronouncement-stories" is typical of Mark. Thus 7:14 would be simply a transitional construction and vss. 15-23 would only be thematically related to the question of defilement in vs. 5b and only indirectly and unintentionally "answer" it.

Matthew, in reworking the material, has limited the initial question to the specific inquiry--"Why do your disciples transgress (παράβαλλον) the tradition of the fathers?" (vs. 2a) This is followed by the cause of the question (γάρ) which expands the formulaic construction of Mk. 7:5b (κοινὰς χερσίν) and gives succinctly its contextual meaning (οὐ γὰρ νίπονται τὰς χεῖρας). Thus Matthew does not alter the basic intent or content of the Marcan tradition; rather he simplifies and clarifies it by separating into two distinct (vss. 1-9; 10-20) but related sections (both related to the question in vs. 2) what in Mark was somewhat vaguely and awkwardly connected.

In order to accommodate the rearranged material, the evangelist constructed 15:3 to give Jesus' response and to function as a bridge between the accusation and the Qorban material. To be sure, this verse is not a purely Matthean construction. The content has been drawn from the main thrust of Jesus' reply in Mk. 7:8 and the rather redundant introduction to the Qorban section in Mark (7:9). In both Jesus rebukes the Pharisees and Scribes for their misuse of the very "tradition of the fathers" to set aside God's command.

Matthew has reworded this in terms of his opponents' question¹ and used it as the counter response by Jesus. Just as Matthew's form of the opponents' question is given more precisely in Matthew, so Jesus' counter question has the same precise character (cf. Mt. 15:2f. and Mk. 7:5, 8f.). Nevertheless, the basic content is the same as that of the Marcan tradition.²

One further change is apparent in this section. Instead of beginning the Old Testament command in 15:4 with Μωϋσῆς, ὅς ἐπεν (Mk. 7:10), Matthew has ὁ θεός ἐπεν. Barth has seen this as a "more energetic" contrast between God's commandment and their tradition.³ Yet, this change could also be an attempt to maintain consistency between the illustration in 15:4f. (ὁ θεός ἐπεν / ὑμεῖς δὲ λέγετε) and the change in 15:3 (ἐντολὴ τοῦ θεοῦ / ἡ παράδοσις ὑμῶν), rather than questioning the relationship between ὁ θεός / Μωϋσῆς ἐπεν. The point of contrast is just as strong in Mk. 7:9-13 as in Mt. 15:4-6, but the context of the former tends to detract from it while it is set in bold relief in Matthew's rearrangement.

¹ διὰ τί οἱ μαθηταί σου παραβαίνουν τὴν παράδοσιν
 διὰ τί καὶ ὑμεῖς παραβαίνουν τὴν ἐντολὴν
 τῶν πρεσβυτέρων;
 τοῦ θεοῦ---

²Hummel, *op. cit.*, p. 47 notes that Mark's "tradition of men" is not taken over by Matthew. He attributes this to the fact that the Scribal tradition still had authority for Matthew and his church (p. 47). However, Hummel overlooks the fact that Mk. 7:8 is the climax of Jesus' reply and is formulated in terms of the quotation in 7:7. Elsewhere only the more personal accusation of "παράδοσις ὑμῶν" occurs (cf. 7:9; 7:13) and was probably considered the more appropriate for 15:3 by Matthew. The charge that this was essentially παράδοσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων is still the point of the quotation for Matthew (15:9 "ἐντάλματα ἀνθρώπων") and any subsequent specification in his own words, as in Mk. 7:8, would now be superfluous to the reworked material. Thus the absence in Matthew could hardly have been a deliberate modification of Jesus' reply.

³Cf. Barth, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

By placing the section on Qorban where he does, the first evangelist has the Isaiah quotation following on the charge: "You have annulled (ἠκυρώσατε) the word of God on account of your tradition (διὰ τὴν παράδοσιν ὑμῶν)" (15:6b // Mk. 7:13a). At this point, he returns to his Marcan tradition and concludes Jesus' reply to the Pharisees with Isa. 29:13. To consider this as merely a rebuke against the Pharisees and Scribes because of their ὑποκριτής is to introduce a second element to the context which was foreign to it.¹ Granted that Matthew characteristically changes the less conspicuous "περὶ ὑμῶν τῶν ὑποκριτῶν" of Mk. 7:6b to a prominent, direct address, "ὑποκριταί,"² this in no way means that 15:9 is to be ignored.

Therefore, up to this point Matthew has followed the basic intent and content of his Marcan tradition. Jesus in response to a legal question based on the "tradition of the fathers" rejects the Scribal tradition because, according to Isa. 29:13, it was the commandments of men (ἐντάλματα ἀνθρώπων) and it runs counter to the command of God.³ Stylistically, by rearranging his tradition the evangelist knits the material together more tightly. If anything, one might say that Matthew has given a stronger emphasis to Jesus' response by reversing the Marcan material. In so doing he makes Jesus' answer explicit immediately at the outset, and the point of the quotation from Isaiah follows quite logically as a capstone. In Mark the quotation and thrust of Jesus' reply first receives

¹ Cf. Hummel, op. cit., p. 47.

² Cf. below p. 112.

³ To limit Jesus' rejection of the "tradition" for Mark to its human character, as does Hummel, op. cit., p. 46 (supposedly in contrast to Matthew) is to overlook a) that integral to the accusation in 7:8 was ἀφέντες τὴν ἐντολὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ (7:8a) and b) the introduction and intent behind Qorban (7:9-13).

clarification at the end (7:8). However, there is no difference in theological overtones between Matthew and Mark's portrayal of Jesus' stance toward Scribal tradition.

Having completed his reply to the Pharisees and Scribes, Jesus summons the multitude (Mk. 7:14 // 15:10) and states in a veiled manner that the defiling aspect was what proceeded from man rather than what entered him (7:15). The more general character of Mk. 7:15 betrays its existence as an authentic, isolated saying,¹ and yet it was basically related in content to the question of ceremonial cleanliness raised in Mk. 7:1-5b // 15:2b. Thus Mark has introduced the rather vague saying of 7:15 and its later explication to the disciples (7:17-23)² into the present context because of similar subject matter and not as an integral part of Jesus' reply to the Pharisees and Scribes (7:1-13).

Matthew follows Mark's basic outline but inserts between the saying to the crowd (15:10f.) and the explanation to the disciples (15:15-20) a polemic against the Pharisees (15:12-14). In 15:10 Matthew takes over the transitional verse of Mk. 7:14 indicating a change in audience with the preceding. In 15:11 he simplifies the construction and clarifies the meaning of the saying in Mk. 7:15. Instead of the more general "whatever enters into/proceeds from man," Matthew has the more precise "whatever enters into/proceeds from the mouth" which is in keeping with the initial question introducing the context (15:2b--eating with unwashed hands, cf. Mk. 7:3-5) as well as the subsequent explanation in Mk. 7:19.³ Nevertheless, this again does not differ

¹Cf. Bultmann, Tradition, pp. 77, 84; Taylor, Mark, p. 342.

²Cf. Taylor, Mark, pp. 342f. et al. who relates the explanatory section to the disciples to the Church's discussion and interpretation of the saying.

³To be sure this particular designation runs into

essentially from the content and intent of Mk. 7:15.

Some have suggested that Matthew did not understand the "full" implications of 15:11 which would also set aside the Levitical laws on food.¹ It is also argued that Matthew could hardly have taken over tradition undercutting the validity of the Old Testament Law which had just been the basis of the argument in 15:1-9.² This same apparent contradiction is not "Matthean," since he but repeats his tradition found in Mark (7:8-13, 15).³ Furthermore, the fact that Matthew specified "what enters the mouth" indicates quite clearly that he "fully" understood the implications of the saying. This is also corroborated by the subsequent insertion into the material (15:12-14).

Mt. 15:12 introduces the polemical section against the "Pharisees" and is most probably redactional. Approaching Jesus, the disciples report that the Pharisees had taken offence at Jesus' saying. As Kilpatrick has noted, this turns what had been a controversy into an attack on the Pharisees.⁴ Yet one must not be too quick in passing judgment on the whole of 15:1-20.

conflict with 15:19 since not all of the defiling deeds come "from the mouth." But it does indicate that Matthew considered the emphasis of the saying to rest on what entered the mouth (obviously the less explicit meaning of Mk. 7:15a as seen in the explanation in 7:19). For sake of parallelism he maintained the same designation in 15:11b and even in 15:18b just prior to the apparently contradictory list of 5:19.

¹Bacon, Studies on Matthew, p. 352; Barth, op. cit., pp. 89f.; Blair, Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew, pp. 114f. et al.

²Most recently, Barth, op. cit.

³Indeed, if both the Qorban section and Mk. 7:15 are authentic, as Taylor suggests (Mark, p. 339), then the "apparent contradiction" stems from Jesus himself. The problem of how Jesus could appeal to the validity of the Old Testament on one occasion and yet set it aside on another was not as systematically considered by either Jesus or the early tradition as by later exegetes.

⁴Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 108, 121.

First of all, Matthew consciously followed the transition in Mk. 7:14 (15:10) which indicated a shift from the question of the Pharisees and Scribes discussed in 15:1-9 // Mk. 7:1-13.¹ Secondly, Mt. 15:12b relates the insertion to the preceding by τοῖς ἑσθῶν . This connecting link has only been used elsewhere to refer to a specific statement² and not to particular contexts.³ Furthermore, the insertion of "the Pharisees" at this point is somewhat awkward since the immediate context has Jesus addressing the crowd and the traditional framework has the initial question raised by the Pharisees and Scribes (15:1 // Mk. 7:1, 5). It also would mean that "the Pharisees" understood what the disciples themselves did not understand (cf. 15:16). Thus the insertion here is conditioned primarily by the material of vs. 11 rather than the traditional framework. Matthew attributes the reaction characteristically to Jesus' arch rivals--"the Pharisees."⁴ By registering "the Pharisees'" opposition to Jesus' saying in 15:11, Matthew would not only accurately reflect the Jewish reaction to such a statement by Jesus but also their reaction to the ensuing practice of the Church.

Such an attitude by "the Pharisees" leads to a pronouncement of two judgment sayings. The one (vs. 13)

¹If he had wanted to connect the two and unite them in order to take 15:11-20 as but a second element in Jesus' reply to the Pharisees and Scribes, he would merely have had to drop this introduction.(cf. Mk. 7:16 which Matthew dropped). The appearance of the "Pharisees" in 15:12 does not alter the twofold character of Mt. 15:1-9, 10-20. See below.

²19:11 (although debated, it most likely points to vs. 12); 19:22; 26:44 and 28:15.

³Cf. the familiar plural τοῖς ἑσθῶν in the concluding formulas in 7:28; 19:1; and 26:1 when referring to sections of teaching.

⁴Cf. p. 40, n. 4.

whose source is unknown rejects them as being plants planted by God,¹ a familiar picture for the people of God, and thus are only to be destroyed. The other (vs. 14) is an isolated saying from Q (Lk. 6:39), and its introduction--*ἡμεῖς ἀποκρίνομεν* --indicates Matthew's conviction that "the Pharisees" were a lost cause. Neither saying appears to have any specific relationship to the context of 15:1-20 except as an expression of judgment against "the Pharisees." Thus the reason behind the insertion could well have been the opposition encountered by the practice of the Matthean congregation. In the first section of 15:1-9 // Mk. 7:1-13 the Pharisees and Scribes were condemned as "hypocrites" because of the stress on "their tradition" at the expense of God's commandment; in the second section (15:10-20) they are condemned because of their attitude towards things clean and unclean which go beyond even Scribal tradition and include Levitical laws. The former is in keeping with Matthew's tradition; the latter with the experiences of the Church. Therefore it seems difficult to imagine that Matthew did not "fully" understand the implication of 15:11 or his tradition Mk. 7:15, 17:20.

In vs. 15b Matthew returns to his Marcan tradition in which the disciples themselves inquire about the meaning of the "parable" in 15:11 // Mk. 7:15. As above in vs. 11, the Marcan material is condensed and directed specifically at what enters into and emerges from the mouth (15:16f. cf. Mk. 7:17-20).² As noted above, this

¹Cf. S.-B., I, 720f.; Manson, Sayings, p. 199.

²As in 15:11 cf. 7:15, the reworked Matthean form contains essentially the same material as its traditional counterpart. Granted that Matthew eliminates some of the particular details of Mk. 7:17-20, this can only be understood as a softening of the antithetical character of the tradition (cf. Hummel, op. cit., p. 48) if one forgets that 15:17f. were but an explication for 15:11. To repeat it all, as Mark has done, was not necessary.

could hardly have been understood otherwise than in terms of the Levitical laws and Scribal regulations pertaining to food. The absence of the awkwardly constructed parenthesis in Mk. 7:19b (καθαρίζων πάντα τὰ βρώματα) need not be an argument to the contrary, since Matthew often drops Mark's interpretative material.¹

If then such did not defile one, what especially did? Both Matthew and Mark concur that defilement comes from "the heart" (15:19 // Mk. 7:21). However, they do not concur in detail on the specific examples which coming from the heart do defile man. Whereas Mark has a catalogue of numerous vices (twelve altogether in 7:21f.), Matthew has condensed the number to seven (15:19). Five of Matthew's seven are related to the Decalogue.² All but ψευδομαρτυρία are found in Mark but in a different order. Interestingly enough the same order and essentially the same commandments are found in 19:18 // Mk. 10:19, and three of them were involved in the Antitheses (the "traditional" Antitheses: 5:21f.; 27f.; and 33ff., see below). Thus it could be that Matthew refers indirectly to a catechetical stream which emphasizes the Decalogue³ and uses this as his determining principle for what defiles one.⁴ However, one can not put too much emphasis on this since Matthew does not limit the catalogue of vices found in Mark exclusively to the Decalogue (begins with διαλογισμοὶ πονηροὶ and concludes with βλασφημία --possibly in keeping with his

¹E.g. in Mt. 15 alone; Mt. 7:2ff.; contra Blair, op. cit., p. 116.

²Φόνος; μοιχεύει; πορνεία; κλοπή; ψευδομαρτυρία.

³Cf. G. Kretschmar, "Ein Beitrag zur Frage nach dem Ursprung frühchristlicher Askese," ZThK, 61(1964), pp. 44f., 57. Cf. R. M. Grant, "The Decalogue in Early Christianity," HThR, 40(1947), pp. 1ff.

⁴Cf. Barth, op. cit., pp. 88ff.; Hummel, op. cit., p. 48 and Strecker, op. cit., p. 31--who sees here a distinction between "christliches Sittengesetz im Gegensatz zur Zeremonialgesetzlichkeit."

emphasis on what enters and leaves the mouth, vss. 11, 18).¹ Matthew's major objective here as well as throughout his handling of the Marcan material in 15:1-20 is one of condensing and clarifying his tradition.

This brings us then to the final verse. In Mk. 7:23 the catalogue of vices is summarized (πάντα τὰ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) as that which proceeds from within a man and thus defiles him. The sayings on defilement are concluded with this. Mt. 19:20, however, not only states redactionally that the examples just cited defile a man but also adds redactionally that eating with unwashen hands does not defile one. Does this addition indicate that 19:10-20 was also inherent to Jesus' response to 15:2b for Matthew? That is, Jesus actually gave a twofold reply: a) he rejected the use of Scribal tradition and b) he sets his own interpretation ("halacha") against that of the Pharisees and Scribes.² Strecker has rejected such a conclusion since the contrast for him in 15:20 was between the "Christian" moral Law--rather than Jesus' interpretation--and the ceremonial Law.³ Was 15:20 intended however in the first place to be such a programmatic antithesis?

As we have seen in our examination of Matthew's usage of the tradition, while stylistically compressing, clarifying and integrating the Marcan material the first evangelist has followed its basic content. It was also apparent that Mark had Jesus responding to the Pharisees' question on the tradition of the fathers by attacking the use of tradition itself which was contrary to God's commandment (7:1-13). Yet on the subject of defilement as such, Jesus addresses the crowd and later

¹Furthermore, the use of the Decalogue in 19:18 comes from his tradition, as do the examples in the Antitheses.

²So Barth, op. cit., pp. 87-90 and Hummel, op. cit., pp. 47ff. and Blair, op. cit., pp. 114f.

³Strecker, op. cit., p. 31, n. 1, cf. p. 245.

the disciples (7:14-23). This concerned two related but distinct questions. Matthew does not alter but clarifies this. Indeed he makes the former more emphatic by rearranging the material (15:1-9), the latter he condenses and simplifies (15:10-20). By adding vs. 20b, he merely makes explicit for 15:10-20 and its relationship to 15:2b what was implicit in Mk. 7:14-23 and its relationship with 7:5b, namely defilement comes from the heart of man not from eating with unwashed hands (cf. p. 66). Thus the modification in vs. 20b merely reflects Matthew's binding of the material together thematically and does not necessarily represent a different theological motif.

Therefore, we can conclude that Matthew did modify his Marcan tradition in 15:1-20 cf. Mk. 7:1-23, but this was almost exclusively for stylistic reasons. He followed both the intent and content of Mark on Scribal tradition as well as things clean and unclean. The only real innovation was the insertion of the "Pharisees'" reaction to the latter and their resultant condemnation which could well be a reflection of similar Jewish opposition encountered by the Matthean congregation. Thus the same traits appear which we have seen previously: a) stylistic modifications which clarify and make more precise the thrust of the tradition and b) the motif of conflict with the religious leaders is intensified and their condemnation is expressed (cf. 9:13; 12:7; 15:12ff.).

§4. "Temple Tax:" 17:24-27

This pericope differs with the ones previously discussed in terms of both tradition and style. As has been conclusively demonstrated by the examinations of Kilpatrick and Strecker,¹ this complex represents a

¹Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 42, 44; Strecker, op. cit., pp. 200f.

piece of tradition which had been handed down in oral form until recorded by Matthew. With reference to style, instead of Jesus being approached on the subject by the religious leaders and faced with a polemical question, the collectors of the tax approach Peter with a positive question (vs. 24): "Does your master not pay the didrachma?" The dialogue then focuses around Peter and Jesus about the payment (vs. 25b-26a).

The nature of the analogy would imply that the Temple tax which every male over twenty years of age had to pay¹ was the occasion behind the pericope. The fiscus judaicus did replace the Temple tax as such after the destruction of the Temple and was used to support the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus in Rome,² but the "freedom" of the "sons" applies to the relationship of the early Church as "sons" of God to the Temple and not to Rome.³ Thus, the situation no doubt reflects the primitive Church's debates concerning her relationship to the Temple in that interim stage of her development in which she was no longer bound to the Temple but yet still within the walls, so to speak, of Judaism.

The major question, however, is how this fits into the situation of the evangelist. Bornkamm and his students have taken this as another indication of the Matthean congregation's deep attachment to the synagogue.⁴ As Hummel has noted, it seems most certain from the form and content of the pericope that it was not intended by the evangelist to reflect his understanding

¹Cf. S.-B., I, 762.

²Cf. Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 41f., who contends for this as the background behind 17:24-27.

³Cf. Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 146; Barth, op. cit., p. 90; Hummel, op. cit., pp. 105f. and numerous older commentators.

⁴Bornkamm, "End-expectation," p. 31; Barth, op. cit., p. 90; Hummel, op. cit., p. 105.

of the Law concerning such taxes.¹ The "freedom of the sons" applies to their relationship to the Temple, not to the Law at this point. But is it an expression on his part of such ties to the synagogue? Barth considers this to be established by the very fact that the evangelist has taken the account into his Gospel. Thus he concludes: by adopting these Matthew "...shows that he has no objections in principle to them but agrees with them."² However, the fact that Matthew has recorded this is not ipso facto a basis for suggesting that he either understood it to have the same meaning as initially (cf. 5:19; 23:2f.; 23:23) or that he was in complete agreement with its intent.

Hummel has treated this the most extensively and concludes that Matthew has taken the material over as an expression of his relationship with the synagogue, namely, to keep the doors of the mission open by not giving them an offence.³ After conceding that the heart of the argument in vss. 24-26 applies to the days of the Temple, Hummel hints that it still played an important role for the days after the Temple's destruction. Prior to the destruction of the Temple a refusal to pay the tax would have set the congregation off as a Sect. According to Hummel, this would have been even more the case after the Temple's destruction, since it no longer was a confessional act.⁴ Therefore, the congregation was to continue paying in order to maintain her ties to the synagogue. In other words, he sees two factors involved, a) the "freedom" of the "sons" with

¹Ibid., p. 104.

²Barth, op. cit., p. 90. Barth also combines the passages of 5:23f. with this pericope as an expression of the evangelist's favorable attitude towards the ceremonial Law.

³Hummel, op. cit., p. 105.

⁴Ibid., p. 105.

reference to the cult and the Temple (vss. 25f.) and b) the desire to remain within the synagogue circles (vs. 27).

This argument has several weaknesses. First of all, the petitio principii is that the Matthean congregation is still a part of the synagogue, a position which, as we saw above (cf. 12:5-7, 9, 15:12f.) is not to be posited arbitrarily. Secondly, refusal to pay the taxes in support of the Roman temple of Jupiter Capitolinus could hardly have been more Sectarian than refusal to pay the Temple tax. Thirdly, since the "sons" were only "free" from paying taxes to the Temple, one is left with the anachronistic thrust of the argument in vss. 25f. should the pericope be taken literally as reason for supporting the fiscus judaicus. In fact, this would be one of the major indications that the argument was no longer "valid" for Matthew. The problem can hardly be alleviated by dividing the argument into two parts--vss. 25f. and vs. 27--with the latter being of interest to Matthew. From the viewpoint of tradition this section, although possibly composite, came to Matthew as an oral traditional unit.¹ Furthermore, from the standpoint of content the argument of vss. 25f. concludes with vs. 27. Therefore, it would hardly seem probable to separate the two for Matthew. To suggest that Matthew's concern was that his congregation might lose an entrance to the Jews through "offending" them by discontinuing payment of the tax overlooks the highly provocative elements of his own Gospel (cf. 9:13a; 12:5-7; 15:12ff.; and above all chap. 23!).

Why then did Matthew incorporate this into his account? This would be an indication that Matthew's congregation was still close to those who had struggled

¹Cf. Strecker, op. cit., pp. 200f.; Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 41f.

with the issue of the Temple and its cult¹ as illustrated by the presence of this tradition. The issue was no longer a live one for his congregation especially after the destruction of the Temple, but the tradition was preserved as an expression of the Church's attitude towards the Jewish ordinances and regulations. With the coming of Jesus a new heilsgeschichtliches moment had set in, the old order had been fulfilled and the age of salvation had dawned. Yet, at the same time, the old order was still very much a part of this world, and the "sons of the Kingdom," who were free, were also free to place themselves within this order lest they be an "offence" to those of this world (cf. 5:17, 18, below). Therefore, while no longer directly applicable to the situation of the Temple and its taxes, the pericope contained an important principle for Matthew's congregation, a principle which is also reflected in essence in the evangelist's handling of 5:17, 18 and the Antitheses.²

§5. "The Rich Young Ruler:"

19:16-22 // Mk. 10:17-22 // Lk. 18:18-23

The pericope of the "Rich Young Ruler" is of particular importance because it represents a definite parallel to what we find below in Mt. 5. The pericope has been reworked stylistically and to a certain extent contentwise by Matthew. Stylistically whereas Mark (followed closely by Luke) has basically one question (10:17 // Lk. 18:18) to which Jesus gives a threefold response,³ Matthew breaks the dialogue into four sharply

¹Contra, Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 42, 129.

²Cf. L. Goppelt, "Der Staat in der Sicht des Neuen Testaments," Macht und Recht, 1956, pp. 12f.

³a) 10:18 // Lk. 18:19--directed at the unusual form of address; b) 10:19 // Lk. 18:20--directed at the question itself; c) 10:21 // Lk. 18:22--twofold summons.

defined sections by placing a question at the beginning of each.¹ Generally attention has been focused on the two major changes contentwise: the removal of the attribute "good" from the address as found in Mk. 10:17 cf. Mt. 19:16 and the addition of the question pertaining to τέλειος (19:21). The former has generally been taken to be a result of christological considerations and the latter a product of a two-level ethic on Matthew's part.²

However, are these two content modifications to be taken so independent of each other or do they not along with the stylistic modifications point to one underlying motif for Matthew's reworking of the Marcan passage? Much of recent criticism has rejected the two-level ethic as being the intent behind the evangelist's insertion of the question in 19:21a regarding τέλειος.³ Not only does such a tendency lack any other parallel in Matthew, but the question in 19:17a and 19:21a are essentially the same questions.⁴ This is

¹a) 19:16--basic question; 19:17a--response concerning "the good" and the "One" who is good; b) 19:17b--question restated by Jesus and answered in general; c) 19:18--specific question by the young man and Jesus' reply concerning the Law (19:19); d) 19:20b--following an affirmative response the young man asks a third question which Jesus rewords and answers in a twofold manner (19:21).

²Apart from the fact that this is one of the major passages which has in the past been used as a basis for one of the three evangelical counsels among Catholic theologians, it has also been viewed as indicative of two levels within the Christian community by Protestant exegetes. Cf. Wellhausen, *Matthaei*, ad loc.; B. W. Bacon, "Jesus and the Law: A Study of the First Book of Matthew (Mt. 3-7)," *JBL*, 47-48(1928-29), pp. 224f.; Klostermann, *Matthäus*, p. 158; Braun, *op. cit.*, II, 53, n. 3; cf. G. Kretschmar, *ZThK*, 61(1964), pp. 53-59.

³As Catholic, cf. Trilling, *op. cit.*, p. 192. In particular, Barth, *op. cit.*, pp. 96f.; and Davies, *Setting*, pp. 212f.

⁴Both represent Jesus' rewording of the young man's

further corroborated by vss. 22f. The young man departed sad because his "first" question was not answered, not because he could not make the grade of the "second." This is seen especially in the following discussion about entering the Kingdom in vss. 23ff. Furthermore, although the first alteration has seldom been questioned,¹ there appears to be at least an additional factor behind it besides christological considerations. After all, the christological problem while being toned down in Mt. 19:16f. still remains in part; plus the fact that the present construction of the dialogue is most awkward if seen merely as an attempt to avoid a difficult response on Jesus' behalf.² It would have been much easier for Matthew to have simply dropped the modifier from the address and/or Jesus' corresponding response. Is it not possible to see here traces of an intentional recasting of the Marcan pericope in terms of a rabbinical framework?

There are several minor indications to support this. First of all, we have already noted above the stylistic contrast between Mt. 19:16-22 and Mk. 10:17-22 // Lk. 18:18-23 in which the Matthean account has taken on a more didactic form.³ In addition to this general

questions. The latter's questions set forth the same inquiry--19:16 "what good deed shall I do in order to have eternal life?" cf. 19:20 "what do I still lack" (in order to have eternal life)? Matthew has Jesus reword these (19:17a; 19:21a), and in so doing indicates that to have eternal life necessitated that one be τέλειος (cf. 5:20 together with 5:48).

¹Cf. Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 285.

²Cf. Taylor, Mark, p. 427 attributes the shift from the neuter to masculine to signify Matthew's following of Mark (cf. vs. 16b and 17a). Cf. V. E. Hasler, Gesetz und Evangelium in der alten Kirche bis Origenes, 1953, pp. 21f; McNeille, Matthew, p. 277.

³Cf. p. 79, n. 3 and p. 80, n. 3. Such a treatment of his tradition appears to have been common for Matthew. Cf. 9:13a, 12:5-7; 12:11-12; 15:1-7; 19:3-9--all are directed at someone and involve more discourse.

stylistic modification, Matthew has also reworked the introduction of Mk. 10:17a (cf. Mt. 19:16a) in keeping with his alteration of the "Q" material in 8:19 // Lk. 9:57,¹ a passage which also pertains to "discipleship." This parallel is of importance since these two passages also happen to be the only two of six occurrences in Matthew where the address διδάτκαλε does not appear in the mouth of Jesus' opponents.² As has already been pointed out by others,³ Matthew's usage of this term differs from that of Mark and Luke in that it is never used by Jesus' own disciples or even one seeking his help.⁴ The six occurrences where the term of address does appear⁵ do not imply a derogatory or satirical usage but rather reflect along with the other Matthean usages⁶ the common designation for such a one among the Jews. In other words, to those "outside" Jesus appeared as a teacher or rabbi (διδάτκαλος) with his students or followers (κύριος), but for those who saw him in faith

¹Mt. 8:19 καὶ προσελθὼν εἰς γραμματεὺς εἶπεν αὐτῷ
 Mt. 19:16 καὶ ἰδοὺ εἰς προσελθὼν αὐτῷ εἶπεν
 διδάτκαλε ---
 διδάτκαλε ---

²12:38 cf. Mk. 8:11; 22:16 // Mk. 12:14 // Lk. 20:21; 22:24 // Mk. 12:14 // Lk. 20:28; 22:36 cf. Mk. 12:28. In two other passages the construction ὁ σῖδας καλὸς ὑμῶν is used with reference to Jesus by his opponents--9:11 cf. Mk. 2:16; Mt. 17:24.

³Bornkamm, "End-expectation," p. 41; F. Hahn, Christologische Hoheitstitel, 1964, pp. 76f; Strecker, op. cit., p. 124.

⁴He either strikes the term or omits the passage six times (Mk. 5:35; 9:38; 12:32; Mt. 19:20 cf. Mk. 10:20; 20:20 cf. Mk. 10:35; 24:1 cf. 13:1) or replaces it with κύριε twice (8:25 cf. Mk. 4:38; 17:15 cf. Mk. 9:17). He also replaces ῥαββουνί with κύριε in 20:33 cf. Mk. 10:51 and 17:4 cf. Mk. 9:5 and omits ῥαββί in 21:20 cf. Mk. 11:21.

⁵8:19 cf. Lk. 9:57; 12:38 cf. Mk. 8:11; 22:36 cf. Mk. 12:28; and 19:16 // Mk. 10:17; 22:16 // Mk. 12:14 // Lk. 20:21; 22:24 // Mk. 12:19 // Lk. 20:28. Cf. 17:24 and 9:11 cf. Mk. 2:16.

⁶10:24f. // Lk. 6:40 and 23:8, used by Jesus himself.

as he really was, he was more than simply another δίδασκαλος . He was the κύριος . Consequently, for Matthew, the two men (8:19 // Lk. 9:57 and 19:17 // Mk. 10:17 par.) came to Jesus just as one would have approached a rabbi--the one wanted to become one of his followers (8:19), the other wanted to know what was necessary in order to gain eternal life (19:16). To bring out this background in the former, Matthew introduced the inquirer as εἷς ῥαμματεύς and inserted the corresponding address "διδάσκαλε" (18:18 cf. Lk. 9:57).¹ However, in 19:16 the evangelist found the address δίδασκαλε already in a traditional pericope which presented a scene comparable to what he had created in 8:19. He simply modified the Marcan introduction by dropping the rather urgent character of Mark's account (cf. Mk. 10:16), and instead of inserting the designation ῥαμματεύς (cf. 8:19) he refers to the inquirer as δ νεανίσκος (19:20 cf. ἐκ νεότητός μου --Mk. 10:20 // Lk. 18:21).

Such a motif would not only help in explaining the difference stylistically together with the introduction, but it also gives another possible reason behind the replacement of the adjective ἁγαθός from δίδασκαλε ἁγαθός to τί ἁγαθόν ποιῶ . The address δίδασκαλε ἁγαθός, while common in Greek, was most rare in Hebrew/Aramaic² and certainly would not be characteristic of a situation similar to Mt. 19:16ff. in which one would approach a

¹Cf. Mt. 8:21. In contrast to the one of 8:19, this one is introduced as one of his disciples by Matthew (cf. Lk. 9:59f.) and he addresses Jesus with the title "Lord." Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 82 notes that "ἐτέρος" need not refer back to 8:19, rather it is used "loosely" as ἄλλος .

²S.-B., II, 24f. lists only one parallel from the fourth century for this which in agreement with Dalman, *Worte*, I, 277 is explained to mean "kind." This attribute follows that used of God since the rabbi in question brought rain, an act which generally is attributed to the grace of God. Such a usage is quite remote from

rabbi with a question. However, by transferring the adjective from the address to the question one has both the address as well as a question characteristic of just such a situation. Indeed, the present form of the question could well refer to the Jewish teaching regarding the doing of "good works" which went beyond one's duty under the Law.¹ Thus the modifications focus more on the general situation of the pericope than on specific christological considerations.

If the young man's initial question can be understood in this way, Jesus' response loses some of its awkward character and in fact takes on a specific intent. Since the young man was approaching Jesus as one would a rabbi and since he was asking about a specific good work which might guarantee his obtaining eternal life,² Jesus' reply in vs. 17a might also be seen as an indirect rebuke for such a question. In other words, 19:17 indicates that the question was directed to the wrong individual. Rather than asking a rabbi what good thing one might do in order to obtain eternal life, one should seek the answer from the One himself who alone is good. This, of course, involved doing the will of him who is good, and it was this very facet which Jesus gave in his twofold reply. Thus, while Jesus rebuked the form of the question, he nonetheless answered its essential thrust (19:17b, 21).

Consequently, we have here in Matthew a resetting of the tradition in terms more in keeping with a

Mk. 10:17, as is seen by Jesus' response.

¹S.-B., VI, 536f., 559f., cf. Moore, Judaism, II, 92.

²...ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου... cf. Taylor, Mark, p. 426, who notes the stronger emphasis on attainment through effort in Matthew's alteration of "ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου" (Mk. 10:17 // Lk. 18:18). S.-B., I, 808f. lists several rabbinic parallels to the question which brings out further the "Jewish" character of the pericope in Matthew.

rabbinic situation. Contrary to Matthew's other handling of the tradition concerning Pharisaic Judaism, the polemical aspect is missing. This might well be the result of the content of the material. Rather than approaching Jesus with reference to the Law as such, the young man was seeking "eternal life." Instead of the polemic of the Jewish opposition, this reflects more the positive aspect of the mission situation to the Jews.

Nonetheless, Matthew does not merely intend to re-judaize the pericope, but rather seen in its entirety the reworking of the pericope reflects a theological motif quite similar to that found in Mt. 5:20. The young man represents Pharisaic Judaism both in the formulation of his question as well as the essential content of the question. This portrayal is then confirmed by his positive response to Jesus' demand concerning the Law, an element taken over from tradition. "The commandments" is explicated by a list of five of the Ten Commandments, which Matthew found at hand in his tradition (Mk. 10:19). To this Matthew has added Lev. 19:18. These are set forth as legal requirements which one is to keep, as indicated both by Jesus' response (19:17b) and that of the young man (19:20). At this point, however, Matthew again intervenes in his tradition, and, taking the words from Jesus, he reformulates them as a question by the young man--"τί ἐτι ὑπερέω ?"¹ By so doing Matthew indicates that keeping the Law, in particular those specified by Jesus, was not sufficient in itself for gaining eternal life and sets the stage for Jesus' reformulation of the initial question in terms of τέλειος (19:21). Thus we have here in Matthew's reworking of his Marcan tradition a theological motif

¹Cf. Mk. 10:21--ἐν σε ὑπερέω / Lk. 18:22--ἐν τοῖς λέειπες

quite similar to that in 5:20, 48 with which he introduces and concludes the Antitheses. The "righteousness" of the Scribes and Pharisees which was not sufficient to enter the Kingdom is paralleled by the insufficiency of a young man's keeping of the commandments for obtaining eternal life; this then is followed in 5:48 by the demand for τέλειος which in turn is paralleled by the demand for τέλειος in 19:21.¹

What, however, is the basic thrust behind τέλειος in these two passages (5:48; 19:21)? Seen from a lexical standpoint, it has been all but unanimously conceded that the Greek word is to be understood more from its corresponding Hebraic than its Greek background.² Yet it is not so evident whether the usage is paralleled more by the occurrence of the term in the Essene

¹At this point, our difference with Kretschmar's understanding of τέλειος becomes apparent. For him "discipleship" in the narrow sense of the term related to a specific group who had been called to leave all and follow Jesus and who continued to live on in the "Wanderaposteln, -propheten und-lehrern" of the evangelist's day (ZThK, 61(1964), p. 61). These were the ones to whom τέλειος applied, and Jesus' radical demand as seen in the Antitheses applied to them in particular. Along side of these, were the "rest" of the congregation who followed the "Weg zum Leben" but remained in the "alten Ordnungen." The pericope of the Rich Young Ruler illustrates both. However, as we have noted, the young man did not represent that part of the Church which was still a part of the old order, but his designation of Jesus as *δοκτωρ τοις γραμμαις* and the further reworking by Matthew casts him in the mold of Pharisaic Judaism. τέλειος and the call to discipleship do not apply to a part of the Church. They are the very essentials for entering the Kingdom (5:20, 48; 19:16, 21) demanded of all.

²Cf. Braun, II, 53, n. 3 as an example of a recent exegete who still maintains the Greek background for 19:21. This is partially the result of Braun's viewpoint that 5:48 is "primary" and 19:21 is "secondary." Yet as we note below 5:48 appears to be secondary as well, i.e. both appear to have been introduced into the traditional material by Matthew, cf. pp. 133f.

writings¹ or in the Old Testament.² An examination of the appearance of *τέλειος* in the LXX reveals that it is relatively infrequent and generally is the translation of two Hebrew words--אֱלֹהִים³ and מֵאֵשׁ.⁴

Du Plessis has recently made an extensive examination of the meaning of *τέλειος* in the LXX by considering not only the passages where *τέλειος* occurred but also the basic meaning of the Hebrew words behind it.⁵ The Hebrew אֱלֹהִים has a twofold usage, according to Du Plessis: a) a "cultic and quantitative" meaning which "...strives to convey wholeness, entirety and intactness..." of objects,⁶ and b) a "personal qualitative" meaning which characterizes one's entire existence before God.⁷ It is the latter which has to do with the LXX translation of *τέλειος*, and it accentuates the wholeness or solidarity of the individual in his relationship before God and his fellowman.⁸ Whereas this usage of *τέλειος* places the emphasis on one's "wholeness" in his relationship to others, it is not amoral,

¹Barth, op. cit., pp. 98f.; J. Gnilka, "Die Kirche des Matthäus und die Gemeinde von Qumran," BZ, n. f. 7 (1963), pp. 59ff.; Davies, Setting, pp. 208-215.

²This has been the position of the older exegetes who sought a Semitic background for the term, cf. Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 197; Schniewind, Matthäus, p. 73; Allen, Matthew, p. 56 and McNeile, Matthew, p. 73. Ljungman, Das Gesetz Erfüllen, pp. 89ff. and Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 194 represent two more recent exegetes who find the background to be the Old Testament.

³Gen. 6:9; Ex. 12:5; Deut. 18:3; II Sam. 22:26.

⁴Judges 20:26; I Kings 8:61; 11:4; 15:3, 14; I Chron. 28:9.

⁵P. J. Du Plessis, ΤΕΛΕΙΟΣ: The Idea of Perfection in the New Testament, (1959), pp. 94-103.

⁶Ibid., pp. 94f. *τέλειος* is used in only one passage (Ex. 12:5) with this meaning, otherwise (ca. 60 times) is the usual translation of the LXX.

⁷Ibid., pp. 95f. This is seen in particular by the LXX's choice of adjectives to translate מֵאֵשׁ along with *ἁγίος*: *ἁγιος*, *ἁκακος*, *ἀληθινός*, *δικαίως*, *ἐνθούσιος*, *ὁσιος* and *τέλειος*.

⁸Du Plessis puts it so: "In this sense of an integrate fellowship governing the life of each within the community in all its aspects, telios serves as a translation for and assumes the innate meaning of tamim," op. cit., p. 97.

since "requiring full proportion entails living in harmony with true standards."¹ The same is true of the second Hebrew word behind the Septuagint usage of *τέλειος*. With the exception of Judges 20:26² and Jer. 13:6 these references are all combined with *Kap Seā* "...asserting a wholehearted allegiance to the Lord."³ This "wholeheartedness," however, is also not an abstract relationship to God; rather it also expressed itself in corresponding conduct.⁴ Consequently, one can summarize the LXX usage of *τέλειος* by saying that it refers to the wholeness, completeness of the individual as seen particularly in his dynamic life relationship before God, a relationship which in its very nature also involves a moral aspect.⁵

In the Essene writings *ד' אן* plays a very important role⁶ and refers specifically to the "personal qualitative" side as found in the Old Testament usage.⁷ This is seen in particular in that it most frequently accompanies the verb *אן* and the corresponding noun *אן*, i.e. as being characteristic of their manner of life.⁸ However, there are several different nuances in the use of *אן* here as compared with the Old Testament.⁹

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

² Judges 21:4 is similar but only occurs in a few mss.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 99. Cf. I Kings 8:61; 11:4; 15:3, 14; I Chron. 28:9.

⁴ Each of the references make this quite clear: e.g. I Kings 8:61 "...to walk in his statutes and to keep his commandments;" 11:4--"...his wives turned away his heart after other gods and his heart was not perfect with Jehovah his God;" 15:3--"...he walked in all the sins of his father..., and his heart was not perfect with Jehovah his God."

⁵ It is important to note that the moral facet is not the primary thrust of *τέλειος*. Rather it is an integral but secondary aspect.

⁶ 1QS--18 times; CD--7 times; 1QM--2 times.

⁷ Du Plessis, *op. cit.*, p. 104 points out that the predominant Old Testament usage in the "cultic and quantitative sense is lacking in these writings.

⁸ Cf. Braun, I, 26, n. 3; p. 101, n. 5, for a breakdown of the occurrences of *אן* in 1QS and CD. It occurs only one time as an absolute (1QS 3:3) without being directly qualified by a modifier relating in some way to either conduct or holiness. The exception of 1QS 3:3 along with the phrase (1QS 8:9) "house of perfection" are also most certainly to be understood in this manner.

⁹ Du Plessis, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-115; cf. Barth, *op. cit.*, pp. 98f.

One stands out especially. Whereas both bring out the aspect of wholeness, the Old Testament stresses more the wholeness and integrity of the person in his relationship before God but the Essene writings accentuate the conduct in complete obedience to the totality of the Law as revealed to the community.¹ Therefore, since this involved a certain epistemological exclusiveness, the term became a specific designation for the members of the Sect and excluded by definition all those outside it.

Which, if either of these represents the background for the Matthean usage? First of all, it should be noted that Matthew's construction in 5:48 is without parallel in either the Old Testament² or the Essene writings, indeed as Percy has noted, even in all Judaism.³ Consequently, the first evangelist was not attempting to align it with any familiar passage but rather was motivated by his own interest in τέλειος / τέλειος as a conclusion to 5:20-47. Thus it would be

¹Braun, II, 43, n. 1, has summarized it: "Denn Ἀ'Α'Λ-verbindungen des Man. und der Dam. meinen einen sämtlichen Vorschriften umfassenden bzw. einen besonders auf kultische Korrektheit ausgerichteten Wandeln...."

²Whereas Deut. 18:13 offers a command to be τέλειος before God, it does not base the command on God's perfection. Furthermore, the usage of Lev. 19:2 as the backdrop for 5:48 overlooks two important factors: first, ἁγιος and τέλειος are not simply interchangeable concepts (ἁγιος was never used for either Ἀ'Α'Λ or Ἀ'Α'Ω in the LXX). While the Old Testament frequently attributes holiness to God, it never uses Ἀ'Α'Λ of his person. Had Matthew had Lev. 19:2 in mind, he most certainly could have retained the adjective ἁγιος / ἁγιος. Secondly, as will be noted below, 5:48 was already structured in the tradition found by Matthew in "Q" (Lk. 6:36). He did not create it by taking the pattern from the LXX of Lev. 19:2 nor did he place it here from another context. Rather he simply changed the words οἰκτιρῶν / οἰκτιρῶνες for τέλειος and placed it in relationship with what preceded rather than what followed (as in Lk. 6:37ff.). Therefore, although Lev. 19:2 and Mt. 5:48 appear similar in form, the structure is not in any way due to the reworking on the part of Matthew.

³Percy, op. cit., p. 163--"...So findet sich nicht ausdrücklich der Gedanke, daß wir in irgendeiner Hinsicht Gott in Vollkommenheit gleichen sollen."

fairest to seek to determine from the evangelist's own work what he intended rather than to begin from outside and superimpose one's findings upon the text.

Apart from the root meaning of the Semitic term pointing to wholeness or completeness, we also have indications in the Matthean reworking of the material which show that this was an important consideration in his choice of the term. To begin with, 5:48 follows closely on the contrast $\tau\acute{\iota}$ $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\sigma\sigma\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ ποιεῖτε in 5:47, and it serves as the concluding note of the section 5:20-48 with its counterpart being 5:20. The section was introduced by a demand for a righteousness that exceeded by much ($\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\sigma\sigma\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$... $\pi\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\omega\omega$) the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, and it concludes by a demand for $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma$. Thus $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma$ and $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\sigma\sigma\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ are brought together materially. The same holds true for 19:19f. Instead of $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\sigma\sigma\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ / $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\sigma\sigma\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ Matthew uses the traditional material with $\upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ (cf. Mk. 10:21) to lead into the usage of $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma$. Therefore, without doubt $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma$ in both 5:48 and 19:21 was intended to reflect its formal meaning of "wholeness."

It can hardly be doubted that the moral aspect was involved as well. This is seen particularly from the present contexts into which Matthew has introduced the term. In both cases it accompanied a summons to conduct in keeping with Jesus' demand (5:21-47; 19:19, 21). This raises then the question of how the demand for $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma$ corresponds to the demand for a certain conduct. For some $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma$ is but the designation for those who fulfill Jesus' demand for conduct, a demand which is but an "intensified" and "radicalized" interpretation of the Law.¹ This is simultaneously the specific meaning of the discipleship demanded in 19:21.²

¹Bornkamm, "End-expectation," p. 29; Barth, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-101.

²Cf. Bornkamm, "End-expectation," p. 29; Barth,

Others also see *τέλειος* as the fulfilling of the Law, but this time it is the Law as properly understood by Jesus.¹ In both cases the emphasis falls on the conduct of the would-be disciple respective of Jesus' approach to the Law.

However, as will be seen,² 5:21-47 is not to be seen as merely a radical interpretation of the Law nor as a new or proper understanding of it.³ The same holds true for 19:21. The demand to sell all and give to the poor can hardly be either a deeper understanding of the implications behind the second half of the Ten Commandments (cf. 19:19 par.)⁴ or a radicalization of the love-commandment which Matthew has inserted into his tradition in 19:19.⁵ The force of the first half

op. cit., pp. 102f., "The following of Christ and the radical fulfillment of the Law are one and the same."

¹Trilling, op. cit., pp. 193ff., "Halte die Gebote, aber in vollkommener Verwirklichung." Hasler, Gesetz und Evangelium, p. 22, "Für Matthäus ist das Neue, das Jesus bringt, das recht verstandene Alte."

²See pp. 117-215.

³Neither can 5:48 be understood solely from its immediate context of 5:45-47. So taken 5:48 supposedly reflects the wholeness of conduct exemplified by the Father's non-discriminatory grace in 5:45 and contrasted by that of the tax-collectors and Gentiles in 5:46f. By limiting the verse to the immediate context (5:43-47), when in actuality it is the summary conclusion to the essential thrust of 5:21-47, this view puts primary emphasis on what was secondary in the demand of 5:48, namely, on conduct. See further below.

⁴This is expressed but much more explicitly than in Matthew by The Gospel According to the Nazareans, Hennecke (Eng. trans., 1963), pp. 148f. Here Jesus' demand (Mt. 19:21) is the explication of the "Law and the Prophets" which are summarized by a radical expression of the love-commandment.

⁵On love-commandment, see below, pp. 94-103. The fact that Matthew also has introduced the love-commandment into the immediate context of 5:48 (vs. 43) was conditioned by his tradition which he had reworked (cf. pp. 133f.) rather than any inherent relationship between this particular commandment and *τέλειος*.

of Jesus' demand in 19:21 was but the essential step to discipleship for the young man.¹ This raises anew the question of how discipleship was related to Jesus and the Law for Matthew. Are the following of Jesus and the radical fulfillment of the Law one and the same for Matthew?² Such an understanding of τέλειος as that above confuses the demand for τέλειος with the demand for conduct found in the same context.

To be sure, the two demands are integrally bound up with one another, but they are by no means identical. Rather than being the constituent element, the specific conduct demanded is the by-product of the demand for τέλειος, more along the line of the Old Testament rather than as in the Essene writings.³ The demands for conduct in both 5:21-47 and 19:21b went considerably beyond that required by the Law. It was a conduct which presupposed a new relationship between the individual and God issuing simultaneously in a new interpersonal relationship with others, a relationship which was characterized by "wholeness" and integrity--τέλειος. Such a relationship becomes explicit in the appeal to sonship in 5:45, 48 as well as in the demand for total surrender and discipleship in 19:21.⁴ In other words, Jesus responded to the young man's question (19:21a) in a

¹This is seen particularly in the conversation following in vss. 23ff. which indicate that riches were the stumbling block in his case preventing him from discipleship.

²Bornkamm, "End-expectation," p. 29; Barth, *op. cit.*, pp. 102f. Cf. Hasler, Gesetz und Evangelium, p. 22, "Nachfolge ist Nächstenliebe, darum Gesetzeserfüllung." Cf. Kretschmar, ZThK, 61(1964), pp. 55, 59.

³This is borne out further by the fact that τέλειος occurs here in an absolute usage and not as a compound form as found in Qumran.

⁴That the relationship to God also involved one's relationship with his fellow man here as well as in the Old Testament is seen in 5:45-47 (be he friend or foe) and in 19:21 (where it involved the poor).

fashion similar to 5:48 as the conclusion of 5:20: Entrance into the Kingdom vis-a-vis to have eternal life demanded that one be τέλειος --i.e. that one's entire life before God be characterized by a "wholeness" which expresses itself in specific conduct towards his fellow man. Although the term corresponds in part with the Old Testament נָאֵם / τέλειος , the nature of the resultant conduct which was demanded (19:21b; 5:21-47) indicates the essential character of this new relationship. It was a conduct which exceeded by far the Law's requirements, a conduct which was in keeping with the presence of the age of salvation.

Once again we discover a connection between 5:20-48 and 19:16-21. In the former, Matthew has the Sermon directed specifically at men who were already disciples (5:1), men who had already been summoned to leave all and follow Jesus (cf. Mt. 19:27ff. par.). Thus he could conclude the Antitheses with a demand which gave expression to this new relationship (5:48) and which was the underlying basis for the preceding six demands for specific conduct (5:21-47). In the latter, however, one who was not a disciple was involved. Consequently, the evangelist not only reworked the initial question about gaining eternal life by equating it with the demand for τέλειος , but he also made the demand even more explicit through the call for discipleship.

The "act" of discipleship itself, however, was no more identical to τέλειος than was the conduct which was demanded prior to the actual discipleship (19:21b). But Matthew could address the demand for τέλειος specifically to Jesus' disciples (5:48) as well as lay down discipleship as a constituent element of τέλειος (19:21) since God was at work in Jesus' person. Allegiance to Jesus' person was an expression of total surrender to God, an expression of the new relationship and conduct characteristic of the age of salvation and brought to

pass in the heilsgeschichtliche fulfillment of Jesus' person and work (see below, 5:17, 18d).

§6. "The Love-Commandment:"

22:34 // Mk. 12:28-34; Lk. 10:25-28

In many of the recent works on Matthew the love-commandment has become the controlling factor in understanding the evangelist's approach to the Law. Some have seen it as his principle for interpreting the Law;¹ others have viewed it as the summary of Jesus' demand for Matthew.² That the commandment played an important role for Matthew is not to be doubted since he has inserted Lev. 19:18 into 5:43 and 19:19 and has declared the "Golden Rule" (7:12) and the love-commandment (22:40) to be the summary of the "Law and the Prophets." Yet to say that it was important to him and to determine its meaning and usage for him are two entirely different matters.

Beginning with 22:34-40 we find that Matthew has once again reworked his Marcan tradition.³ It is possible that we have traces of a "Q" tradition in the opening scene,⁴ but the other differences can all be

¹E.g. G. Bornkamm, "Das Doppelgebot der Liebe," (Festschrift für Bultmann, 1954), p. 93 and "End-expectation," p. 31; Barth, op. cit., pp. 136f., 147, although he is more cautious than the others in his expression of this. For him, this also involved the norm of the moral Law in contrast to that of the ceremonial Law (pp. 135, 137, 147).

²Cf. E. Schweizer, "Matthäus 5:17-20," Neotestamentica, pp. 405f.; and Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 204, sees it as the "Mittelpunkt für die matthäische Paränese."

³There is no real reason to assign Mt. 22:34-40 and Mk. 12:28-34 to two separate traditions, as has Bornkamm, "Das Doppelgebot der Liebe," p. 93.

⁴Cf. McNeile, Matthew, p. 326 and Strecker, op. cit., pp. 135ff. for discussion. There are some verbal parallels but only $\delta \nu\omicron\mu\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ is otherwise foreign to Matthew: $\nu\omicron\mu\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ (only here in Mt.) cf. Lk. 10:25; $\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\upsilon$ cf. Lk. 10:25; $\sigma\iota\sigma\alpha\kappa\alpha\lambda\epsilon$ cf. Lk. 10:25; $\epsilon\upsilon \tau\omega \nu\omicron\mu\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ cf. Lk. 10:26.

attributed to Matthew. He prefaces the complex by introducing Jesus' arch rivals, "the Pharisees," into the scene (vs. 34). One of them, a "lawyer" ($\delta \gammaορμικὸς$ // Lk. 10:25), approaches Jesus in order to "tempt" ($πειράζων$) him (// Lk. 10:35), addresses him as "teacher" ($\deltaιδάτωκε$ // Lk. 10:25) and asks concerning "the great commandment in the Law" (vss. 35f.). These changes all serve to set the pericope in an anti-Pharisaic light in contrast to the Marcan Scribe who comes to Jesus apparently with a serious intent.¹ Furthermore, as we saw with the Rich Young Ruler, this introductory element also corresponds in detail not only to Jewish practice but also to an actual Jewish question.²

The question itself differs in form from that of Mk. 12:28. Whereas Mark's account has a question concerning the ἐντολὴ πρώτη πάντων, Matthew has ἐντολὴ μεγάλη ἐν τῷ νόμῳ. Nevertheless, the content of the two questions is the same. As Taylor has pointed out, the rather awkward Marcan construction is quite probably an "example of translation Greek to represent the Semitic use of the positive for the superlative...."³ Matthew would then be the more literal rendering of the Semitic usage and it most likely would imply the superlative force.⁴ The addition of ἐν τῷ νόμῳ by Matthew may have a parallel in the "Q" question of Lk. 10:29 ("What is written in the Law?"), but it could also be simply a redactional addition to make the question more

¹Cf. Mk. 12:34, "You are not far from the Kingdom of God." Although the exact meaning of this has been much debated, it certainly places the Scribe in a different light than the one of Matthew.

²Cf. S.-B., I, 902-905 and Abrahams, Studies, I, 23-26 for examples.

³Mark, p. 486.

⁴Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 655; Abrahams, Studies, I, 24; McNeile, Matthew, p. 325; Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 179, et al.

precise in keeping with the person of the questioner (ὁ νομικός).

Jesus' reply in Matthew (vss. 37-39) is basically the same as that of Mark (vss. 29-31a). There are two noticeable differences which are most likely stylistic in character. First, Matthew drops the opening section of the Shema found in Mk. 12:29 and focuses directly on the commandment itself.¹ Secondly, whereas Mark has prefaced the commandment with Jesus' response to the question (vs. 29a), Matthew places it immediately following the commandment (vs. 38). The reason for this is seen in the fact that he has added the πρώτη from the Marcan material in order to move more smoothly to the "second" commandment of vs. 39. In this manner the first evangelist combines harmoniously the two commandments which stand more or less side by side in Mark lacking any bridge between them (cf. vs. 31a). His particular emphasis on Lev. 19:18 comes to light by his equating of the two commandments (ὁμοία ἀντὶ). The next major difference between Matthew and his Marcan material comes with the concluding sentence. In Mk. 12:31b Jesus concludes by saying that no other commandment was greater than these. Mt. 22:40 closes on a positive note by saying that the "whole Law" (ὅλος ὁ νόμος) and the Prophets "hang" (κρέμονται) on these two commandments.

Thus we see that the distinctive Matthean elements focus around the introduction (vss. 34-36) and the conclusion (vs. 40). In the former we noted that Matthew had introduced in a manner rather characteristic of him an anti-Pharisaic element (vs. 34). This is strengthened by the use of πλεγμαῖς to describe the "lawyer's"

¹Most probably in view of the Jewish background of his audience which would have made the presence of the Shema unnecessary (cf. Bornkamm, "Das Doppelgebot der Liebe," p. 93).

intent for coming to Jesus. By introducing the pericope in this way, Matthew aligns it with the immediate context in which Jesus had been approached by the various groups of the Jews, each with their own characteristic question: a) 22:15-22 parr. the Pharisees and the Herodians (their only appearance in Matthew) ask about paying tax to Caesar; b) 22:23-33 parr. the Sadducees ask about the resurrection; and c) 22:34-40 par. a "lawyer" of the Pharisees now asks about the greatest commandment in the Law. The context then ends for Matthew by Jesus directing a question at the "Pharisees"¹ which they cannot answer, a significant contrast to Jesus' replies to the three previous questions. Consequently, Matthew continues the note of conflict which he had found preceding this pericope. One must keep this in mind when examining the thrust of the pericope for Matthew.

The conclusion of vs. 40 has given rise to much discussion over Matthew's intent. The phrase "the Law and the Prophets" occurs four times in the first Gospel² and twice in Luke.³ From a purely lexical viewpoint the phrase represents the Old Testament scriptures as such, or at least that part which was read in the Jewish worship services.⁴ However, we see two different emphases in the Matthean usage.⁵ In 7:12 and 22:40 Matthew introduces this just following the two

¹Cf. Mk. 12:35ff. the question about David's son which follows is raised during Jesus' teaching in the Temple, and it did not point out a direct counterpart as in Matthew. Mt. 22:46b concludes with what Mark had used to conclude 12:34b.

²5:17; 7:12 cf. Lk. 6:31; 11:13 // Lk. 16:16 ("Q"); and 22:40 cf. Mk. 12:31.

³Lk. 16:16 is a "Q" reference and 24:24 has the word "Psalms" added.

⁴W. Gutbrod, TWNT, IV, 1051 and Moore, Judaism, I, 236-240.

⁵Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, pp. 173f.

commandments which were of particular interest to the early Church, the "Golden Rule" and the love-commandment.¹ Thus one can not avoid the accent on the "normative" aspect of the Scriptures in this usage. This is supported even more by the way in which Matthew has arranged his sentence: ὁλος ὁ νόμος κρέμνεται καὶ οἱ προφῆται. However, the phrase also points to the "revelatory" aspect of the scriptures. This is particularly clear in 11:13 where Matthew's reworking of the material betrays his emphasis: πάντες οἱ προφῆται καὶ ὁ νόμος ... προφῆτευσαν. The same is true of 5:17 (see discussion below).

If then the force of 22:40 is to relate the two love-commandments to the "normative" aspect of the Old Testament, how is this done? The answer lies with the verb κρέμνεται. On the one hand, the verb could possibly reflect a technical rabbinic usage comparable to וְיָצַח² and would mean that the whole Law could be deduced exegetically from these two commandments. As such Matthew would not be saying anything essentially different from that of Rabbi Aqiba.³ The emphasis throughout the pericope would not be on the importance or unimportance of the commandments but on their being fundamental principles from which the whole Law could be derived.⁴ However, this understanding of the verb and of the pericope overlooks the strong polemical element which Matthew deliberately used to introduce this complex. It would be rather incongruous for him to have responded in vs.

¹Cf. not only "Q" but also the Did. 1:3. Cf. Bornkamm, "Das Doppelgebot der Liebe," p. 86 and Kretschmar, ZThK, 61(1964), pp. 44f.

²S.-B., I, 907f.; Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 657; Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 206.

³Cf. Sifra on Lev. 19:18, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself: R. Aqiba said, This is the greatest principle in the Law (הַדָּבָר הַגָּדוֹל בְּתוֹרָה זוֹ)," quoted from Abrahams, Studies, I, 20.

⁴Cf. Abrahams, ibid., p. 24 for rabbinic parallels.

40 with a statement which would have nullified his introduction in vss. 34f.

If, on the other hand, we take the verb in a figurative but non-technical usage, Κρεμναι could have been used to set forth a dependent but not derivative relationship between the two commandments and the "normative" aspect of the Old Testament scriptures. Rather than an exegetical relationship such as that between the hala-choth and the Law or the rabbinic character of fundamental-derivative laws, this picture would exhibit a relationship of total dependence such as a door on its hinges¹ or objects hanging on a nail.² The love-commandments were not the "essence" (Inbegriff) of the Law³ but rather the sine qua non of the Law. By placing such emphasis on these two commandments Jesus not only set them apart as the "greatest" in the Law, but he did so since they were, according to Matthew, the pivotal points of the Law. To single out two laws in such a manner would have been most disturbing to a "lawyer" of the Pharisees. No law or group of laws was ever accorded such absolute precedence over the others by the Jewish teachers of the Law.⁴

If this be the case in 22:40, Matthew would not only have set the love-commandments in a situation reflecting the Jewish opposition to such teaching (vss. 34f.), but he also captured the thrust of the love-commandments reflected in Mk. 12:32-34 and Lk. 10:28. In each of these the love-commandment is seen as the absolute demand of the Old Testament which expressed above all one's relationship before God as well as his

¹Bauer, ad loc.; Bornkamm, "Das Doppelgebot der Liebe," p. 93 and Barth, op. cit., p. 78.

²Bertram, TWNT, III, 918f.

³Bornkamm, "End-expectation," p. 31 and Barth, op. cit., p. 78.

⁴Cf. Abrahams, Studies, I, 20-29.

relationship with his fellow man. Such a demand, however, can be taken both apodictically and casuistically as evidenced by the Lucan sequel concerning the good Samaritan, the starting point of which was the "lawyer's" attempt to evade through legal casuistry the thrust of the commandment: "Who is my neighbor?" (Lk. 10:29).

This twofold aspect is also apparent in the Matthean material. His usage of the love-commandment is characterized by a certain tension. On the one hand, as we have just seen^{that} it and its correlate, the "Golden Rule," are given by Jesus as the epitome of the "Law and the Prophets." Yet, on the other hand, the first evangelist has inserted Lev. 19:18 twice into material (5:43; 19:19) to represent the Old Testament Law as countered by Jesus' own radical demand (5:44ff. // Lk. 6:27f. and 19:21). Is this not self-contradictory? The answer is in the difference of perspective and reflects the Matthean understanding of the "Law."

In the first case, Matthew inserted^{Lev.} 19:18 into 5:43 to form the premise for the antithesis of Jesus' radical demand (5:44ff.).¹ Yet this Old Testament passage was inserted with an additional clause--"and hate your enemy"--which characterized the legal aspect of the love-commandment" as given and practiced in both the Old Testament as well as in Jesus' day (cf. 1QS 1:4f.). The misuse of this as legal casuistry is reflected above all in the Scribe's question of Lk. 10:29--"in order to justify himself." Jesus breaks through national and religious barriers by demanding a love for all--even for one's enemies (5:44ff.). This demand is based in 5:45 on God's own example as the Creator who sends his rain and sun for the just and the unjust, the good and the evil. As Goppelt has pointed out, this reference to the order of creation (cf. 19:3, 8) was neither

¹For further discussion see below, pp. 193-200.

Stoic nor popular religion. Rather the order of creation pointed beyond itself, not backwards to paradise, but "forwards" to the age of salvation. Since Jesus' ministry represented the presence of the age of salvation in his person and work, such a radical demand takes on practical rather than utopian meaning.¹

As we saw above, the same was true in 19:18-21. The evangelist again has inserted Lev. 19:18 into a context, this time with commandments from the Decalogue, in which the Old Testament commandments were taken in terms of their legal implications. This is seen by the young man's response--"I have kept all these." Jesus then counters with his radical demand for him to sell all his possessions, give the proceeds to the poor and come follow him. Jesus was demanding conduct not contradictory to the commandments nor even a radical interpretation of them but conduct which went beyond the keeping of the Law in its legal requirements. Jesus was demanding the total surrender of the individual to God. This was evidenced through the summons to discipleship. In both instances Jesus' demand came as a summons to repentance and conversion in view of the absolute condemnation of anything less than total surrender.

In the examples where Matthew was using his tradition (7:12--"Q"; 22:36-39--"Mk"), Jesus was not setting his new and radical commandment against the Old Testament Law. Rather he was summoning one to the very heart of God's will as expressed in particular by the Old Testament scriptures but seen in its absolute character, namely, complete surrender to God and its correlate relationship to one's fellow man. In the former instances, Matthew was representing the Law as a legal ordinance (cf. Antitheses below); in the latter

¹Cf. L. Goppelt, "Die Freiheit zur Kaisersteuer," Ecclesia und Res Publica (Festschrift für K. D. Schmidt), , pp. 43ff.

Jesus is setting forth God's absolute demand as found in the Old Testament Law, a demand which could not be limited by either legal casuistry (Lk. 10:29ff.) nor by aspects of the Law itself (since the "whole" Law and the Prophets "depended" on it--22:40). By portraying the love-commandment in this twofold fashion, Matthew depicts the key aspect of Jesus' relationship to the Law. What has been in the Old Testament and Judaism an integral complex of apodictic demands and legal ordinances has been separated into an absolute demand summoning one to repentance on the one hand and pronouncing an absolute judgment on anything less than the demand on the other.

In summary, therefore, the "love-commandment" has a twofold role for Matthew. On the one hand, it reflects along with other commandments the legal aspect of the Old Testament Law (cf. 5:43; 19:19) which was countered by Jesus' own radical demand. Yet, on the other hand, it sets forth in all clarity the concrete relationship with God and with one's fellow man which was an expression of the absolute will of God, a demand set forth by Jesus as ^{being} the very pivotal points of the Old Testament Law. In neither case does the love-commandment represent a "summary" or the "essence" of the Law nor is it ever a replacement of the Law's demands. This is seen in that its Matthean appearances always accompany other demands of the Law (cf. 5:21-43; 19:18f.) and in the force of the verb *κρέματα*. Furthermore, our examination has shown that it was never used by Matthew as the principle for interpreting the Law, contrary to much current exegetical opinion. This was certainly not the case in 5:43 nor 19:19, and the force of *κρέματα* in 22:40 was not that the "whole Law" stood in a derivative-exegetical relationship to the love-commandments as in rabbinic teachings; rather the "whole Law" and the Prophets stood in relationship of

total dependence on these absolute demands as set forth by Jesus. To cite 9:13 and 12:7 as primary examples of such an interpretive usage of the love-commandment is to take these verses from their christological context and to fill them with content foreign to Matthew's intent, as we saw in our discussion of relevant passages above. The same goes for 23:23 as will be seen below. According to Matthew, rather than being a summary of Jesus' "ethical demand" or his "teaching," the love-commandment as seen in 7:12 and 22:34-40 represents primarily the sine qua non of the "normative" aspect of the Old Testament scriptures for Jesus, the concise expression of the absolute will of God.

§7. "Woe to you, Scribes and Pharisees:"

Matthew 23

We turn now to the last of the passages in Matthew which deal specifically with the matter of the Law. In contrast to the previous passages, this chapter represents not questions concerning the Law but rather a discourse of judgment against those whose life centered most around the study and practice of the Law. In following the Marcan outline, Matthew, as noted above, modified his material in 22:34-46 to introduce the Pharisees twice into his context (vss. 34, 41) and to move the conclusion of Mk. 12:34 to 22:46 signifying the conclusion of Jesus' encounters with the Pharisees. He then utilizes the Marcan warning against the Scribes and the subsequent predictions of the coming judgment upon them (Mk. 12:38-40) as the occasion for bringing together an extended pronouncement of judgment against Jesus' opponents, the Scribes and Pharisees (Mt. 23: 1-36).¹

¹E. Haenchen, "Matthäus 23," ZThK, 48(1951), 38-63 for a detailed examination of the history of tradition.

Such an attack against the religious leaders involved of necessity their raison d'être, namely, their teaching and practice of the Law. Whereas Mark refers to them as γραμματεῖς and Luke uses both Φαρισαῖοι (11:42f.) and νομικοί (11:46, 52) but separate, Matthew has combined the two throughout chapter 23 as γραμματεῖς καὶ Φαρισαῖοι.¹ This designation, although not historically precise since they were not two separate groups, does maintain the twofold aspect of the Jewish leader's relationship to the Law. The "Scribes" were the interpreters and instructors of the Law ("teaching") and the "Pharisees" were those zealous to keep the Law ("doing") in its most minute details.² It is precisely these two aspects which receive the most attention in Mt. 23. There are three sections in particular which involve Scribal teaching of the Law (vss. 2f., 16:22 and 23f.) and three which focus on their deeds (vss. 5-7, 25-28).³

All three passages dealing with the Law as such pertain either directly or indirectly to Scribal tradition and all three appear either to look with approval upon it (vss. 2f., 23b) or to leave the matter open (vss. 16-22). Mt. 23:2f. opens the chapter by recognizing the authority of the Scribes and Pharisees as successors to Moses' καθεδρα. This, being a figure of the rabbis' teaching position, most certainly applied specifically to their role as teachers of the Law, and

¹It is difficult to know to what extent Matthew and/or his special source used the combined designation. Apart from the six Woes where it is redactional, it occurs four times, one of which is Marcan (5:20; 12:38; 15:1 // Mk. 7:1; 23:2). In each of the three his special source could have been involved (cf. 23:2 esp.) but Matthew's hand is not to be ruled out.

²Goppelt, Christentum und Judentum, pp. 41f.

³To be sure these, just like the designation "Scribes and Pharisees" are not mutually exclusive but overlap. The difference is primarily that of emphasis, as will be seen below.

vs. 3 bears this out. Such a sweeping statement would naturally include the Scribal tradition since this was integral to their understanding of interpreting and instructing the Law's demands.¹ Mt. 23:23² is much more explicit. After accusing the Scribes and Pharisees for their observance of their minute interpretation of the Law on tithing³ while ignoring the Law's essential demands, an explicit admonition follows that they were to do both. This taken literally appears to give approval to Scribal interpretation. This leads us to the question of where such sayings could have had their Sitz im Leben and what role do they play for Matthew.

Mt. 23:2f. comes from Matthew's special source and doubtless reflects a Jewish Christian milieu.⁴ However, to ascribe it simply to an extreme Jewish Christian element⁵ does not remove all the difficulties. As seen above, the only other material which we have from this Palestinian tradition reflecting Scribal rulings pertains to the Temple tax which was done out of "freedom" and not because they were "bound" by the Scribal regulations. Furthermore, if the background had been so "Jewish" as to give rise to such a saying, how could they have leveled the criticism integral to the saying in vs. 3? Certainly, if one were so close to Judaism

¹ Although some have sought to limit the extent of this to either the Old Testament Law itself or to that which concurred the O.T. Law (Cf. Zahn, Matthäus, p. 648; Allen, Matthew, p. 244; Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 665; Schniewind, Matthäus, p. 225 and most recently, Davies, Setting, p. 108), this hardly seems congruent with ἡ ἡμετέρα in vs. 3. Whether the verse arose in Jewish Christianity or is an authentic logion, in either case Scribal teaching (ἡμετέρα) would only naturally involve Scribal interpretation as well (so correctly, Strecker, op. cit., p. 16; Hummel, op. cit., p. 31).

² For 16-22 cf. discussion below under 5:33-37 (pp. 288-290).

³ Cf. S.-B., I, 932f.

⁴ E. Haenchen, "Matthäus 23," ZThK, 48(1951), pp. 40f.

⁵ Haenchen, ibid; Blair, op. cit., pp. 113f. (cf.

that they recognized the Scribal teaching to be just as binding as the Old Testament Law, he could hardly have accused them of not following their own teaching of the Law or imply that the "Jewish Christian" might better keep the Scribal teachings.¹ Therefore, Mt. 23: 2f. must be seen as a rhetorical overstatement. If it be taken as such, the intent of the deliberate overstatement would be to set off the Scribes and Pharisees as those of authority who teach and interpret the Law. Yet they themselves fail to do the will of God.² This would conceivably have a place in both Jesus' ministry as well as the primitive Church since the major force of Jesus' ministry to the religious leaders was to show that their "legal" works were not sufficient. In fact, they had actually used them as a shield against God's demand.³ The real emphasis of vs. 2f. would focus on vs. 3b. The commands in vs. 3 would then be rhetorically conditioned in order to set in bold relief the bifercation between the teaching and the doing on the part of the Scribes and Pharisees. That such was the case is supported by the fact that Matthew has introduced the saying into its present context directed so negatively against the Jewish religious leaders.

This, however, raises the second question of how Matthew could introduce a passage which even hinted at supporting the teaching of the Scribes and Pharisees. In Mt. 16:11b-12 he interprets Jesus' warning against the "leaven" of the Pharisees and Sadducees to be their

literature on p. 113f.).

¹Qumran is hardly a comparable example of a more radical approach to keeping the Law than that of Phari-saism, since this overlooks the fact that Qumran could never have stated 23:21

²Cf. the usage of *πορεύω* in Synoptics for doing what God has commanded, Braun, *op. cit.*, II, 30, n. 1.

³Mt. 9:10-12 parr.; Mt. 12:1-14 par. Mk; Mt. 15: 1-20 par. Mk; Lk. 7:40-47; 15:3-32 (cf. Mt. 23:23).

"teaching."¹ However, such an apparent incongruity is not unusual for Matthew,² but one must be careful to note how the evangelist actually handles this apparently self-contradictory element.

The tradition of 23:3 warns against doing the works (τὰ ἔργα) of the Scribes and Pharisees and ends with the rather vague explanation: λέγουσιν γὰρ καὶ οὐ ποιοῦσιν. Matthew then appends a section from the "Q" material (Lk. 6:46) to clarify the previous charge. In the "Q" material the religious leaders in question (νομικοὶ in Luke) are accused both of burdening men with heavy loads as well as doing nothing to relieve the burden. This without doubt refers to their teaching. Thus what would appear at first glance to be an incongruity is converted into an advantage by his use of tradition. The τὰ ἔργα and λέγειν are explained by vs. 4a--binding up heavy burdens and placing them on the shoulders of men (=the Scribal teaching), and the ambiguous οὐ ποιοῦσιν of vs. 3b is explained by vs. 4b--they do not want to raise even a finger to remove the loads.³ By combining the two traditional sections of vss. 2f. and 4, Matthew condemns Scribal teaching for loading men with burdens (λέγειν vs. 3c = 4a) without attempting to offer relief (οὐ ποιοῦσιν vs. 3c = 4b).

¹Mk. 8:14-21 leaves the "leaven" undefined and Lk. 12:2 interprets it as their "hypocrisy."

²Cf. especially 5:17-19 together with 5:21-48. See below pp. 262-265.

³The meaning of κινῆσαι has often been taken to mean in a figurative sense that the Scribes and Pharisees themselves do not "touch" the loads, cf. e.g. S.-B., I, 914; Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 667f.; Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 182; Lohmeyer, Matthäus, ad loc. et. al. However, this appears to be an attempt to align vs. 4 with vs. 3 and overlooks the fact that it is a traditional element used as a whole to describe what the Scribes and Pharisees "do." Thus it is probably best to take the verse in keeping with the parallel in Luke to mean "remove" (Rev. 2:5; 6:14--Manson, Sayings, p. 229).

3. To be sure this still leaves vs. 3a--^{πάντα}
^{οὐκ ἔστιν εἰρησὺν ὑμῖν ποιῆσατε καὶ τηρεῖτε} along with the
 force of vs. 2 as a problem. However, if this was
 intended and understood as a rhetorical overstatement,
 this would justify Matthew's passing over vss. 2, 3a
 and concentrating on the thrust of vs. 3b. At any
 rate, from the Matthean viewpoint it was this latter
 element rather than the former which gave him reason
 to incorporate this material into the present section.¹
 The other alternative, which takes vss. 2f.,⁴ as two
 separate, unrelated entities, would leave us with even
 a greater discrepancy, since Mt. 23:2f. taken literally
 is contrary to both vs. 4 as well as Matthew's own
 view of Scribal teaching (16:11bf.). Thus one would
 have a positive saying supporting Scribal tradition
 (vss. 2f.) directly beside a deliberately inserted
 section (vs. 4) which attacked the practice of Scribal
 teaching. If the latter was not meant to modify the
 former then we are faced with the question of why
 Matthew placed the two together in the first place.

Why then did Matthew use vss. 2f. in the first
 place? Some have answered that it was a tactical man-
 ouver in terms of his Jewish milieu.² Others have seen
 here a tacit approval of the obligatory character of
 Scribal teaching on Matthew's part and thus for his
 congregation.³ A third approach following Haenchen
 has differentiated between the traditional meaning of
^{πάντα} (O.T. and tradition) and Matthew's understanding
 of it (solely in terms of the Old Testament).⁴ In
 spite of the various suggestions, which all seem to

¹This apparent discrepancy is also an illustration
 of Matthew's conscious faithfulness to his tradition--
 even when using it to express his own viewpoints. He
 did not work in an arbitrary manner with the material
 (cf. below on 5:17-19). Thus one must be careful
 about ascribing traditional material too hastily to
 Matthew's own opinion.

²Lohmeyer, *Matthäus*, p. 335 and Hummel, *op. cit.*,
 p. 31--this overlooks the fact that vs. 2f. which might
 appear favorable to the Jews is set of all places in
 the contradiction of chap. 23!

³Hummel, *op. cit.*, p. 31; Bornkamm, "End-
 expectation," p. 21.

⁴Haenchen, *ZThK*, 40(1951), p. 40; Barth, *op. cit.*,
 pp. 71, 85f. Cf. Strecker, p. 16 for negative agreement.

begin with vss. 2, 3a, the real purpose behind Matthew's including of the material lies in the negative aspect of vs. 3bc against the Scribes and Pharisees. This coupled with 23:4 (Q) begins a chapter pronouncing judgment upon the religious leaders of the Jews who sitting in a position of authority use it merely to burden men with their teachings while offering no help themselves.

Mt. 23:23¹ comes from the "Q" material and has a close parallel in Luke's first Woe of 11:42. As with 23:2f. this saying also presents us with difficulties concerning its Sitz im Leben. Since the positive attitude towards the Scribal interpretation (23b // Lk. 11:42b) runs counter to Jesus' view of tradition reflected in the Synoptics, this verse has often been relegated along with 23:2f. to the Jewish Christian community.² Others have placed the accent on the element of accusation (vs. 23a // Lk. 11:42a) and traced it back as an authentic saying by considering the element of admonition (vs. 23b // Lk. 11:42b) to be either secondary³ or ironically intended.⁴ At this point, it is impossible to determine which of the two alternatives is correct. Nevertheless, in view of the presence of the admonition in Lk. 11:42,⁵ it definitely was part of the pre-Matthean tradition.

Unlike vss. 2f. this saying was a part of the traditional material concerning the Woes, and this helps explain its presence in Mt. 23. Yet there are

¹Mt. 23:16-22 will be discussed along with the Fourth Antithesis below, pp. 288-290.

²Most recently by Haenchen, ZThK, 48(1951), p. 48, followed by Strecker, op. cit., p. 136, n. 4. In older discussions see H. Branscomb, op. cit., pp. 211f.

³Cf. H. Branscomb, op. cit., p. 212; Bultmann, Tradition, p. 139; Manson, Sayings, pp. 235f.

⁴Schniewind, Matthäus, p. 231.

⁵The only place where it is missing is in MS D which quite possibly reflects the Marcion influence.

two noticeable differences between Lk. 11:42 and Mt. 23:23. Instead of having the direct object τὰ βαρύτερα τοῦ νόμου followed by the appositives τὴν κρίτιν καὶ τὸ ἔλεος καὶ τὴν πίστιν, Luke has simply the compound direct object of τὴν κρίτιν καὶ τὴν ἀγάπην τοῦ Θεοῦ. As Haenchen has pointed out,¹ the threefold appositive is probably the more original of the two. These represent the three Old Testament terms of *שׁוּמַר*, *דִּבְרֵי*, *יִשְׁרָאֵל* and should not be forced into the Matthean usage of the terms in his Gospel.²

The matter is not so clear with τὰ βαρύτερα τοῦ νόμου.³ However, whether Matthew has added this or not, it does appear that he has added what might have been a current proverbial saying in 23:24. This redactional addition corresponds with the emphasis of τὰ βαρύτερα τοῦ νόμου so that one can see Matthew's desire to stress the point of the accusation found in his tradition. For him the focal point centers around the Scribes and Pharisees' concern about the minutiae of their interpretation of the Law rather than the Law's "weightier matters." Since the "weightier matters" were in all probability in his tradition and particularly in light of the three examples given, this could hardly mean that a "true interpretation" of the Law was being set over against that of the Scribes.⁴

¹Haenchen, *ZThK*, 48(1951), p. 48.

²Cf. Bornkamm, "End-expectation," pp. 26f., and Barth, *op. cit.*, p. 115 who make *πίστις* far more specific than the Old Testament usage of "faithfulness towards men." For them it would have "...a comprehensive sense of behavior directed towards God, i.e. faithfulness to his will as stated in the Law and the prophets" (Barth, p. 115). This tends to overlook the traditional character of the saying and its close relationship with *κρίσις* and *ἔλεος* and seems to go beyond the evidence of the immediate context.

³Barth, *op. cit.*, p. 88f. considers it to have been inserted by Matthew. Cf. Hummel, *op. cit.*, p. 75; for pre-Matthean tradition cf. Haenchen, *ZThK*, 48(1951), p. 49 and Strecker, *op. cit.*, p. 116, n. 4.

⁴So Barth, *op. cit.*, pp. 88f. and Hummel, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

Matthew is not saying any more than his tradition. At most, he is sharpening and defining the Woe, but he certainly is not modifying its content. To attribute any more to him is to go beyond the evidence of the material.

Thus we find in Mt. 23:2-4 and 23f. three different traditional units--each related to the Law and the Scribes and Pharisees; each very negative in character. In vss. 2-4 we saw where Matthew combined two elements to accuse the Scribes and Pharisees' teaching of the Law concurring with Matthew's interpretation in 16:11bf. In vss. 23f. Matthew maintains and intensifies (ὁδῆγοι τυφλοί--vs. 24) the Woe found in his "Q" material accusing the Scribes and Pharisees of failing to observe the "weightier matters" of the Law in their concern about the minutiae of tradition. The latter pertains to the actual "deeds" of the Jewish religious leaders and brings us to the second aspect of Matthew's discourse in chap. 23. This is where we can really see Matthew's hand at work in his tradition.

The introductory section dealing with the teaching of the Scribes and Pharisees (23:2-4) is followed by a section pertaining to their works (ἔργα --vss. 5-7).¹ This is introduced by a redactional element in vs. 5a which corresponds almost verbally with the compositional introduction by Matthew to 6:2-18.² After inserting

¹E. Haenchen, *ZThK*, 48(1951), p. 42, sees this section as "contradictory" to vs. 3c (οὐ ποιοῦσιν) above. However, Haenchen fails to notice how Matthew has interpreted vs. 3bc by vs. 4, so that both vs. 3c and vs. 4 explain τὰ ἔργα of vs. 3b by reference to their teaching. In vs. 5 Matthew deals specifically with τὰ ἔργα in the form of conduct as such (as opposed to conduct related to the Law in vs. 3--cf. Braun, II, 30, n. 1 on ποιεῖν).

²πάντα δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ποιοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ θεαθῆναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις - 23:5. cf. 6:1 - τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὑμῶν μὴ ποιεῖν --- πρὸς τὸ θεαθῆναι αὐτοῖς ---.

two examples of religious conduct ostentacious in character (vs. 5b), Matthew returns to his Marcan material (12:38f.) for four further examples which demonstrate the Scribes and Pharisees' desire to be seen and honored by men (vss. 6, 7a). By rearranging the examples, the evangelist places the ἀναπαύουσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀγοραῖς at the end of the Marcan material to accompany a corresponding characteristic which he has added, namely, the desire to be called, "Rabbi" (vs. 7b).

Without doubt the theme of this section represents Matthew's major attack against the "Scribes and Pharisees." This is seen particularly in 6:1-18 (cf. 5:20); 15:1-9 (esp. vs. 7); and 23:5-12, 25-28 as well as in the emphatic use of ὑποκριταίς (15:7 cf. Mk. 7:6; 22:18 cf. Mk. 12:15; 23:13, 15, 23, 25, 27 (28), 29). There is no question in the evangelist's mind about whether the "Scribes and Pharisees" do anything or not; they are, in fact, very deliberate in their actions in order that they might appear before men to be what they are not. This is explicitly developed in the fifth and sixth Woes.

In 23:25f. the evangelist reworks the Q material (Lk. 11:39-41) and places it in the form of a Woe¹ in order to strengthen the force of the traditional material. Although an indirect reference to the Pharisees' concern for ceremonial cleanliness may be involved,² the major import of the figure used was aimed against the Scribes and Pharisees personally. This was not

¹That this was not originally a Woe is seen in its content. Whereas a Woe pronounces final judgment, Mt. 23:26 leaves the issue open by giving a command (cf. Lk. 11:41--Bultmann, *Tradition*, p. 139 (supplement)) on Aramaic background for the difference in content). To be sure, Matthew intended the material to be a Woe of the same character as the other six, but the disparity between the content and form reveals his redactional hand. Cf. Haenchen, *ZThK*, 48(1951), p. 49.

²Cf. *S.-B.*, I, *ad loc.*

only true for the tradition (Lk. 11:39 τὸ δὲ ἔσωθεν ὑμῶν...) but also of Matthew as seen both by the address, "Φαρισαῖε τυφλέ" beginning vs. 26 and γεμοῦν in the third plural of vs. 25. The content of vs. 26 is meaningless if taken literally, since washing the inside of a cup does not clean the outside. Rather, in keeping with Mt. 15:11, 15-20 // Mk., applied to the person, a cleansed "heart" will result in a cleansed person.¹ It was not the external, but the internal, not the appearance, but the essence which was at stake.

The sixth Woe (vss. 27f.) reflects Matthew's emphasis even more clearly. Whereas the basic content of vss. 25f. was found at hand in "Q" (11:39-41), here Matthew totally reworks the traditional figure of Lk. 11:44. In Luke the Pharisees are compared to unmarked tombs which defile men before they are aware of it. Matthew, however, keeps the figure of the tombs but changes the analogy completely in keeping with the thrust of vss. 25f. The Scribes and Pharisees are likened to whitewashed tombs which appear quite attractive on the outside, but inside they are full of the bones of dead men and all uncleanness. Once again the evangelist focuses on the difference between how they "appear" and what they really are.

Thus by drawing on tradition from various backgrounds Matthew concludes Jesus' ministry to the public with a discourse of judgment against the religious leaders of the Jews. The material itself, for the most

¹The distinction between ceremonial and moral "uncleanliness" drawn again most recently by Strecker, *op. cit.*, p. 31 for this Woe is an attempt to be more precise than the material. The material itself is ambivalent since it applies an analogy drawn from ceremonial context to the Pharisees personally. The very fact that Matthew could make such an application (vss. 27f.) indicates that such a distinction between moral and ceremonial purity was just as foreign to him as it was to the Jews.

part, carried the weight of the judgment (23:2f., 4, 6f., 13, 23, 25, 27, 29, 34-36). Matthew by reworking and rearranging it brought to bear a unifying force on the diverse elements. Nevertheless, the basic thrust was found in his tradition. Matthew's own hand can be seen most clearly in his emphasis on the discrepancy between what the "Scribes and Pharisees" really were and how they wanted to appear to others (cf. vss. 5, 25f., 27f.). This is a trait which is also emphasized by the use of ὑποκριτής. Matthew's use of this term is no doubt polemic in part, as was seen by his frequent introduction of anti-Pharisaic elements to his tradition above,¹ but it also carried a certain element of theological import.² As Trilling has put it: "Sie ist der umfassende Ausdruck für die Gottes wirklichen Willen verfehlende Religiosität und damit das Gegenstück zur geforderten σωστοσύνη."³ This becomes clearer when we turn next to the demand for a "righteousness which exceeds that of the Scribes and Pharisees."

§8. Summary

Our examination above has covered numerous aspects of the problem of Jesus' relationship to the Law seen in the responses to various questions and situations. Invariably the first evangelist has begun with a traditional basis which he has often reworked, rearranged

¹Haenchen has placed far too much weight on this as being so peculiarly Matthean in character and has overlooked the import of the tradition which the first evangelist had used in chapter 23, as well as Jesus' own encounters with the Jewish religious leaders during his ministry, cf. Goppelt, Christentum und Judentum, pp. 43f.

²Cf. Did. 8:1 where the "hypocrites" had come simply a designation for the Jews as such.

³Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 202. Cf. same, pp. 198-202 for thorough examination of the use of ὑποκριτής by Matthew.

and even expanded by his own composition or other elements from his tradition. Yet throughout we have been able to trace some consistent patterns which reflect Matthew's own understanding of the material and his intent for using it. As to the Law, we saw, above all, that Matthew leaves little question about Jesus' absolute rejection of Scribal tradition as being "commandments of men" (15:1-20), "teaching" (16:11f.) which weighs upon men like "heavy burdens" (23:2-4). In 15:19 the first evangelist limits the catalogue of vices found in Mk. 7:21f. more or less to those found in the Decalogue, but this is the only occasion, apart from other traditional material (cf. Jesus' reference to the fourth commandment 15:4 // Mk. 7:10 as well as his initial reply to the Rich Young Ruler 19:18f. // Mk. 10:19), where the Decalogue enters the discussion. The love-commandment was not the underlying principle for Matthew's understanding of the Law, but its appearance does reflect the twofold aspect of the Old Testament Law, namely, as a legal ordinance (5:43 and 19:19) and as God's absolute demand (cf. 5:44ff; 7:12 and 22:34-40).

If there was an underlying principle which covered Matthew's understanding of the Law, it would be his christology. This is evident in 9:13; 12:5-7; 15:11, 18-20 par. Mk.; 17:26f. and 19:21. For Matthew Jesus' conduct and teaching regarding the Law represent the presence of one "greater than the Temple," the presence of the age of salvation in Jesus' own person and ministry (cf. "publicans and sinners," Sabbath controversies, "freedom" of the "sons" to pay the Temple tax and the call to leave all and follow him). These were often a part of the tradition which Matthew clarified and set in sharper focus.

The most consistent trait occurring in almost every pericope which we discussed above was the heightening or addition of an anti-Pharisaic element. Without doubt

"the Pharisees" had come to represent the strict Jewish opponents of Matthew's congregation, and the tenor of this material reflects a definite polemic on the part of the Jews in the immediate vicinity of the congregation. However, the character and content of these sections indicate that the congregation had already come to consider itself a separate entity, but it was still close enough to its Jewish counterparts to receive the brunt of their opposition. Rather than being conciliatory or apologetic in tone--an element which one would expect if the congregation were attempting to stay within the confines of the Synagogue--the material indicates that the evangelist had given these opponents up to God's wrath (cf. 12:5-7, 9f.; 15:12ff.; 22:34f. cf. with Mk.; and Mt. 23).

So far we have dealt with a more negative aspect of the problem as seen primarily in Jesus' conflict with the religious leaders of his day. We concluded with the discourse of Mt. 23 which pronounced judgment on the "hypocrisy" of these leaders and noted that this is but the reverse of the demand for a "greater righteousness" for Matthew. This more positive aspect of Jesus' ministry is set forth in Matthew's form of the Sermon, in particular, in 5:17-48, and raises once again the issue of Jesus' relationship to the Law.

III. THE ANTITHESES (5:21-48)

One of the most characteristic passages of Matthew's Gospel is the so-called "Antitheses" in 5:21-48. Here, as is the case with the other sections within the Sermon on the Mount, one discovers a quilt-like composition consisting of materials brought together from Matthew's various sources. By examining anew the substance of what Matthew found in the tradition as well as his method and motivation for combining, modifying and expanding these diverse elements, one may then gain a better position from which to approach the central question: How did the Antitheses view the "Law" and what was Jesus' relationship to it?

§1. Traditional, Redactional or Both?

The origin of the individual Antitheses has been the subject of much debate. Whereas it is now a foregone conclusion that the antithetical format was pre-Matthean, it is by no means agreed upon whether three, five or six Antitheses were found in his sources. On the one side, there have been numerous scholars¹ who have designated the first, second and fourth as pre-Matthean while relegating the third, fifth and sixth to Matthew's editorial reworking of "Q".² On the other

¹The majority of whom are continental scholars: M. Albertz, Die synoptischen Streitgespräche (1921), pp. 146-149; Bultmann, Tradition, pp. 143f.; Kümmel, "Traditionsgedanke," ZNW 33(1934), p. 125, n. 75; E. Käsemann, "Das Problem des historischen Jesu," ZTK 51 (1954), p. 144; Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 42 and Braun, op. cit., II, 5, n. 2.

²This is done in view of at least three reasons: a) the absence of the introductory formula in the Lucan parallels (cf. J. Schmid, Matthäus (1959), p. 96 for a thorough discussion of the alternative, an alternative represented most recently by E. Percy, Die Botschaft Jesu (1953), pp. 149f.); b) the difference formwise (both Bultmann, Tradition, p. 143 and M. Albertz, Die Botschaft des Neuen Testaments (1947), I/1, p. 54, consider these to have been wisdom sayings which have

side numerous scholars have either assigned the anti-thetical form of five to tradition and one (5:31f.) to Matthew himself¹ or all six to Matthew's sources.² This discussion is not without significance. It is one thing for Matthew to be merely the vehicle through whom the traditional form was transmitted, but quite another if he had an active role in deliberately modifying his traditional material. Which position seems the more tenable?

The key to this discussion would seem to lie with the third, fifth and sixth Antitheses which have material parallels in Luke. Rather than simply posit the presence of these Antitheses in a pre-Matthean tradition, let us first examine them to see if there is any evidence which would support a) a "Q" source with either Matthew or Luke reworking the material or b) a traditional source behind Matthew which was independent of that used by Luke.

been developed into legal pronouncements) and c) the difference contentwise (cf. Bultmann, Tradition, p. 144, "In den drei...Bildungen handelt es sich nicht um ein Verbot, sondern um eine Anweise (bzw eine Konzession 5:31), die nicht überboten, sondern umgestoßen wird."). Braun makes particular usage of this argument to distinguish the third, fifth and sixth from the first, second, and fourth (op. cit., II, 5f., n. 2).

¹These have been mostly Anglo-American scholars: Branscomb, op. cit., p. 234 (contra Albertz); B. H. Streeter, The Four Gospels (1926), p. 248; B. Bacon, Studies, p. 181; T. W. Manson, The Sayings of Jesus (1954), pp. 23f.; B. B. Lanwer, Jesu Stellung zum Gesetz: Mt. 5:17-48 auf dem Hintergrund des AT und Spätjudentums (1933), p. 23; Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 85, 19f.; Filson, JBL, 75(1956), p. 229; Percy, op. cit., p. 150; Davies, The Setting (1964), p. 387f. et al.

²H. T. Wrege, "Untersuchung zur Überlieferungsgeschichte des Sprachgutes der Bergpredigt" (Diss. 1963), pp. 78ff. for his discussion of the third antithesis' traditional background.

When one analyzes the six Antitheses both stylistically and contentwise, one discovers two different divisions. Stylistically: apart from the fact that the first and fourth commence with the full formula of ἡκούσατε οὗτις ἐπρέθη τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ¹ the style of numbers one through three is that of a legal ruling set forth in the third person.² In contrast, the fourth through the sixth are set forth as apodictic commands in the second person.³ Hence one has the twofold division of 1-3 and 4-6. Contentwise: a different division becomes evident. Whereas the Old Testament Law appears to be merely transcended through Jesus' radical demand in the first, second and fourth, it appears to be abrogated by his radical demand in the third, fifth and sixth. Thus we have the grouping 1, 2, 4 and 3, 5, 6.

In the solution to this apparently contradictory division we may have a hint of Matthew's role in this section of 5:21-48. The natural grouping as to style could reflect Matthew's attempt to bring his material harmoniously into its immediate context.⁴ Thus the

¹This could have been either a mnemonic device, a literary device for dividing the six into two parts or just plain coincidental.

²Although the first and second theses have second person elements, the first is expanded by οὗτις δὲ ἔστω which is the form of the third thesis (a further indication that the location of the third was influenced by the second, since formally the οὗτις δὲ ἔστω would serve as a correlative to the simple command of 5:27 as οὗτις δὲ ἔστω in 5:21?). All three themes are countered by the antithesis comprised of πᾶσι ὁ + participle, a form already present in 5:32.

³The fourth and fifth being similar with μὴ + infinitive in the antithesis and the sixth having simply the second person plural imperative.

⁴Cf. the analysis by H. J. Held, "Matthew as Interpreter of the Miracle Stories," Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew, pp. 137ff., 149, of Matthew's use of catchwords and phrases to introduce material smoothly into his traditional context.

preceding Antitheses would set the style for what followed.¹ The grouping according to content, nevertheless, betrays the twofold source of Matthew's Antitheses.

Is this conclusion, however, borne out by a closer examination of the third, fifth and sixth Antitheses? Beginning with the third Antithesis (5:31f.) one finds that a frequently cited argument against its authenticity has focused on the condensed formula ἐπείθῃ & in place of the usual ἡκούσατε ὃν ἐπείθῃ.² To be sure the argument could be reversed in defense of a pre-Matthean formula in 5:31, since it would seem strange that the evangelist should take such care in constructing 5:31f. on the stylistic analogy of 5:21f. and 5:27f. only to have modified the characteristic introduction which he had found in the first, second and fourth Antitheses. Yet even this apparent inconsistency is not so unusual for Matthew. In 23:13,15,23,25,27 and 29 he used a formula of address, which he had most likely constructed himself, and even placed vss. 25f. in the Woe-formula³ with the identical address. Yet in 23:16-22 the evangelist inserted material, also as a Woe, but with a different formula of address (cf. 23:16). Therefore, it is quite possible that the shortened formula in 5:31 could be a product of Matthew's work rather than that of his tradition, but this argument alone does not suffice.

¹The third on the order of the first and second; the fifth and sixth as the fourth with the sixth deviating by using the straight imperative since it was one removed from the fourth. and its $\mu\gamma$ + infinitive, a form which Matthew could hardly have used with the sixth.

²This is not to say that the content is different but merely that there is a definite difference in form. Thus the retort that the shorter introduction has the same essential meaning is irrelevant.

³v. supra pp. 112f.

The all important clue is to be found in the comparison of 5:31f. with its material parallels in Lk. 16:18 and with Mk. 10:2-11 // Mt. 19:2-9.¹ An examination of Lk. 16:18 shows not only that the antithetical format is missing but also that the saying is in a totally different context.² From this contextual difference it seems quite possible that the logion was handed down in "Q" as an isolated saying and that it was placed by both evangelists in its respective context.³ That such was the case is further supported by Matthew's characteristic manner of bringing together topically related materials.⁴ Having at hand a saying which pertained to adultery (*μοιχεύω*), Matthew then introduced it into the context of the second Antithesis which dealt particularly with the seventh commandment.⁵ So far this comparison has only established the probability of the independent character of the saying and a possible motivation for its present location in Matthew, but this is by no means a certain indication that Matthew was responsible for this nor that the

¹See below pp. 172ff.

²While Mt. 5:32 is now a part of the Sermon, Lk. 16:18 is a part of Jesus' instruction for his disciples.

³An examination of Mt. 19:2-9 // Mk. 10:2-12 indicates that the saying most probably was handed down initially as a single logion. We cannot determine whether Mark's present location in a Lehrgespräch was a product of his source or his own choice (cf. Taylor, Mark, p. 415). The location of the verse in Matthew within the Streitgespräch is most certainly due to his reworking of the Marcan account (see below)

⁴Filson, JBL, 75(1956), p. 229; cf. Held, op. cit., pp. 137f.

⁵Since the main thrust, however, of 5:31f. is centered on divorce, it is not to be considered as merely a secondary element to 5:37f. (cf. Bacon, Studies and Albertz, Streitgespräche which Lanwer counters, op. cit., p. 23), but rather as a full fledged Antithesis. Yet its close ties to the second Antithesis through the catchword *μοιχεύειν* could well explain the

antithetical format or lack thereof was the editorial product of Matthew or Luke.

The questions are best resolved by a further comparison of the Marcan tradition (Mk. 10:2-11 // Mt. 19:3-9). In Mk. 10:11 the logion is set apart from the preceding pericope both in reference to the questioner as well as locale.¹ As in Luke any evidence of an antithesis is missing. Far more decisive is Matthew's handling of the Marcan material. Not only is the saying part and parcel of Jesus' answer within the pericope to the Pharisees' question, but, as a result of Matthew's rearrangement, Moses' provision immediately precedes the saying. In this way Jesus' saying is set in a definite antithetical contrast to Moses' provision. Therefore, both in view of the absence of any antithetical traits in either Luke or Mark and particularly in view of the editorialized antithetical relationship in Mt. 19:7-9, it appears justifiable to conclude that 5:31 was also an intentional reworking for the logion in 5:32 and that the third Antithesis was the product of Matthew's handling of his tradition.

In the case of the fifth and sixth Antitheses they have the distinction of sharing to a great extent a material parallel with a passage in the Lucan form of the Sermon (Lk. 6:27-36). To be sure there are differences between the two accounts, two of the most obvious being that of form and disposition. Whereas Matthew has the material separated into two Antitheses, Luke

abbreviated formula in vs. 31 in contrast to the "normal" formulas in vss. 38, 43 which stand more independent of their context.

¹The pericope takes place during or after Jesus' instruction for the multitudes (10:1) and the central question of the pericope is raised by the Pharisees (10:2), whereas the logion itself is an answer to the disciples' further question (10:10) at a house (ἐἰς τὴν οἰκίαν πάλιν).

without the antithetical format has the material unified in one solid block. With such a parallel before us one can legitimately raise the question about the degree to which these differences stem from redactional variations and/or from divergent sources.

That Matthew and Luke were drawing from two entirely independent traditions would seem highly improbable in light of only a superficial examination of the material. In both Mt. 5:39-48 and Lk. 6:29-36 we have a composite element which consists of two originally separate, traditional units (Mt. 5:39b-42 // Lk. 6:29-30 and 5:44-48 // Lk. 6:27f., 32-36). The difference in the two is obvious in the change from second person plural (5:44-48 // Lk.) to the second person singular (5:39b-42 // Lk.). In Matthew the two units occur consecutively with the singular construction at the beginning (5:39-42), whereas the two are combined in Luke with the singular unit enclosed by the plural (Lk. 6:29-31 in Lk. 6:27f., 32-36). Nevertheless, in spite of this difference in disposition, both traditional units do occur in the immediate proximity of each other and in the same context of the Sermon. Furthermore, these traits carry over in the Didache and Justin.¹ One cannot simply overlook this phenomenon. It would almost certainly suggest that the Matthean and Lucan tradition "sprang" somewhere along the line from a "common" tradition. Should one, however, concede a "common" tradition for both evangelists, one is still a long way from determining whether the tradition as we find it now became divergent in the pre-Matthean/pre-Lucan tradition or whether this divergence can be attributed to the evangelists themselves. In order to facilitate the discussion a cross-section

¹Did. 1:3f., Justin, Apol., I, 15, 9-12 (Justin's Apol., I, 15-16 has various elements from all six Antitheses. See p. 134 n. 4.

examination of the form and content of the passages in question is essential. Since Matthew and Luke vary in their disposition, the simpler method would be to follow the outline of the unified tradition in Luke.

i. Lk. 6:27-28¹ form: four apodictic commands arranged in a double parallelism.
content: love for one's enemies and corresponding behavior.

Mt. 5:44 form: two apodictic commands.
content: corresponds roughly with Luke's first and last command.

Summary: Although having minor differences, they correspond in both form and content.

ii. Lk. 6:29-30² form: two sets of imperatives: legalistic rulings in form and comprised of an alternating command and prohibition introduced respectively by a dative participle with imperative and an and + genitive participle with prohibition.
content: rules pertaining to conduct both towards an adversary and requests.³

Mt. 5:39b-42 form: two sets of imperatives: legalistic rulings in form beginning with But and halved by a dative participle. The first set has two commands; the second has two commands

¹Did. 1:3 includes in part elements of all four commands in Luke. Add to this the fact that Luke is not known for constructing parallelism, rather for the contrary (cf. W. Pesch, Der Lohngedanke in der Lehre Jesu (1955), p. 57), and we have fairly good evidence that the parallelism is pre-Lucan.

²The Golden Rule follows in vs. 31, whereas it appears later in Mt. (v. supra pp.97f). Although different in number of 2nd person, it doubtless belongs to the complex of vss. 29f.

³Rather than two rules pertaining to adversaries and two for one's response to a request, vss. 29 and 30b refer to an adversary and 30a alone pertains to a request. This is probably a result of the Lucan reworking of the material. Cf. below.

plus a prohibition.

content: two rules pertaining to conduct towards a legal adversary and three referring to various requests.

Summary: In general, both correspond in form and content apart from minor differences. Change in style is definitely characteristic of Mt.: 1) ~~6:11~~ 6:11¹, 2) breaking of a traditional pattern.¹

iii. Lk. 6:32-24 form: three expanded rhetorical questions.

content: comparison of certain behavior with that of "sinners."

Mt. 5:46-47 form: two rhetorical questions each followed by a negative question.

content: concurs with Lk. on only the first, plus differing at several points.

Summary: some correspondence in form but considerable difference in content.

iv. Lk. 6:35a form: three apodictic commands combined with promise of reward.

content: summary imperative of the three rhetorical questions (cf. above for differences in Lk. and Mt. under no. iii).

Lk. 6:36b form: promise and its explication

content: promise of sonship of the "Most High" who likewise is gracious to the undeserving.

Mt. 5:45 form: final clause directed at sonship which was explicated.

content: to demonstrate a sonship in keeping with the Father's conduct toward the good/evil, the just/unjust.

Summary: 6:35a is without parallel in Mt. 6:36b // Mt. 5:45, while corresponding in essential content, they differ in form and order.

v. Lk. 6:36 form: apodictic command.

content: demand for God-like mercifulness.

Mt. 5:48 form: apodictic command.

content: demand for God-like "wholeness."

¹Cf. below pp. 189f.

Summary: they correspond in form and in general content, but differ in the specific expression of the command.

Our analysis demonstrates considerable affinity between Matthew and Luke in form and content, yet there are several specific differences. Are these differences traceable to an editorial reworking on the part of Matthew and/or Luke or were these differences already in the form of the tradition used by the respective evangelists? By answering the first option, we are well on the way to replying to the second.

Since, as the two accounts stand presently, the Lucan one represents an obvious combination of the two traditional elements found separated in Matthew it is only logical to begin here in order to see if any of the particular differences result from this conjunction of material. Our first major divergence in content occurred in the comparison of the rhetorical questions (cf. iii). The first question has a parallel in Matthew (5:46 // Lk. 6:32) and it also appears in the Didache and Justin.¹ Contentwise, this first question clearly refers back to the command to love one's enemies (Lk. 6:27a). The third question (6:34) has been somewhat of an enigma since it has a terminological similarity with Mt. 5:42.² Recently, Schürmann has helped resolve the complexity with his hypothesis of "reminiscences" which demonstrate that this question points backward to an earlier form of Lk. 6:30b.³ Schürmann also traced the second question back to 6:27b.⁴ Thus

¹Did. 1:3d, Justin, Apol., I, 15, 9a.

²ἐναείζω --appears solely within this context in the NT. It seems a bit more than mere coincidence.

³H. Schürmann, "Sprachliche Reminiszenzen an abgeänderte oder ausgelassene Bestandteile der Spruchsammlung in Lukas- und Matthäusevangelium," NTS, 6(1959-60), p. 196.

⁴Ibid., p. 196; van Unnik, op. cit., p. 287.

one has two questions referring to vs. 27, and it leaves the third question (6:34) to refer rather disjointedly to the last element (6:30b) of the inserted section (vss. 29-30). However, since the third question is related to the second half of the insert (vs. 30), is it not more probable that the second question (6:33) refers to the first half of the insert (vs. 29)?¹ The two rhetorical questions peculiar to Luke (vss. 33-34) would then be seen as constructions patterned after the traditional question (vs. 32) in order to help incorporate the insertion of vss. 29-30 into the complex.

The second divergence--this time in form, content and order--appears in the following verse 35 of Luke (cf. iv.). Since, by removing the traditional element of vss. 29-30 and its corresponding rhetorical questions (vss. 33-34), we are left with the one "traditional" question (6:32 // Mt. 5:46 cf. Did. 1:3, Justin, Apol., I, 15,9), we must consequently delete the last two apodictic commands of 6:35 which concur with the last two rhetorical questions. Furthermore, the phrase "καὶ ἔστω ὁ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολὺς" is all but identical with that in Mt. 5:12 // Lk. 6:23 and may well have been inserted here to round off the imperative. Removing these "secondary" elements, we have then a command to love one's enemies (6:35a) and a statement pertaining to sonship with its explication (6:35b). Is it not more reasonable to suggest that vs. 35b was actually displaced from the complex of vss. 27f. by the insertion of vss. 29f.¹ and

¹Here we would have ἀγαθοποιεῖν = returning good for evil or rather good conduct in face of an adverse situation (6:29). A similar concept of ἀγαθοποιεῖν combined with suffering occurs in I Pet. 2:20, cf. W. C. van Unnik, "The Teaching of Good Works in I Peter," NTS, 1(1954/55), pp. 99f. and "A Classical Parallel to I Peter 2:14 and 20," NTS, 2(1955/56), pp. 199f.

²Cf. Bultmann, Tradition, p. 100, who attributes

then reintroduced after the rhetorical questions along with a newly constructed imperative introduction.¹ This would mean then that the order found in Matthew was the more original, and apart from a difference in form² the basic thrust of both accounts would then be quite similar.

The third difference in content pertains to Lk. 6:36 // Mt. 5:48 (cf. v.). In both cases we have to do with an apodictic command for God-likeness. However, this is expressed differently. For Luke one is commanded to be "merciful" (οἰκτιρῶνες); for Matthew one is to be "whole" (τέλειος = "whole").³ An examination of the contexts indicates that Luke's command is far more in keeping with what follows in 6:34ff. than what has preceded in 6:27ff. One might suggest this to be a result of the reworking of the "Q" material which tended to place emphasis on Lk. 6:35b and less on 6:36 forcing the latter into another context. However, this overlooks the fact that whether οἰκτιρῶν was found in the tradition by Luke or not⁴ a word with a similar meaning is certainly to be assumed.⁵ This would mean that 6:36

this to the work of Luke; J. DuPont, Les Béatitudes (1958), p. 154, attributes it to Matthew.

¹Cf. Wrege, op. cit., p. 101 who chooses to take vs. 35 as a similar but separate traditional element to that of 27f., 32. This simply complicates matters by bringing a further hypothetical traditional element to bear for which we have no other evidence.

²Mt. 5:45--final clause; Lk. 6:35b--promise. Cf. below, pp. 133f., 201.

³See pp. 192f.

⁴One strong indication for its pre-Lucan character is the fact that it is a hapaxlegomena, cf. Strecker, op. cit., p. 141, n. 2.

⁵Above all, it is in keeping with the frequent Old Testament description of God as being merciful. Cf. below, p. 201 and Harnack, Sprüche, p. 46.

was used originally to make the transition to the next context which focused on judging. Consequently, this difference in 5:48 // Lk. 6:36 is to be explained in light of other considerations.¹ The other differences between Matthew and Luke noted in the examination above are minor in character and are not related to the combination of traditional elements. Therefore, in the final analysis, we actually have, after removing the combined elements and their corresponding modifications, a traditional unit--Lk. 6:27f. (35b), 32, 36--which concurs in broad outline to that found in Mt. 5:44-46, 48.

On the surface our examination would appear to confirm the suggestion of those who have attributed the combination to the editorial work of Luke.² This impression gains more support from the lexical and stylistic considerations. Lexically, we have at least four Lucan "trademarks:" a) χάρις³ (Lk. 6:32-34 cf. Mt. 5:46f.), b) ἀμαρτωλοί⁴ (6:32-34 cf. Mt. 5:46f.), c) πλῆν⁵ (6:35), and d) ὑφίστος⁶ (6:35 cf. 5:44). Stylistically, we have the Lucan characteristic in 6:32-34 of constructing in groups of threes.⁷

However, neither of these is a decisive argument for a Lucan reworking of the material. Whereas Luke does have χάρις eight times in contrast to the total

¹See p. 203.

²Cf. most recently, Percy, Botschaft, p. 149f.

³χάρις --appears eight times in Luke, none in Mt. or Mk.

⁴ἀμαρτωλοί Luke has 17 times, Mt. has it 5 times and Mk. 6.

⁵πλῆν--Mt. has 5 (one at least Q 11:22 // Lk. 10:14), Lk. has 15.

⁶ὑφίστος--Matthew has 1, Mk. has two and Luke has 7, cf. Dalman, Worte Jesu, I, 163.

⁷van Unnik, "Feindesliebe...", op. cit., p. 288 based on R. Morgenthaller, Die lukianische Geschichtsschreibung als Zeugnis (1949), I, 73-79.

absence of the term in Matthew and Mark, we have here a technical usage of the term,¹ which--while known to Luke (Lk. 17:9 (L) cf. 14:12f.)--was also familiar to the early Church.² The conjunction $\pi\lambda\eta\nu$ might possibly be a semi-technical catechetical form with an imperative or jussive future.³ Even should this be Lucan in 6:35, it by no means labels the entire construction as Lucan.⁴ The same holds true for both $\alpha\muαρτωλο\acute{\iota}$ and $\upsilon\phi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ which definitely are Lucan. These could have been modified by Luke without implying that the major differences resulted from him. Stylistically, as noted above the threefold character of vss. 32-34 and 35a is a product of the insertion and not necessarily due to a Lucan tendency to build in groups of threes. Therefore, one should not move too hastily to the conclusion that Luke is responsible for the modifications noted above.

In fact there is much which speaks against this viewpoint. First of all from the standpoint of the editorial characteristics, Matthew is known as the one who freely rearranged the "Q" material to correspond with different motifs. Luke on the contrary is known

¹van Unnik, "Feindesliebe," Nov. Test., 8(1966), p. 296, has pointed out that this is a technical term frequently found in the greek concept of reciprocal ethics. "Wenn jemand einem Mitmenschen Gutes erweist, ist das $\chi\alpha\rho\iota\varsigma$, aber auch wenn der Empfänger etwas zurückgibt heißt das $\chi\alpha\rho\iota\varsigma$. In letztem Falle stattet man seinen Dank in sehr konkreter Form ab."

²We see a similar usage in I Pet. 2:20 and Did. 1:3. This concept was not limited exclusively to Greek oriented contexts. As van Unnik has pointed out, a comparable passage is found in Sirach 12:1 (ibid., pp. 290ff.).

³Wrege, op. cit., p. 14.

⁴Apart from the parallel(s) in Q noted above, Mt. 6:33 has "6ε" and the parallel Lk. 12:31 has $\pi\lambda\eta\nu$.

for following the order of "Q".¹ He does combine his multiple sources into a composite unit, but we have no other evidence that he ever did such with any single source such as "Q" or Mk. Secondly, the most persuasive argument for the pre-Lucan combination is Schürmann's explanation of the reminiscent verb βαλεῖν in Lk. 6:34 (cf. 6:30b // Mt. 5:42b) which refers back to the pre-Lucan form of 6:30.² A third reason is more subjective and based on the external witness of the Didache to this passage. Stemming from a similar background as Matthew and quite possibly familiar with the Matthean text,³ we are faced with some parallels to the Lucan text in contrast to Matthew. This might be explained as evidence for familiarity with Luke, but more probably is a reflection that the Didache was familiar with the "Q" material known also to Matthew. It chose then in places to follow the "Q" material rather than the Matthean modifications.⁴ Of these the two most important is the form of the rhetorical question--"ποῖα γὰρ χάρις" (1:3 // Lk. 6:32 cf. Mt. 5:46)!--which would mean that the χάρις formula was pre-Lucan.

By reversing the question we see that we not only have negative evidence for a Lucan reworking of the material, but we also have positive evidence for Matthean editorial work in all three of the elements in question. First, this is seen most clearly in the

¹V. Taylor, "The Original Order of Q," New Testament Essays: Studies in Honour of T. W. Manson (1962), p. 266; J. P. Brown, "The Form of 'Q' Known to Matthew," NTS, 8(1961-62), p. 27.

²Schürmann, "Reminiscenzen," NTS, 6(1959-60), p. 196.

³1:3c--διωκόντων (5:44b); 1:3d--οὐκὶ καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ, ποιοῦσιν (5:47), 1:4a--// Mt. 5:39b; 1:4b--καὶ ἐστὶ τέλος (5:48).

⁴1:3e // Lk. 6:27f.; 1:4c combined Lk. 6:29b and Mt. 5:40; 1:3d--ποῖα γὰρ χάρις cf. Lk. 6:32-34.

stylistic changes found in 5:39b-42 // Lk. 6:29-30.¹ Secondly, instead of the three rhetorical questions found in Luke, Matthew has only two. The first is obviously a traditional element, but the second is almost certainly a Matthean construction on the analogy of the first.² Thirdly, within the rhetorical questions themselves there is a difference in formulas. Luke has all three unified by the formula--*ποία ὑμῶν χάρις ἔστιν*, while Mt. 5:46 has *τίνα μισθὸν ἔχετε* and 5:47 has *τί περισσὸν παύετε*. Schürmann has suggested that the presence of *μισθός* in 5:46 and in Lk. 6:35a indicated another instance of "reminiscence." *χάρις* would then be a Lucan substitute for *μισθός*.³ However, there is a

¹ Apart from the significant changes in the nuance of 5:39b, 40 (cf. pp. 185f.), the participial construction has been replaced by the indefinite relative which is typically Matthean (cf. p. 184 n. 1). Yet there appears to be a deliberate attempt to keep the dative participle as the introduction to the second half of each group (cf. Lk. 6:29, 30 and Mt. 5:40 and 42a).

² *ἀδελφός*--religious fellowship or compatriot, in contrast to fraternal in the physical sense, fellowship: Mt. 15 times (4 from Q: 7:3ff. // 6:41f.--3 x's, 18:15 // Lk. 17:3; 5:22 (bis), 23, 24, 47; 18:21, 35; 23:8; 25:40; 28:10. Lk. has four (3 from Q) 22:32 (L), Mk. none. Cf. further Jeremias, *Gleichnisse Jesu* (1965), p. 108, n. 2 and Davies, *Setting*, p. 98.

μόνον--7 times in Mt. (8:8 cf. Lk. 7:7; 9:21 cf. Mk. 5:28; 10:42 cf. Mk. 9:41; 14:36 cf. Mk. 6:56; 21:19 cf. Mk. 11:13; 21:21 cf. Mk. 11:22f.), 2 times in Mark (5:36 // Lk. 8:50, 6:8), 1 in Luke (8:50 // Mk.)

περισσός--cf. 5:38 and the pair *τελῶνα* and *ἐθνικοί* together only in 18:17.

Some have attempted to explain *ἀσπάζομαι* as the more authentic form of the second question with *ἀφαιθετοῦν* in Lk. as a clarification (cf. recently, W. C. van Unnik, "Die Motivierung der Feindesliebe in Lk. 6:32-35," *Nov. Test.* 8(1966), 289f.). This however breaks down in that there is little or no correlation between the two verbs. *ἀσπάζομαι* has the more pregnant meaning of an important ceremonial greeting (cf. Mk. 12:38 par.) whose oversight meant disrespect (cf. S.-B., I, 380ff.; Windisch, *TWNT*, I, 496f.). In Mt. 10:12 we have another appearance of the verb peculiar to Mt.

³ Schürmann, "Reminiszenzen," *NTS*, 6(1959-60), p. 197.

definite difference between the constructions $\delta \muισθός$ $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota \muισθός$ (Lk. 6:35a cf. Mt. 5:12 // Lk. 6:23 (Q)) and the $\tauόν \muισθόν \epsilon\chi\epsilon\iotaν$ which occurs only here and in Mt. 6:1--an obviously Matthean construction introducing 6:2-18. Mt. 6:2, 5, 16 (M) have the more common form of $\tauόν \muισθόν \alpha\pi\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iotaν$ cf. 10:41, $\tauόν \muισθόν \lambda\eta\mu\psi\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$. Consequently, if any "reminiscence" were involved, it would have been on Matthew's part. When he relocated Lk. 6:35b in the form of the final clause in 5:45, he could well have carried the idea of $\muισθός$ (Lk. 6:35a) over to 5:46.¹

This brings us then to the fourth and fifth points of evidence indicating Matthean reworking which have to do with Lk. 6:35b // Mt. 5:45 and Lk. 6:36 // Mt. 5:48. On the one hand, Lk. 6:35b, as we saw above, belongs most logically with the command complex of 6:27f. If this were reintroduced into this context by Matthew, then we might well look for a characteristic Matthean conjunction to tie it in with the preceding vs. 44. This we have in $\epsilon\sigma\tau\omega\varsigma$ with a final sentence.² This would then be a strong support for Matthew's rearranging the "Q" material. On the other hand, Mt. 5:48 can definitely be attributed to Matthew's reconstruction. First of all as noted above, Lk. 6:36 fits into the following (6:37ff.) rather than into the preceding complex (6:27ff.). In Matthew, however, this is no

¹Cf. below for further discussion of the Matthean form and style, p. 202.

² $\epsilon\sigma\tau\omega\varsigma$ --17 times in Mt., 1 in Mk. and 7 in Lk. Of these 17 in Mt., two (9:38 // Lk. 10:12 (Q)) and 12:14 // Mk. 3:6) are not pure final clauses (related to verbs, cf. Baur, ad loc.). Luke has only three final clauses (2:35; 16:26, 28--all special to him) and Mark has none. These statistics are further supported by the fact that three Matthean "fulfillment" passages (2:23; 8:17; 13:35 cf. 12:17 v. l.) are introduced by $\epsilon\sigma\tau\omega\varsigma$, and it is added three times to Marcan material (8:34 cf. Mk. 5:17 par; 22:15 cf. Mk. 12:13; 26:59 cf. Mk. 14:55).

longer the case.¹ It is joined by both subject matter (cf. 5:45--God-like conduct) and conjunction ("δε") to the preceding. Secondly, and the most obvious sign is the change in content. Whereas Luke's οἰκτιρμοὶ could well be authentic,² Matthew's τελειοι is obviously Matthean. It only occurs in Matthew's Gospel and the one other occasion is Mt. 19:21 where it is inserted into Marcan material. Thus we have a Matthean usage of the "Q" material to conclude this complex rather than to introduce the following one. We then have numerous indications of his reworking the tradition at the crucial points in question: Lk. 6:29f. // 5:39ff.; Lk. 6:32-34³ // Mt. 6:46f.; Lk. 6:35 // Mt. 5:45 and Lk. 6:36 // 5:48.

Finally apart from the negative evidence against a Lucan reworking of the material and apart from the positive evidence for a Matthean modification of the source, one must also note the force of the external witness of the Didache and Justin.⁴ Both have the two traditional elements in the same context.⁵ Neither, however, follows

¹The change in context might well be reflected in the difference between Mt. 7:1f. and Lk. 6:37ff. Whereas Lk. 6:36 functions as the apodictic command and theme for 6:37ff., it now is used otherwise in Mt. 5:48. Consequently, rather than a series of commands pertaining to "mercifulness," Mt. has simply the one command (7:1a cf. Lk. 6:37a) followed by two bases 7:1b,2. He then returns to a more faithful rendition of "Q" in 7:3ff.

²v. supra.

³One might also add the relocation of the "Golden Rule" in 7:12 from the "Q" context in question.

⁴One might well question the relevance of Justin in this matter except for the fact that in chapters 15 and 16 of the Apol., I, numerous parallels occur to the Sermon: 15:1f. // Mt. 5:28f.; 15:3 // 5:32 (vs. Lk. 16:18!); 15:9 // Lk. 6:32 cf. Mt. 5:44, 46; 15:10 // Mt. 5:42, 46 cf. Lk. 6:30, 34; 15:13 // Lk. 6:35 cf. Mt. 5:48, 45; 15:17 // Mt. 6:1; 16:1 // Lk. 6:29 cf. Mt. 5:39; 16:2 has parts of Mt. 5:22 (a,c), 41, 16; 16:15 // Mt. 5:34, 37.

⁵Did. 1:3-5; Justin, Apol., I, 15, 9f; 16:1.

the Matthean order but rather more or less combines these under the command to love one's enemy, as found in Luke. This appears to be in keeping with our analysis, namely, that the material was brought together early and transmitted as a unit until Matthew again separated it into two distinct Antitheses. Both the Didache and Justin seem to have been familiar with Matthew's handling of the material but followed in general the tradition as commonly known to all four: Luke, Matthew, Didache and Justin, the so-called "Q" material.

Therefore, our analysis of the fifth and sixth Antitheses has shown that we have two early traditional elements (Mt. 5:39b-42 // Lk. 6:29f. and Mt. 5:44-48 // Lk. 6:27f. 32-36) which were actually combined pre-Matthean and pre-Lucan in the "Q" tradition. The differences in the present texts are not to be explained as resulting from two different forms of "Q" corresponding to different areas or branches in the early Church¹ but rather as editorial modifications most of which are characteristic of the evangelists. This of course does not mean that both evangelists shared the same "copy" of the Sermon, but rather that the Sermon had taken on a more or less definite form in the "Q" tradition and that Matthew had greatly reworked and expanded it whereas Luke appears to have remained fairly true to the tradition as he found it.²

¹E.g. H.-W. Bartsch, "Feldrede und Bergpredigt. Redaktionsarbeit in Lukas 6," TZ, 16(1960), 11f.; Wrege, op. cit., pp. 93f. attributes the difference between Mt. and Lk. to two independent traditions of Jesus' words--the one Jewish-Christian-Palestinian (Mt.), the other Gentile-Christian (Lk.).

²Lk. 6:27ff. would then represent the next block of the Sermon in the tradition, with the Lucan "Woes" removed, following directly on the Beatitudes. As such this section fits in perfectly with the one Beatitude which is different in form from the others (Mt. 5:11f. and Lk. 6:22f.). The latter could be explained as a transitional unit inserted to combine the Beatitudes

In summary, of the six Antitheses three were taken over by Matthew from his special source, and three were constructed by his drawing on "Q" materials. Both the exclusive presence of the three "authentic" Antitheses and above all Matthew's choice to use these as a pattern for three more indicates that he had a particular interest in this format. In order to determine just what this interest was and its theological implications for Matthew, we must turn now to an exegetical examination of the Antitheses themselves.

§2. The "Traditional" Antitheses

A. Matthew 5:21-22

1. Premise, 5:21

The premise found in 5:21 consists of two elements. It begins with a straightforward apodictic prohibition-- οὐ φονεύσεις--and ends with a legal pronouncement-- ὅς
 ὁ δὲ φονεύσῃ, ἐνόχος ἔσται τῇ κρίσει. While the first element is clearly a direct quotation of the sixth commandment (Ex. 20:13, Deut. 5:18), the source as well as the meaning of the second part presents more of a problem. One solution of this problem has been to view the second half as a legal ruling typifying the casuistry of Scribal tradition. In this way Scribal casuistry

with the exhortations following in 6:27-49. Granted some of the Lucan modifications in this block, one cannot but help seeing a block of material fitted for catechetical purposes, a function which concurs with the usage of the "Q" material (Cf. L. Goppelt, Die apostolische und nachapostolische Zeit (n.d.), 29, n. 10). Bornkamm's ("End-expectation," p. 17) finding of a "catechetical pattern" for "Matthew" is actually but an expansion of the pattern found in "Q:" a) "Beatitudes"--Lk. 6:20b-23 par. Mt.; b) "rules for the congregation"--Lk. 6:27-42; c) "warnings about the 'false prophets'"--Lk. 6:43-45 par. Mt. Cf. 6:46-49 // Mt.

becomes the focalpoint of the premise which Jesus counters by his own antithesis.¹ Another solution, while conceding that the second clause is not a literal quotation of the Old Testament, suggests, nonetheless, that one has here a representative summary of what the Old Testament taught in reference to the legal consequences of the sixth commandment (cf. Ex. 21:12; Lev. 24:17; Num. 35:16f.).² Consequently, for this position it was the Old Testament Law with which Jesus was taking issue. Thus the common twofold manner of explaining Jesus' relationship to the Law as seen in the Antitheses becomes evident: a) Jesus set his own teaching in deliberate contrast to the Scribal interpretation of the Law, or b) Jesus set his teaching in deliberate contrast to the Old Testament itself.

Must one, however, choose between these two options or is there not a moment of truth and error in both? The first option is ruled out by the content of the antithesis (vs. 22) which shows that Jesus was not merely opposing the Scribal judicial casuistry. It is not the fact that the transgressor is liable to the "judgment" which is countered in 5:22a but rather the nature of the transgression as found in the sixth commandment. Nevertheless, 5:21b does reflect the judiciary practice of the day. We have an abundance of

¹McNeile, Matthew, pp. 60f.; Dalman, Jesus--Jeschua, pp. 67f.; N. B. Stonehouse, The Witness of Matthew and Mark to Christ (1944), p. 201; Barth, op. cit., pp. 89, 94. Cf. Zahn, Matthäus, pp. 225f., who considers this construction to be an ironical usage of Scribal methodology.

²Allen, Matthew, p. 47; Manson, Sayings, p. 155; Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 166; J. Jeremias, TWNT, VI, 975; Lanwer, op. cit., p. 24 (from Deut. 16:18). Cf. Percy, Botschaft, pp. 125-127, who does not consider this to be primarily a summary as such but rather an adaptation of the OT teaching to the premise in light of the antithesis.

rabbinic evidence pertaining to capital crimes and their respective court procedures.¹ It is most probably with reference to this judicial procedure (κρίσις) rather than the Old Testament sentence (θάνατος cf. LXX, Gen. 26:11; Mt. 26:66) to which 5:21b refers.²

The second option runs aground on the usage of κρίσις. Generally speaking the premise of 5:21 embodies essentially the Old Testament instruction, i.e. the offender must be punished. But by relegating the premise exclusively to the Old Testament this option fails to incorporate the relevant indications pointing to the specific judicial practice in Jesus' day for carrying out the Old Testament commandment.

In other words, the premise of 5:21 is neither an attempt to portray exclusively the Scribal interpretation of the Law nor to reflect merely the Old Testament Law as such; rather it involves the character of the Law common to both. By citing the sixth commandment in both its apodictic and legal form, the premise sets forth the Law as being an integral combination of apodictic commands and legal ordinances.

2. Antithesis, 5:22³

The antithesis of 5:22 consists of a trilogy of legal pronouncements corresponding in form to the legal ordinance of the premise (vs. 21b): πᾶς ὁ + participle/ὁς δ' αὖ + subjunctive, ἐνόχος ἔσται τῇ κρίσει.... The

¹Whereas the OT passages had plainly stated that the one who kills must himself die (Ex. 21:12; Lev. 24:17; Num. 38:16), the complexities of method and motive for the killing made the courts a practical necessity (cf. S.-B., I, 255-75). Thus the presence of the courts was not itself directly the product of Scribal interpretation, but rather a means whereby the OT Law, as well as those of tradition, might be implemented.

²See below pp. 275-278.

³See Excursus I, pp. 278-282 for a discussion of the problems in the history of tradition behind 5:22.

first element of the trilogy (vs. 22a) contrasts with the premise (vs. 21b) in the nature of the transgression ($\phiονεύω \neq \theta\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\eta\kappa\alpha\iota$) but agrees as to its consequence ($\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\chi\omicron\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\tau\tau\alpha\iota \tau\eta \kappa\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\epsilon\iota$). The second element (vs. 22b) contrasts with both the premise (vs. 21b) and the first element of the antithesis (vs. 22a) in the nature of the transgression ($\dots \acute{\epsilon}\pi\eta\rho\acute{\alpha}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\dots$) as well as the consequence ($\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\chi\omicron\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\tau\tau\alpha\iota \tau\omega \sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\delta\rho\acute{\iota}\omega$). The third element (vs. 22c) differs in both transgression and consequence with all the preceding (vs. 21a, 22a,b): ($\dots \acute{\epsilon}\pi\eta \mu\upsilon\rho\acute{\epsilon}, \acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\chi\omicron\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\tau\tau\alpha\iota \epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma \tau\eta\nu \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\nu\alpha\nu \tau\omicron\upsilon \pi\upsilon\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$). The relationship of these elements to one another together with the intent of the antithesis necessitates a more thorough examination.

Although it has been much debated,¹ there seems to be no real lexical cause for not recognizing this trilogy of legal pronouncements to be setting forth in ascending order the judiciary tribunals familiar to a Jewish audience.² $\kappa\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, meaning the common judicial process as handled by a "local court," is the first level.³ $\Sigma\upsilon\nu\acute{\epsilon}\delta\rho\iota\omicron\nu$ being the "supreme court" of the land and meaning in nuce a court proceeding before this judiciary,⁴ represents the second level. The highest court of all was the final divine tribunal which is represented by its sentence-- $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma \tau\eta\nu \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\nu\alpha\nu$.⁵ Thus

¹Cf. Percy, Botschaft, pp. 127-130 for an analysis of alternative suggestions and literature.

²Jeremias, TWNT, VI, 975; Dalman, Jesus-Jeschua, p. 74, cf. below, Excursus I, pp. 277f.

³See Excursus I, below p. 278.

⁴See Excursus I, below pp. 273ff.

⁵Jeremias, TWNT, I, 655f. The $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ with an accusative is most probably to be explained as a formulaic expression of the phrase $\beta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu \epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma \tau\eta\nu \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\nu\alpha\nu$ (Mk. 9:45, 47 // Mt. 5:29; 18:19 (Marcan); Lk. 12:5 cf. Mt. 10:28 (Q)). Interestingly enough Matthew has the phrase-- $\alpha\pi\omicron \tau\eta\varsigma \kappa\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\epsilon\omega\varsigma \tau\eta\varsigma \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\varsigma$ --either from M or as editorial construction in 23:33. Is this not further

the Old Testament commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," and the way in which this was enforced--"Whoever shall kill...shall be liable to a judicial process (by a local court)"--was countered by the antithesis, "Whoever shall be angry with his brother shall be liable to a judicial process (by a local court); whoever shall say to his brother $\beta\rho\alpha\delta\acute{\alpha}$ shall be liable to the Sanhedrin (for a court process); and whoever shall say $\mu\omega\rho\acute{\epsilon}$ shall be liable to the hell of fire (the sentence of the final divine tribunal)." In other words, Jesus has intentionally placed two legal ordinances against each other by stating: Whereas the Law forbade murder under penalty of trial by local court, I say that anger and common invectives endanger one of trial by the local court, by the Sanhedrin and by the divine tribunal respectively.

Just what then was the intent of such an antithesis? By relegating 5:22bc to another context,¹ some have found here the distinction between "thought" and "deed."² However, this interpretation is not only placed in question by the authenticity of vs. 22 as a unit³ but also by the fact that such a bifercation lacks support in any of the other Antitheses.⁴

Others have stressed the legal format of the antithesis and thus interpreted 5:22bc as a detailed legalistic intensification in the form of Scribal casuistry

support for the authenticity of 5:22c, since in either event (M) of (Mt) vs. 22c could have been smoothed out with either $\epsilon\nu\omicron\chi\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \mu\epsilon\epsilon\nu\eta\varsigma$ (cf. Mt. 26:66 with genitive and Genesis 26:11) or $\epsilon\nu\omicron\chi\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\eta\ \mu\epsilon\epsilon\nu\eta$? Instead, we have the elliptical construction of $\epsilon\delta\varsigma\ \tau\eta\nu\ \mu\epsilon\epsilon\nu\eta\nu$ as found in the traditional Jesus' sayings of Mk. and Q noted above.

¹See Excursus I, pp. 278f.

²Most recently, Schmid, Matthäus, p. 98 as one of a long line of such commentators. Cf. Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 43.

³Cf. Excursus, I, pp. 280ff.

⁴Cf. 5:28 below, pp.144f. as the only other possible parallel in the Antitheses.

found in the primitive Church.¹ This understanding of the material overlooks the discrepancy between the seriousness of the "crimes" and their respective "punishments." Whereas the distinctions in the judicial levels is quite clear, the differentiation in respective transgressions does not seem to be proportionate to their consequences.² Furthermore, a literal legalistic understanding of 5:22 not only ignores the impossibility of carrying out the "new laws" judicially in the Church but also must accept the various tribunals as being merely figurative. In other words, by concentrating too much on form, this view has overlooked some important content factors.

However, from the standpoint of content alone, 5:22 represents but a radicalization of the sixth commandment, and such radical expressions were not foreign to the ethical teaching of Judaism.³ Nevertheless, to concentrate merely on the content is to overlook the deliberate use of the form of a legal ordinance in vss. 21b, 22. By countering the premise (vs. 21) with an antithesis (vs. 22) set exclusively in the form of a legal ordinance, a particular emphasis is placed on the legal aspect of the Law. Such an emphasis is hardly coincidental since, as will be seen, it is characteristic of all the Antitheses. One must take note of both the content and the form in order to find the intent and meaning of the first Antithesis.

Therefore, just as the apodictic sixth commandment was placed in its legal format (5:21b), so what appeared occasionally as an ethical maxim in Judaism was set in

¹Cf. Braun, op. cit., II, 24f., n. 9; V. E. Hasler, "Das Herzstück der Bergpredigt. Zum Verständnis der Antithesen in Matth. 5:21-48," TZ, 15(1959), p. 92f.

²Cf. the similar meaning between *ῥαγ* and *καὶ*, yet the world of difference between the consequences--Sanhedrin and divine punishment. See below pp. 272f.

³Cf. S.-B., I, 277-279, 280-282 for numerous rabbinic parallels against both anger and the misuse of invectives.

the form of a legal ordinance. Ethical "principles" were set as "laws." Even more, these were set in anti-thesis to the Law's demand. Thus by demanding what went beyond all previous legal requirements and even what went beyond all social requirements, Jesus' demand did not merely radicalize the sixth commandment but, negatively, as an antithesis it stands as an absolute condemnation of the previous relationship between "brethren" and, positively, it is an absolute demand for conduct characteristic of a new relationship between "brethren"--a relationship which transcended the demands of the Law. It was this new relationship characterized by reconciliation which is expressed as a positive exhortation by the following passages of vss. 23f.,¹ 25f.²

B. Matthew 5:27-28

From a traditionsgeschichtlich standpoint, the complex comprising the second Antithesis (vss. 27-30) is probably the least complicated of the six Antitheses. The Antithesis itself (vss. 27, 28) is one of the three (vss. 21f., 27f., and 33f.) which have generally been recognized as having been found in their present form by the evangelist³ and which for most scholars reflects

¹This passage has a material parallel in Mk. 11:25 cf. Did. 14:2 and probably belonged together with 5:22 to Matthew's tradition. Cf. Strecker, op. cit., p. 31, n. 1.

²This parable is from "Q" (Lk. 12:57-59). Cf. Jeremias, Gleichnisse Jesu, pp. 39f.; C. H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom (rev. 1961), pp. 105f., and could well be attributed to Matthew's reworking of the material. Cf. Strecker, op. cit., pp. 159f.

³Percy has questioned this conclusion. He has suggested that this Antithesis built along the analogy of the other Antitheses could have been a later addition by the early Church to Matthew 5. Three considerations enter into his reasoning: a) a catechetical desire to bring the seventh commandment into Mt. 5; b) the prevalence of similar teaching in rabbinic Judaism; and c) the difference contentwise between this Antithesis

authentic sayings of Jesus.¹ The following verses 29 and 30 have a doublet in Mt. 18:18f. (cf. Mk. 9:43, 47).² Since the role of the "heart" and "eye" occur frequently together in rabbinic warnings against adultery,³ we may

and the others--in that the antithesis (vs. 28) counters the premise (vs. 27) by simply redefining what was forbidden (Botschaft, pp. 143f.).

Percy's first reason appears quite subjective. It seems strange from a purely catechetical perspective that only one other of the nine remaining commandments should have been placed in Mt. 5. In addition, this Antithesis appears to have much more at stake than merely catechetical instruction. In his second reason, Percy himself has taken great pains to point out the differences between vs. 28 and the Jewish parallels (*ibid.*, pp. 144f.). Furthermore, the addition of 5:31f. almost certainly presupposes 5:27ff. to explain its presence and location. This would mean then two post-Matthean additions to the Antitheses. Such would be highly questionable, particularly in view of the Matthean character of the third Antithesis, cf. pp. 121 f.). Percy's third reason, moreover, stands in contradiction to his explanation of the section's origin. If this antithesis had been constructed along the "analogy" of the others, why would it have differed in the nature of content with the others (some of which are also secondary, cf. 5:31)? Is not this lack of "analogy" the strongest recommendation for its authenticity?

¹See n.1 on p. 117. In contrast to this Braun considers this to be one of the Antitheses which reflects common Jewish teaching and thus does not stem from Jesus (*op. cit.*, II, p. 86, n. 1; II, p. 109, n. 6; II, p. 5, n. 2).

²Bultmann, Tradition, p. 350; Montefiore, Synoptic Gospels, I, p. 64; Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 45; Kilpatrick, Origins, p. 19; Schmid, Matthäus, p. 101; Filson, JBL, p. 229.

Differing with the above: Manson, Sayings p. 157 and Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 126. The latter considers it to belong together with vss. 27f. in Matthew's tradition. Cf. Kilpatrick's penetrating analysis for distinctive Matthean traits. This removes most of the problems raised by Lohmeyer and Manson.

³S.-B., I, 299f.; Abrahams, Studies, II, 205ff.; Montefiore, Rabbinic Literature and Gospel Teachings (1930), pp. 41ff.

have here a partial explanation for the presence¹ of these sayings within the context of vss. 27f.

The premise (vs. 27) of the second Antithesis focuses indubitably on the Old Testament by quoting the seventh commandment (Ex. 20:14). In contrast to the composite format of the first premise (vs. 21) it is simply an apodictic commandment. Thus in both form and content any hint of Scribal interpretation is excluded. The antithesis (vs. 28), however, offers a different picture. Just as the first antithesis (vs. 22), so the second (vs. 28) takes the form of a legal ordinance. Furthermore, the content--adultery is not necessarily limited to the overt act--sounds quite similar to certain rabbinic sayings on the subject of adultery. In fact, they are so similar that some scholars have even considered them to be synonymous.²

Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that several Jewish parallels appear practically synonymous in substance with the antithesis (vs. 28),³ a closer examination of them reveals an important difference in the perspectives from which the apparently synonymous material is approached. While the Jewish parallels always begin with the concrete principles of "adultery=actual

¹The inversion of the Marcan order could well be in order to bring the "eye" into closer contextual relationship to the subject matter of verse 28-- $\pi\alpha\varsigma \delta \beta\lambda\epsilon\pi\omega\nu$

²Braun, op. cit., II, p. 5, n. 2; Moore, Judaism, II, 268; Manson, Sayings, p. 157; Montefiore, Rabbinic Literature, p. 41; Abrahams, op. cit., II, 205ff.

³Most similar is: "Wer eine Frau mit (begehrlicher) Ansicht anblickt, gilt wie einer, der ihr beiwohnt," Tr. Kalla 1 (S.-B., I, 299, translation). Another sounds almost identical until one reads further to discover that it refers to an Old Testament usage: "Du sollst nicht ehebrechen," daß man nicht ehebrechen soll...auch nicht mit dem Auge und nicht im Herzen. Und woher, daß das Auge und das Herz huren? Siehe Num. 15:39: 'daß ihr nachbuhlt,'" M^ekh d^eR. Schimson III (S.-B., I, 299, translation).

deed" and "adulterer-transgressor through actual deed" as the basis by which they compared the less overt desire or intent via "eye" or "heart,"¹ the antithesis of 5:28 simply posits the invert "desire-adultery." This contrast in perspective is but a reflection of the difference in intent underlying the sayings.

On the one hand, the rabbinical concern about determining just who an adulterer is in view of an expanded application of the term adultery demonstrates a characteristic trait of their interpretation of the Law. They were most concerned about interpreting the Law in all of its legal consequences, i.e. transgressions and transgressors. Such concern, however, in these parallels did not arise in order that the "transgressor" might be discovered and punished.² Rather they were meant as warnings or preventative measures that one was to keep in mind.³ In other words, this was the Scribal way of explicating the seventh commandment by specifying its ramifications.

On the other hand, the antithesis of 5:28 focuses on the meaning of adultery,⁴ and the usage here is enunciated without any comparisons of transgressions or transgressors. It sets forth in bold letters a judicial pronouncement rather than a wider legalistic

¹See p.144 n.3 for parallels.

²There is no trace of punitive, judicial elements in any of the related materials. This absence is most striking in contrast with the large amount of Scribal tradition dealing with the judicial aspects of the seventh commandment. See S.-B., I, 295ff.

³Cf. Moore, Judaism, II, 269, "The rabbis, in their endeavor to 'keep man a long way off from sin,' took manifold precautions against the incitement of lustful thoughts through the senses...."

⁴Percy is correct in seeing a definition of adultery at stake in the Antithesis, but the tone and intent make it plain that much more is involved than merely a redefinition of adultery or a radicalizing of the seventh commandment. Cf. Percy, Botschaft, p. 144.

interpretation of the seventh commandment. This is no admonitory, preventative measure; this is a condemnation--"(he)...has already committed adultery with her in his heart."

What then is the import of the second antithesis? Although 5:28 handled as an independent saying does evidence certain differences in comparison to the rabbinic passages, one must concede that, to a limited extent at least, material parallels are present since both deal essentially with the seventh commandment. By removing, however, verse 28 from its context one loses the critical contextual factor. This saying receives its force only when handled as an antithesis to verse 27.¹ The major question is: How can the legalistically formulated verse 28--"everyone who..., has already committed adultery with her in his heart--" be understood antithetically to the apodictic clause in verse 27--"thou shalt not commit adultery?" Quite obviously no antithesis exists on the surface between these two formulations.

As in the first Antithesis so here, the form of the antithesis (vs. 28) furnishes the key to the answer. The legal format of this verse set in antithesis to the apodictic command of vs. 27 brings to light the legal character of the seventh commandment. It was both morally and legally wrong to commit adultery.² However, Jesus placed a moral principle found in both the rabbinic sayings as well as the Old Testament itself (cf. the tenth commandment) in the form of a legal ordinance which actually condemned the lustful look as being

¹Bultmann, Tradition, p. 144, et al. see this necessary contingency as an authenticating factor for the antithetical format.

²This understanding was not only found in rabbinic circles, but also in the Old Testament Law itself. Cf. Lev. 20:10 and S.-B., I, 295f.

adultery in the heart.¹ Such a radical condemnation was not simply the radicalization of the seventh commandment nor was it an attempt to spell out the ramifications of the commandment, but as an antithesis to 5:27 it condemned the covert desire by equating it with the overt act. In so doing, Jesus was actually demanding a relationship between the sexes which transcended even the legal demands of the Law.

C. Matthew 5:33-37

1. Premise, 5:33

We turn now to the last of the three Antitheses considered by most scholars to have been authentic.² This, however, is by no means the unanimous consensus of opinion. Both Allen, writing around the beginning of this century, and Percy, of recent, have questioned the authenticity of the premise in vs. 33.³ T. W. Manson also found a problem in what he believed to be a confusing of material on oaths and vows which he attempted to alleviate by relegating verse 33b (ἡ ποσὶς λέγει).

¹By comparison, the Jewish parallels use "heart" as an instrument through which one can commit adultery, just like "eye," "hand," or "foot." Moore gives a clue to this usage by his translation "mind" (Judaism, II, 268). The usage of "heart" in 5:28, however, is in keeping with other NT sayings, and it differs in two ways with the Jewish parallels. First of all, it is used integrally with the lustful look and not simply one of a list of possible instruments through which one commits adultery. The lustful look is the instrument; "in his heart" places the action. Secondly, the meaning of "heart" in the sayings goes much deeper than "mind" or "intent." It is "...der Mittelpunkt des inneren Lebens des Menschen," and often functions as the very root of one's person in contrast to the more external appearances (Behm, TWNT, III, 614f.). Both of these differences play an essential role in 5:28 to set Jesus' saying off against the understanding of verse 27 in its external implications.

²See p. 117.

³Allen, Matthew, p. 53; Percy, Botschaft, p. 148.

δε τῷ κυρίῳ τοῖς ὅρκους σου = vows) to the status of an explanatory insertion for 33a (οὐκ ἐπιορκήσεις = oaths).¹ For each the problem hinges on an apparent disparity between the intent of the premise (vs. 33) and the antithesis (vs. 34-37).

The premise (vs. 33) consists of two elements neither of which is a direct quotation from the Old Testament. With reference to the first half (vs. 33a--οὐκ ἐπιορκήσεις --the only passage coming into consideration is Lev. 19:12 which prohibited false swearing in the Lord's name on the basis of the second commandment (Ex. 20:7). From a purely terminological standpoint there is little or no correspondence between these passages. Whereas Lev. 19:12 appears to focus specifically on the consequence of false swearing--i.e. misusing the divine name, Mt. 5:33a stresses the act of false swearing as such. Nevertheless, the material differences here may be more apparent than real. A genuine oath by nature always involved God as a witness, even when his name was not directly cited.² This would have been taken for granted by a Jewish audience hearing "οὐκ ἐπιορκήσεις."³ It is quite possible that the absence

¹Manson, Sayings, p. 158; Davies, Setting, p. 240, who follows Manson.

²S.-B., I, 330, "Zum Wesen des Schwörens gehörte, daß er beim Namen Gottes, d.h. beim Jahwenamen geleistet wird." This remains valid even when substitutes for the divine name becomes more and more the practice (cf. S.-B., I, 331f.). The substitutes, however, had to refer clearly to God or else they were not binding (cf. S.-B., I, 332f.; Philo Spec. Laws, II, 1f. (Loeb). It is just this very point at stake in vss. 34-36 as well as 23:16-22. Philo also writes in Decalogue, pp. 84-86 (Loeb), "One must consider in no careless fashion all that an oath involves.... For an oath is an appeal to God as a witness on matters in dispute...."

³Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 131, who overlooks this in his discussion.

of "in my name" might well suggest that the Old Testament prohibition was being "quoted" in terms of the common practice in Jesus' day of avoiding a direct usage of the divine name. At any rate, one may safely conclude that 5:33a refers to false swearing in light of the Old Testament teaching as found in Lev. 19:12 (cf. Ex. 20:7).¹

The second half of the premise-- ἀποδῶναις δὲ τῷ κυρίῳ τοῦς ὅρκους σου --has its closest formal parallel in Psa. 50:14 (LXX 49:14).² However, it differs content-wise at the crucial point of ὅρκους for εὐχάς. Some scholars have tended to ignore this variation and, while otherwise sharply distinguishing between "oaths" and "vows," have chosen to understand this clause strictly with reference to the εὐχάς.³ Verse 33b would then reflect the teaching of Psa. 50:14 as well as Deut. 23:21 (LXX 23:22) and diffuse the thrust of the premise by introducing a second element concerning "vows." This position might well be questioned. Not only does it introduce a disharmonious element concerning "vows" into a complex (vss. 33-36) dealing exclusively with "oaths,"⁴ but it overlooks the key word "ὅρκους" in vs. 33b. Granted that εὐχάς fits better with the Old Testament passages, it is, nevertheless, this very factor which suggests that ὅρκους was deliberately chosen over in view of the immediate context. In other words, the immediate context of "oaths" overruled the Old Testament terminology of "vows." Such an interchange could hardly

¹S.-B., I, 326f.; Philo, Spec. Laws, II, 2 and Decalogue, pp. 84-86 (Loeb); Sirach 23:9-11.

²Mt. 5:33b: ἀποδῶναις τῷ κυρίῳ τοῦς ὅρκους σου
Psa. 50:14: ἀποδος τῷ θεῷ τὰς εὐχάς σου

³Allen, Matthew, p. 53; Manson, Sayings, p. 158; and Davies, Setting, p. 240.

⁴Thus to reconcile vs. 33b with the complex, one must either explain vs. 33 as such as secondary (cf. Allen, Matthew, p. 53) or the clause in vs. 33b as a secondary insertion (Manson, ibid., and Davies, ibid.).

have been possible unless the two terms shared a common denominator.¹

This common element becomes clearer when the two-fold nature of "oaths" in Judaism is taken into consideration.² First, we have the "assertive" oath (either positive or negative in nature); e.g. "I swear that I have/have not eaten," and secondly the "promissory" oaths (likewise either positive or negative)--ex. "I swear that I will/will not eat." As is obvious, the second type approximates in nature the "vow." Thus given a specific differentiation,³ a "promissory" oath and a "vow" share the same generic character. Both

¹The other option would be to maintain a sharp distinction between the concepts. If so, there would be no OT content parallel to the clause, since the emphasis could not possibly fall on "vows" (ἐὐχάς) in vs. 33b with "oaths" explicitly given in the text.

Davies, who follows Lieberman (Greek in Jewish Palestine (1942), pp. 115f.), considers this exchange of ὅρκος for ἐὐχή to be a product of a popular confusion between the two terms (Setting, p. 240). This explanation fits better under our argument for a common element between "vows" and "oaths." Davies himself argues later on against sharp distinctions between them with reference to Josephus and the Essenes (*ibid.*, p. 242). It would be most difficult to imagine how two words with entirely separate meanings could be confused--particularly when allegedly referring to an Old Testament reference as in vs. 33b. The only way for confusion to arise, if indeed it did in this instance, would be through a similar meaning for the two terms.

²See Mishnah, trans. by Danby, p. 411--Sh^ebuoth 3:1. Fiebig, Bergpredigt, p. 63 labels these "asser-torisch" and "promissorisch" respectively.

³Danby has distinguished these according to their usage in the Mishnah: "The vow is distinct from the oath, in that a vow forbids a certain thing to be used..., while an oath forbids the swearer to do a certain thing although it is not a thing forbidden in itself," The Mishnah (1933), p. 264, n. 1; Fiebig, Bergpredigt, pp. 66, 171, "Nach rabbinischer Theorie bezieht sich eigentlich das Gelübde auf einen Gegenstand, der Schwur auf einer Tätigkeit."

involve personal, verbal asseverations.¹ To this extent they could be exchanged in 5:33b without affecting the basic intent of the Old Testament commandment. The Old Testament commandment would have the same force with "vows" as 5:33b does with a "promissory" oath. One would not, however, be able to re-insert "vows" (τάς ἐϋχάς) into Mt. 5:33b without breaking up the contextual harmony, although the basic thrust would remain the same. Therefore, since the general meaning is the same and since a specific choice of ὅρκους appears to be conditioned by the context, it would be legitimate to predicate the Old Testament passages of Num. 30:3, Deut. 23:22 and above all Psalms 50:14 as "parallels" for 5:33b.

If then 5:33b even with τοὺς ὅρκους reflects the Old Testament teaching as Psalm 50:14, etc., is it to be considered necessarily as secondary?² If one takes it as explanatory for vs. 33a,³ then it would limit the premise exclusively to a promissory oath which is not directly countered by the antithesis. Such would naturally raise questions about either the antithetical format or the modifying clause. However, the second clause need not be exegetical. It could very well be correlative to the first clause. The particle ὅτι is most commonly used as an adversative,⁴ but this is not

¹To this extent they were interchangeable--cf. Num. 30:3 for a synonymous parallelism with "vows" and "oaths." Philo reflects this by combining the two together. Fiebig also points out that even in the Mishnaic tract on "vows" in Nedarim, II, 1--"Hier haben wir Gelübde--und Schwurformel neben einander. Beide gingen vielfach in einander über," Bergpredigt, p. 66, n. 171.

²v. supra, p. 149.

³Allen, Matthew, p. 53; Manson, Sayings, p. 158; Davies, Setting, p. 240; Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 132; Schneider, TWNT, V, 178.

⁴Bauer, ad loc., Blass-Debrunner, §447.

its sole function. Mt. 1:2-16 along with 5:21, 31, 37; 6:16; 23:4 et al. illustrate its function as a trans-
itional or continuative particle between separate ele-
ments. Such being the case the premise would consist
of two correlative statements (cf. 5:21): the one a
prohibition based on the Old Testament against the false
usage of an "assertive" oath, the other a command like-
wise based on the Old Testament for keeping a "promis-
sory" oath. Nonetheless, this still leaves the question
pertaining to the relationship of the "promissory"
element to the antithesis (vss. 34-37) unanswered. We
must return to this after a more thorough examination
of these verses.¹

2. Antithesis, 5:34-37

In turning to the antithesis (vss. 34-37), we find
again two traditionsgeschichtliche positions. Several
scholars have considered verses 34b-36 to be secondary,²
while most recently Strecker has singled out verse 37
as an additional problem, since it demonstrates partic-
ular Matthean editorial characteristics.³ In either
case 5:34a--μή ὀμόσαι ὅλως--stands out as an indisput-
able element of the saying. The infinitive construction
functioning as a prohibition with the adverb ὅλως for-
bids swearing entirely.⁴ Such a radical demand is

¹See further below, pp. 292f.

²Montefiore, Synoptic Gospels, II, 68; Bultmann, Tradition, p. 143 (vss. 34b-35); Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 19-20; Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 132, n. 3; cf. Schniewind, Matthäus, p. 65 (on "Jerusalem" in vs. 36); Schmid, Matthäus, p. 106; Davies, Setting, p. 240; Hasler, "Herzstück," TZ, 15(1959), p. 98.

³Strecker, op. cit., p. 133; Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 42, hinted at this long ago.

⁴The meaning of "ὅλως" in this phrase is singular--
"not at all" (Bauer, ad loc.). Any attempt to limit
this to a particular type of oath ends in the final
analysis as unsuccessful casuistry. Cf. Lanwer, op.
cit., p. 30 who seeks to distinguish between public

without parallel in any of our Jewish sources, although we have numerous rabbinic warnings against unnecessary swearing as well as false swearing.¹ Even the Essenes who shied away from using oaths appear to have taken an initial oath upon entrance into their closed community.² Philo, no doubt influenced by Greek philosophers who forbade swearing,³ never went to such an extreme. His advice was to swear only if absolutely necessary, but to try if possible to avoid it.⁴ Therefore, for a Jewish audience conditioned as they were by the Old Testament practice of swearing, this prohibition would come as a most radical demand. Verse 34a, however, could hardly represent the totality of the antithesis, as James 5:12 indicates. This raises next the question of the relationship between 34a and 34b-37.

Both Matthew and the primitive Church have been charged with diluting just such radical demands as Mt. 5:34a. In this case, the Church rather than Matthew has been held responsible.⁵ Verses 34b-36, for many scholars, reflect this tendency either by qualifying the total demand of vss. 34a,⁶ by introducing a side issue aimed at the Scribal practice of using genuine

and private life; Hasler, "Herzstück," TZ, 15(1959), p. 98 takes the $\epsilon\lambda\omega$, as being explicated by vss. 34bff.

¹S.-B., I, pp. 328-330; Sirach 23:9-11; Montefiore, Rabbinic Literature, p. 48.

²Josephus, Jud. Bell., II, viii, 6,7; 1QS 5:8; CD 15:1-13, cf. CD 9:9. Davies has a good discussion of this material in Settings, pp. 241-244.

³Diogenes Laertes, VIII, p. 22 (Pythagoras' teachings) and Epictetus, Encl. 33:5.

⁴Spec. Laws, II, iif. (Loeb), Decalogue, pp. 84-86 (Loeb).

⁵Cf. Strecker, op. cit., p. 133 for detailed discussion.

⁶E.g. Bultmann, Tradition, suppl. to p. 145; M. Dibelius, Der Brief des Jakobus (1964), p. 298.

but substitute oaths,¹ or by focusing attention on the careless but widespread usage of strong affirmations (not quite on the level of oaths).² To a limited extent the various suggestions have been correct. Mt. 5:34b-36 does appear to be the product of the primitive Christian community's handling of an authentic saying, and these clauses are qualifying factors to the saying. However, the scholars have failed in perceiving both how these modify the logion and why. Rather than being paranetic³ in the sense of legalistic rules of conduct, vss. 34b-36 appear to have arisen in the atmosphere surrounding the primitive Church during her daily encounters with Judaism.⁴ They qualify the authentic logion by neither limiting its scope nor by introducing extraneous material but rather by extending the radical thrust of vs. 34a in order to exclude any casuistical evasion of its import. Therefore, in view of such a function they do not detract in any way from the basic intent of the antithesis.

The last verse of this complex, vs. 37, can best be handled by considering both halves separately. The presence of either vs. 37a or a related clause in the more original form of the logion appears to be beyond question.⁵ However, in view of its differences with the corresponding element in James 5:12b many have rejected the authenticity of the Matthean form and intent in favor of James. According to most who hold

¹See p. 284 n. 1.

²See p. 286 n. 2.

³See pp. 288f.

⁴v. infra pp. 288ff.

⁵As Percy puts it: "... (verse 34a: μη ὁμολογᾶτε ὅλως)...kann kaum von Anfang an die ganze Antitheses darstellt haben" (p. 148). This is supported by the integral nature of the clause to the saying in James 5:12.

this position, James with--" ἡὲν δὲ ὑμῶν τὸ ναὶ ναί, καὶ τὸ οὐ οὐ demands a complete honesty, while Matthew with--" ἔντω δὲ ὁ λόγος ὑμῶν ναὶ ναί, οὐ οὐ " appears to offer a formula as replacement for the prohibited oaths.¹

Nevertheless, the priority of James is by no means as certain as many have concluded. When one re-examines 5:12 as a whole, one discovers considerable evidence pointing to a later date than the corresponding passage in Mt. 5. This is true, first of all, stylistically. One notes immediately the Semitic influence on the usage of ὁμνυμι with a preposition in Mt. 5:34b-36, whereas James has the more acceptable Greek form of ὁμνυμι with the accusative case. Furthermore, Matthew's awkward construction of μὴ...ὅλως followed by three μὴτε's is smoothed over by the more expected μὴ...μὴτε's. Secondly, the formal difference noted below² between the two passages also suggest an earlier date for Matthew, since the polemical usage reflecting the earlier Sitz im Leben of the logion preceded the paranetic.³ This

¹Dibelius, Jakobus, p. 298; Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 134; Braun, op. cit., II, 80, n. 6; Strecker, op. cit., pp. 133f.; Hummel, op. cit., p. 57; Wrege, op. cit., p. 83. Not all who assign the priority to James concur that the Matthean form is formulaic. Some attribute 5:37a to a mistranslation of the Aramaic: cf. Zahn, Matthäus, pp. 248f.; Fiebig, Bergpredigt, p. 82, n. 202; Torrey, Four Gospels (1933), p. 291; Manson, Sayings, p. 159. Others have sought other non-formulaic explanations: cf. Schmid, Matthäus, p. 105; Hasler, "Herzstück," TZ, 15(1959), p. 100.

²See p. 288.

³The paranetic nature of Mt. 5:34b-36, according to Dibelius, was one of the strongest reasons for granting priority to James. But, as was seen below, Matthew reflects the polemical situation of the Church with Judaism rather than a paranetic instruction for Christian behavior. Since James has the definite paranetic form and since his entire epistle is paranetic in nature, there is no question about the paranetic character of his saying. However, Matthew reflects neither in form nor context such a paranetic intent.

priority in form is also supported by the contextual differences, when one takes into account the antithetical framework in Matthew as opposed to the paranetic context of James. Thirdly, Percy has drawn attention to the fact that the demand of James 5:12b for absolute honesty actually is a non sequitor to the prohibition of 5:12a against swearing.¹ Logically speaking, James 5:12b can only be taken as a separate exhortation to honesty along side of the prohibition in vs. 12a. Mt. 5:37a, however, introduced by the adversative "ἐπεὶ" develops naturally as the positive element in contrast to the negative statement in 34a and forms a single unit. Finally, while much has been made of the presence of the articular form in Justin and other early fathers,² this need not automatically point to a non-Matthean source. In fact Justin and other fathers demonstrate a definite familiarity with the Matthean text.³ The change in form might well have been occasioned by similar circumstances as James 5:12b.⁴

Since, therefore, from a stylistic and formal standpoint James appears to represent a later form of the logion in general and since the second clause in particular presents problems contentwise in its relationship to the first clause, one would need a strong negative argument against the priority of Mt. 5:37a in order to concede the priority to James 5:12b. In other

¹Percy, Botschaft, p. 147, n. 4. Justin Martyr (Apol., I, 16,5) also understood Mt. 5:37 to be in contrast to 5:34a, although he has the form with the article. Yet how he understood it as such is seen in his introduction to the quotation--"περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἀρνύσθαι ὅλως (concerning not swearing at all), πάντοτε δὲ λέγειν ἀεὶ (but always speaking the truth)." Here the contrast is between "not...at all" and "always," a contrast which is not explicit in James 5:12.

²Cf. Dibelius' argument from this point, Jakobus, p. 297.

³See p. 159 n. 6.

⁴See p. 163.

words, the argument for priority cannot stem from evidence against Matthew, who in general appears to represent the less reworked form of the complex in 5:34ff.

Just such a negative argument against the priority of Mt. 5:37a¹ has been drawn by a few scholars in view of its form.¹ Most scholars of recent, however, have sought to deduce the incriminating evidence from the apparent intent behind 5:37a within its present context as a formulaic substitute for the prohibited oaths.² In this way the radical prohibition of vs. 34a is toned down through the introduction of a comparable replacement for the practice of the early Christian community. That is, the paranetic needs of the Church conditioned the radical saying as it was handed down to them.³ Thus while James 5:12b reflects Jesus' straightforward demand for honesty, Mt. 5:37a appears to be merely a formula of affirmation/negation developed in light of the early Church's needs.⁴

¹Since an anarthrous usage of the doubled "yes" and "no" occurs in rabbinic sources as an oath, some scholars, such as Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 47; Manson, Sayings, p. 159; Torrey, Four Gospels, p. 291; Schmid, Matthäus, p. 105; Soiron, Bergpredigt, p. 274, have taken issue with the form of the saying. This argument, however, carries little weight. First of all, even if it were deliberately altered, it would be most difficult to explain how either a Jewish-Christian community (as seen in vss. 34b-36, if pre-Matthean) or Matthew himself could have consciously constructed an oath formula within the immediate context of a total prohibition of oaths. Secondly, the only rabbinic evidence for such a usage as oaths is quite late (ca. 350 from Sh'buoth 36a, S.-B., I, 336; Fiebig, Bergpredigt, p. 80, v. 202). The only early parallel from The Secrets of Enoch 49:1ff. cited by Charles (Pseudepigrapha, p. 460) and followed by several others (cf. Schneider, TWNT, V, 181, n. 58 and Wrege, op. cit., p. 83) has been ruled out of question as a later interpolation (cf. Vaillant, Le Livre des Secrets d' Hénoc (1952), p. 109, n. 7f.). Only one manuscript tradition has this passage.

²See p. 155 n. 1.

³Although this argument is closely connected with the supposed paranetic nature of vss. 34b-36, by demonstrating vss. 34b-36 to be other than paranetic, one does not exclude this possibility from vs. 37a.

⁴Ernst Kutsch, "Eure Rede aber sei ja ja, nein nein," ET, 20(1960), pp. 217f., interprets this as a formula but in a completely different way. For him it represents an abbreviated way of saying one's speech

Such an understanding fails to account for some important considerations. From the standpoint of the immediate context, which explicitly eliminates any oaths or quasi-oaths used to strengthen one's word, the introduction of a substitute formula to accomplish the same purpose would seem most improbable, even if at all possible. Hypothetically one can easily speak in terms of a "substitute" for the prohibited oaths, but seen from the practical side, the actual substitution would have been impossible. An "oath" was constituted by a certain form regardless of the specific content. The content merely determined whether the "oath" was binding or not.¹ Therefore, to substitute the formula "yes yes"/"no no" would not have changed the oath-like character of one's statement at all, so that the practice of vs. 37a would still run counter to the absolute prohibition of vs. 34a².

From the standpoint of content, by labeling the form and intent of vs. 37a as formulaic, one implies a rote usage deprived of any inherent meaning. Yet the construction of a double "yes"/"no" could hardly imply an empty formula for either Matthew's audience³ or for his tradition, since in either case Jewish Christians were involved. In the Semitic languages just such a doubled construction serves a particular grammatical function of intensifying or emphasizing the quality of the words involved.⁴ This being the case the meaning

should be consistent: "yes--yes" and not "yes--no." His material parallel comes from an inscription dating from Nebuchadnezzar's time. Whereas this might explain the "missing link" between James 5:12 and Mt. 5:37a, it leaves Mt. 5:37b hanging in the air. As will be seen below (p. 164) vs. 37b shows definite signs of being Matthean. This would mean that he either misunderstood the "shorthand" or purposefully changed its content.

¹This was the very point in question for vss. 34b-36.

²Cf. Secrets of Ennoch 49:1-2 "I swear to you, my children, but I swear not by any oath.... If there is no truth in men, let them swear by the words, 'yea, yea' or else 'nay, nay.' And I swear to you, yea, yea...." Here we have an excellent example of a contradiction in terms--"swearing" by a "non-swearing" formula!

³Strecker, *op. cit.*, p. 133f., attributes this to Matthew, but the introduction of it here was prompted by the practice of his audience or at least it presupposed their familiarity with such a "formula."

⁴Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, ed. and enlarged by E. Kautsch, rev. and transl. by A. L. Cowley (21910), p. 396 (§123e).

of the "formula" would be the same as a "non-formulaic" explanation--i.e. "let your word be an emphatic 'yes'/'no' or "let your word be an untainted (simple) 'yes'/'no'!"¹ This usage is supported, furthermore, by the rabbinic sources.² Only once does the doubled "yes"/"no" occur within a context which might in any way approximate a "formulaic" usage. That happens to be the one example in which the "formula's" status as an oath is discussed.³ Otherwise the doubled construction always appears in a "non-formulaic" context with the meaning of an intensified "yes"/"no." Therefore, contentwise the grammatical construction as well as the Jewish parallels point most favorably to a "non-formulaic" intent.

From the standpoint of the traditionsgeschichte, by understanding Matthew's form as a mere "formulaic" response in contrast to James' demand for honesty, one is left with a considerable gap between the second half of the corresponding passages (5:37a cf. James 5:12b), although they both reflect the same traditional milieu in the first half (Mt. 5:34a // James 5:12a).⁴ This difference has been variously explained as either a further modification of the tradition in the primitive Church or an editorial reworking by Matthew.⁵ Yet from an entirely different perspective, there are at least three church fathers who have the articular form instead of 5:37a, but they demonstrate a definite familiarity with the Matthean complex of 5:34ff.⁶ This

¹Cf. the following who accept the "non-formulaic" explanation--i.e. "let your word be an emphatic yes/no:" Zahn, Matthäus, p. 248; Allen, Matthew, p. 54; McNeile, Matthew, p. 68; cf. Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 183; S.-B., I, 376; Percy, Botschaft, p. 147; Stählin, "Zum Gebrauch von Beteuerungsformeln in Neuen Testament," NT, V (1962), p. 119.

²Cf. S.-B., I, 336f.

³S.-B., I, 336: Sh^ebuoth 36a.

⁴See pp. 283f.

⁵Strecker, op. cit., p. 133f.

⁶a) Justin, Apol., I, 16,5, who not only quotes vs. 37b --a certain Matthean addition (cf. p. 264) but also quotes from all six of the Antitheses plus other special Matthean material within the immediate context: I, 16,2= Mt. 5:22, 41, 16; 15:1f.=Mt. 5:28f. (nb. 5:29 here within vs. 28 instead as found in Mark!); 15:3=Mt. 5:32 cf. Lk. 16:18 (nb. again the location immediately following 15:2=Mt. 5:28f.!); 15:9=Mt. 5:42, 46; 15:18=Mt. 5:48, 45; 15:17=Mt. 6:1. In light of this evidence, there seems to be no question but that Justin had Matthew in mind in these two chapters!

becomes even more striking when one realizes that these

b) Pseudo-Clement, Hom. 3,55,1 and 19,2,4 have the articular form together with 5:37b! Furthermore, 5:34f. is quoted in the same context as 5:37 (3,56,3).

c) Clement from Alexandria: Unlike the two above, Clement from Alexandria does not directly combine vs. 37b with vs. 37a or its equivalent. Nevertheless, he does quote vs. 37b in another work along with vs. 36--cf. Paed., III, 16,4 (vs. 36); II, 103,4 (5:29b). In addition a closer examination of Strom., VII, 50 appears to reflect a familiarity with vss. 33-37. Like Mt. 5:33-37 this chapter is not paranetic in either nature or content. Rather it is an exposition on the subject of not swearing. The similarities are as follows:

1) 50:1 introduces the subject matter of lying and swearing (cf. vss. 34a and 37a)

2) 50:1 defines an oath as a specific expression calling upon God (cf. vss. 34-35!)-- "... ὁμολογία καθοριστικὴ μετὰ προπαραλήψεως θείας."

3) 50:4 mentions repeatedly lying and false swearing (vs. 33a)-- ψεύσεται οὔτε ἐπορκήσεται.

4) 50:5 refers to not swearing at all (vs. 34a)-- ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁμῶνται.

5) 50:5 instead of swearing one is to prefer in cases of affirmation to give simply a "yes," and in cases of negation a "no" (vs. 37a!)-- ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς συγκαταθέσεως μόνον τὸ ναί, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀρνήσεως τὸ οὐ προσελλόμενος τὰ πρὶν ἐπίρρημα. Here specific "instructions" are evident, just as in vs. 34, 37a of Matthew. One is to give simply a "yes" (cf. emphatic usage of doubled forms). The article here serves its normal articular function of specification.

6) Since swearing means using an oath or something having the meaning or intent of an oath, one must suffice with such a simple answer--50:5 (cf. vs. 34b-36!)-- ὁμῶναι γὰρ ἔστι τὸν ὅρκον ἢ ὡς ἂν ὅρκον ἀπὸ δεινολίας προσφένθαι παραστατικῶς.

By contrast, however, Strom., V, 99,1-- ἔγωγε ὁμῶν τὸ ναί, ναί, καὶ τὸ οὐ, οὐ --and Strom., VII, 67,5-- ἔστι ὁμῶν κτλ... differs not only in form (as seen here) but also in emphasis. Whereas Strom., VII, so placed the emphasis on not swearing, Strom., V, 99,1 places the demand for honesty ahead of the prohibition of swearing (Strom., V, 99,2) and Strom., VII, 67,5 omits swearing altogether and labels the clause the "ἐπιτομή δικαιοσύνης!"

It is certainly possible that both Strom., V, 99,1 and VII, 67,5 developed from the saying in Mt. 5:37a. However, the paranetic nature of these sayings plus the difference in emphasis coupled with the non-paranetic character of Strom., VII, so in keeping with Mt. 5:33ff. makes it possible if not probable to suggest two sources.

were not only completely independent from one another, but they reflect no awareness of James' Epistle. Thus we are confronted with a traditional phenomenon existing between Matthew and some of the early church fathers similar to that between Matthew and James; namely, the so-called "formulaic" usage as opposed to the radical demand for honesty with both stemming from an apparently common traditional background.¹ In view of this close parallel, perhaps a further examination will give us the necessary clue to the problem of priority.

The older explanation that the fathers reflect a mixed tradition² is basically an argument from silence for a second source³ which becomes redundant if one could narrow the gap to the extent that the one tradition might plausibly have both a development from Matthew's form. The necessary bridge could quite possibly be the "non-formulaic" interpretation of Matthew's form: i.e. an emphasizing of the respective "yes" or "no."⁴ In other words, according to Matthew, Jesus countered in vs. 34a the Jewish practice of using an oath as a means of assurance for one's word. But he did not leave the

As noted above, Paed., II, 103,4 indicates that the Matthean tradition was familiar to Clement. Perhaps the isolated saying in its paranetic form as found in James 5:12 was also familiar to him. In either case, there is certainly no evidence of a "mixing" of sources, since none of the passages indicate a comparison of a Matthean and a non-Matthean source.

¹We just saw the fathers' familiarity with Mt. 5: 33ff. and we noted before the Jewish-Christian background for Matthew and James' tradition.

²Cf. Resch, ZKLW, IX, 283ff.; Bousset, Die Evangelien-citate des Justins des Märtyrers (1891), p. 72; Dibelius, Jakobus, p. 297, n. 1.

³This would mean either that each author had a separate "second" source which he deliberately chose to substitute for vs. 37a or Matthew's text of vs. 37a was modified at some time and the three different fathers in different locales happened upon the "mixed" form. In either case the explanation leaves things more hypothetical than before.

The one exception could well have been Clement of Alexandria who might have had both the paranetic form of the logion as well as the Matthean account. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of any mixing of the sources here, since all three passages are singular in content (see p. 159 n.6).

⁴See pp. 158ff.

matter at that point. Rather he not only removed any superficial means of guaranteeing the validity of what was said, but he also demanded that one's word be of such character to supply the necessary assurance. Underlying such a demand is an absolute honesty on one's behalf. Therefore, the apparent bifercation between Matthew's form of the saying and that found in James and the early fathers becomes a matter of degrees. In the one, the demand for honesty is explicit; in the other, it is implicit to the demanded response.

Nevertheless, several differences still remain between Matthew and the fathers in question. These differences become more pronounced when we realize that they have their parallels in James 5:12b. Apart from the question of form, James and the fathers share the same intent--paranetic exhortation (or reflection of such usage). Even more important they share a difference in emphasis over against Mt. 5:37a.¹ Whereas Matthew's two homogenous clauses focus singularly on the subject of swearing,² the others have a clause prohibiting swearing combined together with a clause demanding honesty to form a composite emphasis on both swearing and honesty.³ Some might immediately conclude that this is further proof for the secondary character of Mt. 5:37a, since it appears to be an attempted alignment with the overall antithetical complex on swearing. This conclusion, however, shortcircuits the all important witness of the fathers by emphasizing the gap separating them from Matthew and neglecting the underlying agreement as noted above. Since Matthew's "formulaic" construction has absolutely no parallels in the early Church⁴ and since these sources which do have the artic-⁵ular form of James 5:12b all quote at times from 5:33ff., one cannot arbitrarily rule out the possibility of their modifying the Matthean form. Even using a hypothetical "mixed source"⁶ the transition would have had to have

¹Bousset, op. cit., p. 72.

²See p. 156. Clement of Alexandria, Strom., VII, 501-6 has a unified theme (cf. p. 159 n.6).

³For James, see p. 156. Justin brings the two elements together in his introduction Apol., I, 16,5. Clement of Alexandria in actually elevating honesty above not swearing in Strom., V, 99,1 and in Strom., VII, 67,5 eliminates the latter altogether. Pseudo-Clement, Hom. 3,55,1 and 19,2,4 refers only to 5:37 and thus a reference to honesty.

⁴Cf. Irenaeus, Haer. 4,11,4,--13:15-16.

⁵See p. 159 n. 6.

⁶Cf. p. 161 n. 2.

been made at some point. Such a modification would not only have been possible but even quite probable should Matthew have been understood as a "non-formulaic" "yes"/"no" with an underlying demand for honesty.

Granted this further parallel between James and the early fathers in the development of their tradition, Matthew would then represent the more original form in its rather limited, non-paranetic context pertaining to swearing. The complex, being removed from its antithetical framework and condensed according to the paranetic needs of the early Church, was actually broadened in its scope. The implicit demand for honesty found in the doubled "yes"/"no" of the antithetical context now took on greater proportions and was made explicit by simply placing the construction in a predicative relationship--a construction which would have been much more intelligible to a Greek audience than the more Semitic form of Mt. 5:37a.² Such an explanation would account for the differences in form, intent, and emphasis; but yet it would also bridge the gap between Mt. 5:37a and James 5:12b as well as the respective church fathers. Therefore, whereas a "formulaic" understanding of Matthew leaves a huge gap in the history of tradition between Matthew and James on the one side and Matthew and certain church fathers on the other, a "non-formulaic" function makes a transition between the two constructions possible.

Therefore, since James 5:12 stylistically and formally is later in general than Mt. 5:34-37a and since the negative arguments against the form and intent of Mt. 5:37a in particular all break down under closer examination, we have no actual grounds for denying Matthew the priority by relegating vs. 37a to either the primitive Church or Matthew. Furthermore, our analysis has made it clear that only a "non-formulaic" understanding of vs. 37a as a demand for an emphatic "yes"/"no" is compatible with the context, the construction, and the various traditionsgeschichtliche factors. Thus, we have

¹The form of II Cor. 1:17-- το ναι ναι , το ου ου has been cited from time to time, as a further example demonstrating the authenticity of the articular form. One might just as readily argue to the contrary in view of vs. 18. vs. 18: ο λεγος ημων -- ουκ εστιν ναι και ου
5:37a: ο λεγος ημων [εστιν] ναι ναι, ου ου

²Cf. the polished Greek of James 5:12a with Mt. 5:34bf.

here in 5:37a the second half of a single unit bringing to expression the positive demand underlying the negative prohibition of vs. 34a rather than a second element of a composite saying referring jointly to both swearing and honesty.

The second half of verse 37 is linked to the first half grammatically by another correlative "σε",¹ and materially by the demonstrative pronoun, "τούτων." Since both "περιττόν"² and "τοῦ πονηροῦ"³ are characteristically Matthean, it appears quite certain that vs. 37b was a Matthean product. The major uncertainty has focused on the gender of "τοῦ πονηροῦ."⁴

By beginning with the less ambiguous passages of 13:19, 38 and including the special adjectival usage of πονηρός in Matthew⁵ rather than limiting one's inquiry to simply the substantival usages, a definite redactional pattern emerges which has direct bearing on vss. 37, 39. As Jeremias has demonstrated, 13:19 and 13:38 are both products of Matthew and refer to Satan as the "Evil One."⁶ However, this is by no means simply a substitute for the name "Satan."⁷ Rather as the context

¹ See vs. 33b, p. 151.

² 5:47

³ Mt. 5:37; 6:13 cf. Lk. 11:4; 13:19 cf. Mk. 4:15 // Lk. 13:38.

⁴ Matthew has given substantival usages of this term. Interestingly enough, all the examples occur in the two long passages of Jesus' teaching--the Sermon on the Mount and the chapter on the parables of the kingdom. Two seem most certainly masculine--13:19 and 13:38. The other three examples could be either masculine or neuter --5:37, 5:39 and 6:13.

⁵ By limiting one's inquiry to the substantival usage, one has tended to overlook an important aid in understanding the connotations involved. While Luke has ten adjectival occurrences and one substantival, Matthew has nineteen adjectival and five substantival (of these adjectival--eight are from Q: 5:11 // Lk. 6:22; 5:45 // Lk. 6:35; 6:23 // Lk. 11:34; 7:11 // Lk. 11:13; 12:35 // Lk. 6:45; 12:45 // Lk. 11:26; 16:4 // Lk. 11:29; 25:26 // Lk. 19:22.

⁶ Jeremias, Gleichnisse, pp. 80, 82, n. 6, 7.

⁷ Matthew uses both the name "Satan"--4:10;

demonstrates, ὁ πονηρός represents the adversary to the preaching of the Kingdom, and the "children of the Evil One" are the counterpart to the "children of the Kingdom."¹ This is further substantiated by the adjectival use of πονηρός to describe the bitter opponents of Jesus' earthly ministry,² which, according to Matthew, reflected the presence of the Kingdom.³ The opposition did not cease with the end of Jesus' ministry. In fact it not only countered the preaching of the Kingdom (cf. Mt. 13:19, 38f.) but also included an affront upon the "children of the Kingdom." The latter is seen in Matthew's explicit warning against false prophets whose evil deeds issuing from their inherent nature betray them as "evil ones" (see 17:16-18! as reworked from Lk. 6:43). Since, therefore, the attack was also aimed at those of the Kingdom (cf. 5:11) as well as its proclamation, it becomes more probable that the ambiguous ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ of 6:13 echoes the struggle by praying for deliverance from "the Evil One."⁴ This same note of conflict can also be seen in the remaining substantial usages--5:37b and 5:39. Just as one's words are characteristic of their source⁵ (12:34f.!) and one's deeds are indicative of one's nature (7:17, 18)⁶ so the words in 37b stem directly from the "Evil One"⁷ and the

12:26 // Mk. 3:23; 16:23 // Mk. 8:33 and "Devil"--4:1, 5, 8, 11; 13:39; 25:41.

¹In keeping with this, the parable of the fish net is interpreted as separating "the evil ones" from the "righteous." Thus "children of the Evil One"="the evil ones." This deliberate contrast between "good and evil" is seen particularly in that with one exception (19:17) all nine occurrences of the adjective πονηρός appear together with a contrasting ἀγαθός.

²Matthew 9:4 cf. Mk. 2:11 // Lk. 5:22; 12:34, 35 (cf. context with Lk. 6:45), 39, 45 and 16:4 cf. Lk. 11:29.

³Mt. 12:23, 28, 42.

⁴E. Lohmeyer, Das Vater Unser (51962), pp. 150-152. Contra Harder, TWNT, VI, 560f. for a strong argument for the neuter.

⁵Here Matthew makes a deliberate point by reworking and rearranging the Q passage (12:35 // Lk. 6:45) from the Sermon on the Plain to this context of conflict between Jesus and his opponents.

⁶Reworked and expanded by Matthew from Q (Lk. 6:43) to warn against false prophets.

⁷Not so much since "anything more than these" was evil or reflected the "evil principle" in the world, but

deeds of vss. 39bff. reflect the nature of an "evil one" (in contrast to the deeds of those in the Kingdom (vss. 39ff. cf. 5:45)).¹ The masculine gender here is not only more in keeping with Matthew's usage of *πονηρός/πονηρους* as the One or ones opposed to and in contrast to the Kingdom and those belonging to it but also with the fact that the one abstract usage of *τὸ πονηρόν* in Q (Lk. 6:45) is changed by Matthew to the more concrete *πονηρά*.

Thus the meaning of 5:37b would be: "Anything more than an emphatic "yes/no" is from the "Evil One." The "τούτων" could hardly have any other grammatical or theoretical antecedent than "ναὶ ναί, οὐ οὐ." The source "from the Evil One" could well imply its contrary character to Jesus' teaching.² In addition, since Matthew consistently employs *πονηρός* for those not belonging to the Kingdom,³ the construction could also be an indication of the intent behind vs. 37b. Rather than being directed as a mere warning to the Christian community, this section might well have been added to vs. 37a within the same purpose for which vss. 34b-36 were added to vs. 34a, namely to cover any of the various Jewish attempts to skirt the import of Jesus' demand.

rather since they stood in direct conflict to Jesus' demand, the "requirements" of the Kingdom. The construction *ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ* as an ablative of source cannot be taken, as has often been attempted, to be causative or explanatory: "Anything more than these is due to the evil principle in the world." Neither can it mean that such is inherently evil, since the OT has numerous examples of God himself swearing. Rather "anything more than these" reflects an opposition to the demand of Jesus for an absolute honesty.

¹The usage of "evil one" in small letters corresponds to the "evil man" of Mt. 12:34f.; the evil men of 5:45, 13:49; the "children of the Evil One (13:38)" and the evil servant of 18:32.

²See p. 165 n. 7.

³One exception is the Q passage of 7:11 // Lk. 11:13 which Matthew took over directly. The factor of contrast is present in the saying, but it is between God and man. All of the other Q sayings, however, have been placed in other contexts directed at those outside of the Kingdom.

In either case, whether as warning to the Christian community or as a rebuke against the Jewish practice regarding oaths, verse 37b in no way connotes a weakening of Jesus' demand. On the contrary, by attributing everything beyond an emphatic yes/no to the Evil One, the opponent of the Kingdom, Matthew makes perfectly clear the underlying either/or of the demand in vs. 37a. This addition demonstrates that Matthew was concerned with neither a paranetic intent of the antithesis, nor a more practical interpretation of its thrust. His major concern was that Jesus' demand be seen in the radical nature of its intention.

In summary, the complex of the fourth Antithesis (5:33-37) represents a rather involved analysis of the tradition. We have found traces of three distinct levels: a) the more authentic part of the Antithesis--premise = vs. 33a and antithesis = vss. 34a, 37a; b) the primitive Church's expansion of this--vss. 33b, 34b-35, (36); and c) Matthew's editorial addition in vs. 37b. Taken altogether, these form a composite section whose antithetical character is somewhat blunted. But by removing the various layers, one is left with a sharply defined Antithesis consisting of a simple premise (vs. 33a) pertaining to "assertive" oaths countered by a compound antithesis (vss. 34a, 37a) referring to the same type oaths.

The additions by the primitive Church (vss. 34bf., 36) most probably arose in the everyday contact between the early Christians and their Jewish surroundings and were based on comparable teachings of Jesus.¹ Rather than softening for casuistical purposes or reflecting the paranetic teaching of the primitive Church, these additions sharpen the kerygmatic character of the initial Antithesis by broadening its scope to include

¹See p. 293.

the common "promissory" oaths (vss. 33b, 35) and by strengthening it against any casuistical evasions via spurious oaths (vss. 34bff.). This was not only borne out by a closer examination of their Sitz im Leben behind these elements, but it is also supported by Matthew's editorial comment to the entire complex (vs. 37b). With Matthew's concluding sentence, the "either/or" of Jesus' radical demand becomes most obvious. Thus these expansions detract in no way from the basic thrust of the original Antithesis.

The more authentic form of the premise (5:33a) represents the Old Testament Law pertaining to the prolific usage of oaths; namely, one must not swear falsely. Jesus counters this by totally forbidding the use of oaths and by demanding that one's word be limited to an emphatic "yes/no." In other words, by removing the provision for substantiating the truth by means of an oath and by replacing this with simply an emphatic "yes/no," the underlying thrust of the antithesis becomes apparent--a demand for complete honesty.

Church history is replete with examples of those who have sought to legalistically carry out the demands of 5:34ff. However, such an approach misunderstands the entire thrust of the antithetical form by viewing Jesus' demand as the chronological sequence to the demand of the Law. On the other hand, one cannot ignore the antithetical framework and take 5:34a, 37a out of its antithetical context. Jesus was not merely setting forth an apodictic demand for honesty. Such a demand was found already in the ninth commandment. Rather, by condemning the use of oaths and demanding absolute honesty in antithesis to the Law's provision for insuring honesty--viz. the recognition of oaths, Jesus was countering the very starting point of the premise in 5:33a. The premise (5:33a) moves out from the given of evil and dishonesty; Jesus' antithesis (5:34a, 37a) moves

out from the defeat of evil and dishonesty. Therefore, the antithetical aspect must be seen as eschatological and not chronological.

Once again in the fourth Antithesis, it was not merely a moral principle which Jesus set forth, rather he placed the absolute ethical maximum as the necessary minimum--"anything more than this is from the Evil One" and set it in antithesis to the Law's demand. His demand not only condemned the need of oaths as such but set forth a demand which transcended that of the Law.

D. Summary

In summary, our analysis of the three "traditional" Antitheses has shown that we have three premises whose content refers either directly or indirectly to specific Old Testament laws and in no way involves Scribal interpretation. One premise quotes the Old Testament Law verbatim (5:27), one quotes the Old Testament Law in the first half (5:21a), and one does not expressly quote the Old Testament Law at all (5:33a). However, this very lack of uniformity in quoting the Old Testament Law should serve as a caution against considering that the premises represent the Old Testament Law in general.

As we saw in the introduction,¹ the Old Testament concept of the Law was an integral complex involving both moral principles and legal ordinances. This same concept of the Law was also present in Pharisaic Judaism, in spite of their legalistic "hedging" of the Law with their Scribal tradition, as seen in the partial parallels among the rabbinic materials to Jesus' demands. However, in the Antitheses we saw that the Law was presented solely in terms of its legal aspect. This was done through adding a clause in the form of a legal ordinance in the premise of 5:21b; by combining an

¹Cf. pp. 23f., 36.

apodictic command with an antithesis in the form of a legal ordinance (5:27f.) and by wording the apodictic premise in terms of the legal practice concerning oaths (5:33a). Therefore, the "Law" represented by the premises is, strictly speaking, neither characteristic of the Old Testament nor Scribal teaching. Rather it is a deliberate representation of the Law exclusively in terms of its legal character.

At the same time, the antitheses in form also have the character of a legal ordinance. In content each antithesis has a material parallel in either the Old Testament, Scribal teaching or both. However, whereas the parallels had represented the maximum of ethical conduct, Jesus, by setting them in their present form and context, declared them to be a necessary legal requirement. Whereas the Law had legally condemned murder, adultery and false swearing, Jesus' demands "legally" condemned anger, invectives, lustful desire and even the need and usage of oaths as such. Whereas the Law had condemned conduct contrary to the premises, Jesus' authoritative word condemned all conduct short of that required in the antitheses.

However, this is not simply a radical interpretation of the Old Testament Law, since that would both ignore the moral aspect of the Old Testament Law and the deliberate choice of the legal form in the antitheses. Nor are the antitheses intended to be set against the Old Testament Law as its chronological successor--a nova lex, since this overemphasizes the legal character of the Old Testament Law and ignores the content of the antitheses. Rather in antithesis to the Law as represented in the premises, Jesus' demand stands, negatively, as an absolute condemnation to all that which legally fulfills the Law's requirements but fails to meet his radical demand. Positively, the antitheses represent a demand for conduct stemming from a

new relationship between men (5:22-26, 28), a relationship in which evil has been defeated (5:34a, 37).

In other words Jesus' demand set forth in the Antitheses is basically a demand for repentance. Set in such an antithetical framework to the legal requirements of the Law, one can only realize the utopian character of carrying out Jesus' radical demands as well as the insufficiency of a "righteousness according to the Law" (cf. 5:20 below). Such conduct must reflect that of the age of salvation. Therefore, Jesus' demands in these three Antitheses stood in antithesis to the Law by transcending the Law's legal requirements by means of a demand for conduct which went beyond any legal bounds.

As to the tradition itself, there seems to be little or no evidence which would be contradictory to the authenticity of the three "traditional" Antitheses. These have been elements added by both the early Church (cf. vss. 34f. (?), 29f. (?) and vss. 33b, 34b-35) and Matthew (vss. 25f. (?), 36 (?), and vs. 37b). Yet in each case, the addition has served, on the one hand, to bring out the intensity of the particular demand rather than to mollify it. On the other hand, they indicate to us that the demands were understood concretely and not simply as an "ideal" ethic beyond one's grasp. To be sure they do presuppose a new basis for one's action: vss. 23-26--the new basis for one's relationship between both God and man is forgiveness and reconciliation, vss. 29-30--the hyperbole of self-mutilation indicates that only a "new heart" is the solution and vs. 37b-- bluntly puts it to the contrary, namely, anything short ("more") than Jesus' demand comes from the Evil One.

Matthew's role so far has been primarily that of taking over the traditional material and placing it in his Gospel. The material which can be attributed to him is in keeping with the thrust of the traditional

material and merely serves to illustrate and clarify the issue at stake. In the three Antitheses which follow, however, we see a more extensive redactional modification of traditional material.

§3. The "Matthean" Antitheses

A. Matthew 5:31-32

One's treatment of the third Antithesis (5:31f.) hinges to a great extent on the traditionsgeschichtlich evaluation of a saying in 5:32 which occurs in three variations (Mt. 5:32; Lk. 16:18; Mk. 10:11 (// Mt. 19:9), 12).¹ Since with the exception of Mt. 19:9² all three forms are double sayings, it is only reasonable to conclude that the original saying was so constituted. Which variation then reflects the more authentic saying? The second element of the Marcan passage (10:12) represents quite clearly a further adaptation of the logion corresponding to the Gentile practice.³ This leaves the

¹As noted above p. 121 an examination of these different contexts shows that the saying was transmitted as a unit in itself.

²This exception is explainable. See n. 3.

³Jewish practice never permitted a woman to divorce her husband, Strecker notwithstanding (Moore, Judaism, II, 125). In certain exceptional cases she could sue in court for a bill of divorce from her husband, but this always was given from the man (cf. S.-B., I, 318f.; Moore, ibid; Montefiore, Rabbinic Literature, p. 47). Cf. the majority of commentators ad loc. for the Gentile practice as exemplified in Mark.

That such was the case most probably explains Matthew's omission of this clause in his parallel 19:9 (cf. Strecker, op. cit., p. 132). The specific reference at the beginning of both pericopes (Mt. 19:3 // Mk. 10:2) to the husband's right to divorce his wife (ἐἰ ἐξίστην (ἀνδρὶ) (τῇ) γυναῖκα (αὐτοῦ) ἀπολῦσαι), rather than being the formal grounds for Matthew's elimination of Mk. 10:12 (cf. Strecker, op. cit., p. 132), is more likely to have reflected the historical situation in which the Pharisees as representatives of the Jewish law could only ask with reference to the husband's right. This would be even more reason to suspect Mk. 10:12, which--even if in a Lehrgespräch--was

parallel between Mt. 5:32b and Lk. 16:18b as the more likely second element. The first element presents a more unified picture with agreement between Mt. 19:9 // Mk. 10:11 // Lk. 16:18a. Thus since both elements of Luke's saying have parallels (16:18b // Mt. 5:32b and 16:18a // Mk. 10:11 // Mt. 19:9), the Lucan form of the saying emerges as the more authentic double logion.

In comparison with the Lucan saying, Mt. 5:32 differs, apart from the antithetical format, in at least three major points: a) 5:32a cf. Lk. 16:18a; b) "except" clause; and c) the stylistic differences in vs. 32b (ὅς ἐάν + subj., μοιχᾶται) and Lk. 16:18b (πᾶς + participle with μοιχεύει). Several scholars have sought to explain 5:32 as a Matthean construction based on 19:9 par.¹ Such a solution appears congruent with the following evidence. First, the antithetical format corresponds to the antithetical context found in Mt. 19.² Secondly, vs. 32b shares formal³ and verbal⁴ similarities with Mark 10:11. Nevertheless, affinities to Mk. 10:11 are not sufficient grounds for positing an editorial construction by Matthew in 5:32⁵ whereas they might well reflect Matthew's

nonetheless brought into this context by either Mark or his source to further explain the Streitgespräch (cf. vs. 10--"περὶ τούτου").

¹Soiron, Bergpredigt, pp. 105f., 265; Schmid, Matthäus, p. 102; Gaechter, Matthäus, p. 169.

²Moses' allowance for divorce is cited by the Pharisees in argument for the practice (19:8). Jesus counters by asserting that such was not the practice originally (vs. 8) and his own "ruling" is given for contrast (vs. 9).

³ὅς ἐάν + subjunctive.

⁴μοιχᾶται

⁵Soiron's major argument hinges on the disciples' surprise at this difficult saying (Mt. 19:10). Such a reaction would hardly be fitting if Jesus had so spoken on another occasion (cf. Bergpredigt, pp. 105, 265f.). This argument would only substantiate the editorial location of Mt. 5:32 and not its source. Soiron's thesis presupposes the historical reliability of

editorial reworking of a given saying.¹ The Achilles' heel of this solution is in fact the one clause (vs. 32b) which is stylistically identical to the Marcan format. This clause has no content parallel in either Mt. 19:9 or Mk. 10:11 but strikingly enough in Lk. 16:18b. This agreement in content (5:32b // Lk. 16:18) coupled with the agreement in form (5:32a // Lk. 16:18a)² raises again

Mt. 19:3-10--which is far from certain since vss. 3-9 are from Mark and verse 10 is either an editorial bridge or a part of Mt (M) itself. Granted this presupposition, however, should Mt. 5:32 belong to "Q" and Mt. 19:9 to Mark, this would in no way establish two different "authentic" sayings. Both traditions are isolated sayings and could just as well be derivative of one "original" saying to which the disciples reacted with such astonishment.

¹This is particularly so when one recalls that the antithetical framework of Mt. 19:8 and 9 is the product of Matthew's reworking of his Marcan material. The crucial saying (Mk. 10:11) is not even a part of the Streitgespräch in Mark but rather it is included in the appended Lehrgespräch (cf. p. 122 n.1). Secondly, the form of $\delta \epsilon \alpha \nu$ + subjunctive--while definitely unusual as a correlative with $\pi \alpha \varsigma \delta$ + participle in any of the Gospels (cf. pp. 279-281)--introducing the second element of an antithesis does occur in Mt. 5:22 (see p. 138) and could be a result of both Matthew's familiarity with the Marcan material as well as his desiring to parallel this antithesis (vs. 32) with his previous pattern (vs. 22).

Furthermore, the usage of $\mu \alpha \chi \alpha \rho \alpha \iota$ for $\mu \alpha \chi \epsilon \omega$ need not be explained exclusively in terms of Mt. 19:9 // Mk. 10:11 since this form of the verb occurs in the LXX: Jer. 3:8 (interchanged with $\mu \alpha \chi \epsilon \omega$ 3:9); 5:7; 9:1; 23:14; 36:23 and Ezek. 16:32; 23:37. In view of this usage in LXX Greek it is plausible that $\mu \alpha \chi \alpha \rho \alpha \iota$ represents the more authentic form of the verb (Mt. 19:9 // Mk. 10:11, 12 and 5:32b). In such a case Luke's usage of $\mu \alpha \chi \epsilon \omega$ is understandable as his reverting back to the more common classical root, and Mt. 5:32a, which is to be taken as a Matthean modification (see below) has the form $\mu \alpha \chi \epsilon \upsilon \theta \eta \nu \alpha \iota$ in order to fit into the context of 5:27f., since only the root $\mu \alpha \chi \epsilon \omega$ occurs in the seventh commandment or directly related to it (cf. 5:27f., 19:18 // Mk. 10:19 // Lk. 18:20).

² $\pi \alpha \varsigma \delta$ + participle.

the possibility of a "Q" source.¹ One major obstacle, however, remains in the way--the difference in content between 5:32a and Lk. 16:18a.²

Before handling this difference between the Matthean and Lucan sayings, it might be advantageous to first examine the so-called "except" clause-- παρεκτός λόγου προνείας. This clause has had numerous explanations both with reference to its source and its meaning.³ With reference to source it appears all but certain that the clause is a Matthean addition to vs. 32 since it also occurs as an interpolation in Mt. 19:9 cf. Mk. 10:11.⁴ If this be so, the meaning of the clause would

¹The consensus of most scholars lies along this line. Harnack, Sprüche, p. 58; Bultmann, Tradition, p. 140; Bacon, Studies, p. 239; Montefiore, Synoptic Gospels, I, 66; Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 19, 85; Schnie-
wind, Matthäus, p. 62; Albertz, Botschaft, I, 54; Schnackenburg, Die Sittliche Botschaft des Neuen Testaments, (21962), p. 104 cf. J. Dupont, Marriage et Divorce Dans L'evangile: Matthieu 19:3-12 et parallèles, (1959), p. 45, et al.

²Wrege, focusing on this change in content has argued that since Matthew adopted the logion in 19:9 without altering it, the non-Jewish character of Lk. 16:18a (given a "Q" source) would not have bothered him enough to change it. Thus this "revised" edition must have been the result of a Jewish-Christian community from whom Matthew received the tradition rather than from Q (op. cit., pp. 76f.). Cf. also Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 129 and Manson, Sayings, pp. 157f., who take Mt. 5:32 as an independent traditional element.

³Cf. Schnackenburg, op. cit., pp. 104-106, for the more frequent interpretations and their weaknesses.

⁴There appears to be no sufficient ground why Mark or Luke would have stricken it from their independent traditions, and Paul reflects no knowledge of such in I Cor. 7. The only possibility might be that Mt. 19:9 is an interpolation based on 5:32 which he received independently from either Mark or "Q". Thus it would be an attempt to align Mt. 19:9 with 5:32. Apart from the fact that there is little evidence that 5:32 is from Mt (M), the difference in the form of the clauses would appear most unusual for one who is attempting to make the passages parallel. Indeed the differences in the two clauses appears to correspond to a difference in sources. The phrase παρεκτός λόγου προνείας appears to be Matthew's translation of the Hebrew ערוך דבר which was the center of the Scribal discussions on Deut. 24:1 and more important the premise of 5:31. In

then be bound up with the intent of its author and/or his audience. Consequently, most scholars finding the motive in the exigencies of the early Church have interpreted the clause to be a casuistic conditioning¹ of Jesus' demand. While some have sought to harmonize the clause with the radical nature of the demand in Mk. 10:11 and Lk. 16:18,² others have simply conceded that Matthew represents a casuistic softening in order to

19:9 we find the enigmatic construction *μη ἐνὶ πορνείᾳ* which appears to have been added simply as an interjected exception and not out of the same deliberation as 5:32. In other words the phrase in 5:32 appears to have been chosen in view of Deut. 24:1, whereas in 19:9 the phrase is added without specific reference.

¹Arising a) as the Church attempted to use the saying for a legal enactment (cf. Bultmann, Tradition, p. 159; McNeile, Matthew, p. 66; Taylor, Mark, p. 431; Filson, Matthew, p. 87); b) as a direct influence of rabbinic instruction on the primitive Church (cf. Allen, Matthew, p. 52; Manson, Sayings, p. 157; Braun, op. cit., II, 110, n. 4; Branscomb, op. cit., p. 152; Strecker, op. cit., pp. 17, 132; Hummel, op. cit., p. 51); or c) as Matthew's better understanding (possible through further "unpublished" teaching of Jesus) of Jesus' intent (cf. Schnackenburg, op. cit., p. 106; Tasker, Matthew, pp. 69, 182.

²Above all Schnackenburg's defense of the "classical" Catholic position--Mt. 5:32 and 19:9 is a further interpretation of Jesus' saying for the early Church which had run into problems over divorce. In other words, Jesus permitted divorce in the case of adultery, but he did not permit one to remarry under any circumstances. Thus the unclear statement of Lk. 16:18 and Mk. 10:11 is clarified by Matthew for the Church's needs.

This defense, however, overlooks the basic question at stake in remarriage. Why could one not remarry without being guilty of adultery?--because the former marriage bonds could not be cancelled. Legalistically understood, therefore, divorce was to absolutely no avail under any circumstances, unless one maintained that adultery was the one exception since by nature it automatically cancelled the marriage bonds. Given this concession, two further problems arise here: a) if it were so "automatic," then why the need to call attention to it in Mt. 5:32; 19:9, and b) if this were the case that the wedding bonds were actually broken through adultery, why would remarriage be adultery?

The heart of the problem lies in the starting point, i.e. a legalistic understanding of the saying as such.

make Jesus' saying more practical for the early Church.¹ Both of these attempts run into real problems, since they both begin with the same working premise--the clause was meant casuistically by Matthew.

Although we no longer have the original context for the logion, we can inquire into its intent by way of its content. Apart from the fact that the position of the wife is raised to that of the man,² the basic thrust of the saying, as found in Luke and Mark, is that the marriage bonds are indissoluble.⁴ In other words, as Mt. 19:3-8 // Mk. 10:2-9 indicates, Jesus viewed marriage as a divinely ordained, inseparable matrimonial relationship in which divorce was unthinkable (as would be, naturally, adultery!). Hence he could declare in apodictic fashion the divine intent: "What God hath joined together let no man put assunder" (Mt. 19:6 // Mk. 10:9). But at the same time Jesus often placed his

¹Among others Braun, op. cit., II, 110, n. 4; Strecker, op. cit., pp. 17, 132; and Hummel, op. cit., p. 51.

²On the former, see Schnackenburg and particularly Schmid, Matthäus, pp. 103f. who both lean toward the "classical" solution, but who admit that no solution is without major problems in harmonizing Matthew's form of the saying with that of Luke and Mark. The latter position, however, has the problem of harmonizing their viewpoint with the Matthean context. Most who hold this opinion consider the antithetical format to be a product of Matthew. If so, it is most difficult to imagine that he would have gone to such lengths just to set forth Jesus' saying as being synonymous with the position of the school of Shammai. Indeed, the antithetical framework would have no force other than to give Jesus' teaching a setting. That such was the case is most out of character with the other Antitheses.

³In Jewish practice adultery could only be committed against the husband--seen either from the perspective of the wife who commits adultery against her husband or from the third party who commits adultery against the woman's husband. One could never commit adultery against one's wife. Thus polygamy was a theoretical (and at times an actual) possibility without transgressing the seventh commandment. By committing adultery against one's wife, as found in the logion, the woman is elevated in legal standing to that of the man.

⁴As evidenced by the fact that remarriage is adultery. In other words, the first marriage has not been terminated. Therefore, to remarry is to commit adultery against the partner of the first marriage.

absolute demand in the familiar legal medium of his day in order to actually get its radical import across to a Jewish audience which tended to consider the will of God in terms of its legalistic ramifications. Therefore the construction--"He who divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery"--could well be a legal embodiment of the absolute will of God: namely, marriage is inseparable, even by divorce.

Furthermore, we have good reason to believe that Matthew understood the legal formulation in just this manner. Not only is this supported by way of negative argument through the unsatisfactory results of the various casuistic interpretations of Matthew's clause² but particularly in that the saying has been placed within a framework of related sayings (vss. 22, 28) which, though also legal in form, were never intended to be taken legalistically.³ It would hardly be conceivable that Matthew should have constructed the logion anti-thetically and placed it in such a context of radical demands only to soften it for casuistic purposes. The evangelist would actually be working against himself. The logion's presence here among the Antitheses would only be logical if the basic thrust of 5:32 (as well as 19:9) remained the same as that of Luke and Mark--namely, both remarriage by a divorce and marriage of a divorcee are adultery since the marriage cannot be broken--and not be the "except" clause.

This still does not explain the force of the Matthean clause. If, however, the clause was not introduced from a casuistic viewpoint and if it does not receive the major emphasis of vs. 32, could it not have been inserted for apologetic reasons? Several have already noted the apologetic tenor of Matthew's Gospel which might reflect the polemic in both Jesus' own confrontation with the Jewish leaders of his day as well as that of the early Church.⁴ It is not inconceivable that the Jewish community interpreted such sayings as being intended legalistically in their polemic against Jesus' teaching. In other words, whereas Jesus used this to express the divine will in marriage, it, legalistically interpreted, could be limited to a ruling on divorce. Thus, the saying might actually be used to the reverse effect by arguing that such an absolute statement as found in Lk. 16:18 meant--Jesus

¹Cf. 5:22 and 5:28.

²See p. 175 n. 3.

³See above on 5:22 pp. 141f. and on 5:28, pp. 145ff.

⁴Cf. 5:37b above, p. 166 and p. 290 n.2below.

prohibited divorce under any circumstances.¹ Such teaching would be, as Schlatter has put it, "schmutzig und absurd"² to a Jewish audience which either demanded the adulteress' life³ or at least her divorce.⁴ Matthew, therefore, countered such an argument by eliminating the heart of it-- $\pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\kappa\tau\omicron\varsigma \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon \pi\omicron\rho\eta\nu\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$.⁵

¹It is quite possible that Matthew's reworking of the Streitgespräch in 19:3-9 reflects such a polemic. First of all the phrase " $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\nu \alpha\iota\tau\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu$ " placed in the Pharisees' mouth would not so much represent the rabbinic disputes as their charge that Jesus forbade divorce for any reason (among the scribal schools the question was always "which" grounds for divorce not "whether" there were any). Secondly, the passage from Deuteronomy is rearranged in 19:7 (cf. Mk. 10:4) and placed in the mouths of Jesus' adversaries, possibly reflecting their opposition to the absolute requirement (19:4-6) regarding marriage which in Matthew significantly precedes their argument (cf. Mk. 10:4). Thirdly, Jesus' saying on divorce is brought into the context as further support for his view of marriage but with the addition of the clause, as though it were an indirect response to the charge " $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\nu \alpha\iota\tau\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu$." Thus by putting the Streitgespräch in brackets through adding " $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\nu \alpha\iota\tau\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu$ " and bringing the saying 19:9 into the context, Matthew counteracts the Jewish twisting of Jesus' absolute demand in Mt. 19:3-8 // Mk. 10:2-9.

²Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 180. One might legitimately question whether 5:32 is any more "absurd" than 5:38f. There is, nonetheless, a major difference between the two. The legalistic force of 5:38f. is that one should forego his rights--even when protected by law. This would naturally be most impractical, but it would not in itself be a transgression since there was no law which stated that one must prosecute for his rights. (Cf. S.-B., I, 341f. for some examples among the Rabbis where just such an attitude is praised). In 5:32, however, more was at stake in the casuistic argument above. Not only was one foregoing his right to divorce, but he was avoiding his legal responsibility to divorce an adulteress (cf. below n.4). Thus by condoning her evil he himself became a transgressor--a drastic implication to draw from Jesus' "radical" demand.

³Cf. Jn. 8:5; Blinzler, NTS, 4(1957-58) pp. 32-47 et al.

⁴Moore, Judaism, II, 125, "In case of proven adultery the husband was required by the court to divorce her even if he was willing to condone the offense."

⁵While Matthew might well have been familiar with the scribal discussions on divorce, one cannot say that Matthew was primarily concerned with squaring Jesus'

By conceding to a Jewish legal technicality the evangelist did not legalistically correct the logion by changing its basic thrust, but rather he protected it from casuistical misuse. Taken casuistically it must read: "One can divorce his wife only on grounds of adultery" (Shammai), but taken apologetically it reads: "Everyone who divorces his wife (except for adultery) and marries another commits adultery."¹ Without the clause one might escape its import through an argumentum ad absurdum; with the clause the force of Jesus' demand is inescapable, i.e. remarriage by a divorcee and marriage of a divorcee is adultery, therefore, marriage cannot be broken. Consequently, the "except"-clause would be similar in character to the expansions and clarifications of the fourth Antithesis (vss. 34b-36) by the early Church. Both would have arisen in the Church's confrontation with the Jews and Scribal casuistry.

Now we can return to Mt. 5:32a which was the last major obstacle to a "Q" background for this logion. The difference in content between Mt. 5:32a and Luke 16:18 is most significant since the Matthean saying (*πᾶς ὁ ἀπολύων... ποιεῖ αὐτὴν μοιχεύειν*) is much more in line with the Jewish understanding of adultery than the Lucan-Marcan version (*πᾶς ὁ ἀπολύων... καὶ γαμῶν ἑτέραν μοιχεύει*).² Consequently, while Luke represents a "new" teaching regarding both divorce and adultery,

teaching with the conservative school of Shammai. Both happened to be using the most obvious Jewish ground for divorce. What Matthew arrived at on apologetical grounds, Shammai reached legalistically. Two entirely different purposes were at stake.

¹Mt. 5:32 will be discussed further below: "Everyone who divorces his wife (except for adultery) causes her to commit adultery." See below.

²In Matthew 5:32a, given the underlying presupposition of these statements on divorce--i.e. divorce does not end a marriage relationship, the woman who remarries commits adultery (against her husband) since that marriage was not broken. In Lk. 16:18a (=Mk. 10:11 // Mt. 19:9) the divorced man who remarries another woman (presumably an unmarried woman, other wise 16:18b would be superfluous) commits adultery (against his wife). This latter case would be foreign to Jewish practice (see p. 177 n.3).

Matthew has a "new" teaching only regarding divorce. If then Matthew had reworked the saying in order to remove any casuistic detractors through his adding of the "except"-clause, it is quite reasonable to assume that a similar reason could have been behind the modification of vs. 32a.¹ By removing this secondary element on adultery, all detracting factors to a Jewish audience would have been eliminated, and the primary thrust of Jesus' saying would have been left. Thus by explaining 5:32a as a product of Matthew's editorial reworking of the verse we are able to take the saying as being from "Q".

In light of the isolated character of the saying in "Q" (vs. 32), this leaves the premise (vs. 31) to be an editorial construction by Matthew. The impetus for such an antithetical format might well be found in the Streitgespräch of Mk. 10:2-8 where we have already noted the tendency on Matthew's part to contrast the Pharasaic appeal to the Mosaic teaching with the logion of Jesus.² The premise itself is not a direct quotation of the Old Testament Law, but is a loose summary of Deuteronomy 24:1

¹This leaves naturally the question of why Matthew would change the saying in 5:32a and not in 19:9. As Wrege (see p. 175 n.2) has noted, the unchanged saying in 19:9 // Mk. 10:11 indicates that it was in itself not offensive to Matthew. What then might have prompted the change? Perhaps the context of the second antithesis (5:27ff.) offers an explanation. In Mt. 19:9 the sole concern was the question of divorce in a context which Matthew found in his source. By contrast the "Q" form of the saying appears to have been outside an immediate context. Most scholars concur that it was the theme of "adultery" in the second Antithesis which served as a cue for the introduction of the third Antithesis. If so, then both the theme of adultery as well as divorce would stand out here. Since the theme of adultery had just been treated and possibly out of desire not to detract from the primary theme of divorce by introducing a new usage of adultery, Matthew would have had reason to modify the saying on adultery.

²See p. 173 n.2.

in legal format. Such a formulation no doubt reflects both the Old Testament provision and its legal usage.

Taken together what do the verses 31 and 32 then mean as an antithesis? The premise (vs. 31) sets forth the procedure by which one divorces his wife, implying that with the bill of divorce the marriage bonds are severed. The antithesis (vs. 32) counters this by asserting that every divorcee who remarries commits adultery, as well as the one who marries her. In other words, the marriage relationship is not broken by a bill of divorce. One can readily see that the contrast is not between the commonly accepted legal options-- (vs. 31) "you may divorce your wife" ≠ (vs. 32) "you may not divorce your wife." Rather the underlying concept of marriage is at stake.

The actual scope of this logion is expressed in the Streitgespräch of Mt. 19:3-9 // Mk. 10:1-11. Jesus places his demand--the original will of the Creator for marriage (19:4-6 // Mk. 10:6-9)--in antithesis to the provision of the Mosaic Law which was given in view of the "hardheartedness" (19:8 // Mk. 10:5) of man. As in the fourth Antithesis, so here in 5:31f. the difference in starting points between Jesus' demand and that of the Law becomes most evident. The latter moves out from the "hardheartedness" of man; the former moves out from the age of salvation in which the "hard heartedness" has been replaced by a "new heart."¹

Consequently, Jesus' radical demand pertaining to the marriage relationship does not merely transcend the legal demands of the Law, as was the case in the first three Antitheses above, but rather actually sets aside the Mosaic Law pertaining to divorce. However, the nature of Jesus' demand in 5:32 remains the same as that in the three "traditional" Antitheses. In both cases

¹Cf. pp. 214ff.

his demand condemns the "hardheartedness" of man--even when one's actions are "legally" justifiable--and demands a conduct characteristic of a "new heart," of the age of salvation.

B. Matthew 5:38-42

The premise of the fifth Antithesis (5:38) could well have been taken from the Old Testament as found in Ex. 21:24, Lev. 24:20 and Deut. 19:21, and obviously does not involve Scribal interpretation as such. Whether the jus talionis was literally practiced in Jesus' day or whether it had been replaced by other forms of punitive justice is not only impossible to determine with certainty but is also immaterial to the usage here.¹ The actual phrase--"eye for an eye, tooth for tooth"--had already become a technical designation in Deut. 19:21² for the principle underlying punitive justice. Consequently, while vs. 38 might well have been taken from the Old Testament passage, it need not refer exclusively to the Old Testament Law as specifically understood and practiced in Ex. 21:24, but rather, as an abbreviation, could quite easily represent the contemporary understanding of the Law's teaching on retribution. These words in 5:38 would then have been put into Jesus' mouth in order to illustrate the principle of retribution which served as the foundation stone for social justice.

The antithesis (vss. 39-42) is a composite section

¹As S.-B., I, 337 has pointed out, we have no evidence from rabbinic sources to establish the case either way. Mishnaic materials indicate that the corporeal punishment had been replaced to a degree by financial adjustments (Baba Kamm, 8:1). In either event the principle of retribution was certainly still at the base of the judgments as seen in the intricate legal ordinances of the Mishnah.

²Cf. Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 136.

consisting in part of Q material. It can be divided stylistically into three sections. First, we have the direct antithesis (vs. 39a) to the premise which has the same format as the first part of the previous antithesis (vs. 34a)-- $\mu\eta$ + infinitive functioning as an apodictic prohibition. This is then followed by two sections having the form of legal ordinances. The first half of each begins with the indefinite relative pronoun-- $\delta\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$, and the second half with a dative form of the participle (cf. Luke 6:29a, 30a). The heart of the antithesis-- $\mu\eta$ $\delta\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$ $\tau\omega$ $\pi\omicron\nu\eta\rho\omega$ --has been the subject of much discussion with reference to the meaning of $\mu\eta$ $\delta\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$ as well as the gender and meaning of $\tau\omega$ $\pi\omicron\nu\eta\rho\omega$. Taken in isolation from its context the clause can be used in various ways. However, it is set in a particular context which helps limit the possibilities of its background and intent. Thus it will be to our advantage to begin with the second section which is directly related to vs. 39a by means of the conjunction--" $\kappa\alpha\iota$."

The second section (vss. 39b, 40) corresponds in subject matter to Luke 6:29. Yet the parallelism ceases at this point. Stylistically, Luke's participial construction beginning the first half has been replaced by the typically Matthean usage of the indefinite $\delta\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$ (5:39b cf. Lk. 6:27a).¹ The dative form of the participle now introduces the second half of the saying in Matthew (vs. 40 // Lk. 6:27b). Lexically there are several points of contrast. The presence of $\rho\alpha\pi\acute{\iota}\omega$ and $\tau\rho\acute{\epsilon}\phi\omega$ in vs. 39b might quite possibly reflect an alignment of this saying with the Old Testament

¹Matthew introduces this term five times into the Marcan text: 12:50 cf. Mk. 3:35; 13:12 cf. Mk. 4:25 (bis); 19:29 cf. Mk. 10:29; 21:33 cf. Mk. 12:1 par., five times into Q: 7:24 cf. Lk. 6:47; 7:26 cf. Lk. 6:49; 10:32 cf. Lk. 12:8; 10:33 cf. Lk. 12:9; 27:55 cf. Lk. 23:49. In addition 20:1; 22:2 and 25:1 could well be Matthean--cf. 7:24, 26.

terminology.¹ The usage of λαβεῖν and ἄρες (vs. 40) could well be the product of the different setting of the saying in Matthew.² The remaining verbal differences lead us to the third differentiation--namely, the difference in settings.

First of all, the occurrence of σεσκά in vs. 39b signifies more than a Matthean tendency to give priority to the "right" side.³ Rather, it designates the action as particularly derogatory to a Jewish audience, since of necessity such a slap on the right cheek would have to come from the back of the hand.⁴ The derogatory character of such an action is seen in that the Mishnah assigns a penalty twice as severe for striking one with the back of the hand.⁵ Thus whereas Luke 6:27a focuses on the act of being struck on the cheek, Matthew 5:39b focuses on the degrading nature of the act. The recourse

¹Cf. Isa. 50:6 in which both cheeks are mentioned (τὰς σιαγόνας) as well as the fact that he did not turn his face away from the shame of spittle. Furthermore, the fact that this passage was introduced by Matthew into the Marcan account in 26:67 makes it conceivable that the reworking of 5:39b was Matthean. Hosea 11:4 also has: "ὡς ἠαπίζων ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ τὰς σιαγόνας." Cf. K. Bornhäuser, Die Bergpredigt, pp. 96f., and Ljungmann, Das Gesetz Erfüllen (1954), p. 84, both of whom refer to Isa. 50:6ff. for this context.

²λαβαίνω would be more in keeping with a court procedure, and ἄρες is the expected antonym of μὴ κωλύεις should the prohibition become a positive demand.

³5:39, 40: in both cases the situation is intensified. This appears to have been done deliberately by Matthew to place the recipient in the most adverse circumstances rather than out of any mere specific tendency on Matthew's part. Contra McNeile, Matthew, p. 69; Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 49 and Schmid, Matthäus, p. 108.

⁴S.-B., I, 337; Bornhäuser, Bergpredigt, p. 95; Manson, Sayings, p. 51; Gaechter, Matthäus, p. 190.

⁵Baba kamma 8:6.

in the first case would be self-defense and personal revenge; in the second case it would be legal action to gain recompense and vindication.¹ In other words, in Matthew the person on the receiving end foregoes his right to judicial retribution, while in Luke he foregoes personal action on his own behalf. The judicial character is even more explicit in the second half of the saying in Matthew (vs. 40) as compared with Luke (6:29b). The presence of "τῷ θελοντί σου κληθῆναι ... λαβεῖν" expressly puts the scene of action in the law court. Luke, on the other hand, appears to depict a robbery scene.² In Matthew one is exhorted not to contest his rights before an adversary. Therefore, in both cases the difference in setting between Matthew and Luke results in a difference in intent. In Luke the imperative demands a certain personal passivity, nonresistance, in opposition to aggressive action on the part of one's adversary; whereas Matthew's passage demands that one forego his legal rights to judiciary action. How did this difference in perspective come about? Perhaps the answer lies back in vss. 38, 39a.

With or without the aura of the legal lawsuit in the following examples, numerous scholars have taken $\muὴ ἀντιτεῖναι τῷ πονηρῷ$ with just such a judicial connotation.³ This interpretation is actually in keeping

¹Only a legal suite could ever regain one's lost prestige. It was one thing to protect oneself or to vindicate oneself for physical abuse, yet it was something else when the person's dignity was at stake.

²This explains the difference in order of τὸ ἴματιον and τὸν χιτῶνα. Zahn, Matthäus, p. 252, n. 26; McNeile, Matthew, p. 70; Manson, Sayings, p. 51; Harnack, Sprüche, p. 45.

³Cf. Zahn, Matthäus, p. 252; Allen, Matthew, p. 54; Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 186; Bornhäuser, Bergpredigt, pp. 94f.; Kilpatrick, Origins, p. 20; Percy Botschaft, p. 152 and Ljungmann, op. cit., p. 84.

with vs. 38 which sets forth the basic principle of legal justice as well as vss. 39b, 40. Nevertheless, this clause has been frequently used with the connotation of nonresistance, the refusal to use force in protection of one's own "rights." In fact, Lohmeyer has explicitly stated that the Antithesis is between the use of force (vs. 38) and the rejection of such usage of force,¹ rather than between the use and non-use of legal justice. Hence we have the two possible interpretations for $\mu\eta\ \alpha\nuτιστηνα\iota$. The one takes it in the context of the court room--meaning that one is not to seek due retribution for insult or loss; the other understands it to demand a refusal to use force to counter (the evil use of) force. The choice between these two possibilities depends to a great extent upon the intent behind vs. 38. How does the antithesis of vs. 39a counter the premise in vs. 38?

When we review the three passages in the Old Testament which may have served as either a direct or indirect source for vs. 38, we find that in each case it is setting forth a principle of legal justice rather than merely the principle of the use of force against the use of force. The emphasis falls on the necessity for equal retribution as one's right. This is particularly true of the third Old Testament passage, Deut. 19:21, in which the lex talionis is used as a principle for punishing a false witness (who had used no force, as such) in accordance with his testimony. This is done in order to punish the false witness and to be a lesson for those in the community to prevent a recurrence of such (19:19f.).

Even more interesting is the fact that the jus talionis actually occurs in a hypothetical court scene (Deut. 19:15-21) concerning a false witness. Furthermore,

¹Lohmeyer, Matthäus, pp. 137f.

the false witness is described as one who "... ἀντέστη
κατὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ !" When the penalty has been assigned;
it was not only based on the jus talionis, but one of
of the reasons for such action was "... ἐξαιεῖν τὸν
πονηρὸν κατὰ αὐτῶν" (Deut. 19:19). In other words, we
could quite possibly have here in Deut. 19:15-21 both
the source and background for Mt. 5:38, 39a, since we
not only have the premise of 5:38 (Deut. 19:21) but
also the nucleus of the antithesis--vs. 39a-- ἀντιστημι
(Deut. 19:18) and ὁ πονηρὸς (Deut. 19:19).

If such be the case, from this background we can
resolve some of the questions which have arisen over
the meaning of both the premise (vs. 38) and the anti-
thesis (vs. 39a). There could no longer be any doubt
but that the premise of 5:38 referred to the lex tal-
ionis as a principle of legal justice by which one
defended and received his legal rights. Here, as in
each occurrence in the Old Testament, the intent would
not have been an example of the use of force against
force. The context of the antithesis in vs. 39a would
then be the law court, and the meaning of μὴ ἀντιστηναι
would mean foregoing one's legal rights to retribution
before a court rather than nonresistance as it has been
more popularly understood.

Furthermore we would also have the explanation
for the gender of τῷ πονηρῷ. Whereas the false witness
(ὁ πονηρὸς) of Deut. 19:19 was placed against his
"brother"-- κατὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ (19:18), Matthew, in terms
of his audience, exhorts the "brethren" not to oppose
"the evil one." As seen above in vs. 37, the masculine
gender is certainly in keeping with Matthew's use of
πονηρὸς to describe both Satan as the opponent (5:37;
6:13; 13:19) and the sons of Satan (13:38; 5:44) who
are outside of and in opposition to the sons of the
Kingdom (the "brethren").

In the third section (5:41, 42), the first half

is an element peculiar to Matthew, and the second half is a Q element (5:42a // Lk. 6:30a). Although it is stylistically in keeping with the twofold division in 5:39b-42 (5:39b // 41; 40 // 42),¹ the introduction of 5:41 disrupts the symmetry of the tradition. The "Q" format, as seen in Luke 6:29, 30, also consisted of two parallel constructed sayings. However, in Luke both sections are comprised of double logia--a pattern apparent in Mt. 5:39b, 40 but now broken in Mt. 5:41, 42 (5:41, 42a, 42b).² Since 5:41 begins with the indefinite relative which is characteristic of Matthean editorial work³ and since such a disruption in a pattern is typical of Matthew,⁴ it seems most logical to conclude that this verse has been inserted by him into his material. The difference between Mt. 5:42b and Lk. 6:30b can well be explained in terms of the editorial reworking on both Matthew and Luke's part. The presence of δαυείλω in Lk. 5:34f. indicates its presence in Mt. 5:42b (cf. Lk. 6:30b) to be the earlier "Q" form.⁵ However, this does not necessarily mean that Mt. 5:42b on the whole is the earlier form. The insertion of θείω + infinitive was noted above in Mt. 5:40, and this change in the construction would condition the choice of ἀποστρέφω for ἀπαίτέω.⁶

¹See p. 118f.

²Cf. 5:36 pp. 291f. for a similar example.

³Cf. p. 184 n. 1.

⁴Cf. in particular, F. Filson, "Broken Patterns in the Gospel of Matthew," JBL, 75(1956) pp. 227-231.

⁵Cf. p. 131 n.2. The change of αἵρέω by Luke need not be intended to carry over the robbery motif of 6:29b. This might well have been simply for stylistic reasons. The context immediately following αἵτέω in 6:30a could just as well have implied a loan in 6:30b. Cf. Sirach 20:15 in reference to a fool: "Today he lends (δαυείλ) and tomorrow he asks it back (ἀπαίτελ)." ⁶Cf. Did. 1:4-- ἐὰν λάβῃ τις ἀπὸ τοῦ σου, μὴ ἀπαίτελ. Cf. 19:17, 21 for further example of insertion

In contrast to the first and second sections which involved one's juridical rights, the third section deals with one's response to three different types of requests which might confront one in everyday life.¹ The first request (vs. 41) is a binding demand without any recompense. This practice of "impressing" one's service or the use of an item belonging to someone was common in the Middle East.² It is only natural that such an involuntary, forced labor was greatly detested by the people.³ The second request appears to reflect that of a beggar.⁴ While this request was also without repayment, it was at least voluntary and lacks the onus of "impression." The final request is that of a loan. Not only is the response voluntary but repayment is to be expected. Consequently, the third request is by far the least severe of the three. Nevertheless, a certain imposition differing according to the request was placed on the part of the one being asked.⁵ In each case the response was to be positive. Indeed, the request was

of ~~Θεω~~ by Matthew.

¹Perhaps it is not going too far in distinguishing between these requests as follows: a) the first was a legal obligation, b) the second was a religious obligation, and c) thirdly we find a personal obligation.

²Cf. Moulton and Milligan, *ad loc.* for examples from various geographical areas both ante- and post-dating Jesus' day. Mark 15:20 cf. Mt. 27:32 declares that Simon the Cyrene was "impressed" into service to carry the cross. The Mishnaic materials refer to the practice in Baba Metzia 6:3. S.-B. give further examples (I, 344f.).

³Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 189.

⁴The practice of begging was so prevalent in Jerusalem in the first century that Jeremias has written: "In Wahrheit war Jerusalem schon zur Zeit Jesu ein Zentrum des Bettels," Jerusalem zur Zeit Jesu (31962), p. 132.

⁵One must not forget that in Jewish practice even the return of a loaned object was not always forthcoming. Every seven years all debts were cancelled (Deut. 15:2,

to be more than fulfilled in the first instance.

How then does this third section (vss. 41, 42) relate to the heart of the antithesis in vs. 39a? As noted above, the second section (vss. 39b, 40) with its emphasis on the disregard for one's legal rights fits quite harmoniously into the juridical context of vs. 39a, almost as though it were the legalistic illustration of the apodictic prohibition in 5:39a. However, in the third section (vss. 41, 42) the only element concerned at all with the disregard of one's own legal rights is vs. 41--the part added most probably by Matthew! Since the two final exhortations (vs. 42a,b) have absolutely nothing to do with one's legal rights or disregard for them, they stand apparently independent of 5:39a.¹ This is not the case for the "Q" section as found in Lk. 6:29f. Here these four exhortations fit harmoniously as further explications of love for one's enemy being exemplified by a conduct free from a self-centered concern for one's rights. Just as one foregoes his right to retaliation and protection of his personal property (6:29), so one should be free of any limiting concern for his rights in matters of personal requests. In Matthew, however, these demands (5:42) simply round out the fifth Antithesis without actually being a part of its basic thrust. Their presence in this complex is most probably to be explained in view of their presence in the traditional unit found by Matthew² and the

cf. Moore, Judaism, II, 163). Thus the imposition could actually eventuate in a loss.

¹This is the case regardless of how one interprets 5:39a. Cf. Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 141--"Der Spruch scheint zu der alttestamentlichen Regel nicht mehr in Gegensatz zu stehen, denn wo wäre hier von Gewalt die Rede?"

²Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 141.

impossibility of placing them in a juridical context.¹

This leads us then to the all important question-- What was the basic thrust of this Antithesis? As we have noted in our examination above, in contrast to Luke 6:29a,b, Matthew's parallel in 5:39b, 40 emphasizes the principle of disregarding one's own legal rights. This motif is basic to vs. 41 which was inserted by Matthew into the tradition, and it stands out most clearly in the antithetical format of 5:38-39a. Whereas the Old Testament Law had legally provided for the protection of one's rights by demanding an equivalent retribution, Jesus demanded that one forego such a protection of his legal rights. If anything, the equivalent retribution was reversed. Instead of standing for one's legal rights, one was exhorted rather to turn the other cheek, to give also his cloak, and to go a second mile!

In other words, one of the most essential provisions of the Old Testament Law--indeed, of law in general--was countered by Jesus' radical demand for just the opposite conduct. The very basis of legal justice in society was at stake, namely, one's right and obligation to punish the offender. As in the third Antithesis (vss. 31f.) above, this demand did not merely transcend the Law's legal demand. Rather, it set the Law aside by demanding behavior no longer based on a legal framework whose given was the presence of sin and evil in one's relationship to others. Jesus was demanding conduct befitting the "children of God" (cf. vss. 45, 48), a conduct in terms of a social order radically different from that until now.

¹The attempt to explain them in terms of the Church's need does succeed in demonstrating their value to the Church, but fails to show the necessary relationship between 5:42 and 5:39. Cf. Zahn, Matthäus, p. 252; Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 189f.; Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 141.

C. Matthew 5:43-48

1. Premise, Mt. 5:43

The sixth and final Antithesis (5:43-47 (48)) begins with a premise consisting of a twofold apodictic commandment (5:43). The first half (5:43a) is found in Lev. 19:18¹ and appears elsewhere in the Synoptic tradition in answer to the question concerning the Great Commandment (Mk. 12:31 // Mt. 22:39 // Lk. 10:27). This same command to love one's neighbor is also inserted by Matthew at one other place in his Gospel (19:19 cf. Mk. 10:19 // Lk. 18:20), which further supports its presence here as a Matthean construction.² The second half (vs. 43b), however, has no explicit parallel in the entire Old Testament. This has led to many conjectures as to the actual source behind the command to hate one's enemies. Although few have tried to trace this directly to the Old Testament as such,³ many have attributed the saying to Scribal interpretation of the Law in keeping with certain Old Testament teaching on one's relationship to the non-Israelite.⁴ Nevertheless, the absence of such a drastic attitude toward one's enemies in our

¹The absence of "ὡς ἀγαπᾷς" in contrast to Lev. 19:18 and the other occurrences in the Synoptic tradition is most likely to be a literary product of the conjunction of the two commands in vs. 43 rather than for any theological basis. Cf. Mt. 19:19 and Mk. 12:31 par. where the complete form of the commandment is given.

²Both contexts are similar in character, namely, this commandment is considered from the perspective of the Law which had been given of old in contrast to Jesus' demand. Cf. pp. 100f.

³Cf. Allen, Matthew, p. 55 for example.

⁴Zahn, Matthäus, pp. 254-56; McNeile, Matthew, p. 71; K. Stendahl, The School of Matthew (1954), p. 137; M. Smith, "Mt. 5:43: 'Hate Thine Enemy,'" HTR, 45 (1952), pp. 71-73; Stonehouse, op. cit., pp. 199f.; Tasker, Matthew, pp. 65f.; Hasler, "Herzstück," TZ, 15 (1959) pp. 103f.; Barth, op. cit., p. 94; cf. Trilling, op. cit., p. 208 and Lohmeyer, Matthew, p. 142; Percy, Botschaft, pp. 155f.

sources reflecting the rabbinic teaching¹ and, more important, the character of the other premises (or antithetical form) makes such an explanation very hypothetical.

More recently, several have viewed the explicit demand for hatred found among the writings of the Essenes² as a more probable backdrop for 5:43b.³ Apart from the fact, however, that we have not found one such direct reference to Qumran in any of the other Antitheses

¹Montefiore, Rabbinic Literature, pp. 86ff. S.-B., I, 364-366. With the exception of Aboth de Rabbi Nathan 16, all the other examples fail to initiate hatred by commandment, rather they assume it as a given and focus it on a specific circumstance. The object is never one's "enemy." A non-designated saying in Rabbi Nathan reflects a more sectarian attitude in denouncing: a) love for the "learned" and a hatred for the "student," b) love for the "student" and hatred for the "Gesetzesunkundigen" (Amhaares). He calls rather for a hatred of the "Epikuräer, die Verführer, die Verleiter, desgleichen die Angeber (Verräter)...," based on Ps. 139:21f. This raised then the question of how one could hate such in view of Lev. 19:19. The problem is resolved by defining neighbor accordingly: "Ja wenn er nach dem Tun deines Volkes handelt, sollst du ihn lieben; wenn aber nicht, so sollst du ihn nicht lieben." S.-B., I, 365.

Unfortunately this saying cannot be dated. It does appear to dismiss an earlier attitude which favored one according to his knowledge of the Law (in reference to Ps. 139:21f.). "Hatred" was to be directed rather at those whose conduct was in keeping with the expected conduct of the Jewish people. It would seem that the saying is directed at those among the Jews whose conduct was not befitting a Jew. Cf. Percy, Botschaft, p. 155f. who uses this to interpret 5:43. However, the uncertain date for this and its uniqueness should make any use of this saying most tentative. As will be seen further below, 5:43 is not a further limitation of Lev. 19:18, as is the saying in Rab. Nathan.

²In particular 1QS 1:4, 10; 9:21ff. cf. 1QS 4:15-17.

³Wildberger, Ev. Theol., 13(1953), p. 37f.; K. Schubert, "The Sermon on the Mount and the Qumran Texts," The Scrolls and the New Testament, ed. by K. Stendahl (1957), pp. 120f.; Braun, op. cit., II, 57, n. 1; Cross, Library of Qumran (1962), p. 209, n. 23;

some important considerations have been overlooked in this suggestion. First of all, this premise (vs. 43) as a whole is secondary to the complex of vss. 44-47,¹ and it could hardly be considered legitimate to ascribe a Sitz im Leben to Matthew, as editor and redactor, in which the Essene teaching would have been so sharply countered.²

Secondly, in spite of the fact that so much has been made of the "parallel" pertaining to hatred in the writings of Qumran, the only expressis verbis of such a doctrine occurs within a dualistic framework³ in the Manual of Discipline,⁴ a document which was certainly

Davies, Settings, p. 252.

¹Cf. Luke 6:27.

²As Davies, who argues for a sectarian background behind this entire complex, has noted, Matthew reworked the material in terms of Pharisaic Judaism (pp. 254f.). However, if one does not attribute this premise to Matthew but rather to some element of the early Church (as Davies does), one is left to question what element of the early Church. Both O. Cullmann, "The Significance of the Qumran Texts for Research into the Beginnings of Christianity," The Scrolls and the New Testament, pp. 18-32 and M. Black, The Scrolls and Christian Origins: Studies in the Jewish Background of the NT (1961), p. 77, have been too occupied with apparent similarities between the Essenes and primitive Christianity in their attempt to find a point of contact between the Essenes and Christians. Here in 5:43 as in the other "similarities" noted with reference to the first, second and fourth Antitheses, there remains an essential difference. See further below.

³"Love for those" whom God has chosen" (1QS 1:3f.) = "sons of light" (1QS 1:9) and "hatred" for those" whom God has despised" (1QS 1:4) = "sons of darkness" (1QS 1:10).

⁴1QS 1:3f., 9f., 9:21; cf. 4:5, 17, 24f. Josephus Bell. Jud., II, viii, 7 includes among the oaths taken by the initiates the oath to eternally hate the unjust (aiskous) and to fight together with the just (συμ-αντιπαραβαλ τοῖς δίκαιος). Whether there was ever such an oath or not is beyond our control, since we have no evidence in the Qumran texts. Nevertheless, it does correctly combine the "hatred" with the final eschat-

not propagated in public in view of its special content. Furthermore, Davies has already pointed out that such an attitude toward "outsiders" did not actually characterize the conduct of the Essenes. This is seen particularly in the favorable description of them in the early literature and in their successful recruitment.¹ In other words, a doctrine of hatred is neither characteristic of their writings nor of their conduct towards those outside their religious community.² Consequently, one might well question whether 5:43 could have been directed at the Essenes by either Jesus or the primitive Church.

This is particularly the case in view of the third and most significant consideration, namely, the difference between Mt. 5:43 and 1QS in their respective references to love and hate. In the Manual one's love/hate towards another is based upon the recipients' relationship to God,³ whereas in Mt. 5:43 it is based on the

ological war between the forces of the "just" and "unjust" rather than characterize their behavior towards "outsiders." The oath to eternally hate the "unjust" follows the oath to protect that which is just (*τὰ δίκαια*) with reference to mankind (*πρὸς ἀνθρώπους*) and never to do one harm either intentionally or under command!

¹Davies, Setting, p. 246 cites Josephus, Bell. Jud., II, viii, 2, 11; Philo, Quod omnis probus liber sit, 95, 89-91; Pliny, Naturalis Historia, V, XV, 73.

²The presence of the oath to hate the unrighteous and to fight together with the righteous in Josephus (see p. 195 n.4) is misleading in that it could support the impression that such a doctrine is the characteristic trait of the Essenes' opposition to wickedness and the wicked along with their support for that which is right before God and those who practice it. This does not refer to their behavior to those outside their religious community as is evident in the preceding oath--"to protect that which is right...."

³1QS 1:9f. "...love all the sons of light according to his lot in the Council of God." "...hate all the sons of darkness according to his fault in the vengeance of God." Cf. the impersonal construction in

Law as commanded by God. Here we discover two different perspectives. On the one hand, the Old Testament portrayal of God's attitude towards righteousness and wickedness is given radical expression in the personalized terms of those within the religious community of the Essenes who, as "sons of light," followed the "Spirit of truth" (= "Spirit of light" 1QS 3:18-4:1) to do all the Law of Moses as revealed to the sons of Zadok (1QS 5:8f.) and of those outside this community who as "sons of darkness" follow the "spirit of perversity" (= "spirit of darkness" 1QS 3:18-4:1) and walk in the way of wickedness (1QS 5:10f.).¹ The one experienced God's love and election to salvation while the other could expect God's hatred and rejection which would come to final expression at the judgment. This then became the basis for their own "eschatological"² understanding of fellow members and those outside their religious community. Rather than God's commandment³

1:3f. which expresses even more explicitly the basis: "...love all that He has chosen...hate all that He has despised."

¹Whereas both M. Burrows (More Light on the Dead Sea Scrolls (1958), pp. 99f.) and Sutcliffe ("Hatred at Qumran," Revue de Qumran, 2(1959-60), p. 352) are correct in seeing the doctrine rooted in the Old Testament, they do not draw out the particular Qumran difference. It is not enough to say that "...the doctrine held at Qumran on the subject of hate was the same as that they found in the pages of the Old Testament" (Sutcliffe, ibid., p. 352). The Qumran attitude was a radicalized expression bound up with other specific Qumran doctrines. See further below.

²Eschatological in the sense that each is viewed in terms of his final relationship to God, even though membership and non-membership in the present religious community was only an indication of how the lines would fall. Seen practically, however, as was noted above, this was not carried out in the everyday relations with "outsiders." In fact, the contrary was true (cf. 1QS 9:22f.; 10:18 and Josephus, Bell. Jud., II, 139).

³Lev. 19:18 does not appear at all in 1QS. The

his example becomes the motivating force. On the other hand, Mt. 5:43 definitely bases love/hate on a commandment, and reflects a legalistic tenor much more in keeping with that of Pharasaic Judaism than that of the Sectarrians.

If then 5:43b is neither to be traced to the Old Testament, to rabbinic sources, nor even to the sectarian writings, how then are we to account for its origin and meaning? The answer might well be found in a closer look at the clause itself and its relationship to the context. In form it is one of two apodictic commands. However, they are actually not two essentially different commands but rather the second appears to be eexegetic to the first. In other words 5:43b might well be simply the answer to the casuistic question developing out of 5:43a (// Lev. 19:18)--if I am to love my neighbor, how then am I to relate to my non-neighbor? It is this very question which is brought into focus by the introduction of the Old Testament command to love my neighbor (5:43a) into the antithetical context with the command to love one's enemies (5:44). The answer to this question pertaining to one's previous relationship with his enemy is then supplied in 5:43b as the converse of 5:43a (love-hate, neighbor-enemy).¹ Consequently, 5:43b is to be

only occurrence is in the Damascus Scroll where it is one of several obligations listed for the sectarian. Interesting enough it also has been reworked in terms of the covenant community--"...to love each man his brother as himself" (CD 6:20f.). This is particularly true of 19:17, 18b which is literally quoted in a context which obviously defines "sons of the people" and "thy neighbor" as a fellow member (CD 9:2-8). Here in the Damascus scroll the motivating force is not the command but God's example cf. CD 2:15; 8:16-18; 19:29-32.

¹By failing to see that the converse "neighbor-enemy" is the compositional product of Matthew's using of his sources (Lev. 19:18 and Mt. 5:44a) both Jeremias (Gleichnisse, p. 201) and Percy (Botschaft, pp. 155f.) take "enemy" to be a further limitation of the love

understood as a compositional element of Matthew in order to place the limited nature of the Old Testament love command (5:43a) and its casuistic consequences (5:43b) clearly in an antithesis to that of Jesus' demand.¹

Nevertheless, one is not to get the impression that 5:43b is merely the fictitious creation of Matthew in order to set off Jesus' teaching. Granted the compositional character of 5:43, this in no way implies its failure to correspond to the legal implications of the Old Testament command. Although we have no direct evidence for 5:43 in any of our sources, we do know that the casuistic implications behind "neighbor" were a frequent topic of discussion. Billerbeck notes the narrowing over against Lev. 19:18 of the usage of "neighbor,"² and we saw above where the Essenes had applied it exclusively to their religious community.³ Furthermore, the conduct of the Pharisees towards the amhaares reflected in the Synoptic tradition as well as in

command within the boundaries of 5:43a, i.e. a neighbor as long as he does not treat one as an enemy. Jeremias traces this to a non-designated popular teaching and Percy points to a late "parallel" in Rabbi Nathan (Abot 16 cf. p. 194 n.1). Granted that "enemy" in "Q" had a personal character to it which is still evident in 5:44 and 46 (vs. 45 is "neutral"), Matthew's placing ἐχθρόν along side of πληγόν in vs. 43 definitely puts it in a corporate rather than personal category. This is seen particularly in 5:47 where the Matthean use of ἀδελφός parallels πληγόν of 5:43. It is impossible to designate more precisely in what sense πληγόν/ἀδελφός are to be taken, but it definitely is corporate rather than personal as found throughout "Q" in Luke.

¹5:44 does not simply counter 5:43b, but rather it counters the love command limited to the neighbor (5:43a) and the resultant attitude towards the non-neighbor (5:43b). Hence it is not sufficient to place simply 5:43a against 5:44 leaving 5:43b as secondary (cf. Manson, Sayings, p. 453).

²S.-B., I, 353-56.

³See p. 195 n. 3, 196f.

rabbinic sources¹ not only point to the limited concept of "neighbor" but also the disrespect and lack of love shown to the non-neighbor. The classic New Testament example, of course, is the parable of the Good Samaritan in response to the question--who is my neighbor? Here we see clearly the casuistical implications of the Old Testament command which we have in Mt. 5:43!

Matthew not only appears to be congruent with the understanding of Lev. 19:18 in the first century, but he also has caught the basic thrust of the preceding premises, namely, the Old Testament command as seen from its legal implications. Once again, as we have seen in the preceding premises, the premise of 5:43 designates neither the Old Testament Law as such nor the specific Scribal interpretation of the Law but rather the legal ramifications of the Law's demand.

2. Antithesis, Mt. 5:44ff.

In contrast to the fifth Antithesis the actual antithetical reply was found at hand in "Q". Mt. 5:44 represents the antithesis and is comprised of a double apodictic imperative to love one's enemies and to pray for one's persecutors.² This apodictic command is then followed by a positive (vs. 45) and negative (vss. 46f.) basis. It is at these two bases for the command where one finds the major differences between Matthew and Luke.

The positive basis of Lk. 6:35b appears in the form of a promise and is coordinate (καί) with the promise of a large reward (Lk. 6:35a): "καὶ ἔσται ὁ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολὺς, καὶ ἔσθε υἱοὶ ὑψίστου..." Within this secondary context³ such conduct corresponding to the conduct of the Father who is χρηστός ἐπὶ ἀχαρίστους καὶ πονηρούς

¹Cf. Moore, Judaism, II, 157, 159f.

²Cf. p.] 124 for comparison with Lk. 6:27f.

³See above for discussion pp. 127ff.

will be rewarded with sonship. In Mt. 5:45 instead of being in the form of a promise, the positive basis is introduced as a final clause (ὁὖν), and the explication of sonship is accomplished by simply presenting an example of the Father's conduct rather than a description of it (5:45b cf. Lk. 6:35b).¹ The final clause brings in the element of reward which is expressly given in Lk. 6:35a. Furthermore, the following question increases this element by asking, "τίνα μισθεὶν ἔχετε ?"² Consequently, one cannot ignore the fact that for both Matthew and Luke in spite of the differences the positive basis of the command to love one's enemies is the "goal" or reward of sonship.³

However, the "goal" or "reward" for both Matthew and Luke did not focus on the status of sonship but rather on the essential characteristic of sonship, namely, conduct becoming to the Father. In other words, the thrust of the saying was not how one became a son but rather the conduct of the son. This is most evident in the construction of the goal and the promise itself. It was not merely a promise of sonship, but in each case the all important clause was added pertaining to the Father's conduct. Furthermore, the following imperative

¹It is impossible to determine whether 5:45b represents the more original form or not. One thing appears certain, Lk. 6:35b seems to have been abbreviated (only one aspect--ἀγαπᾶτος and πορνείας) and it definitely is more literary (cf. Wrege, op. cit., p. 104 and Harnack, Sprüche, p. 46).

²See pp. 132f.

³There can be little doubt that sonship in both Mt. and Lk. is considered to be a reward. These verses belong along with 6:1, 4, 18 to a group which appear externally to stand close to an ethic of merit. However, these must be seen in the total scope of Jesus' ministry in which even rewards are seen to be gifts of grace and not earned as such. Cf. Bornkamm, Gesammelte Aufsätze, II, 79-89; W. Pesch, Der Lohngedanke in der Lehre Jesu (1955), pp. 122-143, and Ladd, Jesus and the Kingdom, pp. 296ff.

of 5:48 // Lk. 6:36 indicates that the status of sonship was already taken for granted. In both cases (5:45, 48 par.) the imperative intended to bring out the conduct like that of the Father--a sure characteristic of sonship!

The negative basis in Mt. 5:46f. consists of two comparisons, the first of which has a material parallel in the first of three such comparisons in Lk. 6:32-34. Among the differences noted above,¹ the most significant appears to be the respective motivations behind the conduct. Whereas Lk. 6:32-34 has the same question--"ποῶς ὑμεῖς χάρις ἔσταιν?" Mt. 5:46 has "τίνα μισθὸν ἔχετε?" and 5:47 has "τί περὶ τὸν πολεῖτε?" Not only does the Lucan question appear to be the more genuine,² but each of the two questions in Matthew appear at the heart of two other redactional passages, both introducing larger passages concerning "righteousness" or conduct in keeping with God's demand. The question about one's reward underlies Mt. 6:1-18 and, indeed, the same construction τὸν μισθὸν ἔχειν³ appears in the Matthean constructed introduction of 6:1. Furthermore, τί περὶ τὸν πολεῖν reminds us of the verb περιτεύειν in 5:20⁴ which set the tone for the passage of 5:21-48.⁴ Yet while these changes in Matthew give it some Matthean traits, the underlying thrust remains the same as in Luke: To limit

¹Cf. discussion above.

²See pp. 131-133.

³Cf. above.

⁴Cf. Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 195, n. 52.

⁵Whereas one's righteousness was to exceed quantitatively that of the Scribes and Pharisees (5:20) and one's "doing of righteousness" to differ from that of the "hypocrites" (6:1 cf. 23), one's conduct in 5:46f. was no better than that of the "publicans" and "Gentiles." The one represented the highest level of moral conduct; the other represented the lowest.

one's benevolent conduct to deserving ones is to do no more than follow the example of the lowest segment of society. Therefore one has the positive basis--God-like conduct--and the negative basis--mere conduct like that of the publicans and Gentiles/sinners.

However, Matthew does not leave this Antithesis on such a negative basis. By taking Lk. 6:36 from its present context, reworking it, and placing it in conjunction with the Antitheses, he concludes the sixth Antithesis. At the same time, Matthew summarizes and concludes Jesus' demand set forth in all six Antitheses. This will be developed below in terms of Matthew's understanding of the antithetical demand.

D. Summary

In the three "Matthean" Antitheses we found that the premises constructed by the evangelist himself correspond in character to the "traditional" ones. In form, Matthew has followed closely the pattern of the others, and his insertions fit quite harmoniously into their immediate context. In content, all three are related in varying degrees to the Old Testament: 5:31 a summary based on Deut. 24:1 (cf. 5:33a with Lev. 19:12); 5:38 a quotation from Deut. 29:21 (cf. 5:27 // Ex. 20:14) and 5:43 half from Lev. 19:18 and half foreign to the Old Testament (cf. 5:21a/b!). Although these divergencies from the Old Testament have been variously explained, they are most probably intended as the three traditional ones, namely, neither to reflect Scribal tradition (cf. 5:38) nor the Old Testament as such (5:43b) but rather to underscore the Law in terms of its legal character. Whereas the third (vs. 31) and fifth Antitheses (vs. 38) are worded as legal ordinances, the sixth (vs. 43), an apodictic Old Testament command, is modified (vs. 43b) from just such a standpoint. Therefore, we have in Matthew the same concept of the Law as found in the traditional premises.

As we have seen above in the traditionsgeschichtliche analysis, the three "Matthean" antitheses (vss. 32, 39b-42, 44-48) involve "Q" material. The first (5:32) represents an isolated logion appearing in an entirely different context in Lk. 16:18, and the latter two were extended blocks of material found at hand in "Q" Sermon. Matthew has taken over this material, modified it in part and set it in its present antithetical format. In so doing, Matthew has actually made explicit the implicit antithetical character of what Jesus had demanded in contrast to the legal requirements of the Law.

One important difference has often been pointed out between the character of the antithetical element in the "Matthean" Antitheses and that of his "traditional" ones. Whereas the "traditional" antitheses seem to transcend the legal requirements of the premises by countering with a more radical demand, the antitheses in Matthew's constructions now set aside the provisions of the particular premises. However, this difference is more apparent than real. In both groups of Antitheses, Jesus was demanding conduct characteristic of a new relationship between men, a relationship which reflected an entirely different starting point than the Law's legal requirements. Since the Law had started from the given of man's "hardheartedness," it had made provisions which Jesus' radical demands at times transcended and at times set aside. Therefore, the fact that the "Matthean" Antitheses represent the setting aside of the Law's provisions is due simply to the nature of the material involved, rather than a difference in intent. This does, however, bring out most clearly the antithetical character of Jesus' demand in contrast to the legal demands of the Law.

§4. The Introductory Formulas and the Antithetical Format

The introductory formulas of the premise and antithesis have normally been the starting point for any discussion of the "Antitheses." However, such a procedure can lead and has led to a misunderstanding of the relationship between the premise and the antithesis, since the formulas themselves are neither unequivocal in their meaning nor are they to be isolated from their immediate contexts. Let us then turn to the respective elements and examine them successively according to form and content.

Each premise is introduced by the phrase: ἡκούσατε ὅτι ἐρρέθη (τοῖς ἀρχαίοις)."¹ This formula consists of two elements-- ἡκούσατε and ἐρρέθη --both of which have a technical rabbinic usage. On the one hand ἀκούειν occurs in rabbinic literature with a twofold connotation. It can, first of all, have the general meaning: "you have heard (received) as tradition."² In such a case its function would be to designate what follows as tradition. However, ἀκούειν also has a second connotation of setting off the possibility of one or more "understandings" of the Law which was corrected by the following interpretation.³ Still a third possibility

¹To be sure this exact formula occurs in its entirety only in two of the Antitheses (5:21, 33), but it doubtlessly sets the tone for the following shorter forms.

²S.-B., I, 253; Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 42; Dalman, Jesus-Jeschua, pp. 65f.; Kummel, "Traditionsgedanke," ZNW, 33(1934), p. 125 and G. Barth, op. cit., p. 93.

³Most of these have been Jewish scholars who have pointed this out. S. Schlechter, "Some Rabbinic Parallels to the New Testament," JQR, 12(1900), pp. 427f., followed by Montefiore, Synoptic Gospels, I, 56; Abrahams, Studies, p. 16. This was also, however, hinted at by Branscomb, op. cit., p. 240 and thoroughly examined by D. Daube, The New Testament and Rabbinic

is not to be ruled out, even though it is not at all technical. The verb ἀκούειν might simply describe the common experience of "hearing" the Law read and expounded in the synagogue and Temple worship services.¹ On the other hand, the second half of the formula, ἐπρέθη, is also not without a technical meaning in the early rabbinic writings. Billerbeck summarizes its connotation in such contexts by translating it: "Es ist als Tradition gelehrt worden."² Nevertheless, this verb could also have an entirely different intent reflecting a common practice of that day, namely, the usage of the passive voice to indicate divine activity. In so doing the divine name could be avoided.³ Therefore from the standpoint of form alone the first introductory formula could be used either technically in reference to tradition or in a non-technical function referring to the hearing of the Law which was given by God to those of old.

Contentwise, however, one of the two possibilities becomes the more apropos. Whereas both ᾠκούσαντε and ἐπρέθη could refer to tradition, one thing is certain--both do not. Not only would such a combination be without parallel in the rabbinic sources, but taken

Judaism (1956), pp. 55-58 who is followed by Davies, Setting, pp. 101f. Cf. M. Smith, Tannaitic Parallels to the Gospels (1961), p. 154.

¹Dalman, Jesus-Jeschua, p. 65 notes this but prefers the first usage. Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 117; Manson, Sayings, p. 153.

²S.-B., I, 253f. for parallels. This usage would gain even more weight if τῷ ἀρχαίῳ could be used as a dative of agent (cf. S.-B., I, 254). However, as has often been pointed out not only does such a usage not occur anywhere else in the NT but the dative elsewhere is, as here, to be taken as an indirect object, cf. Zahn, Matthäus, p. 224 and Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 117.

³Dalman, Jesus-Jeschua, p. 66; Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 165.

together it would produce a redundant tautology: "You have received as tradition that it has been taught as tradition."¹ Should one choose the second half (ἐρρέθη) as being the technical usage, he faces two difficulties. First of all, this would conflict with the dative of indirect object (τοῖς ἀρχαίοις) in 5:21, 33.² Secondly, there would be an incongruity between the introductory formula and the content of the premises themselves, since only two of the six premises could even possibly be attributed to a traditional interpretation of the Law (5:21b, 43b).³ This problem is certainly not resolved by saying that the "...Torah was thus received as a part of the tradition and in its traditional meaning."⁴ Not only did Jesus elsewhere explicitly differentiate between the Law and its "traditional meaning,"⁵ but this also confuses what by the definition of Law and tradition could not possibly be confused for a Jewish audience. Tradition might be confused with the Torah, but the Torah could hardly have been confused with tradition.⁶

¹Cf. Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 117.

²See p. 206 n. 2.

³5:27, 38 are direct quotations from the Old Testament and 5:31 and 33 have material parallels. Certainly if such had been the intent behind the "Antitheses," six clear cut examples of traditional interpretation could have been found regardless of whether Matthew constructed three or not.

⁴Barth, *op. cit.*, p. 93; cf. Kümmel, "Traditions-gedanke," ZNW, 33(1934), p. 125.

⁵Cf. especially Mt. 15:3 // Mk. 7:5. One could hardly contend for the fact that the Antitheses set the "tradition of the fathers" in sharp relief with the Law itself as in Mt. 15:3f.

⁶Granted that Jesus' hearers also believed along with normative Judaism that the tradition itself was given along with the Law to those of old (a presupposition which cannot be justified, e.g. the Sadducee's viewpoint on tradition!), there always remained an

However, should one choose the first half of the formula (ἡκούσατε) to be a technical reference to tradition, he is left with the questionable introduction: "You have received as tradition that God said to those of old." If what God said to those of old was the Law, then it is nonsensical to say that they have the Law as tradition. The phrase could only make sense if one posits: a) that what follows in the premise is tradition and b) that the intent of the formula is to characterize the origin of the tradition as God-given. However, this presupposes the premise itself to be tradition, a presupposition which cannot be founded as we saw in the analysis above. Should one with Daube and others¹ take ἡκούσατε to refer to differences in "understanding" of the Law, this would overlook the content of both the premises and antitheses in which the one is not only at times transcended but even at times set aside. There is no indication of "correction" in the content of the Antitheses. Furthermore, to emphasize ἡκούσατε puts the weight of the formula on the first half, when in actuality it is on the second half (ἐρρέθη). This is evident both in the contrast ἐρρέθη τοῖς ἀρχαίοις and ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν, and in the fact that ἐρρέθη is the only part preserved in the shortened form of 5:31.²

This leaves us with the alternative of taking the formula at face-value rather than in a technical sense. As such, it would mean: "You have heard (in the reading and explication of the Law) that it was said (by God) to men of old (to whom God had given his commandments)...."

essential difference--the one was written and the other was oral.

¹Cf. p. 205 n. 3.

²This is where Daube, et al. (cf. p. 205 n.3) have gone astray by placing too much emphasis on ἡκούσατε / λέγω parallels in the rabbinic sources.

This would then be a clear reference to the Old Testament Law. Do, however, the premises themselves actually bear this out, particularly since only two of them quote the Old Testament as such (5:27, 38) and two others (5:21b, 43b) have elements foreign to their counterparts in the Old Testament? The answer to this question is both yes and no. On the one hand, the premises appear to have been taken from the Old Testament. As we saw above in the analysis, each refers either directly or indirectly to the Old Testament. On the other hand, they were so qualified that they now represent a concept of the Law quite different from that found in either the Old Testament or Judaism.

We saw at the outset¹ that the "Law" in ancient Israel and the pre-Exilic prophets was part and parcel of the special covenant relationship bestowed upon Israel through God's gracious election.² It was in no way seen as the necessary condition for the covenant but rather was both the ethical norm as well as the laws which determined the conduct and characteristics of the covenant fellowship in terms of everyday life. To be sure, when in the post-Exilic period, the delicate balance between God's gracious election of Israel and her ensuing responsibility before him became quite one-sided in favor of the latter, more and more emphasis came to be placed on the Law.³ Obedience to the Law actually became the basis of one's relation to the "true" Israel and hence to the covenant.⁴ Consequently, the Law came to be understood as a measuring rod, and even the

¹ Cf. above in introduction pp. 24ff.

² Cf. von Rad, *Theologie*, II², 417, 423f.; cf. W. Zimmerli, "Das Gesetz im Altentestament," *TLZ*, 85(1960), pp. 54-60, 66-72; *v. supra*, pp. 24ff.

³ Cf. pp. 35ff.

⁴ This is best illustrated by the Essenes with the "outsiders" and the Pharisees' relationship with the amhaares.

apodictic commands took on more and more the character of legal ordinances.¹ However, even within the legalistic confines of Judaism the Law still remained an integral complex of legal ordinances and ethical demands. This has often been illustrated by references to rabbinic materials which also condemn anger, hatred, lustful desires and dishonesty, sayings which appear in content to parallel Jesus' demands of the antitheses.²

By contrast the Law has been portrayed in the premises solely from the perspective of legal requirements which could and were to be carried out. Two of the premises have the form and function of a legal ordinance as found in the Old Testament (vs. 31 constructed by Matthew with reference to Deut. 24:1; vs. 38 taken over by Matthew from the Old Testament Law). Two others, apodictic in form, take on this aspect by means of their compositional relationship with the respective antitheses (vss. 27, 33), and two others given as apodictic commands in the Old Testament are legally qualified by additional clauses (vs. 21b---M, vs. 43b---Mt).

¹This in no way rules out an apodictic aspect of the Law or even its interpretation and radicalization as found among the Rabbis which often paralleled Jesus' own demands. However, these are all to be seen within the realm of a greater obedience to the Law and its intent. Cf. below for the difference in Jesus' demand.

²In a sweeping statement more true than not, J. Klausner, Jesus of Nazareth: His Life, Times, and Teaching (Eng. trans., 1925), p. 384, asserts: "Throughout the Gospels there is not one item of ethical teaching which cannot be paralleled either in the Old Testament, the Apocrypha, or in the Talmudic and Midrashic literature of the period near to the time of Jesus." Similarly G. Kittel, Die Probleme des palästinischen spätjudentums und das Urchristentum (1926), "...Man kann nahezu zu jedem der sittlichen Sätze Jesu, wenn man ihn als Einzelsatz, als Einzelforderung nimmt, irgendeinen Satz aus dem weiten Gebiet des Judentums finden, der in seiner Weise analoges bietet," p. 96. Cf. further Kittel's discussion, pp. 93ff. Cf. C. Montefiore, Rabbinic Literature and Gospel Teachings (1930), ad loc.

In other words, the premises represent the Law given by God to those of old but seen exclusively as a legal ordinance rather than as an integral complex of ethical demands and legal ordinances. In order to understand the meaning and intent for this one-sided representation we must first examine the second half of the antithetical complex.

Each antithesis begins with the introductory formula: "ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν" Seen from the standpoint of form alone, in contrast to the first introductory formula this introduction has no particular connotation of its own.¹ However, when taken in its present context as the antithesis to ἐρρέθη τοῖς ἀρχαίοις it becomes an authoritative expression by which the antitheses counter the premises simply through Jesus' own Word (Mt. 7:29, cf. Mk. 1:22 // Lk. 4:32). Contentwise as we saw in the analysis above, several of the antitheses have material parallels in both the Old Testament (vs. 28, cf. the tenth commandment; vss. 37a, cf. the ninth commandment) as well as in the rabbinic teachings (vss. 22, 28, 37a). However, their uniqueness lies in the deliberate combination of an absolute demand in the form and function of a legal ordinance set in antithesis to the Law as given by God to those of old. Jesus had taken the ethical maximum and declared it to be the legal minimum in antithesis to the legal demands of the Law.

This raises once again the question of how Jesus actually countered the premises with his own authoritative word. For some the antithesis serves to set off Jesus' radical, new understanding of the Old Testament Law.² Trilling has summarized it as follows: "...Für

¹ A similar expression occurs in Acts 11:13; I Cor. 7:12; Gal. 5:2 and Romans 2:24.

² Cf. pp. 3-8.

Matthäus geht es in der Antithesen nicht um die Frage der Geltung oder Weitergeltung der Tora, sondern um ihr neues Verständnis im Blick auf das Ziel der überfließenden Gerechtigkeit."¹ Such an approach would have been quite similar to that of Qumran or even the rabbis.² However, this viewpoint fails on two accounts. First of all, it overlooks the significant concept of the Law found in the premises. As portrayed in the premises the Law could only be "understood" as a legal ordinance, from a legal perspective. Furthermore, Jesus' demands were also set in the same form of a legal ordinance and thus would also have to be "understood" legally rather than morally. Therefore, the "understanding" of the Law would be the same. The difference would lie in the content of the demand, which leads to the second problem. To see Jesus' demand as merely a radicalizing of the understanding of the Law fails to see that Jesus' demand not only transcended the legal requirements of the Law but also set them aside (cf. vss. 31f., 38f., and 43f., the very Antitheses constructed by Matthew himself!). In other words, by placing the accent on the content of Jesus' demand and ignoring the form, this viewpoint misses the element of discontinuity at the very heart of the antithetical form.

Whereas the first approach tended to overlook the element of discontinuity in the antithetical element, a second approach placed great emphasis on the two distinctive elements of the antithesis. The premise represents the Old Testament Law as given by Moses to those of old, and the antithesis sets forth a nova lex or New Torah as given by the New Moses.³ A variation of

¹Das Wahre Israel, p. 209.

²Cf. Braun, op. cit., I, II, 3-22. Trilling himself notes, "Inhaltlich sind alle Stücke Verschärfung und Überholung der Toraforderungen, wie sie die Rabbinen lehrten" (op. cit., p. 209).

³Cf. pp. 9-14 . B. Bacon, Studies in Matthew

the nova lex is the concept that the Antitheses represent the "Messianic Torah."¹ In the former, the stress is placed more on the contrast between Moses-Jesus, the Old Law-New Law, and the Jews-Christians; in the latter, the emphasis falls more on the Messianic implications of Jesus as the Bringer of a new, Messianic Torah. However, this "Messianic Torah" did not abrogate but merely transcended the old Law. "Torah," in this case, simply stands for Jesus' Messianic "interpretation" of the Law.² Therefore, although terminologically related to the nova lex or New Torah, the Messianic Torah is materially related to the third approach below. Furthermore, Barth has pointed out that even the concept of a "Messianic Torah" as such is not to be found in early Judaism and can only be deduced with difficulty for later Judaism.³ To take Jesus' demand as a new Law historically superseding the Law of Moses, however, is to place the emphasis on the antithetical form at the expense of the content. It takes the antithesis as absolute and removes the antithetical tension between the old and the new. Such a concept does appear in Hermas, Barnabas and Justin,⁴ but could hardly have been the intent of Matthew (cf. 5:18f; 15:19; 19:17). A third approach views Jesus' antitheses as standing

(1930) is the classic representative of this. Davies, Setting, pp. 25-108, has an extensive discussion of the New Moses motif in Matthew, but concludes, "There is little, if indeed, anything, to recall the giving of the Law on Mount Sinai" in chap. 5 (ibid., p. 99).

¹S.-B., IV, 1-3; Davies, Setting, pp. 93, 107.

²Davies, ibid.; cf. S.-B., op. cit.; cf. D. Daube, The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism (1956), who uses the word "Torah" with reference to Jesus' "interpretation" just as Shammai and Hillel's interpretation was called "Torah."

³Barth, op. cit., pp. 154f., see p. 154, n. 2 contra Billerbeck.

⁴Hermas, sim. 5:6:3; 8:3:2; Barnabas, 2:6; Justin, Dial. 11:4; 14:3; 18:3.

within the Jewish legal framework as the new and radical interpretation of the Law.¹ Rather than countering the Law as such, Jesus was to have opposed the "rabbinical interpretation" of it with his "true interpretation."² Barth, who has gone into the discussion more extensively than the others, has based his position primarily on the introductory formulas taken in their more technical traditional usage. Yet, in view of the content of certain premises, Barth has to concede that this offensive against the rabbinical interpretation also led at times to the abolition of the Old Testament Law itself. This approach, however, overlooks the fact that the ambiguous introductory formulas must be taken together with and interpreted in light of the following material which they introduce. When this is taken into consideration, the Antitheses could not possibly be taken as a new interpretation of the Law. First of all, as we saw above, there is no trace of Scribal interpretation to be found in the premises, and secondly, the antitheses do not interpret the Law's demands. Rather they set forth demands which both transcend and set aside the legal requirements of the Law. What we have in the Antitheses is an antithesis in both form as well as content. To concentrate on the one at the expense of the other results in a one-sided misunderstanding of the thrust of the Antitheses which in no way corresponds with Matthew's concept of Jesus' relationship to the Law in the rest of his Gospel.

Therefore, if Jesus brought neither a new and radical understanding of the Law, nor a nova lex, nor even a new and radical interpretation of the Law in contrast to that of the Scribes, what then was the intent behind the "Antitheses?" From the standpoint of form we have

¹ Cf. pp. 14ff. Most recently by Bornkamm, "End-expectation," p. 35; Barth, op. cit., pp. 93f., 158f.; Hummel, op. cit., pp. 72-75.

² Barth, op. cit., p. 94; cf. Hummel, p. 73.

without doubt an antithetical complex. Regardless of whether one accepts the form in its technical or non-technical function, the premises were meant to be countered by the antitheses. This was not only inherent to the form itself, but the character of the secondary "Matthean" Antitheses illustrates this most clearly by having Jesus' demands annul the provisions of the premises (cf. 5:31f.; 5:38ff.; 5:43f.). The deliberate choice of this antithetical form cannot be overlooked. From the standpoint of content the premises were introduced as the Law given by God to those of old (ἐν ὧς ἀρχαίως) but qualified through form and composition to represent it solely from a legal standpoint. These were countered by antitheses introduced as Jesus' own authoritative word (ἐγὼ δε λέγω ὑμῖν) which set forth his own radical command in the form of legal ordinances. These absolute demands set in such a context have a two-fold significance. On the one hand, they absolutely and ultimately condemn as futile the hope of earning salvation through a legal righteousness based on the Law.¹ On the other hand, the Antitheses proclaim the presence of the age of salvation by demanding conduct which presupposes a "new heart" (5:32 cf. 19:8 // Mk. 10:5; 5:37b) and a new relationship on the part of the individual with God and man (cf. 5:22ff., 32, 34ff., 44ff.). As Manson has put it: "The moral demands of Jesus presuppose a changed nature and a disposition in man..,"² and Wilder speaks of this in terms of the "Kingdom ethic:" "...In the sense that it represents the righteousness of those living in the days of the New Covenant and empowered and qualified by the reconciliation and redemption of that age."³

¹Cf. Bornkamm, Jesus, pp. 95f. and "Der Lohngedanke im Neuen Testament," Gesammelte Aufsätze, II, 76.

²Teaching, p. 299.

³A. Wilder, Eschatology and Ethics (1950), p. 161.

Consequently, the Antitheses are to be taken seriously in both form and content. They are to be understood eschatologically rather than chronologically. They were not intended to supplant the Law or its interpretation historically as a new Law or a new and final interpretation of the old Law, rather they set forth concrete examples of conduct indicating the presence of the eschaton and the defeat of evil in the person and word of Jesus. Their intent, therefore, was not to give a programmatic understanding or interpretation of the Law but rather to bear witness to the person and word of Jesus, since such demands apart from the presence of the age of salvation in his own ministry would have been, at best, utopian if not nonsensical. In other words, the Antitheses were ultimately christological and not parenetic in character. Does this, however, hold true for Matthew's understanding of the Antitheses? This can best be answered by examining the redactional elements which introduce (5:17-20) and conclude (5:48) the entire complex.

IV. JESUS AND THE LAW ACCORDING
TO MATTHEW (5:17-20)

The complex of Mt. 5:17-20 not only offers us the key to understanding Matthew's use of 5:21-48, but it also gives the clearest indication of the evangelist's own understanding of Jesus and the Law. Since, however, this passage is also a composite of traditional material and redactional modifications, we are faced again with the problem of separating the two in order to gain a better perspective from which to evaluate both the import of the tradition as well as Matthew's handling of it.

\$1. "Not...to 'Annul' but to 'Fulfill!'" Mt. 5:17

The background of Mt. 5:17 has been considered from various perspectives. According to one approach, Matthew found the total complex of 5:17-19 (20) whose Sitz im Leben was within the strict Jewish-Christian community either in the sayings source (Q),¹ in his own special source (M),² or simply in the early Jewish-Christian tradition.³ Another approach finding too great a disparity in the content of 5:17-20 has omitted vss. 18 and 19 as being from a different context or source and combined vs. 17 with vs. 20 to form a single unit.⁴ For others Mt. 5:17 and 18 represent a single unit,⁵ and still a fourth approach has considered vs.

¹E.g. Bultmann, Tradition, pp. 146f.

²E.g. B. H. Streeter, The Four Gospels (1930), pp. 256f.

³E.g. Bornkamm, "End-expectation," p. 24; Percy, Botschaft, pp. 120f.

⁴Allen, Matthew, pp. 45f.; McNeile, Matthew, p. 58; Kümmel, "Traditionsgedanke," ZNW, 33(1934), p. 128.

⁵Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 104. Lohmeyer concluded from his form and content analysis that these two verses constitute one unit in the group of three comprising the section 5:17-20. W. Knox takes 5:17 together with and based upon a traditional saying in 5:18 which was in the

17 to be a unit within itself--either as an individual saying taken over by Matthew¹ or as his own editorial creation.²

This question can best be answered in terms of the actual examination of the text. The very opening words give an important clue by directing one's attention to an identical structural parallel in 10:34. Here one finds three constituent elements:

- | 5:17 | 10:34 |
|--|--|
| a) μὴ νομίσητε ὅτι | μὴ νομίσητε ὅτι |
| b) ἦλθον καταλύσαι τὸν νόμον ἢ τοὺς προφῆτας | ἦλθον βαλεῖν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν |
| c) οὐκ ἦλθον καταλύσαι ἀλλὰ πληρῶσαι | οὐκ ἦλθον βαλεῖν εἰρήνην ἀλλὰ μάχαιραν |

The first element is the phrase μὴ νομίσητε.

Many have seen in these words a conscious attempt to avoid misunderstanding of Jesus' mission either by his disciples³ or by his critics.⁴ Trilling, however, has

introduction for the "New Christian Torah" source used by Matthew to fill out his material on the Sermon: The Sources of the Synoptic Gospels, ed. by H. Chadwick, St. Luke and St. Matthew (1957), II, 19; Soiron, Bergpredigt, pp. 103f.

¹Schniewind, Matthäus, p. 53; Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 24-26.

²Schweizer, "Matthäus 5, 17-20," Neotestamentica (1963), p. 401; Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 172; Barth, op. cit., pp. 66f.; Strecker, op. cit., p. 144.

³Either during the earthly ministry: H. Meyer, Kritisch exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament, Handbuch über das Evangelium des Matthäus (1864), p. 147; Zahn, Matthäus, p. 212; Schlatter, Matthäus, pp. 152f.; Soiron, Bergpredigt, p. 234.

Or within the debates of the post-resurrection community: McNeile, Matthew, pp. 57f.; Bultmann, Tradition, pp. 141f.; Montefiore, Synoptic Gospels, I, 47; Barth, op. cit., p. 67; Hummel, Auseinandersetzung, p. 66.

⁴Cf. B. H. Branscomb, Jesus and the Law of Moses (1930), pp. 228f.; A. T. Cadoux, The Theology of Jesus (1940), p. 240; Michaelis, Matthäus (1948), I, 245.

recently suggested that the phrase is merely a rhetorical device chosen by Matthew to emphasize the positive import of the following statement rather than an indication of conflicting viewpoints.¹ As such it would then be simply a parallel to the Lucan form of the rhetorical question in 12:49 // Mt. 10:34.² This suggestion presupposes the priority of Lk. 12:51, since the entire saying is built around the form of the rhetorical question, and it implies that 10:34 was a Matthean construction. Therefore in view of the parallel structure in 5:17, it would follow that its form was also the product of Matthew. In other words, this is to say that because 5:17 is parallel in structure to 10:34 and since 10:34 is different in form to a "Q" parallel both reflect Matthew's redactional, if not editorial, hand.

However, the same argument could be used against the "Matthean" character of the format. The particular form of the rhetorical question in Lk. 12:51 occurs only two other times in Luke's writings, and these are in the subsequent passage of Lk. 13:2f., 4f. Without doubt these latter two examples are a part of his special source and characteristic of neither "Q" nor Luke. One could thus conclude that 12:51 was also formed in the same transmissional milieu. This would mean that 10:34 and 12:51 were but transmissional variants of the same saying.³

The second element shared in common with 10:34 is

¹ Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 171.

² δοκεῖτε ὅτι...? οὐχί, λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀλλὰ.... This formula occurs twice again in Lk. 13:2f., 4f., (L).

³ This is further supported by the fact that Matthew himself was familiar with such a usage of δοκεῖω (cf. 3:9 where μὴ νομίσητε would have been just as apropos; cf. 6:7; 26:53 and 24:44), and he editorially uses τὸ ὑμῶν (τοὶ) δοκεῖ as an introductory element six different times (17:25; 18:12; 21:28; 22:17; 22:42; 26:66). This usage is more rhetorical as in Luke's δοκεῖτε.

the ἡθον-saying. Matthew has three such sayings;¹ Luke has two,² and Mark one.³ As Trilling has already pointed out, the use of this verb and others related to it dealing with Jesus' coming and his divine sending was of particular importance to Matthew.⁴ By prefacing this introduction of 5:21-48 with such a saying, Matthew brings to bear a christological tone. The presence of an ἡθον-saying in 10:34 in contrast to the "Q" parallel does not absolutely mean that Matthew was responsible for constructing it. In fact the verb παραγγελλειν in the Lucan parallel occurs eight times in Luke.⁵ Of these, six are in "Q" passages which show considerable variation between Matthew and Luke,⁶ one is definitely Lucan⁷ and one is found in the Lucan passion material.⁸ Matthew himself uses the verb three times, having introduced it at least twice.⁹ Therefore, the ἡθον-saying as well as the introductory formula could well reflect a transmissional variation in 10:34 // Lk. 12:51.

The third structural parallel between 5:17 and 10:34 is a negative statement contrasted by a positive

¹Mt. 5:17; 9:13 // Mk. 2:17; 10:34. Mt. 11:18f. // Lk. 7:33f.; 18:11 // Lk. 19:10 and 20:28 // Mk. 10:45 are Son of Man sayings and use the third person singular,

²Lk. 5:32 // Mk. 2:17 (ἐληλυθα); 12:49 (and perhaps 12:51-- παραγγελλειν). Lk. 7:33f. // Mt. 11:18f. and 19:10 // Mt. 18:11 are both Son of Man sayings.

³Mk. 2:17. Mk. 10:45 is a Son of Man saying. Some have suggested 1:38, but as Taylor has pointed out this most probably refers to Jesus' mission in Galilee and does not have any theological import: Mark, p. 184. Matthew takes over both of Mark's: Mt. 9:13 // 2:17 and Mt. 20:28 // Mk. 10:45. Luke on the other hand has only the one: Lk. 5:32 // 2:17.

⁴Das Wahre Israel, pp. 171f.

⁵It occurs 21 times in Acts.

⁶7:4; 7:20; 11:6; (12:51); 14:21; 19:16.

⁷8:19

⁸22:52

⁹Mt. 2:1; 3:1, 13.

parallel-- οὐκ ἤλθον καταλῦσαι ἀλλὰ πληρῶσαι. The use of such a construction in the three Synoptic Gospels is quite varied, and an examination of the numerous occurrences gives us three results. First, although frequent in Mark,¹ they are totally absent from "Q". Secondly, whereas Luke places little value on these,² Matthew especially favors them.³ Thirdly, Matthew either takes his constructions directly from his tradition or source, or he formulates them from the material at hand.⁴ At no point do we find a purely Matthean editorial construction apart from a traditional element behind it. This might, of course, suggest that we do have indication after all that Matthew was at work in the modification of his "Q" material in 10:34, but it rules out with great probability that 5:17 was simply a Matthean creation. Furthermore, this does not necessarily mean that Matthew modified 10:34, since four of Mark's constructions pertain directly to sayings concerning Jesus' coming.⁵ Therefore, both 10:34 and 5:17 could well reflect

¹2:17 (bis); 2:22; 5:39; 7:15; 7:19; 8:33; 9:37; 10:8; 10:40; 10:45; 12:27; 14:36.

²Luke only has six such constructions, all from Mark: 5:31 // Mk. 2:17 (bis); 5:38 // Mk. 2:22; 8:52 // Mk. 5:39; 20:38 // Mk. 12:27; 22:42 // Mk. 14:36.

³This is seen in Matthew's usage of Mark. He has eleven of Mark's thirteen: 9:12 // Mk. 2:17; 9:13 // Mk. 2:17; 9:17 // Mk. 2:22; 9:24 // Mk. 5:39; 15:11 // Mk. 7:15; 16:23 // Mk. 8:33; 19:6 // Mk. 10:8; 20:23 // Mk. 10:40; 20:28 // Mk. 20:45; 22:32 // Mk. 12:27; 26:39 // Mk. 14:36.

This is also seen by the number of Matthew's own constructions (apart from 5:17 and 4:4 // Dt. 8:3 he has eight of his own): 5:39; 6:13; 7:21; 10:20; 10:34; 16:12; 16:17 (17:12).

⁴4:4 cf. Dt. 8:3; (5:17); 5:39 cf. Lk. 6:29; 6:13 cf. Lk. 11:44; 7:21 cf. Lk. 6:46; 10:20 cf. Lk. 12:12; (10:34 cf. Lk. 12:51); 16:12 (although editorial it is composed from the saying of 16:11); 16:17 (M); 17:12 cf. Mk. 9:13.

⁵Mk. 2:17 (bis) parr.; 9:37; 10:45 parr.

an early Semitic pattern for such sayings,¹ with the former having a transmissional variant in Lk. 12:51.² This structural parallelism between 5:17 and 10:34 would then suggest that both stem from a similar traditional format and that 5:17 was not the product of Matthew but rather a traditional element which he took over.

A. "The Law or the Prophets"

That such was the case is supported by the rather awkward construction of "the Law η the Prophets". This phrase presents a problem because disjunctive conjunction η occupies the place of a correlative conjunction $\kappa\alpha\iota$. Several have sought to explain this occurrence of η as being simply the equivalent of $\kappa\alpha\iota$ in a negative sentence.³ Zahn, on the contrary, has correctly pointed out that this is neither a negative clause nor does always represent $\kappa\alpha\iota$ in a negative sentence.⁴ How then is this to be explained?

A closer examination of Matthew's usage of η reveals that he has a total of fourteen, over twice as many as Mark⁵ and more than a third as many as Luke.⁶

¹C. F. Burney, The Poetry of Our Lord (1925), pp. 90ff.

²Both doubtless represent the same logion in view of the same commentary from Micah 7:6 which follows. Mt. 10:35f. represents the LXX, whereas The Gospel according to Thomas, reflects the Lucan form.

³F. Blass, Grammatik des Neutestamentlichen Griechisch (1896), p. 260; Wellhausen, op. cit., p. 18; Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 173.

⁴Zahn, Matthäus, p. 210f., note 69: 5:25; 7:6; and 10:38.

⁵Mark has five: 7:10ff. // Mt. 15:4ff. (three times); 10:40 and 13:32.

⁶Luke has nine: give of which are nouns--12:14; 13:15; 14:5, 12; 17:7 and four are verbs--9:25; 12:11; 12:47; 21:15. Whereas the nouns could have been in Luke's special source, the verbs appear editorial: cf. 9:25 with Mk. 8:36; 12:11 with Mk. 13:11.

Of this total four were taken over from Mark,¹ six were definitely editorial² as were possibly three others³ besides 5:17. In every one of these editorial instances, except for 6:25,⁴ Matthew has added a noun which is either related to or supplementary to another already in his text. In each case he has used the conjunction η to bring them together.

This fits in perfectly with the situation in 5:17. Whereas Matthew had before him a text which only referred to the "Law," he added the noun and conjunction η τοὺς προφῆτας in a style characteristic of him both in form and content.⁵ Such an addition would not only explain the unusual character of this "disjunction" in 5:17 but would also confirm the implications of the analysis above which indicated that Matthew was apparently working with a traditional element and not simply creating one. Therefore, we can distinguish to a degree between two different readings. In the traditional element, we have a statement which concerns the Law primarily. In the redactional element, we have a statement pertaining to the Old Testament scriptures. This explanation also helps clarify some of the difficulties which have arisen in the interpretation of the contrasting verbs καταλῦσαι and πληρῶσαι.

¹15:4ff. // 7:10ff. (three times), cf. Mt. 13:21 // Mk. 4:17.

²In Marcan passages--12:25 cf. Mk. 3:25; 16:14 cf. Mk. 8:28; 18:8 cf. Mk. 9:43, and in Q passages--5:18 cf. Lk. 16:17; 6:25 cf. Luke 12:22.

³10:11, 14 without direct parallel in "Q" and 17:25 is in M material.

⁴This is a verb construction which can readily be explained as an insertion in 6:25 of a phrase in 6:31.

⁵Cf. pp. 97f. for discussion of this phrase in Matthew. Matthew adds this phrase at two places: to a Q text (7:12 // Lk. 6:31) and to a Marcan text (22:40 // Mk. 12:31).

B. "To Annul"

The Greek verb καταλύνω occurs sixteen times in the New Testament. Of these sixteen, seven are parallel sayings concerning the Temple.¹ Apart from 5:17, the meaning is either "to destroy by tearing down,"² or simply "to destroy,"³ or "to lodge."⁴ The first meaning is the more frequent and has led Ljungman to attempt to explain Mt. 5:17 accordingly.⁵ However, "to destroy by tearing down" seems to be the logical inference from the given context⁶ and not a meaning necessarily inherent to the verb itself.⁷ One must, therefore, approach the usage of the verb in 5:17 from its immediate context.

Without doubt the usage in 5:17 is conditioned from two sides. On the one side, Ljungman reflects the influence of the contrasting verb πληρῶναι be seeking to define the two so that they can reflect a definite antithesis. According to Ljungman, πληρῶναι means to completely fulfill and emphasizes the element of wholeness.

¹Mt. 24:2 // Mk. 13:2 // Lk. 21:6; Mt. 26:61 // Mk. 14:58; Mt. 27:40 // Mk. 15:29. nb--all are Marcan and present in Matthew, whereas Luke has taken over only one.

²The three Marcan passages with parallels in n. 1, Acts 6:14; II Cor. 5:1; Gal. 2:18. Altogether there are six such references.

³In both Rom. 14:20 and Acts 5:38 the figure of tearing down would be quite remote, if at all present.

⁴Lk. 9:12 and 19:7 in which the sense of "to relax" or "to lodge" which is the derivation of figure of unyoking or releasing the beast of burden for the night. Liddell-Scott, ad loc.

⁵H. Ljungman, Das Gesetz Erfüllen: Matth. 5:17ff. und 3:15 Untersucht (1954), pp. 17, 59f.

⁶Apart from the parallel references to the Temple in note 1, Acts 6:14 refers also to the Temple. In II Cor. 5:1 the body is considered an earthly building or dwelling and Gal. 2:18 has the figure of rebuilding what was torn down.

⁷This is borne out by Luke's usage both in his Gospel (Lk. 9:12 and 19:17) and in Acts (5:38f.). Cf. this with Paul's usage in Rom. 14:20.

Consequently, καταλῦσαι would mean to destroy by taking apart or breaking up the wholeness.¹ On the other side, the context also speaks of the Law--in fact, that was the object of the verb in the traditional element--and the usage of καταλῦσαι in a legal sense has its own technical meaning. Since both Classical and Hellenistic literature supports the meaning of "to annul" or "to abolish" a law,² this meaning must also be taken into consideration. Therefore, in order to complete the context and be able to determine more specifically the meaning of καταλύω here, one must turn first to an examination of the meaning and usage of πληρῶσαι.

C. "To Fulfill"

Ljungman has dealt extensively with the various approaches to the verb πληρῶσαι in 5:17 as well as the scholars who have represented the different viewpoints.³ In spite of the many variations, there are basically three different meanings which have been used: a) "to fill up." "to complete" or "to bring to full expression,"⁴ b) "to establish," "to confirm" or "to accomplish,"⁵ and c) "to fulfill a prophecy," "to come to pass" or "to bring to realization" in the sense of a heilsgeschichtliche fulfillment of the Old Testament prophecy.⁶ All three meanings occur at some place or another in Matthew's

¹Ljungman, op. cit., p. 60.

²Cf. Liddell-Scott, ad loc.; Bauer, ad loc.

³Ljungman, op. cit., pp. 16-36. Cf. also Blair, op. cit., pp. 117-124 and Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, pp. 174-179.

⁴E.g. Ljungman, op. cit., and more recently Davies, "Matthew 5:17, 18," Christian Origins and Judaism (1962), pp. 31-66.

⁵E.g. Schlatter, Matthäus, pp. 153f.; Dalman, op. cit., pp. 52-57.

⁶E.g. Schweizer, op. cit., pp. 400f.; Schnackenburg, Die sittliche Botschaft, pp. 4, 38ff.

Gospel. The verb appears a total of sixteen times in Matthew as compared to nine times in Luke and twice in Mark. Twelve of the sixteen have to do directly with the fulfillment of Scripture;¹ two definitely have the first meaning which is the root meaning of the verb;² and 3:15, although much debated, seems best translated by the second option. Which of these is the more appropriate for 5:17?

To begin with is it not possible that we have two different usages of πληρῶναι in 5:17 with the one found at hand in the tradition pertaining solely to the Law and the other reflecting a Matthean intention with the insertion of ἡ τοὺς προφῆτας? This would help resolve the conflict which arises in trying to find a meaning which is both compatible with the strong negative contrast between καταλύσαι and πληρῶναι as well as congruent with the immediate context. The saying, as found by Matthew in the tradition, may conceivably have had a verb other than πληρῶναι originally to build the contrast with καταλύω.³ However, this is not only beyond our control but would only be necessary if there were not a suitable usage of πληρῶ. As the traditional element stands we have two important considerations: the direct object of τὸν νόμον and the strong negative contrast ἡ θρον μὴ ... ἀλλά These would rule out the third option above, namely "to fulfill Scripture."⁴ The first option, "to fill up" or "to bring to full expression," would be conceivable if one were to grant

¹All but one is Matthean--1:22; 2:15, 17, 23; 4:14; 8:17; 12:17; 13:35; 21:4; 26:54; 26:56 // Mk. 14:49; 27:9.

²13:48 and 23:32. Luke has four such usages: 2:40; 3:5; 7:1; 21:24.

³Cf. discussion in Ljungman, *op. cit.*, pp. 16ff. of Gal. 2:18: καταλύω/οἰκοδομῶ.

⁴Although νόμος could refer to scripture as a whole (cf. Guthrie, *TWNT*, IV, 1054), it is highly improbable in view of καταλύσαι and the addition by Matthew of ἡ τοὺς προφῆτας.

Ljungman's hypothesis for a Hebrew/Aramaic original with $\chi\lambda\alpha$ which is paralleled in the Syriac by mallī and schērā.¹ This interpretation places the accent on the root meaning of the two verbs, and thus is left with a rather artificial relationship between them and their direct object, $\tau\omicron\nu\nu\sigma\mu\omicron\nu$. In addition, the argument from the Syriac versions does little to aid in getting at the original Hebrew/Aramaic since they are dealing with 5:17 as it now stands. From a positive side, the second option, "to accomplish" or "to establish by doing," fits both the direct object as well as the negative contrast between the two verbs.

The meaning of "to accomplish" or "to establish by doing" the Law has been often suggested,² and it concurs with the usage of $\pi\lambda\eta\rho\acute{o}\omega$ in Mt. 3:15. Recently in a detailed analysis of Mt. 3:13-15, Strecker concluded that the passage was basically a pre-Matthean traditional element which reflects several traces of the evangelist's own reworking.³ One indication of this was the phrase $\pi\lambda\eta\rho\acute{o}\omega\nu\alpha\iota\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\nu\ \delta\epsilon\kappa\alpha\iota\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta\nu$ in 3:15, although the heart of the clause is pre-Matthean.⁴ The reason, of course, for assigning these to Matthew is that they are supposedly characteristic of Matthew. However, we saw above that the meaning of "to fulfill scripture" was the characteristic usage of $\pi\lambda\eta\rho\acute{o}\omega$ by the first evangelist. In fact, apart from 3:15 all other references to Jesus' coming "to fulfill" have been with this meaning. Since, however, 3:15 and 5:17 (tradition) would be the only exceptions and since both 3:15 and 5:17 reflect traditional elements, is it too fanciful to suggest that both reflect the same "traditional" usage of $\pi\lambda\eta\rho\acute{o}\omega$?⁵ This

¹Ljungman, op. cit., pp. 17, 29f.

²Cf. above all, Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 154 and Schniewind, Matthäus, p. 52.

³Strecker, op. cit., pp. 150, 178.

⁴Ibid., p. 150.

⁵To be sure, the meaning and usage of $\delta\epsilon\kappa\alpha\iota\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta\nu$ in

would not only explain the sole appearance of πληρώω with the meaning of "to accomplish" or "to establish by doing" in 3:15, but it also would clarify the change in emphasis between 5:17 as Matthew found it and as he reworked it. Otherwise, it would seem rather strange for Matthew to have inserted the phrase in 3:15 which was quite similar in force to that found in 5:17 (tradition) only to modify the latter by giving it a meaning in keeping with his other uses of πληρώω.

Thus we have already touched on the meaning of πληρῶσαι as used in 5:17 by Matthew. Whereas Matthew found before him a tradition in which Jesus' coming was related directly to the problem of the Law, by inserting the phrase ἡ τῶν προφητῶν Matthew diverts the emphasis to deal primarily with Jesus' coming and its relationship to the Old Testament scriptures. In other words, the major thrust of the verse for Matthew is to give positive expression to Jesus' coming as the heilsgeschichtliche Fulfillment of the scriptures, a motif which runs throughout Matthew's Gospel. As a result of the modification, καταλῦσαι loses the more specialized legal meaning of "to annul" and takes on the more general meaning of "to destroy" or "to abolish." Consequently, the contrast between the two verbs loses its sharpness.¹ Furthermore, the Antitheses of 5:21-48 would not be directly related to 5:17 as an illustration of "how" Jesus "fulfills" the Law (e.g. by his "teaching"). Their relationship, rather, would be more

3:15 would still be the same as that of Matthew (Strecke, ibid., pp. 179f.), but that would not rule out such a usage in his tradition. Cf. below pp. 255f.

¹Cf. Trilling, op. cit., p. 178, who following Wellhausen, concludes that these are not contradictory but superlative. J. Wellhausen, Das Evangelium Matthaei (1904), p. 18. This is going too far. While these are not diametrically opposed to one another they still remain in a negative relationship for Matthew (cf. Matthew's other statements similar to this in p. 220 n.3, as well as the Marcan passage in 5:39 par.).

indirect in that they represent a demand for conduct characteristic of the age of salvation set forth by the Fulfillment of scripture, the Bringer of the age of salvation.

In summary, therefore, we have seen a twofold aspect to 5:17. As an element of tradition, the verse was structured (cf. 10:34) and transmitted by the early Church as an expression of the relationship between Jesus' coming and the Law. Such an expression might well have had its Sitz im Leben in the primitive Church's discussion of the issue. The introductory formula, however, should caution one about placing this exclusively in the polemic against certain "antinomian" tendencies of the Church, since the parallel in 10:34 indicates that the formula $\mu\eta\ \nu\omicron\mu\acute{\iota}\tau\eta\tau\epsilon$ does not necessarily connote polemical overtones. In addition in both verses, it was used merely to warn against any misunderstanding of the implications of Jesus' coming.

Matthew, on the other hand, has given the verse an entirely different nuance. Instead of referring to the Law as such, the verse has been reformulated by the insertion of $\eta\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \pi\rho\omicron\phi\acute{\eta}\tau\alpha\varsigma$ to show Jesus' relationship to the Old Testament scriptures as their heilsge-schichtliche Fulfillment. This does not mean that Matthew had no concern about Jesus' coming and the Law, but, as will be seen in vs. 18, Jesus' relationship to the Old Testament scriptures explained his relationship to the Law. Therefore, Matthew has chosen to focus attention at the very outset of this complex (5:17-20) on Jesus' coming and the scriptures. Is this interpretation of 5:17, however, borne out by the rest of the introductory complex of 5:17-20?

§2. "Until All Things Come to Pass:" 5:18

A survey of the various analyses of 5:18 reveals

that with the exception of a few scholars¹ the consensus of opinion rests heavily in favor of Q as being the source for this traditional saying.² The differences of opinion have arisen in the various attempts to determine which elements represent the more original saying and which elements are editorial. This problem can best be considered within the following exegesis as such.

A. "Amen-Formula"

In the introductory formula, ἀμὴν ἵνα λέγω ὑμῖν ... (18a), one discovers two issues: the evaluation of the formula and the exegetical function of ἵνα. Whereas Harnack in his discussion of 5:18 intimated that this phrase could have been secondary,³ Trilling has sought to substantiate this ruling on two counts. First, Matthew, according to Trilling, has frequently added the "Beteuerungsformel" both in Marcan and "Q" material⁴ and consequently it would be suspect here in 5:18. Secondly, the presence of ἵνα eliminates any room for question, since the formula with ἵνα "...gibt es in ganzen NT nur bei ihm."⁵ A review, however, of both premises indicates

¹E. Wendling, "Zu Matthäus 5:18,19," ZNW, 5(1904), pp. 253-256, who considers this to be a Matthean construction on the basis of 24:34. The content was taken over from rabbinic sayings. According to Knox the presence of the saying in Lk. 16:17 is to be explained as the incorporation into the text of a former marginal gloss. The saying was familiar to Matthew and he placed it in his present context. The difference in wording alone is sufficient in Knox's opinion to mitigate against these being from a common source: W. Knox, op. cit., pp. 96-99; J. Jeremias, "Zur Hypothese einer schriftlichen Logienquelle Q," ZNW, 29(1930), p. 148.

²Wellhausen, Matthaei, p. 18; Harnack, Sprüche, pp. 42f.; Streeter, op. cit., p. 287; Manson, Sayings, p. 154; Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 17f.; Butler, The Originality of St. Matthew (1951), p. 43, et al.

³Harnack, Sprüche, p. 43.

⁴Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 169, n. 12.

⁵Ibid., p. 140.

that Trilling's conclusion is a possibility, but not a necessity.

Mark has thirteen occurrences of the formula: 3:28; 8:12; 9:1; 9:41; 10:15; 10:29; 11:23; 12:43; 12:30; 14:9; 14:18; 14:25; 14:30.

Besides the three of his own (4:24; 12:37; 23:43--L), Luke follows Mark three times (18:17 // Mk. 10:15; 18:29 // Mk. 10:29; 21:32 // Mk. 13:30--all have Matthean parallels as well). Luke changes Mark three times (9:27 // Mk. 9:11-- $\alpha\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$ to $\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$; 21:3 // Mk. 12:43-- $\alpha\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$ to $\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$; and 22:34 // Mk. 14:30 $\alpha\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$ dropped) and agrees with Matthew twice against Mark (11:29 // Mt. 16:4 against Mk. 8:12 and 22:18 // Mt. 26:29 against Mk. 14:25). The other five in Mark are not carried by Luke.

Matthew follows Mark nine times (10:42 // Mk. 9:41; 16:28 // Mk. 9:1; 18:3 // Mk. 10:15; 19:28 // Mk. 10:29; 21:21 // Mk. 11:22f.; 24:34 // Mk. 13:30; 26:13 // Mk. 14:9; 26:21 // Mk. 14:18; 26:34 // Mk. 14:30. He changes Mark once (12:31 // Mk. 3:28-- $\alpha\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$ to $\delta\iota\alpha\tau\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\tau\omicron$) and follows Luke against Mark twice (16:4 // Lk. 11:29 against Mark 8:12 and 26:29 // Lk. 22:18 against Mark 14:25). Matthew does not have Mark 12:43.

In turning to the "Q" passages or those common to Matthew and Luke one finds that Luke "changes" once to $\nu\alpha\iota$ (11:51 // Mt. 23:36) and once to $\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$ (12:44 // Mt. 24:47) and fails to carry one entire portion of a verse which has the formula (15:5 cf. Mt. 18:13) which Bultmann (Tradition, p. 184), considered to be the more original. In four other references only the $\alpha\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$ is missing in Luke (12:59 // Mt. 5:26; 7:10 // Mt. 8:10; 7:28 // Mt. 11:11; 10:24 // Mt. 13:17. In two other parallels the entire formula is missing in Luke (17:6 // Mt. 17:20 and 13:27 // Mt. 25:12).

Is there any evidence which would indicate a Matthean editorial factor? It must be noted first of all that Matthew never added simply the word $\alpha\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$ to a Marcan passage. On the contrary, he took the liberty to change one and with Luke dropped two. Yet there are two instances in both "Q" and Mark where Matthew has the entire formula in contrast to his parallel ("Q"--17:20 // Lk. 17:6 and 25:12 // Lk. 13:27; Marcan--19:23 // Mk. 10:23 and 24:2 // Mk. 13:2). In each of these the formula occurs at the beginning of a saying or sayings complex. Matthew 18:3 and 21:21 represent reworked Marcan passages, and it may not be by chance that the formula which stood in the middle of the saying in Mark now stands at the beginning in Matthew. One may conclude that an editorializing tendency is apparent in Matthew, but it has to do with the entire formula and with the beginning of a saying. At no place does Matthew add the formul to the middle of a sayings complex. The significance, consequently, of this interpretation for

5:18 can only be drawn in view of one's traditions-geschichtliche evaluation of 5:18. Does the saying here introduce a sayings complex or is it to be seen within the complex which began in 5:17?

At any rate in that Luke has obviously changed $\alpha\mu\eta\nu$ to $\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ three times and to $\nu\alpha\iota$ once and in that he has omitted $\alpha\mu\eta\nu$ at least twice in a Marcan parallel and since Matthew never added simply $\alpha\mu\eta\nu$ to a Marcan passage and since the five "Q" passages in which the is the only missing element of the formula are in the middle of a saying or sayings complex, it does seem safe to conclude that Luke had a tendency to drop the $\alpha\mu\eta\nu$ rather than Matthew having the responsibility of always adding it. Since it is present in Mark, Luke (L), Matthew (M), it does seem a bit unusual that it be totally absent from Q!

In contrast to Trilling's first premise a comparison of the usage of the Beteuerungsformel and their Lucan parallels would seem to show a tendency on Luke's part either to omit the $\alpha\mu\eta\nu$ element or to change it rather than a Matthean tendency to always add it.¹ Such a conclusion, if valid, would cast some doubt on the effect of Trilling's second premise. To be sure, Matthew is the only New Testament writer who uses the formula with $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$, but it only occurs twice where it can be examined!² In the one case, Matthew 17:20 // Lk. 17:6, is most probably Matthean³ but the other occurrence, 13:17 // Lk. 10:24, could just as well have been a Q passage.⁴ Therefore, the status of the $\alpha\mu\eta\nu$ -formula from a comparative Synoptic study must remain at least moot.

¹Harnack, Sprüche, pp. 29f., suggests this possibility. J. Jeremias, "Kennzeichen der ipsissima vox Jesu," Synoptische Studien (Festschrift für Wikenhauser, 1953), pp. 86-93, develops this as a sign of an authentic saying. We are interested at this point in examining the criticism leveled at Matthew as one having a tendency to add rather than to remove (as Jeremias contended) the $\alpha\mu\eta\nu$ -formula.

²5:18 is under question and 10:23 is peculiar to Matthew.

³See p. 230.

⁴Here Luke lacks only the $\alpha\mu\eta\nu$. Trilling himself notes the presence of $\alpha\mu\eta\nu \delta\epsilon \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega \nu\acute{\upsilon}\mu\iota\nu$ in Mark 14:9 (Das Wahre Israel, p. 170). One can add to this Luke 9:27 ($\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma = \alpha\mu\eta\nu$).

From another perspective, however, there is one further consideration which definitely supports the probability of the formula's authenticity. This has to do with the structure of 5:18: a) an introductory formula, b) a subjunctive of emphatic negation (οὐ μὴ + subjunctive), and c) a limiting temporal clause (ἕως + subjunctive). Such a construction occurs seven times in Matthew¹ and not once do elements (b) and (c) appear without (a).² From this one could well conclude that such an introductory formula also belongs here in 5:18.³

Whether or not γὰρ is a Matthean addition or not makes little difference in the present exegesis. It is in the text as it stands now and serves to bind verse 18 to verse 17 with a close logical bond. This relationship will be more clearly seen below in the correspondence both of πληρῶσαι to the second ἕως-clause and of the law's continuing validity with Jesus' statement of not annulling the law behind 5:17.

B. "One Jot or One Tittle Shall in No Way Pass from the Law"

The main clause in vs. 18 is a subjunctive of emphatic negation which asserts the continuing validity of the law: "ἵνα ἐν ἡ μίᾳ κεραίᾳ οὐ μὴ παρέλθῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου." It is modified by two subordinate ἕως-clauses: "ἕως ἂν παρέλθῃ ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ," and "ἕως ἂν πάντα γένηται." The question of how these two subordinate

¹Three from Mark (16:28 // Mk. 9:1 // Lk. 9:27; 24:34 // Mk. 13:30 // Lk. 21:32; 26:29 // Mk. 14:25 // Lk. 22:18; two from Q (5:26 // Lk. 12:59; 23:39 // Lk. 13:35); one from Mt (M) (10:23) and 5:18.

²Five have the μὴν-formula (5:18; 5:26 cf. Lk. 12:59; 20:23; 16:28 // Mk. 9:1 // cf. Lk. 9:27 with ἀληθῶς; 24:34 // Mk. 13:30.

³This would not be any less the case should the absence of the entire formula in Lk. 16:17 be cited as evidence against the presence of it in 5:18. Although Luke's omission would appear to argue against the authenticity of the formula in 5:18, when one examines the

clauses modify the main clause and how they are related to one another has occupied the time and writings of many scholars. We will discuss these in the following order: the main clause (18c), the first ὥς-clause (18b), and finally the second ὥς-clause (18d).

The clause ἵνα ἐν ἡμῖν κεράια οὐ μὴ παρέλθῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου sounds very similar to numerous rabbinic passages dealing with the validity of the Law. Both the yod and the ornamental touches on certain letters were often used descriptively in rabbinic discussions to signify that the Law, even to its minutest detail, remained in force.¹ In spite of the many attempts to move around this stern Jewish element in 5:17-20,² there appears to be no exegetical grounds why one should reinterpret the usage here in 5:18.³ This in turn raises the question about the usage of νόμος. Both Zahn and Schlatter considered it to be the equivalent of "The Law or the Prophets" in 5:17 and thus to mean the Old Testament

context of Lk. 16:17 it becomes evident why the entire formula is absent. It is difficult enough to smooth the rough edges of 16:16-18 without having added an introductory formula to 16:17. To have had merely λέγω ὑμῖν (οὐ) at this point would have brought out what Luke was obviously attempting to tone down. To this extent, Luke would have had much more cause for dropping the formula than for Matthew to have had for adding it.

¹S.-B., I, 247ff.

²Allen, Matthew, p. 45; Holtzmann, Theologie, I, 504ff.; Kümmel, "Traditionsgedanke," ZNW, 33(1934), 128; Bornkamm, "End-expectation," p. 25 et al.

³T. W. Manson, seeing the difficulty in 5:18, has explained this in terms of a misunderstood ironical statement which is easier to get at from Luke 16:17 than here in 5:18. Matthew has so editorialized this that all the original ironical intent is lost, Sayings, pp. 135, 154. Others have sought to alleviate the tension between the extreme literalism which 5:18 implies and Jesus' own actions and teaching (cf. vss. 21-48) by reverting to a more figurative understanding on Matthew's part. Cf. most recently--G. Barth, op. cit., p. 70, n. 3; Schweizer, op. cit., p. 401; Schmid, Matthäus, pp. 87f.

scriptures.¹ Although this is linguistically possible,² the usage here seems to negate this interpretation. First, this clause does reflect a Jewish concept both in content and terminology which refers to the Torah as the Pentateuch.³ Secondly, one must remember the Lucan parallel which points to the Law in 16:17 in contrast to the Old Testament scriptures in 16:16. Therefore, one finds in Mt. 5:18 the emphatic statement that no single part can pass away from the Law.⁴

C. "Until Heaven and Earth Pass Away"

Up to this point one can follow the strong negation as a normative Jew without any qualms. However, the first *ἕως*-clause, *ἕως ἃν παρέλθῃ ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ*, suddenly brings things to a halt. In spite of the fact that for some scholars this clause has represented simply another way of saying "never" and therefore merely further emphasizing the Jewish belief in the eternity of the Law,⁵ the Matthean usage can only be understood here as giving a definite terminus ad quem to the enduring validity of the Law.⁶ There can be

¹Zahn, Matthäus, p. 218; Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 156.

²Gutbrod, TWNT, IV, 1054.

³S.-B., I, 246--only the Pentateuch as such and not the Old Testament scriptures as a whole were considered eternal.

⁴This is not to suggest that the major thrust of 5:18 is on the "wholeness" of the Law, as Ljungman, op. cit., pp. 39f.) has interpreted. The force of the verse is in keeping with the Jewish doctrine of the Law's continued validity (cf. Moore, Judaism, pp. 269f., and S.-B., I, 244ff.). Whereas Ljungman's explanation may be true, it is but a corollary to the main intent of the clause. Certainly, if no part perishes from the Law, it remains intact, whole, but the implication is that since not even the least part can perish then the Law's authority will continue.

⁵Allen, Matthew, p. 46; Klostermann, Matthäus (31938), p. 47; J. Schmid, Matthäus, p. 87; C. Montefiore, Synoptic Gospels, I, 51.

⁶Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 156; Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 109; Schniewind, Matthäus, p. 54; Barth, op. cit.,

little doubt of the expectation that heaven and earth would pass away not only in the Old Testament¹ and in the Jewish apocalyptic literature² but also in Jesus' sayings.³ This is further supported by the form of the saying. All seven such sayings except for 5:26 // Lk. 12:59 conclude with a $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clause which points to the final consummation of all things.⁴ Thus, the first $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clause brings a temporal limitation to bear on the main clause.

Not only is the main clause modified temporally, but more important in being temporally linked together with "this world"⁵ the Law is now considered in

pp. 65, 70 and Filson, Matthew, pp. 83f.

Although the question of a "New Torah" or a "Messianic Torah" as an expectation either of the Old Testament, the inter-testamental literature, or the rabbinic literature is quite dubious, it is certain that there is no evidence in any of these sources which posits the end of the Law. This is seen both in G. Barth's comments as well as Davies' investigation (Torah in the Messianic Age and/or the Age to Come (1952), pp. 85ff.; Barth, op. cit., pp. 154-56). Both Davies and Barth cite S.-B.'s excursus on the Sermon (IV, 1ff.) as being representative of the hope for a "New Torah." This does not mean the suspension nor the abrogation of the Mosaic Law, but rather was to be related positively to it as a new and better expression or interpretation of the Law. In either event, whether one holds, as Davies, to the expectation in Judaism of a "New Torah," or whether one prefers Barth's denial of same, one must concede that the expression of an expected cessation of the Law's validity here in 5:18 is something novel. As will be seen below, this has definite implications for the Sitz im Leben of the saying.

¹E.g. Isa. 24-27; 65:13-17. Cf. the discussion in G. Ladd's, Jesus and the Kingdom (1964), pp. 55-60.

²E.g. IV Ezra 7:42 (112)-45(115) and Ladd, op. cit., pp. 83-88, and S.-B., III, 840-847.

³E.g. Mt. 24:35 par. Cf. discussion in W. G. Kümmel's, Verheißung und Erfüllung (1956), pp. 19-41.

⁴See p. 232 n. 1.

⁵As has been noted, "heaven and earth" is a biblical synonym for "this world." Lohmeyer, Das Vater Unser (21947), p. 77 and Dalman, Worte Jesu (21930), I, 142f.

conjunction with "This Age."¹ Both shall meet their end in the final consummation. Would not such an understanding of the $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clause tend to dilute the "Jewish" flavor of the main clause? This raises next the problem of the Sitz im Leben.

The Sitz im Leben of 18abc has been located most frequently in the early debates between the strict Jewish and the freer antinomian wing of the early Church.² Naturally, this would tend to influence the exegesis of 5:18 and to cause one to soft-pedal the terminus ad quem of the $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clause in favor of the stronger Lucan reading. However, one cannot simply avoid the force of the traditional element which read: a) "Verily, I say to you, b) not even one tittle shall pass from the Law c) until heaven and earth pass away." A statement with such temporal limitations for the validity of the Law could hardly have arisen within the strict Jewish segment of the early Church, a segment which would have held to the eternal nature of the Law, unless Jesus himself had taught it. Consequently, one must conclude that such a saying could well go back to the ministry of Jesus and not merely to the debates within the primitive Church.³

¹By contrast, a very similar saying in 24:35 par. notes that whereas the Law's validity will pass away with heaven and earth, Jesus' own words will not pass away. Again one sees the temporal nature of the Law in contrast to that which will remain.

²Holtzmann, op. cit., I, 504f.; Bultmann, op. cit., p. 146f.; Branscomb, op. cit., pp. 215, 225; Kümmel, "Traditionsgedanke," ZNW, 33(1934), p. 128; Schweizer, "Matt. 5:17-20," Neotestamentica, pp. 400f.; Bornkamm, "End-expectation," p. 25; Barth, op. cit., p. 65; E. Käsemann, "Die Anfänge christlicher Theologie," Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, II, 85f. (=ZThK, 57(1960), 162-185) and most recently Hummel, op. cit., p. 68.

³See Excursus III below, pp. 294ff.

D. "Until All Things Come to Pass"

So far verse 18 has been but the confirmation of the negative statement underlying verse 17.¹ The fact that not even the smallest element should perish from the Law corroborates the given purpose of Jesus' coming as one who did not intend to annul it. Since, however, this validity continues only until the time of the consummation, it is quite obvious then from the negative declaration of vs. 17 that this final event did not take place, for Matthew at least, with Jesus' coming. Naturally, this raises the all important question: if the Law were to remain in its entirety until the final end of This Age and if according to 5:17 this final stage was not reached in Jesus' coming, what then was his relationship both to the Law and to This Age? Perhaps the answer is to be found in the second *ἕως*-clause.

The clause *ἕως ἂν πάντα γένηται* not only creates stylistic problems in that it disrupts the smooth structure of 5:17-19,² but it has also brought about much discussion as to its intent.³ Perhaps in beginning with an examination of its meaning one can find an answer for the questions of why it was placed here and by whom. At least three different meanings have been suggested for this clause: a) it is coordinate to and synonymous with the first *ἕως*-clause and refers to the final eschatological end of This Age;⁴ b) it is subordinate to and

¹ See pp. 225f.

² See Excursus III, pp. 295f. for discussion.

³ It has created such difficulties that some have considered it to be a later gloss: Wendland, *op. cit.*, pp. 253ff.; McNeile, *Matthew*, p. 59; Branscomb, *op. cit.*, pp. 214ff.; Montefiore, *Synoptic Gospels*, I, 51; Klostermann, *Matthäus*, p. 41.

⁴ Wellhausen, *Matthaei*, p. 18; Allen, *Matthew*, p. 47; McNeile, *Matthew*, p. 59; Klostermann, *Matthäus*, p. 41; Manson, *Sayings*, p. 154; Schmid, *Matthäus*, p. 87f.; Michaelis, *Matthäus*, pp. 248ff.; and Filson, *Matthew*, p. 84.

explanatory of the first $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clause and refers to either the fulfillment of the Law¹ or of the will of God;² and c) it is subordinate to and in contrast with the first $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clause and refers to the coming to pass in the person and work of Jesus of that which was prophesied in "the Law or the Prophets."³

1. The first approach runs aground on both textual and contextual considerations. Given the coordinate and synonymous relationship between the two clauses in terms of the first clause, the redundancy makes it difficult to conceive of the presence of both either in the early tradition or as a Matthean addition. Consequently, several of the scholars who take this approach tend to relegate the second clause to the status of a later gloss from 24:34 par.⁴ Contextually, the explicit statements contrary to the Law in the Antitheses of 21-48 stand in sharp contradiction to the statements in 5:18 which can only be recognized but not resolved.⁵

More recently, W. D. Davies⁶ has reworked this first approach by considering the two $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clauses as being synonymous but in terms of the second rather than the first. For Davies the second clause refers to the total accomplishing of the divine purpose in Jesus'

¹The Law as such in its entirety ($\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\varsigma$ with $\nu\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$): Zahn, Matthäus, pp. 219f.; Margoliouth, "One Jot or Tittle," The Expositor, 8 Series, 23(1922), pp. 185f.; A. M. Honeyman, "Matthew V. 18 and the Validity of the Law," NTS, 1(1954-55), p. 142; Ljungmann, op. cit., p. 40; Hummel, op. cit., p. 68.

The fulfillment of the Law as seen in the love-commandment: Schweizer, op. cit., pp. 400f.

²B. Weiss, Das Matthäus-Evangelium, (1898), p. 104 and Barth, op. cit., pp. 65f., 147f.

³Schniewind, Matthäus, pp. 54f.

⁴See p. 237 n. 3.

⁵One must do as Holtzmann, Theologie, I, 504ff.; Kümmel, "Traditionsgedanke," ZNW, 33(1934), p. 128; Branscomb, op. cit., p. 225; and Bornkamm, "End-expectation," p. 25 and explain this in terms of Matthew's inability to reconcile either his tradition or his own interpretation with his tradition.

⁶W. D. Davies, "Matthew 5:17, 18," Christian Origins and Judaism (1962), pp. 31-66, originally in Mélanges Bibliques en l'honneur de A. Robert (1957), pp. 428-456.

ministry which culminated in his death.¹ Although he recognizes the dual contextual problem and wrestles with the contradictory elements, Davies' attempt falls short on both counts. In an attempt to remove the contradictions involved in the two ~~ew~~^{ew}-clauses, he has dubiously explained it as being figurative for "This Age" which could pass away before the physical world.² There are at least two objections to this. First, it would appear most unusual that Jesus should use such a common figure of speech³ in a figurative manner without explanation.⁴ Secondly, if such a usage were conceded, the question still remains whether the dawn of "the Age to Come" with Jesus' death and resurrection terminated "This Age." Did the Church or Paul, for that matter, ever indicate that "This Age" had been terminated by the coming of "the Age to Come" or was it not an interaction with both?⁵

In terms of the larger context of chapter five, Davies explains the actions and teaching of vss. 21-48, which are apparently contradictory to the thrust of 5:18b and c, in view of the presence already in Jesus' ministry of the "powers of the Age to Come." In order to remain consistent with his own interpretation of the second ~~ew~~^{ew}-clause (which referred to the completion of Jesus' work in his death and resurrection) Davies makes a fine distinction: whereas such actions and teaching do annul the Law "in principle," they were not so intended "in fact."⁶ Jesus refused to annul the old Law "explicitly" until he could bring its replacement in the New Torah after his death.⁷ The major objection here is

¹Cf. for similar treatment, Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 157; Soiron, Bergpredigt, p. 277; and Gaechter, Das Matthäus Evangelium (1962), p. 165.

²This is further supported, according to Davies, by the Pauline usage of "new creation" or new age which had come about in Christ, Christian Origins, p. 63.

³Cf. p. 235 n.5 and Mark 13:31, where it refers to the literal passing of this physical world.

⁴Naturally, this is conceivable, but if such a saying arose in the earthly ministry, as Davies suggests (p. 51ff.), either in an attempt to gain an ear with the religious leaders early in his ministry or as an admonition against an iconoclastic tendency in his followers, only a literal meaning would have been intelligible to either. It seems unlikely that Jesus would have spoken in such circumstances with tongue in cheek.

⁵See below.

⁶Davies, Christian Origins, p. 58.

⁷Ibid., p. 59.

that whereas the distinction between "fact" and "principle" was necessary for Davies it was not necessary for Matthew. Thus we are still faced with the contradiction between 5:18 and the following Antitheses.

2. Perceiving the above dilemma the second approach has sought to differentiate between the clauses by placing the latter in a subordinate explanatory (or modal) relationship to the former.¹ This helps to alleviate the textual problem, since this relationship would make the presence of the two clauses either in tradition or as a Matthean addition much more plausible. This, however, while making peace with 5:18c and d, still leaves the larger contextual problem unanswered. One either disregards the problem² or one must reinterpret what it means to keep the whole Law and thus to change the meaning of 5:18b and c.³

According to Schweizer this change in meaning was already accomplished by Matthew through his addition of 18d.⁴ The major thrust of the verse now states that the Law remains valid until it is completely fulfilled. Since Schweizer considers 5:17f. to be the indications that the fulfillment has taken place through Jesus' bringing of the "new commandment,"⁵ which actually

¹Ljungman, op. cit., pp. 45, 47; Honeyman, op. cit., p. 142. The latter translated as follows: "...to the extent, so that (on the contrary) all (of it) will be fulfilled." In other words this clause further explains 18b, c, in terms of "how" the Law will remain valid.

²Margoliouth, op. cit., and most recently Hummel, op. cit., p. 68.

³Cf. Ljungman, op. cit., pp. 40-42.

⁴Matthew, according to Schweizer, took over the tradition from the early Church, where it had been used as a defense for the binding nature of the Law, and interpreted it: "...Daß diese immer dauerende Geltung des Gesetzes bestehe, 'bis alles geschieht.' Dabei geht es ihm keineswegs mehr um das Weiterbestehen der Einzelgebote wie seiner Tradition; sondern um die weit grundsätzlichere Frage, ob und wie das Gesetz als ganzes eine Erfüllung gefunden habe," op. cit., p. 404.

⁵Schweizer, op. cit., pp. 402ff., "Als der Bringer dieses neuen Gebotes, das das ganze Gesetz in sich enthält, enthüllt sich Jesus in den folgenden Abschnitten als der Erfüller des Gesetzes und der Propheten." Matthew understood that "...Jesus habe Gesetz und Propheten zur Erfüllung gebracht. Nun aber nicht so, daß sein Leben und Sterben das von ihnen Geforderte im Gehorsam 'erfüllt;' sondern so, daß er der Bringer der neuen Tora ihr erfüllendes Ziel darstellt."

fulfills the Law and Prophets, he can take the "radical statements" of vss. 21ff. in stride without fear of a contextual contradiction.¹ This approach, although being in harmony with the larger context of Matthew 5, is still entangled in the serious temporal contradiction between the two ἐως-clauses in 5:18 itself.²

Furthermore, one might legitimately question Schweizer's explanation of the phrase, πάντα γενῆται. Whereas this may well have to do with Matthew's concept of the "fulfillment" of the Old Testament prophecies,³ it is quite dubious whether such "fulfillment" is accomplished either by the "love-commandment" or in Jesus' bringing of a new commandment. On the one hand, while the Golden Rule is given in 7:12f. as the equivalent of the Law and the Prophets and in 22:37-40 the "love-commandment" is given as the hermeneutical principle for the Old Testament, neither here nor anywhere else in Matthew are they cited as "the fulfillment of the Law and the Prophets."⁴ Such a usage would not only be foreign to Matthew's usage of "fulfill" in terms of the Old Testament prophecies, but it would also be contrary to Schweizer's own interpretation of Matthew's usage of πληροῦν.⁵ On the other hand, this raises the question whether Jesus could be considered by Matthew as fulfilling the Law and the Prophets by bringing a new commandment. Is it not this very impression which would imply that the Law is no longer valid that Matthew is attempting to combat in 5:17-20?

¹Ibid., p. 405, "Eben das ist die 'bessere Gerechtigkeit,' die in den folgenden Versen verkündigt wird und die in der Gemeinde Jesu 'geschieht.' So setzt sich das Gesetz und Propheten zur Vollendung dringende Tun des Messias in seiner Gemeinde fort. Wo das geschieht, da wird kein einziges Gebot aufgelöst--es findet ja hier seine 'Erfüllung'--und doch sind so radikale Sätze möglich, wie sie in vss. 21ff. stehen."

²Schweizer escapes the contradiction by considering 5:18b, c, to have been merely a postulate of the Law's binding validity--even to its smallest details. As we saw above (pp.234f), however, this statement does contain a significant temporal limitation.

³Schweizer, op. cit., p. 400.

⁴Hummel, op. cit., p. 68, 98ff.

⁵Schweizer, op. cit., p. 400, "Immer ist dabei πληροῦν zu verstehen als 'Zur Erfüllung bringen' immer sind die Prophetenworte Objekt des 'Erfüllens,' immer erfolgt diese 'Erfüllen' innerhalb des Lebens und Sterbens Jesu." "... πληροῦν (5:17) was es an allen anderen Stellen bedeutet: (heilsgeschichtlich) 'zur Erfüllung bringen,' nämlich durch das kommen Jesu."

A third approach accepts the subordinate function of the second $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clause and recognizes the "contradictory" element for what it is--an intentional contrast between the two $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clauses. In order to explicate this contrast one must begin again with the meaning of the phrase-- $\epsilon\omega\varsigma \alpha\nu \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\tau\alpha\iota$.

The phrase itself occurs only one other time in Matthew, and there it is definitely taken over from the Marcan parallel by both Matthew and Luke.¹ Although this passage in Mt. 24:34 par. has provided several exegetical headaches as to its source and interpretation, it seems most clear that the $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clause refers to the final eschatological consummation.² It is also conceivable that 24:34 par. had some influence on the presence of 5:18d, but, as discussed above, it is quite improbable that 5:18d was intended to have the same meaning as 24:34.³ Is there not another clue which could aid in understanding both the clause and why it was used in 5:18?

Perhaps a closer examination of $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\tau\alpha\iota$ and $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ will resolve the problem. It has been noted that $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ has a special flavor at times in the New Testament usage in the sense of a coming to pass of events which were spoken of (or written of) before.⁴ This appears to be certainly the case for Matthew. In three other passages

¹Matthew 24:34 // Mk. 13:30 // Lk. 21:32. The Marcan text does read $\mu\epsilon\chi\upsilon\varsigma \omicron\upsilon$ instead of $\epsilon\omega\varsigma \alpha\nu$ as in Luke and Matthew. This is purely a matter of form since the content is the same. It could be explained either in that Matthew and Luke by following the form of this saying (cf. p. 232), substituted the more frequently used $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ or that the $\mu\epsilon\chi\upsilon\varsigma \omicron\upsilon$ represents a textual corruption (in $\chi, \psi; D, W, \Theta, \lambda, \Phi$, all have $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$). The first is the more likely since $\mu\epsilon\chi\upsilon\varsigma \omicron\upsilon$ is the more difficult to explain.

²Cf. Kümmel, Verheißung, pp. 14f.

³See discussion above, pp. 238f.

⁴See Ljungman for a thorough treatment of this, op. cit., pp. 54-56.

he uses the phrase τοῦτο (ὅλον) γέγονεν in conjunction with πληρώω to express that this (entire) event has come to pass in order that what was spoken by the prophet(s) might be fulfilled.¹ Is it not then possible to consider 5:17 and 18 in the same manner? Does not the presence of all three elements in 5:17, 18² seem to be more than mere coincidence--particularly, since as we have suggested, these appear to be Matthean additions?

In turning back to 24:34 par., we discover the same use of γίνομαι --the coming to pass of what has been spoken of before. The coming to pass of "all things" speaks with an eschatological finality in terms of the culmination of this world. How could this have been fitted into 5:17, 18? The first ἕως -clause already contains the thought of 24:34 par. Since the second ἕως -clause appears to be a Matthean addition and since it would have been senseless to have added a synonymous phrase which was not only disruptive in style but also in form,³ it must obviously offer a contrast to the former.⁴ The contrast lies in the different application of πάντα.

In view of the fact that both γίνομαι and πληρώω are brought together in a complementary relationship, πάντα must refer to all the events which were spoken of before in "the Law or the Prophets" and which came to pass and thus were fulfilled in Jesus' coming (5:17, 18). Therefore, the eschatological implications of 24:34 par. are brought over into 5:18 but in a different expression.

¹Mt. 1:22; 21:4; 26:56; cf. Schweizer, op. cit., pp. 399f.

²ἢ τοὺς προφῆτας, πληρῶσαι and πάντα γένηται.

³See Excursus III, pp. 295f.

⁴The only other solution left which has not been discussed is to relegate the second ἕως -clause to a later addition by another hand. But as Barth has pointed out (op. cit., p. 66), this would only be necessary if one exhausted the possibilities of understanding it from the Matthean origin.

Whereas the $\pi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha$ in 24:34 par. spoke of the coming eschatological consummation of "all things,"¹ the $\pi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha$ in 5:18 conditioned by its context refers to the eschatological fulfillment of "all things" in Jesus' coming. Thus the contrast between the two $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clauses involves the tension of the "noch nicht" but "schon jetzt" in Matthew's understanding of the eschatological fulfillment.

After having examined the meaning of 5:18d is it now possible to explain why it was added by Matthew? On the one hand, we found that the traditional material contained two elements: 18c--the main clause asserting the continuing validity of the whole Law and whose Sitz im Leben could have been just as well in Jesus' own ministry as in the primitive Church debates and 18b--the first subordinate $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clause which set a temporal limitation for the validity of the Law and whose Sitz im Leben could only have been in Jesus' teaching. Together both clauses asserted the Law's continued authority as a principle of this world which would only be terminated by the final consummation of heaven and earth, and they parallel in content the negative declaration behind 5:17.

On the other hand, Matthew also had in mind Jesus' own actions and teachings with reference to the Law (especially 5:21-48) which could only be explained in terms of the presence of the eschatological fulfillment in Jesus' own person. Therefore, since the second $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clause not only contained already certain eschatological implications from 24:34 par. but because it also fitted in with the positive statement of 5:17, Matthew could well have taken it over directly from his Marcan source and added it here in 5:18 to his tradition. In this way the two $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clauses would stand in a deliberate tension with one another and vss. 17 and 18 would represent

¹Cf. W. G. Kümmel, Promise and Fulfillment (Eng. trans., 1961), pp. 59f.

parallel concepts (17b=18bc; 17c=18d).¹

In summary, therefore, we have present in 5:18 a phenomenon quite similar to that in 5:17. Fortunately, we have a material parallel here in Lk. 16:17, most probably a transmissional variant, which enables us to see more clearly where the traditional and the redactional lines run. As in 5:17 (tradition) 5:18 presents a saying which confirms the enduring validity of the Law as a legal principle for this world. The Sitz im Leben for the saying could well have been Jesus' own ministry, and it was then preserved in two different traditional forms. This also raises the question if 5:17 and 5:18 in view of their similarity could not have been transmitted together as a unit. Having an "authentic" saying such as 5:18 would naturally have raised questions about Jesus' coming and the Law. This could have given rise to 5:17 as a preface for the saying in 5:18, or, and this is not to be discounted so readily, 5:17 might also reflect a saying whose Sitz im Leben stems from Jesus' own ministry and questions at that time about his relationship to the Law. Taken together they could well have been used (not necessarily created) in the disputes of the primitive Church (cf. below, 5:19).

For Matthew these sayings both had a positive element. On the one hand, both pointed out the enduring character of the Law for this world. That such was still important for Matthew is seen by the way he handles his material. Rather than simply dropping these elements in order to add his own, Matthew has inserted his additions even at the cost of smoothness and the format of his

¹Hasler, op. cit., pp. 9f., also sees two different elements in these two verses. However, these represent for him the two perspectives from which Matthew viewed Jesus as the heilsgeschichtliche fulfillment through his life and death and as the Law-abiding Jew. These two stand for Hasler unrelated and side by side in Matthew.

tradition. The evangelist was also concerned about that the Law as a legal principle was also set aside in Jesus' coming, in the coming to pass of all things. On the other hand, his additions in both 5:17 and 5:18 fit together by showing that Jesus' coming represents the eschatological fulfillment of what was spoken about in the scriptures. Just as the traditional element pertaining to the Law in vs. 17 was modified in terms of Jesus' relationship to "the Law or the Prophets," so the traditional element pertaining to the Law in vs. 18 was modified in terms of the coming to pass of all things. Together with 5:17 "all things" reflect to the eschatological fulfillment in Jesus' coming of that which was promised by the Old Testament for the Heilszeit.

Instead of being contradictory to the traditional element or historical subsequent to it, both elements stand in the tension of the eschatological Schon-jetzt in the eschatological fulfillment of Jesus' person and ministry and the Noch-nicht of the coming consummation of "this world." Therefore, for Matthew, as we saw in the Antitheses, the Law continues to be a valid legal principle for this world. Yet it is, at the same time, transcended and set aside by Jesus' own demand for conduct representative of the present age of salvation.

§3. "The Least of These Commandments:" 5:19

The various evaluations of 5:19 have almost unanimously favored an earlier source rather than a Matthean construction.¹ This is borne out both in its content²

¹Two exceptions are Maier, F. W., Die drei ältesten Evangelien (1912), p. 135 and McNeile, Matthew, p. 60. The latter hints at a possibility that this may have been a gloss.

²Schürmann, "Wer daher eines dieser geringsten Gebote auflöst..." BZ, n. f. 4(1960), 238f., notes that such a strict concept of the Law was modified by Matthew

and form.¹ The major question, however, centers around the mode of its transmission: a) in conjunction with 5:18,² b) together with 5:17 and 5:20 as a part of M,³ or c) as a single logion whose source is no longer discernable.⁴ Evidence supporting the last approach is often found in the disparity between vss. 18 and 19 or in the absence either of an antecedent for *TOÚTWV* or of a parallel to vs. 19 in Lk. 16:17f.⁵ Since, therefore, the traditionsgeschichtliche question is so involved with the exegesis, it is perhaps the easier once again to return to this both during and after the exegesis.

in 5:17 and 20, as well as in the Antitheses which follow. In addition to this, one might add that all the editorial work so far has been in another direction (cf. above on 5:17, 18d).

¹Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 111, points out that the form of this saying "...ein relativistischer Vordersatz, der die Bedingung, ein futuristischer Nachsatz, der den Lohn nennt...", is quite similar to the Jewish wisdom sayings as seen in the latter Psalms and Talmud. This form is also to be found in the various traditional elements of the Synoptics. Cf. for example (Marcan) Mark 8:35 par. and (Q) Lk. 17:33 // Mt. 10:39 (Matthew, it should be noted, changes the relative clause by using participial constructions!).

²Bultmann, Tradition, p. 146f.; Schürmann, BZ, n. f., 4(1960), 240ff.; Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 182; and G. Barth, op. cit., p. 62f.

³Streeter, Four Gospels, p. 256 and Manson, Sayings, p. 154; Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 25f., considers it to be from M, but originally in another context.

⁴McNeile, Matthew, p. 90; J. Jeremias, "Zur Hypothese einer schriftlichen Logienquelle Q," ZNW, 29(1930), p. 148, n. 2; Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 110; Schniewind, Matthäus, pp. 53, 56; Knox, op. cit., p. 67 (from Matthew's New Christian Torah Source), Strecker, op. cit., p. 145; and Hummel, op. cit., p. 67.

⁵Cf. Lohmeyer, Matthäus, pp. 110f.; Strecker, op. cit., p. 145 and Hummel, op. cit., p. 67.

A. The Protases

This saying is composed of two type-III conditional clauses which occur in a dual relationship--negative and positive. It is connected with the preceding verse by the conjunction $\text{o}\tilde{\text{o}}\nu$. Although the use of this conjunction to combine two different traditional elements has been cited as being particularly Matthean,¹ this does not necessarily deprive the particle of its inferential function.² Neither is it a definite indication of the isolated transmission of 5:19, since $\text{o}\tilde{\text{o}}\nu$ is present within "Q" material on two other occasions in the Sermon.³ In either event, $\text{o}\tilde{\text{o}}\nu$, as an inferential particle, serves to combine vs. 19 with vs. 18 as a logical inference from what has preceded. Thus, 5:19 must be considered in close relationship with the thought of 5:18.

Turning to the protases of the conditional clauses, the first is the negative statement: "Whoever sets aside ($\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\eta$)...and teaches ($\delta\delta\acute{\alpha}\xi\eta$) men so." With its apodosis this clause sets forth a warning against both annulling the Law and teaching others to do the same. The parallel element is the positive: "Whoever does ($\pi\omega\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\eta$) and teaches ($\delta\delta\acute{\alpha}\xi\eta$)." Significantly, the contrast is not between what one teaches and what one does,⁴ but rather is between the verbs $\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\omega$ and $\pi\omega\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\omega$ with the corresponding $\delta\delta\acute{\alpha}\xi\eta$ of each.⁵ Both $\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\eta$ and

¹Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 110; Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 180.

²The new element combined by Matthew stands almost always in an inferential relationship to the preceding: e.g. 5:23, 48; 6:2, 8, 9, 31; 7:24 within the Sermon.

³Cf. 6:23 // Lk. 11:35 and 7:11 // Lk. 11:13.

⁴In contrast to 23:3 and the accusation against the Scribes and Pharisees, cf. S.-B., I, 910f. for Jewish parallels to 23:3.

⁵The forms of $\delta\delta\acute{\alpha}\xi\eta$ have become suspect as editorial additions because of Matthew's tendency to place the disciples along side the Scribes (cf. Schürmann, BZ, n. f., 4(1960), 242). Whether this is so or

ποιήσῃ have to do with the Law from its legal perspective, in keeping with 5:18bc. This leads then to the discussion of the direct object--μῶν τῶν ἐντολῶν τούτων τῶν ἐλαχίστων.

Much of the debate over the origin of vs. 19 has centered around the grammatical antecedent for the demonstrative τούτων.¹ The answer, however, may be found in another usage of τούτων in which no definite grammatical antecedent is present and the demonstrative function is more adjectival than pronominal. In each of these instances the antecedent is indirectly supplied by the physical or logical context of the saying.² Such could very well be the case in 5:19. While (ἰὼτα ἐν ᾧ) μία κεραία may not be capable of functioning as a direct grammatical antecedent because of difference in literal meaning,³ it could most easily function indirectly along with νόμος to give a logical contextual

not is impossible to prove with finality. However, except for 28:20 the verb only occurs in the ministry of Jesus in Matthew. For him to have added it with reference to the disciples at only this place previous to the Great Commission needs more support.

¹On the one hand there are those who finding no definite antecedent in 5:18 contend that 5:19 is either a single logion or taken from another context: Cf. Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 110; Soiron, Bergpredigt, p. 239; Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 17, 25f.; and Hummel, op. cit., p. 67.

On the other hand, those who find ἰὼτα ἐν ᾧ μία κεραία to be the antecedent content that 5:19 was closely bound up with 5:18 and a part of "Q:" Cf. Zahn, Matthäus, p. 218 and Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 41 for grammatical considerations; Ljungman, op. cit., pp. 48f.; Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 181, n. 82, and Schürmann, BZ, n. f., 4(1960), 241.

²Mt. 3:9 // Lk. 3:8--physical context supplied the antecedent. Mt. 25:40, 45--logical context supplied the antecedent and neither of these could be single logions!

³Cf. F. Dibelius, ZNW, 11(1910), p. 188--whereas the former refers to the smallest conceivable calligraphic elements, τούτων refers to "these commandments."

antecedent for ἐντολῶν τούτων.¹ The figurative import of the (ἰσὺς ἐν ᾧ) μίκα κεραία ... ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου is the same as ἐντολῶν τούτων τῶν ἐλαχίστων.² They both represent the elements of the Law which cannot and must not perish, even though for some these might appear the most dispensable. Therefore, vs. 19 is intricately related to vs. 18 as the literal explication (5:19) of its (5:18) figurative implications.

Such a relationship to 5:18 might be the essential clue to determining the history of tradition behind 5:19. It is quite obvious from the demonstrative pronoun τούτων that the saying was not transmitted without a context. Yet the fact that it does not fit smoothly into its present context suggests that it was not developed together with 5:17f. In content both 5:17 and 5:18 have centered primarily on the enduring validity of the Law as a legal principle, whereas 5:19 appears to reflect more the early Church debates over which Laws ("the least of these commandments" cf. e.g., the struggles of those around James in Acts and Gal. 2 concerning the ceremonial law, etc.) one was to keep. In form, the

¹The Law which is in question in 5:18 sets up a legal context. The sudden presence of ἐντολή should not be disturbing since the Law was comprised of commandments and as Schlatter has noted the interchange of the terms is also present in Josephus (Matthäus, p. 157).

²Although there is no evidence that the rabbis used the terms "great" and "small" with reference to the various commandments, it is certain that they ordered them by degrees and for various reasons (cf. S.-B., I, 901). This differentiation seems most logical as a background for 5:19. The choice of "ἐλάχιστος," however, may have been original to the saying. The reason for its usage here could have been either the influence of the figurative element behind (ἰσὺς ἐν ᾧ) μίκα κεραία (Schürmann, BZ, n. f., 4(1960), 242) or the play on terms as seen in the correspondence between "least in the Kingdom" and "least of these commandments" (cf. Dalman, op. cit., p. 60). To assert one or the other exclusively or to attempt to explain which was the "smallest commandment" would go beyond our evidence.

saying has the more impersonal indefinite relative construction and possibly reflects the form of an early Christian legal ordinance.¹ Nevertheless, neither of these considerations would rule against this verse being developed as a commentary to 5:18.² The point of interest was deliberately shifted from the enduring validity of the Law to focus attention on the "literal" exposition of a "figurative" expression used to convey the principle of the Law's validity (5:18c-- *μία κεραία ... ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου*). This context might also be supported by the play on words between *καταλύω/λύω*³ and *πληροῶ/ποιέω*. If, as we saw above, the traditional form of 5:17 contained *πληρῶσαι* with the meaning of "to establish by doing" as in 3:15, then *ποιήσῃ* would be but another way of expressing this.⁴ Therefore, the presence of 5:19 and its relationship to the preceding might well be an indirect indication of the traditional unity and earlier character of 5:17f. as well as its own dependent and secondary nature.

B. The Apodoses

In the apodoses--*ἐλάχιστος / μέγας κληθήσεται ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ*--one has given the consequent rank in the Kingdom corresponding to one's stance with reference to the Law. Such a discussion of rank in the Kingdom is

¹Cf. most recently, E. Käsemann, "Anfänge christlicher Theologie," Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, II, 83.

²Cf. Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 183, n. 87.

³The *λύω* is reminiscent of *καταλύσαι* in 5:17. Although there is a difference between the simple and compound forms, the meanings are both well attested as being the same with reference to the Law (cf. Bauer, op. cit., ad loc.). One may find in the compound a stronger expression of the two, but both mean "to repeal, annul" or "to abolish." Schlatter notes (Matthäus, p. 157) that Josephus uses both interchangeably.

⁴Cf. discussion by Braun, II, 30, n. 1. E.g. 3:15 has *πληρῶσαι δικαιοσύνην* whereas 6:1 has *ποιεῖν δικαιοσύνην*.

not foreign to the account of Jesus' ministry.¹ In each of these instances the way to being "first" is by being "last,"² to being "great" is by being a "servant,"³ and to being "greater" is by becoming as a "child."⁴ None, however, of these pre-conditions for status was meant to be a motivation--no more for trying to keep the Law as for trying to be last or to become as a child, but rather these were simply declarations that the way to a higher rank in the Kingdom is the reverse of that which one might expect.

So it is with the Law. One's position in the Kingdom is not proportionate to his libertine relationship to the Law as though the Law were beneath him, but rather it is in proportion to his subjection to even the smallest commandment. Thus one sees that the Law even as a principle of "this world"⁵ does play a role for the Kingdom. One is not pressing the point too far in limiting this role to merely the determining factor of one's position within the Kingdom and not of one's entrance into the Kingdom. The Law as seen in 5:19 is not to be considered as a principle of salvation. The "entrance requirement" is given in 5:20!

In summary, therefore, we again have a traditional element which in all probability was found together with the traditional complex of 5:17, 18 by Matthew. This verse, however, appears to be a secondary commentary to the preceding verses whose concern was for the observance of the whole Law. This in no way represents

¹On each of these occasions Jesus supports rather than refutes such a concept: 18:4; 20:16 // Mk. 10:31 // Lk. 13:30; 20:21, 23 // Mk. 10:37, 40; 20:26 // Mk. 10:43 cf. Lk. 22:26; Mk. 9:35 and Lk. 9:48b.

²Mt. 20:16 // Mk. 10:31 // Lk. 13:30.

³Mt. 20:26 // Mk. 10:43.

⁴Mt. 18:4.

a hope of salvation based on works, since the focus is on rank rather than entrance into the Kingdom. Matthew, contrary to his handling of 5:17f., has simply taken this over from his tradition without modifying the saying as such. Yet, as will be seen below, this saying has been modified compositionally by 5:20. Its presence in this complex is but another indication that the Law remained as a binding principle for this world. As such, it also had definite implications for the Christians whose existence was both of the Kingdom but in the world.

§4. "Unless Your Righteousness Exceed...." 5:20

The various literary analyses of 5:20 have covered the range of possibilities for a saying.¹ However, the decisive question appears to be whether this is a Matthean reworking of a traditional element or whether the saying is entirely a redactional product. A close examination of the terminology, form² and content of the

¹From Mt. (M): cf. Streeter, op. cit., p. 256; Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 25f.; Manson, Sayings, p. 153.
From Q: cf. hints by Schürmann, BZ, n.f., 4(1960), 243.

As an isolated saying with no indication of source-- Schniewind, Matthäus, pp. 53, 57; Soiron, Bergpredigt, pp. 243f.; Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 183 (cf. Lohmeyer, Matthäus, pp. 112ff.).

As a purely editorial creation: cf. Bultmann, Tradition, p. 161; Montefiore, Synoptic Gospels, I, 47; Barth, op. cit., p. 66 and Strecker, op. cit., pp. 151f.

²a) λέγω ὑμῖν : (Strecker, op. cit., p. 151) this is not an absolute editorial indication since Matthew has (apart from the Antitheses) 17 such phrases: eight are from his sources (five from Q and three from Mark) and two are λέγω changed to λέγει.

b) δικαιοσύνη --which occurs seven times in Matthew and once in Luke: 3:15; 5:6; 5:10; 5:20; 6:1; 6:33; 21:32; 1:75.

c) βασιλεῖα τῶν οὐρανῶν.

d) εἰς --sentence for the conditions of entrance and the plural subject are characteristic for Matthew, according to Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 112. Although this is valid on the basis of 5:20 and 18:3, it is not true for

saying suggest that it was the latter.¹ This will become clearer in the following exegesis.

A. "The Greater Righteousness"

In the structure of 5:20 one has another conditional sentence. This sentence occurring in the form of a future condition with ἐάν, instead of the indefinite relative construction as above² sets forth one of eleven so-called "entrance sayings" recorded by Matthew.³ Although the import of this verse has received much discussion, there are grammatical and lexical considerations which are above debate. Grammatically the hub of the conditional clause is the reinforced comparative construction of περιτεύνη...πλεον.⁴ Lexically this construction can only represent a quantitative and not a qualitative comparison.⁵ Therefore, since we have here

7:21. Neither an ἐάν-sentence nor a plural form is used in this case. However, behind the future condition of 18:3 could possibly have been the indefinite relative condition of Mark 10:15 // Lk. 18:17.

¹Wrege, *op. cit.*, pp. 54f., has recently contended for a pre-Matthean tradition. His argument is based mainly on what he has termed a Semitic construction with δικαιοσύνη the comparative similar in form to Lk. 18:14f. However, this overlooks the difference in form as well as the meaning of δικαιοσύνη, both of which are typical for Matthew.

²Cf. 5:19. Not only does this make the statement more specific, it is also personalized by the resumption of the second person plural (cf. 5:17 and preceding).

³Six of these have to do with the "Kingdom of Heaven:" 5:20; 7:21; 18:3 (cf. Mk. 10:15 // Lk. 18:17); 19:23f. // Mk. 10:23f. // Lk. 18:24f. (twice) and 23:13.

Three refer to "Life:" 18:8 // Mk. 9:43; 18:9 cf. Mk. 9:47; 19:17 cf. Mk. 10:17 (Matthew has "enters," Mark and Luke have "inherit"). Two have to do with the "Joy of your Lord"--25:21, 23.

⁴This is seen not only by the syntactical construction but also in the somewhat redundant appearance of πλεον.

⁵Cf. usage as given by Liddell-Scott, *ad loc.*, and Bauer, *ad loc.* Some indeed have chosen the broader

a comparison and since this comparison can only be a quantitative one, there must be a posited common element by which the one group was to quantitatively differentiate itself from the other. According to Matthew, it was the difference in "righteousness."

B. "Righteousness"

This raises above all the question concerning the meaning of δικαιοσύνη for Matthew.¹ In general there is little question but that "righteousness" for Matthew meant "conduct in keeping with the will of God."² Such a general definition corresponds roughly to the Old Testament usage and has led Bornkamm to conclude that it "formally retains its Old Testament-Jewish meaning" of conduct in keeping with God's will made known in the Law.³ Strecker, after an extensive examination of the material, approximates Bornkamm's findings in his summary: "An sämtlichen behandelten Belegstellen bezeichnet δικαιοσύνη die ethische Haltung der Jünger, eine Rechtschaffenheit, wie sie der wesentliche Gegenstand der Forderung Jesu ist!"⁴ Furthermore, the term is not in any way to be understood "...als 'Gabe,' die dieser Forderung vorausginge."⁵ If one were to take the appearances of "righteousness" in Mt. 5:10, 20; 6:1 in isolation to their context--as Strecker has done--

implications of the verse rather than the lexical possibilities as their point of departure. Consequently, they have considered this more from the qualitative standpoint. Cf. Luther's translation of "better righteousness," Lohmeyer, op. cit., p. 113; Soliron, op. cit., p. 245; Ljungman, op. cit., pp. 93f.; and Michaelis, op. cit., p. 251.

¹Cf. Strecker, op. cit., pp. 150ff. for a thorough examination of the various occurrences.

²Cf. Schrenk, TWNT, II, 199f.

³Bornkamm, "End-expectation," p. 31.

⁴Strecker, op. cit., pp. 157f.

⁵Ibid., p. 158.

and use these as the basis from which to consider 5:6 and 6:33, such a conclusion would be definitely in order. However, does this not eliminate the very point of differentiation between Matthew's usage and that of Judaism?

To take 5:6¹ solely in the sense of those hungering and thirsting after ethical conduct divorced from all aspects of "Gabe" would be both contradictory to the immediate context as well as the thrust of 5:20, since its only subjects could then be the Scribes and Pharisees, the very ones to whom these verses do not apply! The intensification of the clause by the addition of ~~μεγαλει~~ indicates the desperate need and not merely a desire for conduct in keeping with the will of God.² The assuaging of this need, as the context of the Beatitudes implies, can only be seen in terms of the age of salvation. Yet in 5:10 it is this very conduct in keeping with the will of God which is the cause for persecution (conduct according to the Law would hardly have entailed persecution!). Thus the conduct and promise of the age of salvation is already here, as expressed by the present tense of the promise in vs. 10 which corresponds to that of vs. 3: "theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven."

This is borne out particularly by 5:20. Taken alone "the righteousness" of the Scribes and Pharisees most certainly reflects the conduct in keeping with the Law (cf. below), and a demand for a conduct which exceeds this would most naturally be but a demand for a greater doing of the Law. However, 5:20 cannot be

¹For our interest at this point only the five usages of δικαιοσύνη in the Sermon are pertinent. The two relating to John the Baptist, 3:15 and 21:32, could possibly be pre-Matthean. The variations between 21:32 and Lk. 7:29 may not be merely redactional (cf. Bultmann, Tradition, p. 177f., and Kilpatrick, Origins, p. 30. On 3:15 see p. 226.

²Goppelt, TWNT, VI, 18.

taken in isolation, particularly since it was composed and set as a preamble to the Antitheses which follow (see below). Therefore, the content of the will of God, the "righteousness which exceeds that of the Scribes and Pharisees" is to be found in the Antitheses. As we saw above, in each case, Jesus' demand called for a conduct which did not simply represent a "better keeping of the Law" but rather a radical demand for conduct which transcended and even set aside (cf. esp. the "Matthean" Antitheses, 5:31f., 38ff., 43ff.) the Law's demands. This was a conduct which not only was characteristic of the age of salvation but presupposed the presence of the latter in Jesus' person (5:17, 18d). The usage immediately following this context in 6:1 must be seen as directly related to the preceding. Whereas 5:20 set the stage for defining the content of the "greater righteousness," 6:1, also functioning as a summary introduction by the evangelist, sets forth how the conduct in keeping with the will of God is to be done.

In view of Matthew's handling of the four passages with δικαιοσύνη above, the last occurrence in the Sermon (6:33) takes on particular meaning. "Righteousness" appears in this context in conjunction with the possessive pronoun αὐτοῦ which obviously points back to πατρός in vs. 32. This would give us a somewhat "Pauline" form, "the righteousness of God." However, as seen in James 1:20,¹ this can be used in keeping with the other Matthean passages to mean conduct valid before God, i.e. conduct in keeping with the will of God.² Both Barth and Strecker see the relationship between the Kingdom and righteousness here to be comparable to that in 5:20. The latter is the "entrance requirement" to the former.³

¹Dibelius, Jakobus, pp. 141f.

²Cf. Barth, op. cit., p. 139; Strecker, op. cit., p. 155.

³Ibid.

This conclusion has no other basis than 5:20 itself. In other words, both take, as have numerous others, the negative statement of 5:20 and rework it positively to form a programmatic cause-effect or do ut des saying pertaining to entrance into the Kingdom. This corresponds to neither the content nor the intent behind 5:20 (cf. below). Instead of referring simply to 5:20, Matthew's usage of "righteousness" in 6:33 should be related to the previous four. In each case "righteousness" was that conduct in keeping with the will of God and characteristic of the age of salvation. Both were intimately related, not as cause and effect but as conjunctive. The conduct was both characteristic of and empowered by the Heilszeit. Therefore, it is also conceivable that 6:33 actually refers to the presence of the Kingdom which is expressed in the corresponding δικαιουσύνη.¹ If this were the case, then 6:33 would be but another example of the integral relationship between the Kingdom and the "Kingdom ethic."²

Therefore, δικαιουσύνη in Matthew must be seen above all as a particular conduct. However, it is a conduct which corresponds to the demand integral to the presence of the age of salvation. Both must be seen together. To this extent, it is comprised of both demand and gift, "gift" in that the demand for conduct only becomes a possibility in view of the Schon-jetzt

¹Cf. Strecker, op. cit., p. 155, who argues on the basis of the future usage in "Q" as well as the future concepts in the other Sermon usages (5:20; 6:10; 7:21). Neither argument is that weighty since Matthew definitely was adapting his tradition by the insertion of τῇ δικαιουσίᾳ (cf. Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 147, n.2). Whereas the other references pointed to the consummation of the Kingdom, Matthew's understanding of "righteousness" in chap. 5 would presuppose God's reign in Jesus' person (cf. Goppelt, TWNT, VI, 18). Cf. Schniewind, Matthäus, ad loc.

²These are not, however, synonymous or epexegetic, contra Trilling, op. cit., pp. 146f.

of the Heilszeit. Thus while sharing a formal similarity with the Jewish counterpart, Matthew has filled the form with new content.

C. "Than that of the Scribes and Pharisees"

What then is the force of 5:20? The comparison now becomes clear. For Matthew the "righteousness" of the Scribes and Pharisees is qualified from two standpoints, from the standpoint of 5:20-48 and from the standpoint of 6:1-18. In the first instance their righteousness is that of the Old Testament and Judaism, namely the fulfillment of the Law's legal demands. It is this "righteousness" which is seen in the premises of the Antitheses, in their concern about the Law as reflected in the Sabbath controversies (12:1-14) and in their concern for ceremonial cleanliness on the part of Jesus (9:9-13) and his disciples (15:1-9). In the second instance, this is a "righteousness" which is done out of the wrong motives (6:1; 23:5) and only on the "surface" (23:25f., 27f.). It was a "righteousness" whose characteristic was "hypocrisy" (6:2, 5, 16; 15:7; 22:18; 23:13, 14, 15, 23, 25, 27, 29; 24:51).

This was then countered by a demand for a "greater righteousness." As we saw, this was the "righteousness" characteristic of the age of salvation, the presence of the Kingdom in Jesus' person and ministry. The difference between the "righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees" and that of Jesus' demand is illustrated in the Antitheses. In view of this one might well ask if this does not represent a qualitative rather than a quantitative contrast. The answer to this is again a qualified yes and no. On the one hand, when viewed from the essential starting points they were qualitatively different. The one moves out from the Law as a legal principle of this world the keeping of which was to make one "righteous" and members of "True Israel," the recipients of God's salvation. The other moves out

from the presence of the age of salvation and demands a corresponding conduct. To this extent it was a "righteousness" different in kind to that of the Scribes and Pharisees. On the other hand, the evangelist constructed the comparison in 5:20 with view to its subjects, namely, the "righteous" of his day.¹ His thrust in 5:20 was to use them as a backdrop for the following Antitheses to show that their righteousness was insufficient. In keeping with his criticisms elsewhere of the Scribes and Pharisees, their righteousness and works of righteousness were only for show (6:1; 23:5; 23:25f., 27f.). This was inadequate since Jesus had demanded "wholeness" (5:48; 19:21) and conduct which issued from a "new heart" (15:11, 18ff.; 19:8f.).

As to the structural relationship with the previous, some have considered 5:20 to be separate from what preceded (5:17-19).² However, the use of *καὶ* and a thematic parallel in 18:3f. point to the contrary. Matthew frequently uses *καὶ* as a connecting link between what has preceded and what he is introducing into the text.³ As such, it seldom functions merely as a neutral introductory word; rather it generally serves to clamp what is being added to what has preceded. In this case what has preceded actually represented to an extent the goal of the Scribes and Pharisees, namely conduct and teaching which corresponded to the Law. This, in a Pauline phrase, was the "righteousness of the Law." Such conduct, however, according to 5:19 was relevant

¹As seen in the predication of them as "righteous" Mk. 2:17 // Mt. 9:13; Mt. 23:28 and Lk. 16:15. Paul himself when questioned concerning his relationship to the Law could summarize his impeccability by saying, "I was a Pharisee!" (Phil. 3:5)

²E.g. Bultmann, Tradition, p. 161 and Strecker, op. cit., p. 151.

³Cf. Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 112 and Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 183.

only with reference to rank in the Kingdom and had nothing to do with entrance. The "entrance requirement" was an even "greater righteousness."

Nevertheless these two verses are definitely related for Matthew. This is seen by the thematic parallel in 18:3f., a parallel which could also be the product of Matthew's handling of his sources and his composition.¹ The issue here in 18:3f. is also the question of rank in the Kingdom as well as the entrance requirement. In 18:3f. the question of greatness in the Kingdom (18:4) was only legitimate in view of the conversion in 18:3, the entrance requirement for the Kingdom. In a similar fashion, therefore, in 5:19f. the question of rank in the Kingdom must be understood in terms of the greater righteousness which was the condition for entering the Kingdom. In other words, whereas 18:4 presupposed the conversion of 18:3, so 5:19 presupposes the greater righteousness of 5:20. Therefore, it is not without significance that Matthew used $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu$ in 18:4--the inferential conclusion of 18:3 and $\gamma\alpha\rho$ in 5:20 as a ground or reason for 5:19. In view of the parallel with 18:3f. we can see that 5:19 and 5:20 were thematically related for Matthew. This means consequently, that the subject of rank in 5:19 was of importance to the evangelist and also that 5:20 was intended to be taken as an "entrance"-saying. That, however, 5:20 was not intended as a negative form of do ut des is seen by its relationship to 5:21-48. It simply set forth the requirement for entrance, a requirement whose content was explicated by the Antitheses and summarized by 5:48.

¹Whereas in 5:19 the question of rank appears to be the traditional element and 5:20 to be either an editorial construction or at least a strategic insertion, in 18:3, 4 the question of entrance could well be a reworking of Mark 10:15 par. and the question of rank is the editorial expansion.

§5. Summary: 5:17-20

By way of summary we have found in this complex a rather clearly defined traditional and redactional element. In the tradition 5:17 (tradition) opened the section with a saying pertaining to Jesus' coming and his relationship to the Law. This was followed by a saying in 5:18abc which pertained more explicitly to the question of the Law's continuing validity as a legal principle of this world. However, contrary to the Jewish understanding of the Law, a terminus ad quem was set for the Law. The third verse of the section varies in both style and theme from that of the previous two. The concern in 5:19 is with doing the whole Law as opposed to setting aside its lesser commandments. However, its close ties with 5:18 would seem to indicate that it was developed as a further explication of the figurative element used in 5:18 to express the Law's enduring validity and was transmitted in conjunction with it. This difference between 5:19 and 5:17, 18 would seem to indicate two different situations.

On the one hand, 5:17, 18 are both compatible in form and content and could have been handed down as a traditional unit. Both sayings could just as well reflect a situation in Jesus' earthly ministry as well as in the primitive Church. In fact, the terminal qualification of the Law in 5:18 would even suggest the probability of an "authentic" saying. Jesus' own relationship to the Law during his ministry could have given rise to the vital question about the Law among his followers as well as by his opponents. Furthermore, such sayings need not be contradictory to his own actions conflicting with the Law when one remembers that his relationship to the Law during his ministry was not a programmatic expression of the Law's annulment (a view which is contradicted by the primitive Church's own conduct toward the Law); rather it was a

demonstrable expression of the antithesis between the presence of the age of salvation in his person and the Law as both the legal principle of this world and the means by which one hoped to gain salvation. As a means of salvation the Law was set aside but not as the legal principle of this world (see below). On the other hand, 5:19 set in its own form could well reflect the disputes in the primitive Church over what, if any, commandments could be left behind. This, as noted, was not a matter of salvation but rather one of rank in the Kingdom. As a commentary on 5:18, it lends further support to the authenticity of the latter and reflects its use in the early Church's struggles over the issue of the Law.

For Matthew, however, this complex has taken on an entirely different meaning. In 5:17 we saw where he by inserting ἡ τοῦς προφηταῖς changed the emphasis of πληροῦται from referring specifically to the Law to referring in particular to Jesus' coming as the heils-geschichtliche fulfillment of the Old Testament scriptures. Therefore, the subject of Jesus' coming remains at the fore in 5:17 but its meaning has been modified to a christological viewpoint. This modification corresponds with the insertion of 5:18d which asserts that all things have come to pass, the age of salvation has already dawned. In conjunction with his reworking of 5:17, 5:18d now declares that "all things" have come to pass with Jesus' coming as the fulfillment of scripture. This dawning of the age of salvation in Jesus' coming also has implications for the Law. It simultaneously sets aside the Law (5:18acd!).

Nevertheless, Matthew's treatment of his tradition indicates that its basic theme remains, namely the enduring validity of the Law as a legal principle of this world. This is pointed out by the way in which he has modified his tradition as well as his leaving 5:19 intact. Had his modifications been the overriding

factor in this complex he could have substituted them rather than inserting them and causing such complexity in style and content. By handling the material as he has, the evangelist has intentionally set forth the antithetical tension between the Schon-jetzt (5:17, 18d) of the fulfillment which brings with it a demand for a "greater righteousness" (5:20-48) and the Noch-nicht (5:18b) of the coming consummation. The one brings with it a demand for a "greater righteousness" (5:20-48 which transcends and sets aside the demands of the Law for this world); the other sees the Law as the legal principle of this world which also is to be kept (5:18abc, 19 and the premises). It was just this antithesis which we found at the heart of the Antitheses.

As we have seen 5:17-19 is a unit in itself both from a standpoint of tradition and content. Matthew has, however, added a fourth element to the complex, namely, 5:20. As a saying on entrance into the Kingdom it is indirectly related to the thematic complement of rank in the Kingdom in 5:19, but its major function is to introduce the Antitheses of 5:21-48. Its content also betrays why the Antitheses were of such importance to Matthew. Whereas the evangelist concludes Jesus' public ministry with a discourse of judgment directed at the Scribes and Pharisees in view of their "hypocrisy," in view of the discrepancy between what they appear to be and what they are and want to be, he opens Jesus' ministry with a discourse in which a demand for "righteousness" exceeding that of the Scribes and Pharisees was set forth as the "entrance requirement" for the Kingdom. This "greater righteousness" was not a greater keeping of the Law but rather it was conduct in keeping with the age of salvation and set forth by Jesus' demand in the Antitheses. In contrast to a conduct which was only for "show" and which covered over the real character of the individual like "white-washed

sepulchures," Jesus was demanding a conduct which issued from a "new heart," from a new relationship between God and man characterized by "wholeness" (τελειος).

Therefore, by introducing the Antitheses in terms of Jesus' role as the fulfillment of scripture, as the Bringer of the age of salvation, 5:17-19 has set the stage for the actual demand for a "greater righteousness" demanded in 5:20 and set forth in 5:21-48. Taken together 5:17-48 set forth most explicitly Jesus' relationship to the Law as understood by Matthew. For him Jesus as the heilsgeschichtliche fulfillment of the Law and the Prophets brought neither a new law nor a better understanding or interpretation of the old but rather a demand which not only stood antithetically to the Law by transcending and superseding it but which also presupposed a new relationship between God and man, a relationship characteristic of the age of salvation already present in his person and work.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Our examination of the theme "Jesus and the Law" in Matthew has led us first of all into the question of Matthew's role as an evangelist. One of the most striking features has been the fact that in each of the sections pertaining to the subject a traditional element was involved. This demonstrates, in particular, that the writer was especially conscious of his responsibility to the traditional material concerning Jesus' earthly ministry and that he was not at liberty simply to create material at will. Nevertheless, this indebtedness to the tradition in no way implies that he was merely a passive transmittor of the tradition. Indeed, we have also found a clear redactional element which was the product of the evangelist's liberty to rearrange compositionally, to rework by expanding and curtailing as well as to restructure his tradition. It was from this redactional element that we have been able to discern several consistent patterns in the evangelist's understanding of Jesus' relationship to the Law.

The results of our examination of the material has been threefold. First and foremost, we have seen that the underlying principle to Matthew's understanding of the issues was christological. This was not only clear in Matthew's handling of the various questions concerning the Law but it is given most explicitly in his reworking of the traditional material in 5:17f. For Matthew Jesus came as the fulfillment of the Law and the Prophets, the one in whose person and work the promised age of salvation had dawned. Secondly, as the fulfillment of the promises of scripture Jesus also set forth a demand for conduct befitting the presence of the Heilszeit, the age in which man's hardness of heart would be removed and in which evil would be defeated. Such a demand would both run counter to and transcend the demand of the Law whose given was the power of evil.

This is seen, thirdly, in the portrayal of the Law.

Rather than being an integral complex of apodictic commands and legal ordinances, as was the case in both the Old Testament and Judaism, the Law has been depicted almost exclusively from the standpoint of a legal ordinance. Such a depiction of the Law arose from Jesus' own ministry in which he had set his own absolute demand also in the format of a legal ordinance. Set in such a format it served both to condemn anything less than the absolute demand, any attempt to seek a "righteousness according to the Law." Simultaneously, it was a summons to repentance and to conduct characteristic of and empowered by the presence of the Heilszeit. Consequently, the Law's validity was set in the eschatological tension between the Schon-jetzt and the Noch-nicht of the age of salvation. On the one hand, the Law seen from a legal standpoint had been at times transcended and at times set aside (5:21-48) in view of the fulfillment which had come in Jesus' person (5:17, 18d). On the other hand, the Law as the legal principle of this world was to remain in force until the final consummation (5:18bc).

The antithetical aspect characteristic of Jesus' relationship to the Law must be seen in this eschatological perspective. As such Jesus came neither as the Exponent of the Law by "establishing" it or by bringing a deeper and truer understanding of the Law's intent, nor did he come as the Bringer of a nova lex which was to historically supplant the Mosaic Law. The first suggestion fails to do justice to the deliberate antithetical framework of the Antitheses, whereas the second takes the format to be a literal historical antithesis rather than eschatological. Both, however, were correct

in seeing the premises as representative of the Old Testament Law as given to those of old. A third suggestion, which considers Jesus to be the true Interpreter of the Law for Matthew, not only fails to understand the character of the antitheses but also fails to reckon with the character of the premises. Matthew's understanding of the Antitheses differed from all three suggestions, as seen both by his reworking of the tradition in 5:17, 18 as well as in his own Antitheses constructed as material and formal parallels to those of his tradition.

The same applies to Matthew's role for the Church in his own day. By setting Jesus' demand in a deliberate and real antithesis to the Law as given by God to those of old, Matthew separates himself from the path leading to Ebionite Judaism. Jesus' demand was both radical and absolute which transcended and set aside the Law in its legal requirements. On the other hand, Jesus was not setting out a programmatic Law or a new law which was to supersede historically the old. This set in with Early Catholicism (Did. Barn., and Hermas). For Matthew Jesus' absolute demand was not a nova lex but rather a demand for conduct characteristic of the age of salvation. It was a demand for righteousness which issued from a new relationship between God and man, a relationship established by Jesus' person and work (cf. 5:20, 48 and 19:21).

In Jesus' relationship to the Law we see, above all, the occasion for Matthew's writing of the Gospel. Instead of simply developing an early Christian collection of ethical instruction or compiling mere catechetical material, the christological emphasis noted above indicates that Matthew is primarily concerned with bearing witness to Jesus' coming as the Messiah of Israel. This is supported by the deliberate arrangement of chaps. 5-7, 8-9 introduced by 4:23 and concluded by

9:35, an essential part of which is 5:17-48. Together these chapters demonstrate by means of Jesus' authoritative teaching along with his healing activity the presence of the promised Messiah. As Schniewind has put it, the Messiah of the word and the Messiah of deed (Matthäus, pp. 37, 106). Yet in spite of his particular interests Matthew was not arbitrary in his portrayal of Jesus but gave real concern to understand and to bring out the intent of his traditional material. In so doing he has superbly fulfilled the task of an "evangelist."

In transmitting a witness to Jesus as the Messiah of Israel, Matthew was also concerned with more than passively relating material for posterity. He also reworked and adapted the material for the kerygmatic needs of his congregation. In each aspect of Jesus' teaching regarding the Law, the Jewish religious leaders, usually as "the Pharisees," entered the Matthean scene as Jesus' bitter opponents. Such a consistent pattern no doubt reflects the opposition encountered by his congregation. Yet the tenor of the material indicates that a division had set in between his congregation and the Synagogue. The evangelist's concern was not one of conciliation or apology with reference to the opponents; rather it was invariably a note of condemnation (9:13; 12:5-7; 15:12ff.; 24:34f. cf. Mk.; Mt. 23). Nevertheless, their proximity to the congregation was such that Matthew could use them as the spring board for his material (cf. 5:20; 6:1-18; 23:1-12), and no doubt used the material to caution and to console those oppressed by question and concern in view of such opposition.

Matthew concludes his Gospel with the familiar and oft debated "Great Commission." Integral to this commission is the command to teach "all that I have commanded you." Does this not place the "Gospel" in

a different light? Was his intent "Σιδαχί" rather than "Κήρυγμα?" Without going into the extensive discussion, our examination of the material above has shown that even in matters concerning the Law Matthew's motives were basically that of an evangelist bearing witness to his Lord. Therefore, one should exercise caution about taking 28:18-20 as the starting point for interpreting the thrust of the Gospel.¹ This is to overlook a significant division between the Great Commission and the rest of the Gospel, namely, the Easter-event. As an evangelist bearing witness to Jesus' earthly ministry, Matthew set forth Jesus' demand as a radical summons to repentance in light of Jesus' person and work. It was a demand which led to personal commitment, to repentance, and to conversion. However, the order differs after the Easter-event. The act of salvation precedes the demand: "to go and disciple all nations," "to baptize," and then comes "to teach them all that I have commanded you." In this way Matthew concludes his "Gospel" by pointing once again to Jesus' demand. This demand is now expressly prefaced with what had been latent to his earthly ministry--"all authority has been given to me."

¹O. Michel, "Der Abschluß des Matthäusevangeliums," Ev. Theol. 10(1950-51), p. 21 and most recently by Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, pp. 21ff.

EXCURSUS I.

1. Lexical Studies in 5:22

Since the textual tradition involves lexical questions, certain clarifications must be made at the outset. One finds in 5:22 four much debated terms: κρείς, συνέκρινον, ῥακά and μωρός. The least debatable of these is ῥακά which is most plausibly explained as a transliteration of רִיק' = "empty-head."¹ "μωρός" which stands as parallel to ῥακά presents a more difficult case. There are at least four different explanations for this word: 1) a transliteration of the Hebrew-Aramaic קורא or קורא;² 2) the Greek word as a translation of ῥακά;³ 3) the Greek word μωρός familiar as a Greek loan word in the Midraschim;⁴ and 4) the Greek word μωρός as translation of a Semitic term--most probably the frequently occurring מושש.⁵

The first explanation lacks plausability not merely because there are no parallels for the invective usage of קורא,⁶ but also because the rabbinic parallels use the Greek word μωρός itself in transliteration as an explanation.⁷ The second possibility which posits μωρός as a translation of ῥακά not only is without parallel but the frequent occurrence of both ῥακά and מושש / μωρός

¹S.-B., I, 278f.; Dalman, Jesus-Jeschua, p. 71; Jeremias, TWNT, VI, 973ff.

²See Manson's interpretation below in note 4.

³K. Köhler, "Zu Matthew 5:22," ZNW, 19(1919), p.24.

⁴Allen, Matthew, p. 49; S.-B., I, 279f.; Manson, Sayings, pp. 155f. (who intimates that it might have taken on some moral coloring from the similar Hebrew-Aramaic terms--קורא, קורא).

⁵Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 169; Dalman, Jesus-Jeschua, p. 71; Percy, Botschaft, p. 125; Jeremias, TWNT, VI, 975.

⁶As an invective it occurs only one time in the OT, Num. 20:10 (LXX= ὁ ἀπειθεὶς) and in the Midraschim in Pe sig 118 (probably in reference to Num. 20:10) and NuR 19 (186b) in reference to Num. 20:10--S.-B., I, 279f. The fact that the Midrashim attempted to explain its usage in Num. 20:10 indicates that it was unusual in such a context.

⁷In Pe sig 118^b and NuR 19 (186^b) the Greek μωρός (קורא), is brought into the context as an explanation for קורא. Thus since the occurrence of קורא as a term of insult is so limited and always in reference to μωρός, it hardly seems possible that μωρός in 5:22 could be a transliteration.

as invectives in Jewish literature¹ makes this highly improbable. As will be seen below there is little to substantiate this from the history of the tradition.² A choice between the third and fourth explanation is purely academic since the meaning of $\mu\tau\alpha\sigma$ would be the same in either case.³ Since the Greek $\mu\tau\alpha\sigma$ was familiar in rabbinic circles in transliteration, there is a remote possibility that it was so used in the tradition of 5:22. However, in view of the frequent occurrence of $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$ as an invective⁴ and since $\mu\tau\alpha\sigma$ and $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$ share the same meaning ("stupid, fool"),⁵ it would seem more reasonable to posit $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$ behind $\mu\tau\alpha\sigma$ as a Semitic parallel to $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$. This gains further support since the transliterated $\mu\tau\alpha\sigma$ ($\mu\tau\alpha\sigma$) occurs only in conjunction with $\mu\tau\alpha\sigma$ as a deliberate play on words in the rabbinic sources.⁶

¹ See below for the usage of the latter in Jewish sources.

² See pp. 278ff.

³ This is explicit in Midr. Ps. 9 §16 (46^a) and Midr. KL Einl. 31, cf. S.-B., I, 280. It is implicit in the text of Pe siq 178^b: "Was heißt גורו? In griechisch sagt man zu einem Dummen $\mu\tau\alpha\sigma$, גורו. Einmal begegnete es ihm, daß er ihn dumm (einen Narren גורו = $\mu\tau\alpha\sigma$) nannte. Da sprach der König zu ihm; 'Ich selbst habe dir befohlen: "Du sollst mein Sohn nicht einen Narren heißen," und du hast ihn doch einen Narren genannt; es ist nicht angängig, daß ein Kluger mit einem Dummen , einhergeht.'" S.-B., I, 279 for translation. גורו is interpreted through the Greek usage of $\mu\tau\alpha\sigma$ which is the same as the Aramaic $\mu\tau\alpha\sigma$. This is further supported by NuR 19 (186^b); "Was heißt גורו? Num. 20:10? Es bedeutet: 'Widerspenstige,' כרבוני; aber auch 'Narren' שוטין; denn so nennt man in den (griechisch redenden) Seestädten die Narren $\mu\tau\alpha\sigma$,", S.-B., I, 280, for translation.

⁴ Jeremias, TWNT, VI, 975; S.-B., I, 280. "Das gewöhnliche Schimpfwort ist שוטו, aramaisch שטא."

⁵ See n. 3.

⁶ Cf. Percy, Botschaft, pp. 125f. As the sources cited above demonstrate, גורו is actually expanded to cover the meaning of $\mu\tau\alpha\sigma$ through the usage of the transliterated גורו. Thus Manson's suggestion (see note 4 on p. 271) that $\mu\tau\alpha\sigma$ may have taken on some color from גורו/גורא is not tenable. Rather it was just the opposite.

Although a difference between $\delta\alpha\kappa\acute{\alpha}$ and $\mu\omega\rho\acute{\epsilon}$ has often been sought, it is difficult to limit the actual connotation of $\mu\omega\rho\acute{\epsilon}$ to either an intellectual or moral realm. The most frequent usage in the LXX,¹ Intertestamental literature,² and the New Testament³ is in an antithetical parallelism with wisdom or understanding indicating that a certain noetic incapacity was involved = "stupidity, lack of wisdom." Since this is the same emphasis present in $\chi'\omega\omega$, $\mu\omega\rho\acute{\epsilon}$ would reflect the weight of this emphasis as its translation. Nevertheless, an element of moral irresponsibility is also inherent to $\mu\omega\rho\acute{\epsilon}$ resulting from the incapacity to understand and to comprehend divine action on one's behalf = "fool."⁴ Therefore one cannot choose to stress the one side of the coin at the expense of the other.⁵ Thus the differentiation between $\delta\alpha\kappa\acute{\alpha}$ and $\mu\omega\rho\acute{\epsilon}$ loses its decisiveness. Whereas one may say that $\delta\alpha\kappa\acute{\alpha}$ speaks more of one's intellectual incapacity and $\mu\omega\rho\acute{\epsilon}$ more of one's moral irresponsibility before God, in essence both words actually overlap in meaning to a certain extent. The difference, if any, would only be one of degree.

Recently the usage of $\sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\delta\iota\omicron\nu$ in 5:22b has come up for discussion. Instead of the more commonly accepted term for the highest governing body of the Jews in Jerusalem which functioned both as a council and at times as a court,⁶ Manfred Weise has suggested an entirely different background for the usage here. He has sought to discover a parallel between the Levitic curse as seen in its particular manifestation in Qumran (1QS 1:18-2:8 and CD 2:5-6; 8:1-2) and the church discipline practiced in the primitive Church. In both cases, according to Weise, a council of the community was authorized to excommunicate. This council then was

¹Deut. 32:16 ($\delta\alpha\kappa\acute{\alpha}$), Psa. 93:8 ($\chi'\omega\omega$), Isa. 19:11 ($\chi'\omega\omega$), Jer. 5:21 ($\delta\alpha\kappa\acute{\alpha}$).

²Sirach 16:23; 21:14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 26; 22:7, 8, 11, 14 etc.

³Mt. 7:26; 25:2; I Cor. 1:15, 27; 4:10.

⁴Cf. Isa. 19:11; 32:4f.; Sirach 22:12; Mt. 23:17.

⁵This goes both ways, particularly for those who tend to overemphasize the moral connotations. Not only is this meaning less attested than the former but as a translation of $\chi'\omega\omega$ the former would be predominant.

⁶Dalman, Jesus-Jeschua, p. 67; S.-B., I, 257; Lohse, TWNT, VII, 865. See commentaries on 5:22.

the $\tau\eta\eta\ \text{ΝΙΧΥ} / \sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\delta\rho\iota\omicron\nu$.¹

His major argument in support of this conclusion is the witness of the Syrian Church. First of all, Ignatius uses $\sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\delta\rho\iota\omicron\nu$ explicitly of the Apostles and their successors--the elders. Secondly, the two Syriac versions use $\sigma\upsilon\nu\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta = \epsilon\kappa\kappa\lambda\eta\tau\iota\alpha$ rather than $\sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\delta\rho\iota\omicron\nu$ for 5:22b. Thirdly, the Didaskalia paraphrases 5:22, "If one has called a layman a fool or vile ($\delta\alpha\upsilon\lambda\acute{\alpha}$), he shall be condemned by the 'synagogus' as one of those who raises up against Christ...."²

Even should one grant Weise his argument from the Syrian texts, his argument is far from conclusive.³ Not only is there no parallel for $\tau\eta\eta\ \text{ΝΙΧΥ} / \sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\delta\rho\iota\omicron\nu$, but this fails to take into account the New Testament usage of $\sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\delta\rho\iota\omicron\nu$. The term occurs seven times in the Synoptics⁴ (five of which refer directly to the Sanhedrin of Jerusalem) and fourteen in Acts.⁵ (All

¹M. Weise, "Mt. 5:21f.--ein Zeugnis Sakraler Rechtssprechung in der Urgemeinde," ZNW, 49(1958), p. 117. He is followed in this conclusion by Wrege, op. cit., pp. 65f.

²The Didaskalia Apostolorum (Eng. trans. 1907) ad loc.

³Even should the Syrian churches have interpreted 5:22b in terms of primitive Church discipline, this need not be a proof that the Syrian Church was merely reflecting strains of an earlier "Übergaberitus" (p. 121). This could merely be an indication of their attempt to implement vs. 22 legalistically in keeping with Mt. 18:18. Their recourse had to be the local "churches" rather than a "sanhedrin!" (This certainly appears to be the case in the Didascalia.) If, however, this had been a carry over from the primitive Church's practice seen in 5:22b with $\sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\delta\rho\iota\omicron\nu$, and since Ignatius also was familiar with the term $\sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\delta\rho\iota\omicron\nu$, there would have been little reason to substitute $\sigma\upsilon\nu\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta$ for $\sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\delta\rho\iota\omicron\nu$! As it now stands, the evidence is self-contradictory. Ignatius refers, according to Weise, to a $\sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\delta\rho\iota\omicron\nu$ in the sense of a special group (Apostles and successors--"Elders") as "τῆς ἡγίας," and the Syrsin. cur. pesch. and the Didascalia to Mt. 5:22 have $\sigma\upsilon\nu\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta$ in the sense of the Christian community as the $\tau\eta\eta\ \text{ΝΙΧΥ}$. On the one hand, $\sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\delta\rho\iota\omicron\nu$ maintains its normal meaning of a special authoritative council; on the other hand this term is dropped for the equivalent of $\sigma\upsilon\nu\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta$ connoting, according to Weise, the "Vollmacht der Gemeinde," a meaning which it normally would not have!

⁴Mt. 5:22; 10:17 // Mk. 13:9; 26:59 // Mk. 14:55; Mk. 15:1; Lk. 22:66.

⁵Acts 4:14; 5:21, 27, 34, 41; 6:12, 15; 22:30;

are in reference to the Sanhedrin in Jerusalem.) Furthermore, whereas there may be a slight material parallel between the dismissal of a member from the Qumran community and the dismissal of a member of the Christian community, the all important link is missing. As Weise notes, in Qumran this is accomplished through the "Rat der Gemeinde" = $\text{רַתְּ דֵּר גִּמְעִינָה}$ (1QS 8:5-7 as in Israel this duty fell to the tribe of Levi).¹ In the New Testament, the picture varies between the Church itself (Mt. 18:15-18; I Cor. 5:1ff.) and one particular apostle (Peter, Mt. 16:19 and I Tim. 1:20). In no place, however, do we have a reflection of a "Rat der Gemeinde" or a special council such as implied by συμβούλιον .² Thus there seems to be no reason why συμβούλιον should not be taken as before in reference to the highest Jewish tribunal in Jerusalem.

Whereas $\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma$, $\delta\alpha\kappa\acute{\epsilon}$, and συμβούλιον are key terms for the much debated clauses of 5:22bc, $\kappa\rho\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota$ was without doubt a constituent element of the original anti-thesis. Its occurrence in 5:21f. has commonly been translated by "judgment," but more recently several commentators have used "local court" in an attempt to bring verse 22a into line with 22b.³ Both translations leave something to be desired. The latter suggestion of "law court" is lexically foreign to either Classical or New Testament Greek⁴ and thus improbable for 5:21f. The former suggestion of "judgment" is too imprecise in view of the inherent ambiguity of $\kappa\rho\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota$ itself, as well as its Old Testament counterpart-- שָׁפַט .⁵ Both

23:1, 6, 15, 20, 28--each time it is "the Sanhedrin in Jerusalem" involved in a court scene. Here Luke leaves the reference to the legal body in Jerusalem, whereas in his Gospel (12:11 and 21:12) he deletes the reference to the smaller συμβούλιον of the Diaspora. Most probably this was in consideration for his non-Jewish audience. (cf. Strobel, "Zum Verständnis von Rm. 13," ZNW (1956), p. 73.)

¹Weise, op. cit., pp. 117f.

²In John 20:20f. the disciples as a group receive authority. It is not, however, as a "council" for the Christian community, cf. p. 282 n. 1.

³S.-B., I, 275; Percy, Botschaft, p. 125; Filson, Matthew, p. 85.

⁴Liddell, Scott and Jones, ad loc.; Bauer, ad loc. (with the exception of Mt. 5:21f.); Jeremias, TWNT, VI, 975.

⁵ $\kappa\rho\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota$ translated שָׁפַט nearly 150 times in the LXX.

expressions have both a concrete meaning of a judicial "sentence," which is the more frequent, and an abstract usage meaning a judicial "process," i.e. the "trial" or "court proceedings" leading to a decision.¹ Is it, however, possible to distinguish between these usages here in 5:21f.?

Turning first to the construction ἐν ὄχῳ with the dative, an examination of this prepositional phrase reveals that while not present in the New Testament or LXX, it is attested by both papyri² and Classical Greek as a dative of penalty.³ Such a usage could have been intended in 5:21f. with κρίας as an euphemistic replacement for the actual penalty. Κρίας would then have its concrete meaning of judicial "sentence": "Whoever kills shall be liable to the 'sentence,' that is, the penalty determined by the court." Such an explanation fits well enough with 5:21, 22a, but it runs into difficulties in light of 5:22bc.⁴ Since οὐδέστιον represents a judicial body, it could hardly stand euphemistically for the "penalty."⁵ Furthermore, in verse 22c where the "penalty" is explicit, the dative is missing!⁶ Thus one must take a second look at the usage of ἐν ὄχῳ with the dative.

In Classical Greek the occurrence of this prepositional phrase is not limited to the dative of penalty. It occurs in conjunction with laws, oaths, and, most significantly, in Xenophon, with reference to Socrates' trial.⁷ The question is raised as to how Socrates could have been liable to criminal proceedings. Such a usage would then explain why the dative is present

¹Liddell, Scott and Jones, ad loc.; Bauer, ad loc.; Buchsel, TWNT, III, 923.

²Moulton and Milligan, ad loc.

³Liddell, Scott and Jones, ad loc.; Plato, Laws, 869b "... δίκας τὰς ἐσχάτας ἐν ὄχῳ ..."

⁴Gf. Dalman, Jesus-Jeschua, p. 67.

⁵As a judicial body it could represent the judicial process which one had to face but not the judgment ("sentence").

⁶It might be claimed that such an argument is irrelevant in view of the disputed nature of 22bc. Nevertheless, regardless of one's opinion in reference to vs. 22bc, it is in the immediate context of vss. 21, 22a and uses them as its base. Thus one must, if possible, find an explanation which is in agreement with both elements.

⁷Xenophon, Memorabilia, 1:2:64, "πῶς οὖν ἀν' ἐν ὄχῳ εἴη τῇ ἡραφῇ."

for κρίσις and συνέδριον but is absent when the penalty is clearly set forth in vs. 22c. Both κρίσις and συνέδριον represent judicial proceedings. The third clause (vs. 22c) substitutes for this the "sentence" which is characteristic of the final divine tribunal.¹ κρίσις, therefore, has here the abstract meaning of judicial "process": "Whoever kills shall be liable to a 'court process'."

Having limited κρίσις to its more abstract meaning, is it now possible to make even more precise the nature of this "trial" or judicial process? Since the first occurrence of the term is within the antithesis prefaced by "You have heard that it was said...", it must refer to either the Old Testament Law and/or Scribal interpretation. In either case a human and not a divine judicial process was intended. The same holds true for 5:22a. The antithesis is set in the same legal format as the premise with the difference centering on the transgression (φονεύει ≠ ὀφθαλμομέσος). Hence there is no cause for one's seeing here in vs. 22a a pregnant usage of κρίσις referring to the final, divine judgment.² This is supported not only by the supplementary clause of vs. 22b but also by the present location of the parable in 5:25f.--both of which concern human judiciaries.³

If the above explanation of ἐνόχος with the dative is correct, then one may find here an indication of the background to this saying. For apart from the fact that κρίσις presents a dubious summary of the Old Testament Law concerning murder as such,⁴ rabbinic sources bring light on the judiciary practices of Jesus' day. In the Mishnaic tract Sanhedrin we have reference

¹Mt. 23:33. See Jeremias, TWNT, I, 655f.

²Weiser, op. cit., p. 118, sees a threefold antithesis: a) Lawgivers, b) communities receiving the Law, and c) the penalties. From this he then posits a difference in meaning for τῇ κρίσει. This is, however, to presuppose the conclusion, since the difference between the premise and antithesis in 5:21-22a centers on the transgression, not on the penalty. Cf. the second antithesis for the same pattern.

³On the one hand, if 5:22bc is authentic, it rules out any differentiation between 5:21 and 22a. On the other hand, if they are later expansions either by the Church or Matthew, they indicate that Jesus' statement was understood as parallel to 5:21.

⁴Cf. Ex. 21:12ff.; Lev. 24:17 and Num. 35:16ff. which are in the form of legal ordinances.

to a twofold judicial system: one level consisting of a number of local courts, the other being the "supreme court" known as the great Sanhedrin. Although the degree of reliability of this document for pre-70 A.D. is quite debatable,¹ it does appear to reflect the broad outlines of the earlier period. Such being the case, the practice of placing an accused killer on trial before a local court² to determine the penalty on the basis of the circumstances³ was most probably reflected in the phrase ἐνοχος ἔσται τῇ κρίσει. Thus the first Antithesis would have in mind not only the apodictic Old Testament commandment but also its legalistic understanding as implemented through the contemporary judicial practice of Jesus' day.⁴ It would then be most accurately translated: "...shall be liable to trial (by the local court)."

2. The History of Tradition of 5:22

Having lexically examined the crucial words in 5:21f., we can now focus attention on the problem of the textual tradition behind 5:22. The majority of New Testament scholars are unified on the secondary nature of some elements, at least, in the three clauses. Yet they remain quite diversified in their respective explanations. Some taking the lexical similarity between

¹The reliability of this tract varies according to various scholars (example cf. S.-B.'s usage in I, 254-275 with Kennard's in ZNW, 53(1962), p. 35). There can be little doubt, though, that this reflects the twofold division present in Jesus' day. Such is supported not only by Mk. 13:9 // Mt. 10:17 but also by Josephus, Ant. 14:169-176. Interestingly enough the Sanhedrin lists crimes for capital punishment to the realm of the "lower courts" (in agreement with 5:21b!)--S.-B., I, 257; Dalman, Jesus-Jeschua, pp. 67f.; Blinzler, ZNW, 52 (1961), p. 54.

²As seen on p. 275 n. 4 κρίσις itself cannot lexically mean "local court," but one can go so far as to say that it refers to the judicial activity representative of the "local courts."

³S.-B., I, 264-270 for examples.

⁴This does not mean that Jesus was quoting Scribal tradition and thus taking issue with it primarily. We have no reason to consider the courts to be an outgrowth of Scribal tradition. They were rather the solution to a practical necessity of implementing the OT Law--itself being a mixture of apodictic and legalistic statements (cf. Ex. 20:13 with Ex. 21:12ff.).

ῥακά and μωρέ as their starting point have sought to explain the one clause in terms of the other. Others finding the disparity between 5:22a and 5:22bc too great have relegated vs. 22bc to a secondary gloss.

Within the former group there are two lines of argument: one sees an expanding, the other a condensing of the saying. On the one hand, Köhler contended that the similarity between ῥακά and μωρέ coupled with the witness of some church fathers was sufficient grounds to posit an early interpolation behind 5:22(b)c.¹ On the other hand, McNeile and Lohmeyer see here a condensing of two sayings. McNeile moving out, as Köhler, from the similarity between vs. 22b and 22c explains the present text to be a combination of two antitheses.² Lohmeyer, however, in view of a) a unique usage of κρίσις in vs. 21 ("local court"), b) difference in formulation between vs. 22a and 22bc (πᾶς ὁ + participle ὅς δ' ἂν + subjunctive) and c) the absence of τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ in vs. 22c suggests that the premise of 5:21 was countered originally by two sayings which have been combined here (5:22a + 22(a)bc).³

In light of the lexical studies above both approaches lose some of their force. The usage of ῥακά and μωρέ/κ' ὥς is neither such to imply the one as the translation of the other (Köhler)⁴ nor such as to suggest that one could have been used to antithetically

¹Köhler, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-94; cf. Montefiore, *Synoptic Gospels*, I, 59 and Kilpatrick, *Origins*, p. 18. Köhler explained that μωρέ, as the Greek translation for ῥακά, appeared along the line in the text: ὅς δ' ἂν εἴπῃ τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ ῥακά, ἐνόχος ἔσται εἰς τὴν γέενναν → ὅς δ' ἂν εἴπῃ τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ ῥακά - ὅς δ' ἂν εἴπῃ μωρέ - ἐνόχος εἰς τὴν γέενναν. Since, however, its presence caused the ῥακά clause to hang in the air, the ῥακά phrase was later completed by the words-- ἐνόχος ἔσται τῷ συνδρόμῳ. This corresponds with the presence of only one of the two clauses in Irenaeus, Cyprian, Tertullian and the Syrian *Didascalia*.

²McNeile following Peters, *JBL* (1892), 131f., takes 5:21b and 5:22b to be Scribal interpretation which Jesus countered with his own antithesis: 22a (to 21b) and 22c (to 22b).

³Lohmeyer, *Matthäus*, pp. 118f.: the first=5:22a with κρίσις meaning the "sentence;" the second beginning-- ὅς δ' ἂν ἀρνηθῇ τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ, ἐνόχος ἔσται τοῦ κριτηρίου + vs. 22bc. These were then combined because of similarity. Thus the difference in form is explained.

⁴*v. supra* p. 271 n. 3.

counter the other (McNeile).¹ By defining κρις as the "judicial process representative of a local court," the problem which confronted Lohmeyer in 5:22a is removed. This would then be a less frequent meaning of κρις but not the lexically unique translation of "local court."²

Furthermore, the other arguments of each position are not above question. Apart from Köhler's questionable methodology of taking the witness of a few church fathers as constitutive for the New Testament texts,³ the example in vs. 22b runs contrary to the New Testament pattern of introducing a translation into the text.⁴ McNeile's working hypothesis that Jesus was citing Scribal interpretation of the Law not only fails to come up with any Scribal parallels but, as seen above and as will be seen in light of all the Antitheses, the premises do not reflect Scribal tradition as much as Old Testament Law and contemporary Jewish practice.⁵ The problem raised by Lohmeyer in reference to the difference in syntactical construction between 5:22a and 5:22bc is not so easily explained, since the only Synoptic parallel is 5:32. Nevertheless, to posit a combination of two different sayings just sets the problem back one step. The conflict in form still remains. When one considers the participial construction of the

¹ Both were quite similar, if not identical in meaning. v. supra p. 273.

² v. supra p. 275

³ As noted above (pp.274f), the term Sanhedrin had a special judicial sense in the NT tradition. Furthermore, it was limited mainly to the older levels of tradition (Mk. and Q). Luke's omission of it in his Gospel (with the meaning of "local courts") plus the tendency to replace it with συναγωγη in the Syrian texts leads one to suggest that it was dying out as a judicial term. Ignatius, the only early church father to use it, used it in the Greek sense of "council." Thus to suggest, as Köhler does, that this was a later addition to smooth out the text seems most improbable.

⁴ Even if originally it appeared in the margin of a text, it would be most unlikely to simply repeat: "ὁ δὲ λέγει." A simple introduction along the lines of ὁ ἐρεῖ (Mk. 3:17; 7:11; 11:34; Heb. 7:2) or ὁ ἐρεῖ μεθερμηνεύμενον (Mt. 1:23; Mk. 5:41; 15:22, 34; Jn. 1:39, 42; Acts 4:36; 13:8)--would have been much more logical. Cf. Percy, Botschaft, p. 129.

⁵ See pp. 138, 146, 183 and 198.

antitheses in 5:22a, 5:32a, we may have here an indication of a deliberate format in the form of a participial lead sentence in the antitheses. This then could be followed up by the familiar legal form of the indefinite relative construction (cf. also the form in 5:21b).

The second grouping includes those scholars who move out from the disparity between 5:22a and 5:22bc. Again this can be subdivided into two groups. The first group consists of those who are concerned with the thrust of the Antithesis. By interpreting the Antithesis to be setting deed (murder) and intent (anger) over against each other, the following statements pertaining to a verbal expression of this anger revert to the category of "deed." Thus clauses 22b and 22c have been rejected as later additions.¹ The second group moves more from a religionsgeschichtliche basis. Several scholars see Christian halacoth constructed along the analogy of rabbinic casuistry.² Of recent, Weiser and Wrege have explained these to be the product of a Christian "Übergaberitus" along the pattern found in Qumran.³

One's reply to the first group depends upon the attitude one takes in reference to the intent of the first Antithesis. As will be discussed below, more appears to be at stake than an attempt to set off thought and action against each other. As to a rabbinic casuistry underlying vs. 22bc, one can legitimately question if rabbinic casuistry was so "impractical" to suggest judicial action for "harmless"⁴ name-calling. In fact, it can well be questioned whether the two clauses ever were intended originally to be legal pronouncements.⁵ Furthermore, the lack of any formal parallel between the primitive church and Qumran in terms of an "Übergaberitus" (other than the fact that both communities exercised discipline), makes such a

¹ Above all by Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 43; Schmid, Matthäus, p. 98 and Manson, Sayings, pp. 155f.

² Hasler, "Herzstück," TZ, 15(1959), p. 92; Bultmann, Tradition, p. 142, cf. n.1; Braun, op. cit., II, 24f., n. 9.

³ Weiser, op. cit., p. 117 and Wrege, op. cit., p. 67f. See discussion above pp. 273ff.

⁴ Cf. S.-B., I, 278ff. These terms were common enough and did not have the same consequences as the others. S.-B., I, 281-283. See especially Percy, Botschaft, p. 132.

⁵ Percy, Botschaft, pp. 129f. That it came to be used as such is seen in the addition of _____ to vs. 22a and is evident from the paraphrase found in the Syrian Didascalia.

suggestion for the 5:22bc most improbable.¹

Thus, in summary, there is no valid reason why 5:22 could not have been an authentic whole rather than a composite unit brought together by either the primitive church or Matthew. The double saying of vs. 22bc as a separate logion would be a most unusual saying having little meaning apart from the present antithetical context. Yet it could hardly be considered to be a commentary composed merely for vs. 22a since it goes far beyond the implications of this clause. Something must have given rise to the placing of two common invectives in such a radical statement together with an "authentic" antithesis. The only sufficient grounds to explain this is to accept it as an "authentic" unit.² This is supported by the interrelationship of the three elements in vs. 22 to each other and their combined thrust as an antithesis to vs. 21.

¹v. supra p. 275. Even should one go so far as to grant the possibility that I Cor. 5:3f., as interpreted by Käsemann, might be an actual example of "Heiligen Rechts" in the early Church, it certainly lacks the judicial character found here in 5:22. Käsemann himself remarks, "Aber, wie dieses Zusammentreten (συναγὴς) in der christlichen Gottesdienstfeier geschieht, so kann man die Gemeinde nur sehr eingeschränkt Trägerin des Prozesses nennen," Aufsätze, II, 73.

²Percy, Botschaft, pp. 130f.

EXCURSUS II

Matthew 5:34b-36

The suggestion that verses 34b-36 might be a later insertion into the original antithesis¹ has several points in its favor. First of all, the construction of *μήτε...μήτε* following the strong negative (*μή...ὅλως*) to expand or illustrate the general principle rather than to specify it is without any parallel in either the New Testament or the LXX.² Secondly, should these be an insertion, it would resolve a minor stylistic problem, since the present expanded form of the antithesis (vss. 34-37) contrasts noticeably with the succinct character of the others. By removing vss. 34b-36, a double saying consisting of vss. 34a, 37 would then be left as the more authentic element: "*μή θυμόσθαι ὅλως, ἔγρω δὲ ὁ λόγος ὑμῶν ναὶ ναί, οὐ οὐ...*" Thus we would have then an antithesis which countered the premise negatively by an absolute prohibition of its underlying principle (the practice of swearing) and positively by a radical demand which would make its practice superfluous. Thirdly, the change in number from the second person plural in 34a and 37a to the second person singular in vs. 36 appears to indicate most directly a secondary element. However, since vs. 36 differs in form and content from vss. 34b, 35, this might merely indicate the secondary character of vs. 36 rather than all three verses.

The strongest argument for the authenticity of vss. 34bff. is the related passage in James 5:12. Although most New Testament scholars today reject the possibility of any direct literary dependence on either Matthew or James' behalf,³ they are agreed for the most part that both reflect a Jewish-Christian tradition in

¹v. supra p. 152 n. 2.

²Lohmeyer, *Matthäus*, p. 132, n. 3. S.-B., I, 328 has pointed out that the context excludes the common exegetical rabbinic method of explicating a general rule by citing its specific parts (cf. James 5:12; I Tim. 1:7) with *μήτε* ("neither/nor"), but rather the conjunctions here introduce important elaborations to the general prohibition in the sense of *μήδε*.

³Above all, M. Dibelius, *Der Brief Jakobus* (10¹⁹⁵⁹), p. 297f. An exception to this is Shepherd's thesis in "The Epistle of James and the Gospel of Matthew," *JBL*, 75 (1956), pp. 40-51. However, his thesis could just as well be held in view of an initially common traditional milieu and does not necessitate literary dependence.

their sources.¹ If such be the case, we have then two literary independent versions stemming quite possibly from the same traditional milieu.² Both prohibit swearing, and both explicitly exclude the Jewish practice of swearing by various terms. While this does not substantiate the authenticity of vss. 34b-36, it does place them most probably as pre-Matthean and raises the question of their Sitz im Leben.

Integral to the problem of the Sitz im Leben is above all the meaning of these verses. Within Scribal casuistry two developments had arisen with reference to the practice of swearing. First of all, in order to avoid a direct usage of the divine name, genuine substitutes were introduced into the various formulas.³ From this practice, however, a second developed; namely, the need to determine which substitutes were and which were not binding as oaths.⁴ Most scholars consider the formulas in verses 34b-36 to represent the Scribal practice of using genuine substitute oaths.⁵ However, a closer examination of the Jewish parallels indicates that while certain of the formulas occur as solemn

¹Dibelius, Jakobus, pp. 42, 55f., (who acknowledges a Jewish flavor in much of the material, but does not speak to a Jewish-Christian tradition as such); G. Kittel, ZNW, 48(1942), pp. 78-80; Goppelt, Christentum und Judentum, pp. 189f.; E. Lohse, ZNW, 48(1957), pp. 6, 19f.; Davies, Setting, p. 404; Fein, Behm, Kümmel, Einleitung (1964), pp. 301; Wickenhauser, New Testament Introduction, (Eng. trans., 1958), p. 477; J. Ropes, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle of James, (1916), pp. 20-23.

²Although it is not possible to identify with certainty Matthew's special source, it does appear to reflect a strong Jewish-Christian background: cf. Wickenhauser, Introduction, p. 188f.; Fein, Behm, Kümmel, Einleitung, pp. 65f.; Streeter, op. cit., pp. 255ff.; Bultmann, Tradition, pp. 382f.

³See S.-B., I, 330-332 for parallels.

⁴Shebuoth, 4:13; Nedarim, I, 3f.; Sanhedrin, 3,2 are examples reflecting the practice which is so sharply criticized in Mt. 23:16-19 as being characteristic of the Scribes. Cf. in addition, Haenchen, ZThK 48(1959), p. 48, n. 1.

⁵Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 183 (although he notes the easy transition from such to a casuistical misuse of same); Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 133; Manson, Sayings, p. 158; Schneider, TWNT, V, 180; cf. Schniewind, Matthäus, p. 65; Schmid, Matthäus, p. 106; Percy, Botschaft, p. 148 (cf. 147f); Braun, op. cit., II, 80, n. 6; 81; Davies, Setting, pp. 244f.

affirmations,¹ all are discussed with reference to their binding character as oaths.² Since therefore, one could

¹Since "heaven" often replaces the divine name as a genuine substitute (e.g. in Matthew "Kingdom of Heaven" for "Kingdom of God"), many have extended this consideration through these formulas. However, as seen both in 5:34b and 23:22 in oath formulas "heaven" is not an automatic synonym for "God." This is further supported by our rabbinic sources.

"By Heaven"--Qoheleth rabba zu Kap I, 8 (Fiebig, p. 68, number 177); b. Nazir 66b (Fiebig, p. 69, num. 178); b. Ta'anith 18a (Fiebig, p. 69, num. 179); Exodus rabba par. 42, zu Ex. 32:2f. (Fiebig, p. 70, num. 180).

"By earth" only appears together with "heaven"--cf. Midr. KL 4,2 (74b) and S. Lv 19,17 (352a) (both quoted by S.-B. I, p. 333).

The formula "heaven" appears alone in both the rabbinical references cited above as well as in the New Testament (cf. Mt. 23:22). It also appears combined with "earth" in Judaism, as just noted. The formula "earth" appears alone in neither Judaism nor the New Testament. Thus it is quite probable that they appear separated here in 5:34b in view of the Old Testament quotation to which they are joined, rather than because they represent two separate "oaths" (cf. Isa. 66:1 which refers to both heaven and earth). What was intended initially as the oath "by heaven and earth," was thus divided into what appears to have been two different oaths (cf. James 5:12) in order to fit the Biblical evidence against it.

"By Jerusalem" does not occur in this context (see below p.

"By your head" has perhaps a parallel in "by the life of your head"--Sanhedrin, III, 2; b. B'rathoth 3a (Fiebig, p. 71, num. 185).

²"Heaven and Earth" as a binding oath is explicitly rejected in Sh'buoth 4,13 (cf. S.-B., I, 333, "Der Schwur bei Himmel und Erde ist hiernach, weil zweideutig, von der Mishna abgelehnt worden!") "Jerusalem"--simply to say, "Jerusalem," is not binding--Nedarim 1,3 cf. Tos. Nedarim, I, 2,3 (Fiebig, p. 65, num. 170) where the same occurs. One must preface the term with a preposition showing its relationship to the intended oath. Interestingly enough both the "altar" and the "Temple" occur in this context and are valid under the same conditions (cf. Mt. 23:16-19!)! "By your head"--Sanhedrin III, 2 discusses the possibility of this oath. While the sages decided in its favor, Rabbi Meir (ca. 150) held it as not binding. In each of these cases, it was the oath used in a "promissory" manner which came into question.

"swear" by these and not actually be swearing after all according to Scribal casuistry, these formulas could hardly be genuine substitutes for the divine name. Furthermore, their presence in 5:34bff. in a saying pertaining specifically to oaths and their treatment¹ indicates that they were introduced not simply as affirmations² but rather with the intended connotation of a spurious oath.

The absolute prohibition of 5:34a, however, excluded even such asseverations. Whereas one might rationalize that such were not in essence oaths³ and thus attempt to circumvent the prohibition, by citing these examples and bringing to light their direct reference to God⁴ any question as to their actual status is removed. They too were to be relegated to the category of genuine oaths, and, as such, they were subject to the prohibition of vs. 34a. Thus, the meaning and intent of verses 34b-36 was neither to counter simply the Scribal practice of using substitute formulas for the divine name⁵ nor was it aimed merely at the common assertive phrases of the day,⁶ but rather these

¹ See p. 287 n. 1.

² Cf. especially Percy who contends for this. S.-B., I, pp. 334f. gives quite a list of such everyday forms.

³ v. supra, p. 285 n. 1., p. 284 n. 5.

⁴ A principle used by the Scribes themselves as a test for genuine or spurious oaths (Shebuoth 4,13 and Shebuoth 35^a, as quoted in S.-B., I, 332f.). Philo held a similar principle as seen in Spec. Laws, II, ii (Loeb). Schlatter, Matthäus, p. 183; Haenchen, ZThK 48(1951), p. 48, n. 1.

⁵ v. supra, p. 285 n. 1.

⁶ Percy has considered these verses to be an attempt to counter the common terms of strong affirmation (Beteuerungsformeln), Botschaft, p. 147. Yet, as seen both by 5:34ff. and James 5:12, these were handled as oaths and on this basis were condemned. It is quite possible, however, that Scribal casuistry distinguished between an oath and simply a solemn affirmation. The latter occurs quite frequently in our rabbinic sources (cf. above n. 2), while the rabbinic sources warned sharply against unnecessary oaths (S.-B., I, 321-326). This would seem most inconsistent had there not been a differentiation between the two. It could well have been this very differentiation which vss. 34b-36 sought to eliminate by handling the affirmations as though they were actually oaths in character.

clauses elaborate the implications of 5:34a and in doing so block any casuistic attempt to side-step its thrust. In other words, rather than detracting from the total impact of the absolute prohibition in vs. 34a by introducing a secondary element concerning scribal practice to the context,² these verses 34b-36 actually serve to sharpen the focus of the demand by eliminating any possible casuistical distractions.³

Where could such clauses have had their Sitz im Leben? Since, as seen above, these are pre-Matthean, we are left with the possibility either that these belonged as authentic elements to the saying, or that these were the product of the paranetic needs of the

¹Fiebig, Bergpredigt, p. 66 and Dibelius, Jakobus, p. 298, recognize the force of vss. 34b-36 to be aimed at casuistic attempts to get around the prohibition. Nevertheless, Dibelius considers this to be an addition to the main prohibition: "Die Beispiele...bringen etwas Neues: auf Grund der echt jüdischen, hier aber nicht ausgesprochenen Voraussetzung, daß der Eid bei Gott jedenfalls zu vermeiden sei, wird die Geltung dieser Voraussetzung (nicht: das Hauptverbotes) auch für die Ersatzzeide nachgewiesen," (pp. 297f., n. 3).

The purpose, however, for demonstrating the direct relationship between these formulas and God himself is not so that they would be ipso facto repudiated on the basis of the Jewish practice of avoiding a usage of the divine name. In spite of their close relationship to God, they would still fall short of being the divine name by being merely substitutes for it. Such substitutes were used by the Jews and were not avoided. The purpose, rather, for bringing these formulas in with the divine personage--as substitutes for the divine name--was to give them an inescapable status as oaths! In this way they would then be subject to the main prohibitions--not as something new but as an elaboration of it.

²Cf. Percy, Botschaft, p. 148; Braun, op. cit., II, p. 80, n. 6; Strecker, op. cit., p. 133; Schmid, Matthäus, p. 106.

³By taking the passage in this manner, we not only maintain the accent on the main clause--μη ὀμόναι ὅλως, but we can also explain the function of μητε...μητε to denote an elaboration of the main thought rather than simply its illustration or exposition. Functioning more like μηδε (S.-B., I, 328f. cf. Blass-Debrunner, p. 445, 1) it would then read, "Do not swear at all, not even by heaven..., not by earth...."

primitive church, or that these stem from the primitive Church in her struggle against Judaism. We can with certainty assign the present form of James 5:12 to the paranetic ministry of the early Church. This is evident not only in view of the Book of James as a whole, but also by the form of the saying: 5:12a "ἀδελφοί μου"; 5:12ab cf. Mt. 5:34f., 37a; and 5:12c, "ὡς ἡ ἐκκλησία κηρύσσει πάντες." Here we have the familiar paranetic form of the Haustafeln--address, exhortation, and ground for such concern.¹

1. Mt. 5:34b, 35

Mt. 5:34b-36 has also been relegated by some to the paranetic needs of the early Church.² However, such a situation appears quite untenable. Not only is the passage (vss. 34-37) more polemic than paranetic in form and content,³ it would also be most difficult to imagine this to be a counter for the primitive Church's attempt through casuistry to avoid the radical nature of Jesus' prohibition. Furthermore, and most important, vss. 34b, 35 have a very close parallel in 23:20-22,⁴ whose context explicitly repudiates just such casuistry.

In Mt. 23:16-22 we find two distinct traditional

¹D. Schroeder, "Die Haustafeln des N.T." (Diss., 1959), pp. 92f.

²Above all, Dibelius, Jakobus, p. 298.

³In contrast to James whose form and context is definitely paranetic, Mt. 5:34-37 lacks the paranetic format and more important, is set in an antithetical context. Furthermore, rather than simply authoritative Jesus' sayings, vss. 34bf. are based on Old Testament quotations to give them weight, whereas this element is missing in James.

⁴Matthew 23:20-22 parallels Mt. 5:34bf. in at least two ways. First of all, 23:16-22 is not concerned merely with the practice of using substitutes for the divine name, but rather, as in 5:34ff. it involves the basic casuistic question of the binding character of certain oaths, one of which is common to 5:34bff. (23:22// 5:34b). Although we have little, if any evidence from rabbinical sources substantiating the spurious nature of "altar" and "Temple" (cf. p. 285 n.2, however), these are based on the reliable material of 23:16-19 (see p. 289 n.1). Secondly, both passages share a common goal; namely, to demonstrate that such formulas are indisputably related to God and thus genuine oaths (cf. Lohmeyer, Matthäus, on vs. 22 p. 345 and Manson, Sayings, pp. 158f., refers to it as a textual mistake--"by him' over the altar").

units (vss. 16-19; 20-22).¹ Without doubt the first section (vss. 16-19) reflects the polemical discussion between Jesus and his religious opponents over the binding character of certain "oaths."² This is then taken up and elaborated by three parallel constructed statements which appear to be deliberately arranged in an ascending scale (vss. 20-22).³ Beginning with the "altar" (vs. 20) which picks up vss. 18f., and then "Temple" (vs. 21) which refers back to vss. 16f., the trilogy peaks with "heaven,"⁴ which is new to the

¹Bultmann, Tradition, pp. 142, 158. While a two-fold distinction cannot be absolutely certain, it does seem the more probable in view of the following:

a) There is a definite stylistic difference. 1) Vss. 16-19 are a self-contained polemical unit. The matter, for all practical purposes, is settled by a pointed question. (A method seemingly common to Jesus in a polemical situation: various examples from Streitgespräche--Mk. 3:4 par; Lk. 14:5; Lk. 13:15f.; Mk. 3:23, Mt. 12:26 // Lk. 11:18; Mk. 2:9 par; Mk. 2:26 par; Mk. 11:30 par). 2) Vss. 20-22, however, take up the matter again. This time a "new" oath is introduced to the group and all are put into the third person rather than the second. This time the oaths are declared to be genuine in view of their relationship to the divine personage.

b) Vss. 20-22 appear to be constructed along parallel lines and arranged according to a definite scheme--moving from the lesser to the greater.

c) Since both 5:34ff. and 23:20-22 are almost identical in goal and method (see p. 288 n.4) and since it is all but certain that Jesus did not aim specifically against Scribal casuistry in the antithetical sections of the Antitheses (at least we have no parallel in either vss. 22, 28, 39 and 43!), it seems very probable that these two material parallels stem from the same source--i.e. a primitive Church elaboration of an authentic saying with reference to oaths.

²Bultmann, Tradition, pp. 142, 158; Braun, op. cit., II, p. 81, n. 6; Strecker, op. cit., p. 133, n. 4; Haenchen, ZThK (1951), pp. 47f.

³McNeile, Matthew, p. 334--argument from lesser to greater.

⁴Haenchen, ZThK (1951), pp. 47f. seems to stress unduly the sevenfold character of the passage. This would tend to consider the unit together as a whole, whereas it is actually divided stylistically into two sections.

a) Vs. 16f.: scribal casuistry ("Temple"--"gold") countered by Jesus' question.

context. Since these are elaborations of vss. 16-19, vss. 20-22 must have always belonged as a traditional unit together with vss. 16-19. This aids in determining the circumstances behind their development. Even though the first section was polemic in nature, it would most certainly have been sufficient grounds to discourage any such practice in the primitive Church. Therefore, vss. 20-22 could hardly have been the product of the Christian community's paranetic needs.¹ Rather, these expansions could well represent instruction developed from an authentic logion pertaining to oaths (vss. 16-19) by the primitive Church in her dialogue with her Jewish counterparts. Thus we would then have a traditional element stemming from Jesus' dispute with Scribal casuistry and a second element growing out of the former in terms of the primitive Church's further confrontation with Scribal casuistry (vss. 20-22).²

The same appears to hold true for 5:34b, 35. Apart from the common subject matter and methodology between 5:34b, 35 and 23:20-22,³ we also seem to have a similar traditional phenomenon. In verse 34a we find an authentic saying applying to oaths and vss. 34b, 35 supply the elaboration excluding any casuistical evasions.⁴ Therefore, it seems legitimate to conclude that 5:34b, 35 as 23:20-22, has its Sitz im Leben in the primitive Church's situation within Judaism. This would not only concur with the stylistic and syntactical considerations above, but it would also in view of its early date in the primitive Church community explain its

Vs. 18f.: scribal casuistry ("altar"--"gift") countered by Jesus' question.

b) Expansion of this "traditional element" plus the addition of one new element (vs. 22) in the form of a trilogy. Verse 22 does not seem to have any particular significance as a seventh member, but it does fit in well as a capstone to an ascending trilogy.

¹contra Haenchen, ZThK (1951), pp. 47f.

²Above all C. F. D. Moule, Birth of the New Testament (1966), pp. 73f. has a good discussion of the "apologetic" character of Matthew in terms of the early struggles. Cf. Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 121f.

³v. supra, p. 288 n. 4.

⁴These verses make this elaboration by specifically citing the Old Testament--a trait not foreign to the primitive Church!

presence in James' Jewish-Christian tradition.¹

2. Mt. 5:36

One other problem still remains--the differences between vss. 34b, 35 and vs. 36. Grammatically, in contrast to the entire complex (5:33-37) vs. 36 introduces the singular form of the second person ("...μήτε... ὁρώς"), and in contrast to vss. 34b, 35, it is an independent clause.² Contentwise, there are two ways in which it contrasts to vss. 34b, 35: a) there is no direct reference to the Old Testament as its basis, and b) it is not a direct³ reference to God but rather to the limitations of man. Therefore, it is highly improbable that it belonged together with this traditional unit of vs. 34b, 35. Furthermore, the obvious conflict in number plus the stylistic differences also make the possibility of its being a Matthean construction unlikely.⁴ Nevertheless, the parallels to such an oath in rabbinic sources⁵ would suggest the same Sitz⁶ im Leben as vss. 34b, 35 within the primitive Church.

¹ That James' tradition reflects a later stage is not only seen in the paranetic form, but also in that the stylistic and syntactical problems have been resolved to form a smooth logion.

² While μήτε connects vs. 34b, 37 to the verb form μή ἐνώσαι, μήτε simply connects vs. 36 to the preceding series since it was its own verb.

³ Naturally, this is an indirect reference to God, since it is God alone who cares for man. A similar reference to man's incapacibilities apart from God is seen in Mt. 6:27 // Lk. 12:25. In addition, God's concern for his own is exemplified in the fact that every hair of one's head is numbered (Mt. 10:30 // Lk. 12:7). Hence, this "oath" must take such divine concern into consideration.

⁴ As we noted in the introduction (p. 119), when Matthew was "editorializing" in the sense of creating material (e.g. vs. 31, 39, and 42), he was careful to use the pattern before him. But when he was functioning more as a "redactor," he was not so concerned about the syntactical compatibility of his texts (cf. the frequent change in number within the various elements of the Antitheses in n. 1 on p. 292).

⁵ v. supra, p. 285 n. 1.

⁶ The difference in form and content could be a product of its being a previous proverbial saying. The others of vss. 34bf. were simply dealing with the "oath" directly.

Thus whereas vss. 34b, 35 appear to have merged with 34a early in the primitive church to form a traditional unit, verse 36 appears to have been an independent saying incorporated by Matthew into this complex.¹

3. Mt. 5:33b and Summary

When one reconsiders the above material in terms of the twofold division--"assertive" and "promissory" oaths,² most of the "oaths" in question had to do with the latter type.³ Some were ceremonial in nature--cf. Mt. 23:16-20, "altar," "Temple," Mt. 5:35, "Jerusalem."⁴ Others were more social in character; that is, they pertained to oaths between individuals--cf. Mt. 22:20, "heaven;" Mt. 5:34b "heaven and earth" and 5:36 "one's head."⁵ In daily affairs as well as in worship the early Christian mission was confronted by Scribal casuistry, and their tradition developed in order to counter it. If such was the case in 5:34b-36 and 23:20-22 and since the majority of these examples are "promissory" in character, it is also quite likely that 5:33b--referring specifically to "promissory" oaths--arose in the primitive Church. This would help explain the tension⁶ between the premise of 5:33 which deals with both "assertive" and "promissory" oaths and the more authentic element of the antithesis (vss. 34a, 37a),⁷ which seems to refer more specifically to "assertive oaths." A later addition would also explain the less frequent

¹Mt. 5:21-48 has several examples of such insertions from a second source by Matthew--even when it does not always fit smoothly. Cf. confusion of numbers, for example in 5:23-26; 5:29f. (cf. vs. 28); 5:39.

²v. supra, p. 150. This distinction may have developed later, but it helps in our analysis of the present material.

³Only "heaven" (23:22) and "heaven and earth" (5:34b) appear to have been primarily "assertive" in the Jewish parallels. However, even these may have, like "head" in 5:36 (cf. Sanhedrin, III, 2 with b. Be'athoth 3a (Fiebig, p. 71), might have served both functions--particularly in view of the "promissory" character of 5:35f., and 23:20-21.

⁴These had to do with various ceremonial observances performed by the worshipper.

⁵These were more along the line of "promissory" oaths among other people over various matters.

⁶v. supra, pp. 148-152.

⁷Cf. above p. 164 for discussion of vs. 37b.

coordinate function of the particle "δε."¹ In other words, the primitive Church took an authentic saying pertaining to "assertive" oaths (vss. 33a, 34a, 37a) and supplemented it by combining the "promissory" elements in view of the exigencies in the daily experiences with the Jews. Such supplementation was not entirely creative since they were actually combining two facets of Jesus' teaching. Both Mt. 23:16-19 as well as Mk. 7:11 // Mt. 15:5 refer specifically to the "promissory" oaths and their misuse.

Finally by considering the complex of vss. 33-37 in this way, the questions of the antithesis' authenticity are resolved. We have then a definite antithetical element existing between premise and antithesis, and it fits stylistically with what we have found in the other two authentic examples (vss. 21f., 27f.): premise--"You shall not swear falsely;" antithesis--"Do not swear at all..., but let what you say be simply 'Yes' or 'No'" (RSV).

¹Formally, the addition of a positive element in the premise to counter the negative prohibition would also balance the negative-positive form of the antithesis.

EXCURSUS III

Mt. 5:18 // Lk. 16:17

The question of the Sitz im Leben for this saying can best be handled in terms of an analysis of the parallel passages. Although there is a verbal similarity and although the content may be essentially the same, there is a difference in tone and form between these passages. One is confronted with two possibilities: either one accepts this with the majority of scholarship as a Q saying¹ and then attempts to discern which passage represents the earlier form² or one approaches these as representing two different, separately transmitted forms of the same saying³--the Lucan as a single logion and the Matthean as part of a sayings complex.

Beginning with the first option one must examine the various facets of the two verses to see if there is any hint which might show which is the earlier form. Apart from the differences in construction two verbal changes are immediately apparent--the presence of ἰὺδ in Matthew and the presence of περὶ instead of a second occurrence of παρέχουσι in Luke. In the first instance it seems that we have a Matthean addition,

¹See p. 229 n. 2.

²With the exception of Harnack (Sprüche, pp. 42ff. and a few who follow his analysis, e.g. Butler, op. cit., pp. 43f.) the majority appear to favor Luke's statement as being the more authentic, whereas Matthew's is a reworking of this. Cf. Wellhausen, Matthaei, p. 18; Streeter, op. cit., p. 287; Manson, Sayings, p. 154; and Kilpatrick, Origins, pp. 17f.

³Cf. p. 229 n.1. Although few have been so definite in their evaluation of this saying, many reserve the right to assign it with Branscomb to Q under a question mark (op. cit., p. 214). Cf. the more recent works of G. Barth, op. cit., p. 65 and Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 167. Wrege, op. cit., p. 53, sees these as two independent traditional variants.

⁴This would appear justified from three sides: a) The clue of a Matthean addition (plus a noun) makes it immediately suspect. Whereas the yod and the decorative stroke appear in the Jewish discussions in a similar context, at no place do both occur together. While this does not rule out the possibility in 5:18, it does make it questionable. b) The iota represents the Greek translation for yod, the smallest letter in the Hebrew blockscript or in Aramaic (cf. S.-B., I, 247). It was frequently used in rabbinic discussions (Dalman, Jesus-Jeschua, pp. 56f. and S.-B., I, 247f.), and for this reason could be why Matthew added this from his

and in the second case a Lucan revision to avoid the repetition of *παρεχόμεναι*.¹

From one standpoint, an examination of verse structure sheds little light on the issue, since both constructions could be "authentic." Luke's form of the saying approximates two other passages which are Marcan.² To be sure there is no equivalent passage in Q, but neither is there another comparable one in Luke. Matthew has a construction which occurs three times in Mark, twice in Q and once in Mt (M).³ Luke has all three Marcan passages plus the two from Q. Consequently, the form itself was not offensive to him. Thus from the viewpoint of form either construction could represent the more original traditional element.

From another standpoint, however, a closer look could give a valuable indication as to which version might have the logical priority. In contrast to the six other similar usages, Mt. 5:18 has a different order: a) introductory formula, c) *ἔως* + subjunctive as temporal clause, then b) the *ἔως* + subjunctive of

acquaintance with the discussions. c) The iota is the smallest Greek letter as well and it would seem strange that Luke should drop this.

¹As Harnack has suggested, *Sprüche*, p. 43. Ljungman has a lengthy discussion of *πᾶν* in similar contexts in the LXX which might have served as a precedent for Luke, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-45.

²Lk. 5:23 // Mk. 2:9 // Mt. 9:5 and particularly 18:25 // Mk. 10:25 // Mt. 19:24.

³Matthew has these five plus two others (see p. 232 n.1). Some might see a tendency in Matthew to construct such a form on the analogy of the others. This view would be greatly enhanced, if one could show that 10:23 was a Matthean product. T. W. Manson leaves the option between M and editorial reworking open: *Teaching*, pp. 221f. Both Kilpatrick and Bultmann are more decisive. The former attributes the saying to M (*Origins*, p. 27), whereas the latter labels it a "...christliches vat^{ic}inium aus der Missionszeit," (*Tradition*, p. 129). In contrast Schniewind argues for the authenticity of this saying on the basis of its content: "Ein solches Wort, das schon zur Zeit der Abfassung des Matthäusevangeliums unerfüllt erscheint, konnte wohl nur überliefert werden, wenn es von Jesus selbst stammte," *Matthäus*, p. 131. At least, one would have to say that a Matthean creation of this would be most unlikely! On the contrary, since this is an established form for a traditional saying and since the content of 10:23 must be early, it would appear to be a part of Mt (M).

emphatic negation. The reason for this inversion is clear--the presence of a second $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clause. How is one to evaluate this second $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clause? Of Matthew's two clauses a comparison with Lk. 16:17 indicates that only the second could possibly be expendable. Many have indeed concluded for various reasons¹ that this second $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clause was an editorial addition by Matthew.² If this be the case,³ would it not imply that Matthew found the saying in the usual order of a) b) c) in his tradition and that he transposed b) and c) in order to accommodate his second $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clause? That such was the case would seem far more reasonable than to assume that Matthew first restructured the traditional saying in the form a) b) c) and then rearranged it by purposefully adding a second $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ -clause and creating the difficult reading. Therefore, if one must make a choice between the forms in 5:18 and Lk. 16:17, 5:18 a) b) c) would seem to represent the earlier form.

If, then Matthew's tradition represented the more original form of the saying, how is Luke's version to be explained? As noted above the structure of the saying in Matthew's tradition would not have been offensive and hence not a reason for Luke's changing the form. However, the difference in tone between the two sayings may give us the clue. "Matthew's" form sets forth clearly both the continuing validity of the law and its terminus ad quem--the final consummation. Luke 16:17, on the other hand, states neither of these explicitly but rather indicates merely how difficult it is for the law to perish. In other words, by implication the continuity of the law's authority is set forth.⁴

¹Grammatically: Cf. Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 41; Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 108; A. M. Honeyman, "Matthew v. 18 and the Validity of the Law," NTS 1(1954-55), pp. 141f.; Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 168.

The parallel construction in Mk. 10:30: Wendling, op. cit., pp. 253ff.; and Blair, op. cit., p. 121.

The parallel intent of 18d with 17 $\pi\alpha\lambda\alpha\iota\omega$: Harnack, Sprüche, p. 43; Schweizer, op. cit., p. 402; V. E. Hasler, Gesetz und Evangelium in der Alten Kirche bis Originen (1953), pp. 9f.

²Harnack, Sprüche, pp. 42f.; Schweizer, op. cit., pp. 400f.; Hasler, Gesetz und Evangelium, pp. 9f.; Trilling, Das Wahre Israel, p. 168; Barth, op. cit., pp. 65, 147f.; Hummel, op. cit., p. 67.

³See pp. 242ff.

⁴The Lucan version does sound the more "Jewish" in that it could mean "the Law lasts forever," since the coming end of heaven and earth is not definitely stated (cf. Klostermann, Matthäus, p. 41 and Schmid, Matthäus, p. 87). Such an interpretation, however, could only be

Such a reworking on Luke's part could have been the product of his programmatic saying in 16:16, a saying stemming from Q which he reworked.¹ How could Luke have written, "The law and the prophets were until John...", and then have immediately added, "But I say unto you, not one tittle shall perish from the law, until heaven and earth pass away. Everyone who divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery..."? Such a construction would have unduly emphasized vs. 17 in contrast to vs. 16. Consequently, in order to bring the two elements together in a smoother combination Luke reworked the traditional element in the form of 18:25 par.² One may reasonably conclude, therefore, that Luke 16:17 just as 16:16, is the reworked version and not the more original form of the saying.

In turning to the second option one finds that form and context are the two major supports. Although similar in vocabulary and content, the form of the two sayings is so different that they must have been transmitted independent of one another. Furthermore, as seen above, both constructions represent in form an early traditional saying. It is impossible to designate either the one or the other as the earlier.

Secondly, one must consider the contextual factors. On the one hand, Luke apparently was using "single" logia. This is seen in 16:16 // Mt. 11:12f; 16:17; and 16:18 // Mt. 5:32. Matthew, on the other hand, was apparently using a sayings complex. This consisted of:

possible if one could demonstrate the originality of Luke's structure. If it were a Lucan product, then it certainly would not be a result of the "Jewish" element in the primitive Church!

¹On the one hand, in 16:16 Luke sets out the function of Scripture ("the law and the prophets") as the heilsgeschichtliche preparation for the coming of the Kingdom. In the appearance of the Kingdom this preparatory function of Scripture in redemptive history reaches its terminal point. On the other hand, Luke hastens to add that the law as a legal principle remains (16:17) the contrast is marked by the adversative use of sed -- "but"). The termination of the one does not mean the end of the other. This is then illustrated by a third saying pertaining to divorce (16:18).

²It is perhaps of value to note that while 18:25 par. is a Marcan saying it deals with a subject which is of particular interest for Luke--the entrance of the rich into the Kingdom. It may not be merely coincidental that Luke used this form just preceding the pericope of the "rich man and Lazarus"--a pericope which concludes with a reference to the failure of the rich man's brothers to listen to Moses and the prophets!

a) the traditional element behind 5:17¹ which fits in quite well with the thrust of 5:18 a) b) c); b) 5:18 a) b) c) which in form and content reflects an early tradition and which appears to be the cornerstone for verses 17 and 19, and c) 5:19 which is most likely to be explained in conjunction with 5:18.² Even if one were to reconcile the formal differences between the parallel passages, it is still difficult to understand why there is no trace of either Mt. 5:17 or 19 in Luke. Thus one would have two different forms of the same logion, the one peculiar to Matthew and the other peculiar to Luke.

Of the two options, neither is absolutely conclusive. However, it is quite possible that the Lucan tone reflects the attitude of the Church's struggles with the enduring character of the Law. Matthew's saying appears to be the more positive. Furthermore, since 5:19 follows 5:18 so crudely as a commentary from the primitive Church³ both elements could hardly be from the same source and could suggest the authenticity of the latter. This is supported further by the content of the first *ew*-clause which could hardly have come from a Jewish-Christian background. Therefore, it is quite possible that the second option comes closest to explaining the differences between Mt. 5:18 // Lk. 16:17. Of these the tradition behind Mt. 5:18 would be the older.

¹See p. 228.

²See p. 247 n. 2.

³Cf. pp. 250f.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Ich, Robert Allison Guelich, wurde am 20-6-1939 in Charleston, West Virginia/USA als ältestes von vier Kindern (ein Bruder und zwei Schwestern) geboren. Mein Vater ist evangelischer Geistlicher und wohnt jetzt in Norfolk, Virginia. Neun Jahre besuchte ich in Whitesville, West Virginia, die Schule. Danach zog unsere Familie nach Charleston, West Virginia. Dort absolvierte ich die Klassen 10-12. Am 7-9-64 begann ich meine Studien am Wheaton College, Wheaton Illinois. Ich studierte neutestamentliches Griechisch (Koiné), Philosophie, Theologie. Im Juni 1961 machte ich meine Abschlußprüfungen (Baccalaureus). Im September 1961 begann ich meine Studium an der Universität Illinois, und zwar Studium der altgriechischen Sprache, der lateinischen Sprache und der klassischen Philosophie. Im August 1962 bekam ich meinen "Master of Arts." Im Oktober 1962 begann ich mein Studium am Fuller Theological Seminary und studierte Theologie, lehrte gleichzeitig Griechisch. Im Juni 1964 erhielt ich einen akademischen Grad, Sacrae Theologiae Baccalaureus. Seit dem 15-6-63 bin ich mit Janet Fransen aus Denver, Colorado, verheiratet. Meine Frau ist Volksschullehrerin und hat diesen Beruf auch ausgeübt. In den USA wohnten wir in Pasadena, Californien. Seit November 1964 habe ich an der Universität Hamburg bei Herrn Professor D. L. Goppelt studiert. In diesem letzten Jahr war ich als wissenschaftlicher Assistent bei der Theologischen Fakultät angestellt.